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ABSTRACT.
In the last 10 years, the debate on the idea of ‘partnership’ at work has been re­
ignited, and has come to dominate British industrial relations.
But what I call ‘the 1990s version’ is still only an emerging phenomenon. Progress 
in the debate is exacerbated firstly by confusion over a precise and workable 
definition, secondly by predictable ideological hand-wringing and point-scoring, but 
most significantly, by a lack of clear and independently-assessed case studies of 
verifiable partnership organisations.
In this thesis I aim to set out a standard definition of partnership that does justice to 
the word (suggesting, as it does, an enduring and committed pact for mutual gain 
between more or less equal participants). I derive this primarily from the literature 
on another much-maligned concept: trust. My theoretically robust and practical 
definition provides for a coherent set of observable principles and practices which, I 
argue, ought to be present for an organisation to be accorded ‘partnership’ status. It 
is to be hoped that this may draw a line under the ongoing debate on defining 
partnership. Moreover, using trust to formulate the definition of partnership renders 
the latter concept attractive to every school of industrial relations thinking, from 
unitarists to Marxists, and offers several testable research hypotheses. It also 
contributes to restoring the much-neglected quality of trust to a position of central 
significance in employment relations theory.
To address the lack of genuine fieldwork evidence of partnership, I present the 
findings from four post-implementation qualitative case studies. Each comprises a 
narrative of the partnership and the development of relationships based on trust. I 
identify, from respondents’ own accounts of events, where partnership has 
influenced trust levels, and vice versa.
In my conclusions I address the advantages and disadvantages, pitfalls and benefits, 
of trust-based employment relationships using partnership. Finally, I speculate on 
what might be the fate of this, the latest British programme to manage “pluralism’s 
problems
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PARTNERSHIP IN BRITISH WORKPLACES:
FOUR CASE STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF TRUST.
“The advantage to mankind o f being able to trust one another penetrates into every 
crevice and cranny o f human life: the economical is perhaps the smallest part o f it,
yet even this is incalculable ”
(J. S. Mill, 1848: pl31).
“The defining characteristic o f successful partnerships is trust. ”
(Cave & Coats [TUC], 1998).
Introductory Remarks.
The essential nature of the employment relationship is a “structured antagonism” 
between the conflicting interests of the employer and the interests of the employee 
(Edwards, 1986: p5). The management team secures an employee’s capacity to work 
only, but seeks through productivity improvements and efficiencies etc, cost- 
effective performance that, in a capitalist enterprise, yields surplus profit. Thus, 
labour’s cost is minimised. Employees sell their capacity to work for a certain price, 
then are usually expected to press for as much reward for their performance as 
possible. In addition most employees seek to retain some degree of control over their 
own work situation. Thus, labour’s price is maximised. As it is impossible for an 
employer to detail precisely in an employment contract the quantity and quality of 
effort, creativity and commitment required of employees, the principal issue at work 
becomes one of selecting methods of control.
Control of work is determined through some form of bargaining. This bargaining 
can be minimal or extensive, formal or informal, collective or individualised. But 
between the employer and the employed a ‘bargain’ is struck on how the employer 
will convert employee capacity into employee performance. In more recent literature 
(e.g.: Rousseau, 1995, among many) this has been termed the “psychological 
contract”, comprising a set of agreed expectations revolving, essentially, around 
performance in exchange for reward.
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Since the early sociology of Durkheim, commentators have cast the range of 
possible control strategies, perhaps rather crudely, along a continuum between two 
extremes, with a broad zone for "negotiated order” lying between the two. 
Examples include:
Adversarial........................................................................Collaborative
(Durkheim, cited in Lincoln & Kalleberg, 1990).
Conflict............................................................................ Co-operation
(Edwards, op cit)
In choosing - or bargaining - an agreed form of workplace control, an organisation 
confronts external influences in the form of economic circumstances, market 
fluctuations, legal frameworks, public opinion and social mores. While what 
materialises does so in response to the material conditions of the times, the selection 
of an organisation’s control mechanisms is ultimately conceived and directed from 
within the organisation (Marsh, 1992: p243; see chapter four). It is shaped mostly by 
the prejudices, enthusiasms, analyses and abilities of the organisation’s key 
participants.
Among the myriad of options available for the control of work are authoritarianism, 
strict bureaucratic regulations, a ‘live-and-let-live’ pragmatism, collective 
bargaining, employee involvement initiatives, and the subject of this thesis: 
partnership.
What is partnership?
According to its contemporary advocates,1 partnership is an attempt to shift British 
employee relations from the antagonistic stances found in organisations on the left 
of the above continuums, toward the collaborative and -  in theory at least - mutually 
beneficial behaviours that one might expect to observe in organisations on the right. 
Partnership is an attempt to control the structured antagonism of the employment 
relationship, and perhaps to resolve its inherent conflict, through some form of 
“mutual gains ” arrangement (cf. Kochan and Osterman, 1994).
1 As we shall see. it is by no means a modem innovation in employee relations.
1
Several partnership models are discussed in detail in chapter one. However, the 
concept typically revolves around joint problem solving processes at both the 
workplace and strategic levels, with one of the core ‘problems’ held to be balancing 
the employer’s need for flexible work practices with employees’ concerns over 
employment security. Once this balance is agreed upon in partnership, a further 
feature is that the benefits from any improved performance levels are shared among 
the workforce as a whole (hence its mutual gains characteristic).
Partnership and trust.
My central conceptual argument follows Fox who volunteered his own continuum of 
control strategies:
Low trust..............................................................................................High trust
(Fox, 1974a)
The critical factor in determining an organisation’s mechanisms for control of work 
is the willingness to conceive the possibility of, and to work toward, mutual trust. 
The primary objective of partnership principles and practices -  of achieving the 
balance of interests and mutual gains - is said to be, as per Cave and Coats’ 
observation at the head of this chapter, the development and maintenance of trust 
between managers and their employees.
What is meant by mutual trust is discussed in greater detail in chapter two. However 
for these introductory remarks the reader may consider the following definition: 
“Trust is the belief in confident positive expectations regarding another s conduct in 
a context o f personal risk” (Lewicki, McAllister & Bies: 1998).
A set of partnership principles is agreed among the organisation’s main 
constituencies. Based on these a set of specific partnership practices and policies 
can then be introduced to regulate the employment relationship inside the 
organisation, and to control work activities, in support of these principles. These are 
designed to establish and maintain the mutual trust between management and the 
workforce (whether mediated through trade unions or not) that is at the core of 
partnership. Mutual trust in turn should facilitate more collaborative and
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constructive attitudes and behaviours, which in turn should allow for productivity 
improvements to be introduced; whether they are or not is up to the organisation. 
Partnership is thus an ‘enabling’ agreement only. Its primary objective is to elicit 
attitudinal and behavioural change in organisations that can in turn sanction and 
facilitate organisational change for improved performance. Shifts in attitudes and 
behaviours should be the main concern for research into partnership.
The hypothesis.
My research hypothesis follows from this conclusion. In this research I examine the 
alleged links between ‘partnership’ forms of managing the employment relationship, 
and reported levels of mutual trust.
My central hypothesis is that the process of establishing ‘genuine’ workplace 
partnership (as I define it in chapter one), will increase the extent to which the 
organisation’s employee relations are characterised by, and regulated according to, 
the principles of mutual trust (as I define it in chapter two).
A number of sub-hypotheses flow from this, namely that the greater the extension 
and exercise of partnership principles and practices in an organisation, the greater 
will be the reported levels of trust within the organisation. Relatedly, increased 
levels of trust under partnership should reduce, and may even eradicate, sentiments 
of ‘us and them’ (cf. Kelly & Kelly, 1990). Certainly, one might reasonably expect 
that in a fully-functioning partnership organisation there should be less reporting of 
conflicts and antagonisms. The more established the partnership, the more coherent 
and consistent should be respondents’ reports of mutual trust. Additionally, the 
strength and depth of the trust forged will be decisive in determining whether an 
organisation can withstand and endure challenges to the new form of workplace co­
operation.
Finally, the notion of partnership at work presently enjoys uncommonly broad 
support, but an historical perspective alerts us to the failure of such programmes in 
the past. (See chapter four.) There should then be a compelling reason or reasons 
why partnership is distinctively different from its ill-fated ancestors. One hypothesis 
might be that the present programme concentrates not on inflexible structures and
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agendas which may prove unable to adapt to changing circumstances, but instead 
emphasises the development and management of flexible attitudes and behaviours 
that are informed by an overarching philosophy of mutual effort for mutual gain, and 
it is this long-term focus on the attitudes and behaviours that may prove crucial for 
the coherence and longevity of ‘partnership’ arrangements, when so many of its 
antecedents have floundered.
Thesis summary.
The thesis is divided into seven chapters:
1. In the first chapter I assess the various definitions and conceptualisations of 
partnership, and argue for a robust and coherent standard definition of a 
“genuine” partnership organisation. This is identified by the presence of 
certain key principles and practices, and subsequent behaviours that 
correspond to the requirements for building and sustaining trust.
2. In the second chapter I examine the nature of trust at work. Using the 
literature on trust itself, as well as Walton and McKersie’s behavioural 
theory of labour negotiations (1965) and Axelrod on game theory (1984), I 
describe the processes by which trust is established, sustained and enhanced - 
or undermined and destroyed.
3. In the third chapter I link the two preceding chapters to present my theory on 
how partnership might be expected to generate mutual trust.
4. Before the case studies, I set the present phenomenon in context. Following a 
short review of the historical treatment of the similar programmes, I discuss 
the social, economic and legal frameworks in which the concept (re-) 
emerged in the UK in the 1990s. I try to account for its widespread appeal, if 
not its widespread adoption. I also trace the shifting focus of attention in 
industrial relations/ human resource management literature and the relatively 
recent interest in the notion of trust.
5. Chapter five outlines my chosen methodology -  qualitative case studies - and 
the challenges that I faced in producing this research.
6. The sixth chapter is divided into four for each of my case studies: 
‘WhiskyCo’ (a drinks manufacturer), ‘EngineParts’ (an auto components 
firm), ‘SchoolWear’ (a clothing design and distribution firm), and
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‘Northwest NHS Trust’ (an NHS Trust). For each I examine the content of 
the partnership agreement, and the subsequent arrangements for the 
management of the employment relationship, looking in particular at the 
behavioural and attitudinal processes implied, but above all, I seek evidence 
of them being enacted. I check these against the benchmarks for partnership 
identified in chapter one, and for trust-based relations identified in chapter 
two.
7. The final chapter draws the study toward conclusions, based primarily on the 
findings from the case studies. I comment on the viability of this method of 
managing workplace relations in the UK.
Significance of the research.
To date there is no agreed definition of partnership; this research sets out an 
argument for a standard definition based on the foundations of the programme’s 
primary objective: trust. I hope that the focus on trust will go some way toward 
restoring this essential, and much-neglected, quality of the employment relationship 
to the forefront of academic research.
This research will take its place in a large canon of preceding work, in which 
scholars and practitioners alike have sought ways to manage the apparent conflict in 
the employment relationship, and to install and maintain productive co-operation for 
the mutual benefit of all concerned. My thesis contributes to this body of work.
More practically, the New Labour government has endorsed partnership at work as 
the central theme of its industrial relations legislation. The union recognition rights 
in 1999’s Employment Relations Act mean that this research should be of interest 
and use at currently non-unionised firms. It ought also to be useful in unionised 
firms where employee relations can be improved. But my deliberate inclusion of a 
non-union case study should extend the partnership debate outside the rather narrow 
confines of union-management relations; partnership might more fruitfully be 
viewed as a specific set of practices for managing the employment relationship.
The thesis begins with a discussion of the main construct: partnership.
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Chapter 1. A definition of partnership - principles and practices.
In the late 1990s in Britain the notion of partnership at work became an industrial 
relations phenomenon (just as it did to a similar degree in the United States, Canada, 
Australia and the Republic of Ireland: see respectively Kochan & Osterman, 1994; 
Grant, 1997; Peetz, 1996, and D’Art & Turner, 1999).
If not quite "the only show in town ”, as claimed by many senior trade unionists, it 
certainly seemed the show to be seen at. Officially endorsed by the Labour 
government, promoted zealously by the TUC, and even - albeit rather more 
cautiously - by the CBI, ‘partnership’ in one form or another received an 
endorsement from almost everyone, from the Transport and General Workers’ 
Union to the ardently right-wing Institute of Directors.
This near-universal approval, across such a startlingly broad political spectrum, 
brought upon partnership the inevitable accusation that it was all things to all 
comers, a “portmanteau term which can hold a rich diversity o f ideological 
baggage” (cited in Ackers & Payne, 1998: p529). The malleability of the new creed 
troubled many in the congregation of its broad church, for differing interpretations 
seemed to welcome and, indeed, embrace heretics, atheists and apostates. There is a 
danger that partnership’s “inherent ambiguity” (Bacon & Storey, 2000: p409) may 
undermine the potency of the idea, suggesting - as it surely does -  a positive, 
enduring and committed pact for mutual gain between more or less equal 
participants. It is therefore important to reclaim ‘partnership’ from the myriad of 
almost Orwellian2 employment situations to which the term has been applied. 
Without a robust definition partnership is vulnerable to the same abusive 
interpretations that did for ‘empowerment’ in the late 1980s - to be so corrupted that 
it is, ultimately, rendered meaningless. The ongoing confusion over an acceptable 
definition of partnership continues to hinder the debate about its value, purpose and 
potential within British workplaces.
2 By 'Orwellian ’ I  mean that use o f  the word ‘partnership' to describe patently unequal, even exploitative 
relationships -  or perhaps more commonly only modest and faltering joint consultative initiatives - is 
reminiscent o f  the Big Brother maxims, "War Is Peace ", and "Freedom Is Slavery
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What kind of partnership?
Partnership is a term that has been applied to initiatives on several different levels. It 
is most commonly used to refer to workplace or organisational employee relations 
situations (Tailby & Winchester, 2000: p374), and this level is the subject of my 
thesis.
However, the term also refers to the ‘European’ model of ‘social partnership’, 
involving a long-established and institutionalised dialogue between different 
stakeholder constituencies on continent-wide social policy. The European 
Commission views this as a good thing in itself: “essential pillars o f our democratic 
society and social progress” (European Commission, 1997: vii). For right-wing 
commentators these European connotations have “tainted” the idea, to use Ackers 
and Payne’s word (op cit: p544).3
The term also refers to the broad range of national-level consultative arrangements 
evident in many European countries, German co-determination and the Dutch 
‘polder’ model being two examples. Indeed, the UK’s workplace partnerships owe a 
debt to European industrial relations systems in terms of vision and vocabulary 
(Terry, 2001). Many UK workforces have experienced the ‘European style’ -  albeit 
for the most part in a somewhat diluted form - in European Works Councils (see 
Cressey, 1998, for an overview and a UK case study).
The progressive connotations of the term, suggesting a harmonious and mutually 
beneficial arrangement, have been of considerable rhetorical appeal to the New 
Labour government. It has used ‘partnership’ [they have shied away from the 
suspiciously European-/ socialist-sounding ‘social’ prefix] to describe its own one- 
off examples of national-level multi-constituency consultation on social policy, most 
notably over the national minimum wage (see Metcalf, 1999; Brown, 2000). 
Periodically, Gordon Brown suggests a multi-constituency congress on how to 
improve UK productivity, but although such a body has been convened -  as the 
Productivity Initiative - little has come of it. Tri-partite consultation on social and
3 When Adair Turner, formerly the Director-General o f  the CBI, referred enthusiastically to the pan-continental 
union-employer agreement addressing racism at work as an example o f  ‘social partnership' (reported by Taylor, 
1996), he seemed to imply that a such a pact could be distinguished from  other negotiated agreements by the 
positive and mutually acceptable outcomes.
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economic policy remains a rare occurrence in the UK. In this sense of the word, 
‘partnership’ echoes the ‘stakeholder’ model for the revival of social democracy (see 
Hutton, 1995).
Partnership can also describe inter-organisational collaborations, such as 
‘partnering’ arrangements between suppliers and customers. It has also been used, 
rather more contentiously, to describe contractual relationships between private 
companies and public sector workforces to deliver public services - the so-called 
‘public-private partnerships’.4
The use of the word in this thesis refers exclusively to m£ra-organisational forms. 
Where this involves the presence of an independent trade union it is assumed that 
the partnership is with the union represented internally, and thus is still an intra- 
organisational relationship.
Before moving on to consider how we might best define workplace partnerships, it 
is important to note that ‘partnership’ has a statutory legal meaning. Charles Hanson 
(1992), in a letter to the IP A upon the launch of their manifesto for partnership (IP A, 
1992), pointed to the 1890 Partnership Act’s definition: "... the relation which 
subsists between persons carrying on business in common with a view o f profit”. 
Partners in this sense, Hanson observed, “usually have a say in the management o f a 
business, but the corollary o f this is that they are fully liable for its losses up to the 
limit o f their resources” (ibid). Examples include solicitors or accountants’ firms. 
Hanson doubted, correctly, that this was what people had in mind for workplace 
partnership, although as we shall see there are (weak) parallels.
Workplace partnership: toward a robust definition.
Partnership’s “distinctive substance remains unclear” and there remains “no agreed 
definition” (Guest and Peccei, 2001: p208). This is remarkable for such a 
contentious phenomenon that has been a major issue of debate in UK industrial 
relations for almost twelve years.
4 Concerns over the viability and mutuality o f  these relationships have meant that in media reports ‘partnership ’ 
is often confined within wary inverted commas, rather than allowed to stand without reservation.
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The term can correctly describe a collaborative endeavour at work between 
managers and employees, and it has been applied in this manner, notably over skills 
training and health and safety (see Munro & Rainbird, 2000). But to be considered a 
‘partnership’ organisation involves significantly more than demonstrating 
temporary, calculative co-operation over one or a handful of workplace matters.
Fortunately, there has been a gradual convergence of credible definitions (see 
Ackers & Payne, 1998, for a nuanced review of the various incarnations), centring 
around five essential components at the heart of the three most influential and most 
commonly cited models of partnership, those of the the Involvement and 
Participation Association, hereafter IPA (1997) and the TUC (1999), and the 
academics David Guest and Riccardo Peccei (1998; 2001).
Substance is accorded to this dextrous and multi-purpose idea by the established 
presence of a ‘bundle’ of specific employee relations principles and practices. The 
essential components of these definitions are:
1. Joint commitment to the success of the enterprise
2. Mutual recognition of the legitimate role and/ or interests of each 
constituency - management, unions (where present), and employees
3. Structures and practices that allow for information sharing and consultation 
between the main constituencies at all levels of the organisation, featuring 
representative arrangements for an ‘independent employee voice’
4. A determined attempt to address the balance needed between ‘flexibility’ and 
‘employment security’, and
5. A mutual commitment and effort to develop and sustain intra-organisational 
trust.
Thus, to reiterate my central argument, the special focus of workplace partnership is 
how joint problem solving processes (element 3 above) can be used to establish a 
mutual commitment to success (1) among the acknowledged different constituencies 
(2), and also to develop relationships between them based on mutual trust (5). The 
central workplace concern over which mutual trust needs to be established is 
‘flexibility for employment security’ (4), although there are others (such as sharing 
success and training).
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Seven of the most prevalent definitions are set out in Table 1. Of these I review five 
in this chapter: those of the IP A, the TUC, the New Labour government, Guest and 
Peccei, and the trade union most prominently associated with the movement for 
partnership, the AEEU (now part of Amicus).
The IPA model.
In this section I present the model of partnership put forward by the IPA, the leading 
proponents of the approach in Britain. The IPA model was produced by a team of 
senior business managers and senior trade union officials during 1992, revised and 
re-launched in 1994, and updated again in 1997. I propose to argue for it as the 
standard definition of what an enduring partnership should entail (although later in 
this chapter I assess its merits against the other four commonly discussed models).5 
The IPA model remains, in my view, the best model for the following reasons:
1. It contains all of the essential components of ‘partnership’ whereas others, as 
can be seen from Table 1, do not.
2. Unlike many of the other conceptualisations and models, it goes beyond 
vague aspirations and platitudes to set out and describe a specific 
configurational ‘bundle’ of HR practices that, taken together, form a 
coherent model for managing the employment relationship.
3. These partnership practices are observable and measurable, and as such they 
help analysts to test for the presence and effectiveness of the arrangements.
4. The model is also a realistic and not overly ambitious programme (unlike 
some of the other models).
5. Importantly, it allows for the possibility of non-unionised forms of 
partnership, whereas others do not.
6. It is widely considered to be the most influential model in the development 
of British partnership arrangements. Robert Taylor called it “the best 
example o f the new consensual approach ” (Taylor, 1994: p200); Guest and 
Peccei judged it one of the “most systematic ” definitions, along with the 
TUC’s (2001: p211); Roger Undy selected it as “a reasonable measure o f 
social partnership in the workplace” (1999: p323). Its influence is apparent
5 1 should declare an interest here. During the course o f  my PhD research I  worked in a self-employed capacity 
fo r  the IPA as their Research Manager. However, this thesis is all my own work. (For a discussion o f  the ethical 
implications o f  this, please refer to the Methodology chapter.)
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in the near-identical principles adopted by the TUC, the Fabian Society for 
its ‘Changing Work’ report (1996), and the Industrial Society’s ‘Managing 
partnerships’ (2001). John Knell, researching partnership for the DTI (1999), 
also used the IPA model as his standard definition.
7. It was the first formal conceptualisation of ‘partnership: the 1990s version’; 
the 1992 document “laid the foundations for the current debate” (IRS, 
2000a: p7; also Bacon & Storey, 1996: p41).
8. It has retained its content under stem criticism, and the fluctuating British 
economy, for a decade.
9. As Undy also noted (1999: p319), the IPA model has received admiring 
analysis from the moderate as well as the Left wings of industrial relations 
thinking. However, it is not without its critics.
10. Its influence is readily discernible, and often directly cited, in the 
arrangements at several partnership organisations.
In the IPA model, a set of partnership commitments [principles] is agreed among the 
organisation’s main constituencies, and from these a set of specific partnership 
building blocks [practices and policies] are designed and introduced to regulate the 
employment relationship, and to control work activities. These are designed to 
establish and maintain mutual trust, to facilitate change in work activities, and to 
secure common benefits. I discuss the linkages in greater detail in chapter three.
The IPA model is presented in Figure 1 (my representation). As can be seen, the 
principles inform, and should in fact govern, how the practices through which 
partnership is enacted are both designed and subsequently conducted. The key 
practice is, in its essence, some form of joint problem solving at all levels of the 
organisation, with two main agenda items being employment security in exchange 
for flexibility and sharing the organisation’s success. The outcomes are, 
simultaneously, a ‘partnership’ arrangement, and some level of mutual trust (with 
the latter being confined in Figure 1 within square brackets to indicate that trust is by 
no means either an inevitable or a permanent outcome, as we shall see).
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Table 1 - PARTNERSHIP DEFINITIONS -  A TYPOLOGY. v = Principle ♦ = Practice.
IPA NEW
LABOUR
TUC GUEST/
PECCEI
AEEU CBI EC
Commitment to success o f the enterprise ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
Recognising legitimate and separate roles/ interests ¥ ¥ ¥  implied? ¥ ¥
Building trust ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
Employment security for flexibility/ em ployability ♦ ♦ implied ¥& ♦ ¥& ♦ ¥& ♦ ♦
Addressing the quality o f working life/ fulfilling & ‘em powered’ work  
(e.g.: flexible job design, team working)
♦ ¥& ♦ ¥& ♦ ¥& ♦
Information sharing/ transparency o f information ♦ ¥& ♦ ¥& ♦ ¥& ♦ ♦ implied ¥& ♦
Sharing the success o f the organisation ♦ ♦ implied ¥& ♦ (ESOPs) ♦ implied ♦
Representation o f the workforce/ provision for an employee voice ♦ ¥& ♦ implied ¥& ♦ ¥& ♦ implied
Consulting staff on immediate work issues ♦ ¥& ♦ implied ♦ ¥& ♦ implied
Consulting staff on organisational policy ♦ ¥& ♦ implied ♦ ¥& ♦ implied ¥& ♦
Training/ staff development/ lifelong learning ♦ implied ¥& ♦ ♦ ¥& ♦ ¥& ♦ ♦ ¥& ♦
Harm onisation/ single-status terms and conditions ♦ implied ¥& ♦
[Provision of] employee rights and benefits ¥
[Fulfilling] em ployee responsibilities ¥
Good treatment o f employees now and in the future ¥  implied ¥  implied ¥
Performance management ♦
Equal opportunities/ fair treatment ♦ ¥ ¥& ♦
Extending ‘partnership’ to the com munity ¥& ♦ ¥
NB; ‘implied ’ denotes where a principle or practice is not fully articulated and only mentioned briefly, or where one is expected to infer that it is present.
Sources: IPA (1997): “Towards industrial partnership: new ways o f  working in British com panies”; New Labour (DTI, 1999; 1999b): “Partnerships: f i t  fo r  the
fu tu r e ”; “Competitiveness through partnerships"; TUC (1999): “Partners fo r  progress"; Guest & Peccei (1998): “The partnership company: benchmarks fo r  the fu tu r e ”-, 
AEEU (1999): “A partnership contract with British industry"; CBI: 1998 conference papers, also speech by Adair Turner at the TUC's ‘Partners fo r  P rogress’ conference, 
1999; European Commission (1997): “Green paper: partnership fo r  a new organisation o f  w ork”.
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Figure I: The IPA Partnership model
PRINCIPLES PRACTICES OUTCOMES
(‘Commitments ’) (‘Building blocks’)
including policies and practices 
addressing ‘security for flexibility’
including policies and practices 
for sharing the organisation’s success
PARTNERSHIP
[TRUST]
Commitment to the 
success of the enterprise
Commitment to building 
trust and employee 
involvement
Commitment to the 
legitimate role/ interests 
of each of the parties
Consultation with, and 
representation of, the 
workforce 
()'ointproblem solving), 
and extensive information 
sharing.
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With its emphasis on normative principles and loose prescriptions for how joint
problem solving might be structured, the LPA’s partnership model is fundamentally a
qualitative approach to employment relations (Hyman, 1997). Partnership is
concerned primarily with the processes by which organisational decisions and
outcomes are determined. As the authors have reflected, partnership is:
"... not so much about institutions or methods, as about attitudes and 
culture. It is a question o f building mutual trust, o f recognising differences and 
finding common ground” (Coupar & Stevens, 1998: p i45).
IDS analysts, drawing on six unionised case studies, concur:
“What marks out the partnership approach as being distinctive is the spirit 
in which things are done. Time is not taken up defending unreasonable positions; 
instead more emphasis is placed on problem solving and on reaching decisions by 
consensus in an atmosphere o f greater trust and openness” (IDS, 1998: p2).
Attention to the style and conduct, rather than the structures, of consultation and 
joint problem solving is a feature of many interpretations of partnership. Guest and 
Peccei echo the attitudinal and behavioural emphasis in partnership models, when 
they cite as a “key notion... some idea o f working effectively together to achieve 
shared or complementary goals” (2001: p212). Mutuality and trust are the bases for 
this relationship.
Larry Adams, a leading US consultant on labour-management partnerships, argued 
in an influential policy paper for AC AS that partnership’s objective is subtly 
different from traditional bargaining. It is to generate an agreement based not on 
adversarial conflict resolution, but on consensus and a joint commitment to the 
agreement:
"... to identify those areas where labour and management interests are congruent 
and to use them as the primary building blocks o f a more positive and constructive 
alliance” (Adams, 1993: p20).
Walton and McKersie (1965) delineated the distinction as between ‘distributive’ and 
‘integrative’ bargaining. The USDAW trade union explained it in to their members 
as “problem-solving, not problem-stating” {USDAW, 1998: p6).
20
The three IPA ‘commitments’.6
The three principles, or ‘commitments’, provide coherence to the strategy for 
managing people.
The first - to “the success o f the enterprise ” - is a unitarist aspiration, and represents 
something of a conscious shift in mind-set for many British trade unionists and 
managers. Tailby has noted that “what is distinctive about the 1990s initiatives 
[distinguishing partnership from earlier similar programmes] is the effort to enlist 
employee support for company objectives ” (Tailby, 2000: p5). This has its own 
(supposed) logic: if the company’s profits are healthy, then so will be the prospects 
of the employees. Few employees are likely to object to wanting their place of work 
to do well. Commitment to the success of the enterprise is not a problematic 
objective in itself, although definition of what constitutes success may differ, 
sometimes sharply, as indeed may the method and plans for securing success. Thus, 
the principle is not sufficient in itself; it is the means through which success is 
sought that is more significant.
I shall take the commitments in a different order to that provided by the IPA to 
support my central thesis (the order in the model has no significance). The third 
commitment -  to “recognising the legitimate role and interests o f each partner ” - 
by implication accepts the potential for conflict. Employee representatives are 
charged with furthering their colleagues’ best interests (Flanders, 1970: pp 19-20), 
while management teams are required to maximise shareholder profit, or to improve 
services to certain agreed targets. This separation of interests has long been 
acknowledged in collective bargaining arrangements, and even articulated in the 
terms of reference in agreed deals. The issue then is how this commitment is 
translated into control mechanisms for managing work.
As with the first commitment, it is not intended to merely sit among the opening 
statements in the ‘partnership agreement’, with little or no weight beyond the depth 
of the platitude. In a genuine partnership arrangement, this understanding is backed 
up with the means for each partner to fulfil their “legitimate role ” effectively, for 
their own interests and for those of the organisation. It necessarily implies that
6 All IPA citations are taken from the 1997 report, unless otherwise stated.
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mutual gains should be pursued in a spirit of joint problem solving. This principle is 
also important so that one party may not, in Hayne and Allen’s terminology, “de­
limit the other party's opportunities to participate in and benefit from the 
relationship” (Hayne and Allen, 1999).
For firms where there is no independent employee representation provided by a 
trade union, this commitment requires managers to at least be aware of, and sensitive 
to, the potential for conflicting interests between them and the organisation’s 
employees, and to make a sincere and determined effort to seek a balance between 
these different needs.
The final commitment - “To building trust, and greater employee involvement ” -  is, 
as I argue in this thesis, central to the success or otherwise of partnership. As Hayne 
and Allen put it: “By its very nature partnership requires higher levels o f trust” 
(ibid). I examine trust more thoroughly in chapter two. Suffice at this stage to say 
that the significance of the development of trust can be gleaned from its status as:
■ A necessary pre-condition of partnership
■ The process through which the partnership practices are utilised in order to 
conceive and realise partnership
■ One of the most important outcomes of partnership, and
■ The main method for monitoring progress toward partnership, and 
constraining ‘anti-partnership’ actions.
Trust exerts its influence before, during and after a partnership agreement has been 
signed.
On “employee involvement”, the IPA authors are content, as far as the principle is 
concerned that it simply be articulated; that organisations commit to involving their 
employees more in the planning, implementation and execution of new working 
practices, as well as with any reviews seeking improvements. (Typical practices are 
suggested below.)
There is significant research indicating that employees want, and often seem to 
relish the “responsible autonomy” Friedman (1977) long ago advocated by as an
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optimum means of regulating work that employee involvement schemes can offer. 
Wall and Lischeron (1977) noted the popularity among shopfloor employees for 
input into decision-making at the local level, nearest to their place of work, and less 
enthusiasm for involvement in decisions taken higher up, toward the ‘strategic apex’ 
of the firm. Marchington and colleagues’ research (Marchington, Goodman, 
Wilkinson, & Ackers, 1992) for the then Department of Employment even found a 
link between greater use of employee involvement practices, and reported levels of 
employer-employee trust. Sceptics question whether employee involvement 
initiatives are euphemisms for work intensification and/ or the marginalisation of 
recognised trade unions. But it is clear that the IPA does not endorse this usage. That 
said, it can be that partnership does offer a deceptive smokescreen for either covert 
objective.
The strength of the commitments.
The authors of the IPA model consider that for a partnership to be successful and 
durable, all three commitments need to be firmly held and passionately defended 
principles. Thus, following Schein’s model of organisational culture (Schein, 1986), 
these commitments should not just be manifested in the “artefacts and creations ” of 
the organisation, such as warm words in the corporate mission statement, but be 
firmly rooted in the “values ” and “organisational beliefs ” about the nature of the 
employment relationship and how it is best managed. In Mintzberg’s work, the three 
commitments correspond to the need for an “overarching ideology ” informing the 
organisation’s behaviour (see Mintzberg, 1983: p294).
Organisational principles tend to be formulated and embodied in the senior leaders. 
ACAS concurs with the IPA in urging senior managers to take an active role in 
promoting and sustaining these principles, lest partnership be dismissed by 
employees and/ or their representatives as a ‘flavour-of-the-month’ gimmick from 
HR/ Personnel: “The process works best where leadership comes from the top and 
where individuals -  both management and worker representatives -  demonstrate 
personal commitment to the joint approach ” (ACAS, 1999: p7). They note that, as 
partnership becomes fashionable, the inclination to view it with scepticism will 
“likely become more profound” (ibid).
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Guest and Peccei’s research identified a firm link between organisations expressing 
a strong adherence to the principles of partnership, and the implementation of the 
prescribed set of partnership practices. A clear and resolute belief in the value of the 
partnership principles was strongly associated with progress toward partnership 
(1998: p6; 2001: p231). They recommend that these principles be sufficiently widely 
endorsed throughout the organisation (2001), whether articulated in a statement of 
intent or code of conduct, or approved in a workforce ballot, or perhaps even 
implicitly acknowledged by the key industrial relations protagonists.
The four ‘building blocks’.
The principles must be underpinned by practices that translate the “warm words ” 
into action and tangible outcomes, without which the principles are devoid of 
legitimacy and conviction. For example, an organisation might claim an aspiration to 
“maximise employment security”, but to be credible (rather than facile) this 
ambition must have supporting policies and practices in place. And yet the policies 
and practices have as a point of reference the principles that they are designed to 
uphold and disseminate -  answering the question “why” the practices are 
introduced.
In order to assess the depth of the company’s sincere “b e lie f in the partnership 
principles, one must examine the implementation of the partnership practices. Again, 
it is the means through which these principles are enacted that is of critical interest, 
rather than the wording of an agreement. To these I now turn.
The four IPA ‘building blocks’ constitute a set of operating policies and practices for 
managing a workforce, controlling work activities, securing performance 
improvements and linking employees’ reward to organisational success. The 
‘bundle’ of practices is an attempt to provide for some form of mutual gain for all 
constituencies.
Taking the building blocks in a different order as well to better represent my central 
argument, “informing and consulting the workforce at the workplace and company 
level” and “representation o f the interests o f the employees” are the core practices 
of partnership. This follows logically from the three principles, particularly the
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acknowledgement that the different constituencies have different interests at work 
that need to be heard, respected and addressed.
The two practices provide the process through which partnership is established and 
conducted (or thwarted), and the outcomes secured. Indeed, Marchington 
understands partnership to mean “managements willing to share ideas with 
employee representatives, offer them the opportunity to become involved in joint 
problem solving and generally support their roles and activities...” (Marchington, 
1996).
While Guest and Peccei observed widespread support among IPA member 
organisations for the principle of consulting staff, there was “less unanimity about 
the mechanisms to achieve this” (1998: p8). In practice, these ‘building blocks’ take 
the form of consultative problem solving arrangements working at a range of levels 
within the organisation, from the nearest to different constituencies’ workplace up to 
the strategic level (IRS, 2000a: p7). The input should certainly be in direct forms, 
such as quality circles, team briefings, joint problem solving teams and continuous 
improvement groups. It can come in indirect forms via employee representatives too, 
such as in works councils or staff forums, and in a series of joint working parties. 
The presence of a trade union is valuable, and even to be recommended, but in the 
IPA model is not considered essential. (See a further discussion below.)
Advocates of partnership differ in their views of the strength of the consultation. 
Many unions are seeking German-style co-determination (i.e.: joint decision­
making, with an employees’ power of veto). This is unrealistic in the UK, for the 
moment. However, for the input from employees in joint problem solving to have 
any credibility in a context of ‘partnership’ all parties should have significant 
influence on the outcome of the decisions taken. Employees’ proactive input needs 
to be considered and acted upon before the decision is taken, rather than sought after 
the fact in a cosmetic, “sham ” consultation (TUC, 1999).7
7 As Roger Lyons o f  MSF [now Amicus] has argued, “responsibility without the ability to influence the original 
decision in the first instance is often a means of simply ‘passing the buck’.”
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What ‘consultation’ is understood to mean is expanded opportunities for 
involvement in the decision-making process, the ultimate outcome resting still in the 
hands of management. Wedderbum has called it “strong consultation ”, 
distinguishing it from managerial unilateralism dressed up with a token request for 
employee comment. Provis has cited unions’ desire for “persuasion and dialogue 
rather than threats and offers... consultation rather than bargaining” (Provis, 1996: 
p485-6). John Monks, in an apt quote, describes an emphasis in process “less on 
democratic and equal division o f managerial power and more on extending workers ’ 
influence” (cited in Ackers and Payne, 1998: p537). Wood (2000) cites as a 
distinguishing factor of partnership that arrangements that they involve 
“reconfiguring the representative systems so that bargaining institutions no longer 
necessarily dominate”. But, he notes, they “give commitments to increase the 
involvement o f the workforce in strategic business matters and to the provision o f 
information for employees about business development and performance ”.
IRS (1997: p3) distinguished between what they termed ‘partnership’ ( “the 
organisation involves employees in drawing up and execution o f company policies, 
but retains the right to manage ”) and ‘power sharing’ ( “employees are involved in 
day-to-day and strategic decision-making”). It is not obvious what distinction is 
being made here; what IRS considers ‘partnership’ could be met with a modest set 
of employee briefings. So, for an organisation to truly lay claim to partnership status 
under the IPA model, it is apparent that they should be demonstrating ‘power 
sharing’ under the IRS definition, although the IPA would never use this 
ideologically-charged term.
Marchington et al’s CIPD research into employee voice provisions (CIPD, 2001: p4) 
distinguishes between a “contribution to decision-making” and even more a 
“demonstration o f mutuality and co-operative relations”. However, the research 
team’s study of 18 organisations’ use of ‘employee voice’ found a marked 
managerial preference for styles of consultation that “accentuate the positive and 
eliminate the negative”. While only a few of the 18 might claim to be ‘partnership’ 
organisations, it is helpful to look out for explicit or implicit behavioural constraints 
put on what the ‘employee voice’ says, and how it is said.
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In order to make the consultation meaningful, and to prevent them from descending 
into low-level ‘tea and toilets’ discussions, employees (and their representatives, 
where present) need to be knowledgeable, and armed with sufficient information to 
make a useful contribution. The exchange of information on organisational context - 
its concerns, strategies and opportunities -  needs to be timely, expansive, open and 
high-level (i.e.: including sensitive strategic information). Case (1997), writing 
about the American notion of ‘open-book management’, has explained the value of 
information sharing as providing the ‘why’ for proposed change programmes from 
the outset. With a clear appreciation of the reasons for the need to change, Case 
argues, all parties will want to seek the ‘how’. Relatedly, and in keeping with the 
principle recognising the legitimate role of employee representatives, they should be 
trained to be able to digest, analyse and act upon the information given. Certainly a 
basic introduction to business finance and reading financial books is valuable.
The information sharing needs to be sincere, consistent, and two-way in order for the 
workforce to confer upon it the legitimacy that is its oxygen:
"To achieve this adaptability demands a culture which maximises the 
exchange o f information, laterally, upwards and downwards, one which encourages 
employees to take responsibility for what they are doing, to know as much as 
possible about the performance o f the business and to express opinions without fear 
o f reprisal” (IPA: pi 1; also ACAS, 1999, p7).
The scope of the agenda is enlarged in partnership arrangements over more 
traditional bargaining areas of concern, to include "all facets o f the business at 
national level” (IRS, 2000a: p7); “the agenda o f any employee forum at company 
level needs to be strategic, business-focussed, meet employee needs and adequately 
cover the legal requirements to consult...” (IPA: p i5). This includes input into 
strategic decisions, quality through employee involvement, HR policies, training and 
education, internal communication systems, and corporate values:
“The challenge is to develop machinery which both maximises staff input 
into decisions yet ensures that a focus on the business goals is maintained and 
decisions are not endlessly delayed” (IPA: p i2).
With the expansion of the agenda the frequency of consultation also increases under 
partnership (USDAW, 1998: p4). Employees (and their representatives where 
present) expect to be involved in most decision-making processes. It had often been
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true in unionised firms that the union and management teams tended to meet only 
for the annual pay round; under partnership the amount of contact time increases.
The extent to which this joint problem solving is realised reflects “the philosophy 
and style o f the company”, suggests the IPA (pi 1). If joint problem solving is 
implemented to a sufficiently high quality at all levels, it can demonstrate a clear 
effort to facilitate the pluralist mediation of interests that is critical for the success of 
the partnership model. Employees’ input into decision-making confers upon the 
decisions a legitimacy and a sense of justice that is unlikely to be present in a 
unilaterally-imposed managerial edict: “In effecting changes an association o f 
equals is preferable to a hierarchical organisation” (ACAS Wales, 1993: p3). Joint 
problem solving can smooth the process of change management, reducing resistance 
to change, and even committing parties to succeeding in the implementation of 
change. Femie and Metcalf (1995) and Sako (1998) have each found positive 
benefits in both performance and industrial relations climate from the provision of 
an employee voice.
Other HR policies, such as consistent use of employee attitude surveys, complement 
but in no way adequately replace this building block.
As can be seen the structures for consultation are neither substantially different nor 
radically new. But the agenda is wider, the meetings more frequent, and most 
importantly, the approach to the issues is qualitatively different.
The chief agenda item for the joint problem solving is “recognition o f the 
employee's need for employment security and the company’s need to maximise 
flexibility” (IPA, p2). This “conundrum”, as the IPA has called it, would seem to 
encapsulate the central issue at the ‘frontier of control’ in the present era of 
employment relations. In several surveys, notably those conducted by Mori on 
behalf of the GMB trade union, employees place job/ employment security 
consistently highly as an important feature of their employment. It has typically
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outscored more traditional industrial relations concerns such as better basic pay.
8 Figures fo r  1997 saw "job security" ranked top (56%), followed by "having a job  that you find  interesting and 
enjoyable" (54%), with "basic pay" ranked fourth (41%) (figures from a conference presentation handout).
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White and Hill’s forthcoming research for the ESRC (cited in Taylor, 2001: p i5) 
found employment security to rank second after having an ‘interesting job’ and 
above a sense of positive achievement, and having an input into work matters 
affecting them (‘employee voice’). Equally, managers regularly recite their desire to 
create a flexible and committed workforce, not to mention that rather trite soundbite 
that their people are their ‘greatest asset’. Thus, for organisations to seek to marry 
successfully these two is laudably pluralist. It is one of the four pillars of the EC’s 
European employment strategy.
Employment security has long been endorsed as a critical component in any 
‘bundle’ of best or ideal HRM practices. Walton wrote in his essay, ‘From control to 
commitment’, that managers must also make every effort to “avoid, defer and 
minimise layoffs from higher productivity” (1985: p83). More recently, employment 
security was identified by Delery and Doty (1996: p820), and by Ichniowski, Shaw 
and Prennushi (1997: p312) as having a demonstrable effect on performance, as part 
of a coherent set of HRM practices. Partnership organisations would be expected to 
place considerable emphasis on securing this balance of interests.
In practice, the commitment from organisations is not a ‘job-for-life’; it is instead 
employment security. This error is too often a lazy, or even wilfully deceitful, 
misunderstanding. The IPA describes the arrangement as providing “a stable 
employment framework” and an attempt to “maximise a sense o f security while 
reducing the numbers employed within the organisation ” (IPA: p2, my emphasis). 
Permanent isolation and protection from job losses is no longer a reasonable 
expectation (Robert Reich, in the Financial Times, 6 March 1996) - if it ever was.
Most practitioners would argue that this policy requires, ideally, a no-compulsory 
redundancy pledge, bolstered by a commitment to pursue all other options -  such as 
voluntary redundancies, retraining and redeployment -  before making job cuts. (In a 
letter to the IPA at the time of ‘Toward industrial partnership’, Lord McCarthy also 
expressed “the hope that partnership goes with an above-average reluctance to 
outsource”.) ‘Employability’, by which is meant provision of skills training and 
learning opportunities at work, forms part of the policy. It may also involve a multi­
year pay deal, stabilising the potentially contentious issue of pay over an extended
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period of time. Long-term pay deals have been advocated by the Chancellor 
(Financial Times, 13 September 2000).
With this distinction in mind, then, one ought not to express too much surprise, as 
Hall did (cited in Munro & Rainbird, 2000: p226), when large-scale redundancies 
take place in a partnership organisation. The issue, for the IPA and other partnership 
advocates, is how the redundancies are handled, and agreed upon; not whether they 
happen or not.9
Such guarantees can be for fixed terms only (prompting the question from 
employees, “what happens then?”). Additionally, many contain get-out clauses 
related to unforeseeable shifts in commercial circumstances (such as the celebrated 
Blue Circle agreement). Thus, given these attendant uncertainties, employment 
security policies should be complemented with the careful management of 
employees’ expectations and needs, through information sharing and joint problem 
solving, as well as support, should redundancy become a fait accompli. Where trade 
unions are present, there should be a joint approach to managing the fall-out of 
redundancies. The explicit terms and procedures should be jointly designed.
If carefully planned and implemented, an employment security guarantee can foster 
a sense of common purpose, a feeling of all working under similar conditions (and a 
similar threat). This policy can provide the ‘safety net’ of assurance that then 
facilitates progress in joint problem solving. It does so by removing the constraining 
fear among employees that to accept the new regime of flexible work practices may 
threaten their jobs: the ‘turkeys voting for Christmas’ scenario. It also demonstrates 
respect for employees, and the value of their contribution, and concurs with the 
assertion in the original IPA document that "people work best i f  they have some 
sense o f being secure in their job ” (IPA: p2).
Poor management of redundancy in a partnership, however, can fracture trust in an 
instant, sending companies back to ‘square one’. The IPA concedes that it is
9 A union official from  'WhiskyCo ’ reported that, although his members were disheartened by a plant closure, 
they maintained exceptional performance levels throughout, because, he argued, the redundancy programme 
had been jointly and fairly managed (conversation with author). Similarly, when Barclays followed the launch o f  
their 1999 partnership agreement with UNIFI with 6,000 redundancies the next week, the union described the 
redundancy management as “a model fo r  the industry" (IRS, 1999).
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precisely the fear of breaking such a trust that deters companies from working 
toward employment security, and lurches them toward ‘tough talk’ and ‘no 
promises’: “Mishandling o f the security issue has damaged companies more than 
they expected” (IPA: p8).
“Sharing success within the company” - the fourth and final ‘building block’ - is 
held to “assist businesses in breaking through barriers holding back flexibility” 
(IPA: p2) by addressing the not unreasonable ‘what’s-in-it-for-me?’ response from 
sceptical employees. As one management consultant has noted:
“Unless the parties are very clear that things will be significantly different 
and better within the terms o f a partnership then the energy needed to ensure it is a 
success will not be sustained” (Irvine, 1998: p9).
The principal means are employee share ownership and profit sharing, or 
gainsharing bonuses. Such incentive schemes can tie employees’ loyalties more 
concretely to the aims of the organisation, since success brings benefits to the 
employees. Employees benefiting from organisational success in this way can serve 
to break down barriers of ‘us’ and ‘them’ toward a ‘we’, although the research 
evidence for this, and for the link with motivation and commitment, remains 
contested, with Poole and Jenkins (1990), and Freeman (2001), arguing in favour. If 
companies can manage to avoid disparities of reward among grades within the 
organisation - the often-observed phenomenon of senior executives receiving vastly 
superior bonuses and share options to their sub-ordinates - then fair and transparent 
profit-sharing can clearly be a valuable, genuinely unitarist building block for 
partnership. It also raises awareness among employees of the overall performance 
levels and realities, and can aid performance management. That said, it can equally 
be de-motivating if it is unfocussed, or if an organisation is undergoing a less 
profitable period.
Single-status terms and conditions and harmonisation are also important for the 
“symbolic” role the effort displays, that all of the firm’s employees are treated 
(more or less) equally. This can unify all employees, to all be positioned along the 
same single pay spine, and subject to the same criterion for promotion. If 
consistently implemented, this can yield a greater contribution to partnership than 
the uncertainties of profit-sharing. 90% of respondents in Guest and Peccei’s
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research confirmed that their employees are on harmonised terms and conditions 
(1998).
With one eye on the public sector, the IPA argued that sharing success need not be 
solely monetary: celebrating organisational performance achievements, staff days 
out, even simple praise and appreciation are also valid and worthwhile examples of 
sharing success.
Other partnership models.
Of the seven set out in Table 1 above, four merit detailed discussion here: the New 
Labour government’s, the TUC’s, and that of the principal union associated with 
such deals, the AEEU, plus Guest and Peccei’s HRM-inspired model of partnership.
The New Labour government.
Partnership found official sanction as the central theme of New Labour’s employee 
relations policy for the 1997 general election, alongside a position of "fairness, not 
favours ” toward the unions. Once in government Blair wrote in the foreword to the 
white paper that he wanted "nothing less than to change the culture o f work [to one 
based on partnership]”. Note the focus on culture, rather than institutions or systems. 
It became the government’s stated ambition to "replace the notion o f conflict 
between employers and employees with the promotion o f partnership" (DTI, 1998: 
pi). The government has since been reluctant to spell out exactly what it means by 
partnership, and for lack of a clearer statement Undy (1999: p319) assumed [writing 
in 1998] that New Labour endorsed the IPA model. From an examination of the 
government’s pronouncements on partnership this assumption would seem 
misplaced. The government’s publicly available conceptualisations have been 
characterised by markedly unitarist and individualistic language. The key DTI report 
on partnership is ‘Competitiveness through partnerships with people’ (DTI, 1999b). 
It sets out five ‘paths to sustained success’, which are:
1. Shared goals
2. Shared culture
3. Shared learning
4. Shared effort, and
5. Shared information.
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The definition shares two of the IPA’s principles -  commitment to success and to 
building trust ( “shared culture ” above) - but tellingly not the recognition that there 
might be legitimate interests that employees might want to pursue separate from 
those of their employer.
As for partnership practices, the government endorses efforts to secure flexible work 
practices in exchange for employment security, as well as for job re-design and 
training to create interesting and worthwhile jobs. While not in any ‘partnership* 
text, the Chancellor introduced the all-employee share ownership plan in March 
2000, one option of which is called the ‘partnership’, since augmented with tax 
breaks.
The glaring omission of course is any comment whatever on consultative 
arrangements. The government supports information sharing, and some means of 
allowing employee input into planning, but this would seem to fall far short of joint 
problem solving. The government is silent meanwhile on ‘representation*. Blair 
signed Britain up for the Social Chapter, and he did provide the keynote address at 
the TUC’s ‘Partners for progress’ launch, where he argued that “Britain works best 
when unions and employers work together ”. However, the rhetoric belies an at best 
lukewarm enthusiasm for consultative forms of partnership, as evidenced by the 
outright hostility to the EC’s forthcoming directive on information and consultation.
Smith and Morton (2001) have further argued that the 1999 Employment Relations 
Act poses considerable obstacles to unions seeking recognition rights, and this too 
points to a reticent attitude toward promoting partnership, if the term is to be defined 
as an enduring and committed pact for mutual gain between more or less equal 
participants. While the 1999 reforms went some way toward redressing the 
imbalance between employer and employee on an individual basis, they fell well 
short of formal EU-style institutionalised structures.
Thus, in the present government’s eyes, in common with the IPA, partnership is 
about attitudes and behaviours. However, the IPA does recognise that different 
interests need to be addressed, and that established, formal joint problem solving
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structures are the best means of achieving this. Without mechanisms for consulting 
staff the government’s model of partnership seems to rely a great deal on the 
enlightened benevolence and humility of British employers -  neither of which has 
been much in evidence in the last 20 years (Wood, 2000).
The TUC model.
From specially-commissioned research (Cave, 1998) of 20 unionised firms that had 
gone down the partnership route, the TUC envisaged partnership straddling three 
related agendas: economic development, training, and the workplace. The latter 
involves "models o f work organisation that both enhance productivity and 
competitiveness and also give protection to the individual” (TUC, 1997). From this 
analysis emerged the six ‘principles’ of partnership that have since been formally 
adopted and promoted by the TUC (1999), and many of its affiliate unions:
1. Commitment to the success of the organisation (by which is meant a “shared 
understanding o f and commitment to, the business goals ” of the enterprise, 
“embracing best practice ” and “replacing adversarial employee relations ”).
2. Recognising legitimate interests (a principle that “underpins true 
partnership”, the “constructive engagement” implied distinguishes it from 
“sham” exercises in employee involvement; it necessarily implies a 
relationship based on “trust and respect”).
3. Commitment to employment security (reiterating the IPA search for a 
balance between flexible work practices and employment security, 
confirming that by the latter is meant no compulsory redundancies, and joint 
problem solving on staffing levels).
4. Focus on the quality of working life (by which is meant considerable 
resources ploughed into training and personal development).
5. Transparency (the ready dissemination of “hard and unvarnished” 
information, and an “openness ” about strategic and operational plans at the 
earliest “glint-in-the-eye” stage, with a commitment to at least consider 
alternative proposals), and finally -
6. Adding value (which, for the TUC, means organisational success, increased 
union influence, and secure jobs for employees/ members).
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As can be seen, the only significant differences between the TUC’s model and that 
of the IPA is the absence of the notion of trust, although trust-based relationships are 
considered the overarching objective of partnership. Also, we are required to assume 
that a unionised definition necessarily involves joint consultation, although this too 
is absent. The TUC places greater emphasis on quality of working life issues, such 
as job re-design, family-friendly policies, and training - although the IPA endorses 
training as part of a best practice employment security policy (IPA, 1997: p8).
The truly curious omission from both the TUC model, and that of the AEEU below, 
and indeed of any trade union interpretation of partnership, is the idea of employees 
“sharing the success ” of the enterprise, whether financially or otherwise. One can 
only speculate that unions avoid pay issues so as not to scare off future employer 
‘partners’, or even that the TUC avoids mention of pay systems other than those 
arrived at through collective bargaining to avoid alienating some of its affiliates, 
many of whom remain hostile to profit-sharing and employee share ownership.
The TUC is opposed to prescriptive restrictions on how its affiliate unions might 
interpret these guidelines, and Brown has duly noted substantial variation in themes 
and emphases (2000: p306).10
The AEEU model.
The AEEU trade union is at the forefront of the agenda for partnership at work. It 
lists its seven principles of ‘A partnership with British industry’ (AEEU, 1999) thus:
1. Developing trust through expanding quality communications
2. Joint commitment to profitable companies
3. The only basis for discrimination of any sort is competence
4. Enlarge motivation and commitment at work through lifelong learning
5. Encourage the flexible workforce through prioritising employment security
6. Respect each other’s institutions, cultures and reputations
7. Direct the focus of partnership outside towards our communities, customers 
and suppliers.
10 For example, the AEEU stresses high productivity, flexible work practices employment security, compulsory 
arbitration [and even no-strike deals] and regular consultation. The GMB concentrates on quality o f  working 
life, especially more interesting jobs, as a means fo r  securing employee commitment.
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On their own these principles would appear to offer little in the way of 
representative input for the union. Indeed, by deleting number 6, a non-unionised 
organisation could reasonably claim to be a ‘partnership’ organisation against these 
criteria.
The AEEU’s document expands upon how these principles are translated into 
practice, by way of an exchange of “pledges These include, in sketchy detail, a 
balance to be struck between employment security and flexibility, with the 
acceptance by the union that only profitable firms can offer employment security. 
Another pledge from managers to the union is for “a range o f consultation and 
communication systems, including regular contact with the union, that deal with 
issues o f concern to the worlforce before they are set in stone ” (ibid: p5).
What is meant by the consultative procedures is left unclear; there is no comment on 
the organisational level at which this should take place, or what the agenda should 
cover, or the nature of the consultation -  whether mere information sharing or more 
robust joint problem solving. There is also a call for jointly designed and transparent 
reward systems that “celebrate success”. Finally, and uniquely, the AEEU 
emphasises non-discriminatory policies and extending partnership beyond the 
workplace.
What is also not mentioned is the AEEU’s tolerance, and often vociferous support, 
for no-strike clauses as part of partnership arrangements. In 2001 the AEEU’s 
General Secretary, Sir Ken Jackson, called for an extension to the number of no­
strike deals signed by unions. This stance is controversial and has been subject to 
withering criticism from the Left of the union movement (see Walsh, 1999).
Additionally, it would seem from media reports of agreements hailed by the AEEU 
as a ‘partnership’ that few contain all of the elements of this ‘ideal-type’.
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The Guest and Peccei (1998) model.11
Guest and Peccei’s HRM-influenced model (Figure 2), based on survey responses 
from 82 IPA member organisations, shares clear commonalities with the IPA’s 
(Figure 1). Conceptually, partnership principles inform partnership practices, and the 
impact on organisational performance is refracted through transformations in 
employees’ attitudes and behaviours and improved employee relations.
Figure 2 -  The Guest and Peccei model (pi6).
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Guest and Peccei investigated the impact of 15 different principles (p23) integrated 
into 4 overall categories, and 8 categories of practices, comprising 33 different 
practices (pp25-27). Some break the IPA’s ‘building blocks’ down into distinct parts 
(for example, ‘information sharing and consultation’ is separated into direct and 
indirect forms, and then further according to subject matter); others meld IPA 
‘building blocks’ together (such as ‘communication’ with ‘harmonisation’ and 
‘employment security’), while a weakness is that only one option is offered for 
‘sharing success’ (employee share ownership), which unnecessarily excludes 
worthwhile alternatives such as gainsharing, profit-related pay and, for the public 
sector, non-monetary forms of celebrating achievement.
Their findings proved agnostic about the nature and impact of partnership. No less 
than 13 of the 15 principles generated noteworthy differences in adherence between 
‘high’ and Tow’ partnerships, with attention to employment security, sharing 
success and provision for an employee voice all significant (p6; pp22-23). The two 
omitted referred explicitly to more ‘radical’ pluralist process: employees’ control of 
their work and the right to collective representation. The practices which seemed to 
best instil positive employee attitudes and behaviours were flexible job re-designs,
11 All citations in this discussion are from the 1998 report, unless specified.
37
quality initiatives, and both direct and indirect participation combined -  albeit only 
on certain issues (p38). This particular ‘bundle’, plus employee share ownership, 
also produced the best overall results (2001: p232). However, most of the other 20- 
odd practices could also be found in ‘high’ partnerships, but statistical analysis did 
not bestow upon them significance.
This bundle resembles closely the IPA’s ‘building blocks’, except for the absence of 
‘employment security’, although this did feature as a principle and was found to 
contribute to a positive psychological contract (p38). Those organisations that 
allowed staff influence on policy decisions seemed to enjoy “considerable... pay­
offs in terms o f positive employee attitudes and behaviour” (p38), providing 
supporting evidence for the centrality of all-level joint problem solving and 
employee involvement. Representative participation on its own had a negative effect 
(2001: p232), and a lower level of union recognition was associated with high 
progress toward partnership (p31), which suggests that a ‘traditional’ industrial 
relations set-up, uninformed by ‘partnership’, is not sufficient. There is something 
qualitatively different about partnership. Depressingly, even among IPA members, 
evidence of partnership, and its parts, was limited.12
While Guest and Peccei’s bundle reinforces the essence of the IPA model, the 
latter’s simplicity allows within its principled parameters rather more flexible 
interpretations on partnership’s content and structure and, importantly, its less 
ambitious three principles are more likely to find favour. One would not expect to 
find too many ‘Guest and Peccei-style’ partnerships, given that this seems to require 
adherence to 13 demanding principles (p6) and use of the majority of 33 practices -  
and so it proved. But above all the IPA model avoids prescriptive concerns over 
structures and content to stress qualitative attention to improving processes, 
attitudes and behaviours, without which Guest and Peccei acknowledge partnership 
will not deliver (2001: p232).
Concluding remarks on the definition of partnership.
One’s appraisal of partnership depends on how one chooses to define it. To view it 
as “anything that involves a co-operative approach to employee relations ” (ACAS,
12Just 15 respondents were classified as ‘high ’-levelpartnerships (1998: p23).
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1999: p5) is too vague to be helpful. To move the debate forward one must make a 
judgement on which set of principles and practices best constitutes a ‘partnership’.
For the reasons outlined above, it is my view that the IPA’s model corresponds 
closest to a realistic, mutually beneficial exchange that has as its core the 
development of trust-based relationships; other models are either too vague, lack 
internal coherence (omitting key elements, such as consultation with staff, sharing 
success or provisions for employment security) or too ambitious to be realistic. The 
IPA model, while prone to loose terminology on occasion, does contain all of the 
central elements, and as I outline in chapter three, these elements dovetail neatly 
with requirements for the development of mutual trust at work.
The partnership debate: scepticism and dissent.
In this section I discuss some of the debates surrounding partnership. I analyse, 
firstly, the partnership phenomenon according to the different frames of reference 
(cf. Fox) pertaining to the employment relationship. This leads on to an assessment 
of the debate over whether the presence of a trade union is a necessary pre-condition 
of a partnership. From there I go on to review the criticisms of partnership, primarily 
from the Left (the Right wing of industrial relations thinking has been content to 
monitor partnership’s modest progress, and only occasionally has seen fit to 
comment on what is considered an otherwise peripheral issue). This includes the 
argument that partnership is nothing new. Finally, I provide an overview of the 
(scant) evidence for the UK’s incidence of partnership.
Partnership and ‘frames of reference’.
Ackers and Payne (1998), and Guest and Peccei (2001), have each drawn attention 
to the fact that partnership’s “elasticity” has produced guises that reflect different 
frames of reference. (This can be seen from the disparate varieties of partnership 
definitions in Table 1 above, and the list of known partnership organisations in 
Appendix 1.) The debate over which frame of reference is best reflected in 
‘partnership: the 1990s version’ provides us with a helpful lens through which to 
assess the concept.
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From the definition set out above, it is difficult to envisage partnership as offering 
anything other than an explicitly pluralist view of the employment relationship. 
However, many commentators -  from all political hues -  disagree. Unitarist models 
for managing people that use the term ‘partnership’ (see Blinder, 1990) aim to solicit 
individual employees’ psychological stake in the company through ‘High- 
Commitment Management’ [HCM], financial participation, and modest local-level 
direct employee participation in decision-making. This attention to securing 
employee commitment to the goals of the enterprise, and the downplaying of 
provisions for an employee voice, is considered evidence of partnership’s unitarism. 
In the conclusion to the IRS special on partnership (IRS, 2000a: p6, also p48), which 
reviewed both unionised and non-union case studies, Paul Suff felt that this search
13for employee commitment necessarily cast partnership in the umtanst camp.
Fox argued (1974a) that this kind of small-scale devolvement of responsibility can 
only imply a lack of confidence in employees, and a preference for managerial diktat 
over joint problem solving. It runs the risk of being one-sided, short-lived, faddish 
and prone to abandonment when challenged. Furthermore, an honest researcher 
speaking to shop stewards and shopfloor employees in partnership organisations 
would become quickly disavowed of any impression that the workforce is “one 
happy team Conflict of interest continues to exist, even with all parties committed 
to success.
Having said this, many participants’ descriptions of partnership, from HR managers 
as much as from full-time union officials, do on occasion reveal strongly unitarist 
thinking. Guest and Peccei found evidence of such in their 54-strong sample, such as 
very low assent to the statement, "The goals o f the business and the employees are 
incompatible” -  7% (1998: p21; also pl3).14
If partnership looks unconvincing in unitarist forms, it does not fit comfortably 
within a radicalist frame of reference (cf. Edwards) either. Many partnership 
advocates accept the radicalist view that the employment relationship is in "constant
13 His research methodology is likely to have skewed his conclusions, since his interviews were confined in the 
main to HR managers only.
14 While reflecting sincere appraisals o f  their improved employee relations, the choice o f  words is, I  suggest, at 
least in part an attempt to ‘sell ’ the partnership approach to the sceptical, as well as perhaps to exaggerate both 
the scale o f  the change and their own input...
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flux ”, and even that conflict is inherent. However, most argue that this conflict can 
be negotiated into a stable, compatible ‘order’. Radicalists deride partnership as a 
"chimera ” (cf. Whitston, 2001), while Marxists view partnership as a capitulation 
by the representatives of workers, co-opted on to the management agenda, thereby 
surrendering labour’s “ability to defend its own interests against the interests o f 
capital” (IPA: p i8). Neither can envisage a form of partnership ever existing 
between employer and employed. (See below for their critiques of partnership.)
Partnership then is an explicitly pluralist form of understanding and managing the 
employment relationship. At least, it is in the sophisticated forms that do justice to 
the word. The term itself implies two or more separate agents and interests -  the 
‘partners’ -  engaging in collaboration for a common pursuit. While effort is required 
to mediate an acceptable compromise (a “negotiated order”), the crucial point is 
that this is possible. All parties use partnership to manage the potential for conflict in 
a mutually beneficial way. The primary concern is, as I have argued, what form this 
takes. As one interviewee for the Hayne and Allen research in Legal & General and 
Tesco argued, “With partnership comes a rediscovery o f pluralistic industrial 
relations ” (Hayne and Allen, 1999).
In the form articulated and advocated by the IPA, it is apparent that in calling for 
companies to “recognise the legitimate role o f each partner” (especially, the 
“interests o f the employees”), and to “build trust” a distinction is being drawn 
between the interests of the employer and the employees. Indeed, in rejecting the 
RSA’s absurdly optimistic model the IPA argued explicitly for the pluralist 
viewpoint:
“Employees have their own interests which are separate from those o f the 
business. To achieve alignment o f those interests means firstly recognising their 
independence” (IPA: p i7).
John Monks described partnership’s purpose as “managing these sometimes 
divergent interests better” (Monks & Stevens, 1998: p8). John Knell, on behalf of 
the DTI, agreed; partnership is pluralist in outlook (Knell, 1999). Ackers and Payne 
(1998) debated this point at length, noting the differing interpretations of 
partnership. Their assessment of the IPA model is that it “draws a bridge between 
pluralist readings o f partnership and 1980s employee involvement” (1998: p541); it
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is an “imperfect mix” (p533). This accords with Guest and Peccei’s “hybrid” 
categorisation: broadly pluralist, with clear support for representative systems but 
also direct forms of employee involvement and the pursuit of mutual gains (2001: 
p210). They make the telling point that the mutuality in partnership is not a final 
resolution of conflict, but “constrained... with the balance o f advantage, in terms o f 
principles endorsed and practices in place, leaning clearly toward management” 
(ibid: p231). Hayne and Allen (1999) echo this insight: for them partnership is 
“constrained adversarialism ” in a context of co-operation.
These awkward delineations within the pluralist camp can be further illustrated by 
reflections on Fox’s categorisations of strategies for managing employee relations 
(Fox, 1974a). Partnership best fits the “sophisticated-modern” approach, eliciting 
strong commitment from the workforce to the company’s goals through a 
‘constructive’ relationship with trade unions incorporated into the decision-making 
of the organisation. However, in non-unionised settings partnership most closely 
resembles the “sophisticated-paternal” approach whereby a set of progressive and 
employee-focussed policies offset the absence of independent employee 
representation as the employer looks after its workforce’s interests, obviating the 
need for a union.
Of the typologies of employee representation provided by Hyman (1997: p323) -  
“soft HRM”, “bleak house”, “regulated market” and “micro-concertation” [after 
Regini] - it is clear that, at least if defined by the IPA’s model, partnership would fit 
most appropriately in the last category (confirmed by Tailby & Winchester, 2000: 
p369): what Hyman calls collaborative workplace relations typically borne out of an 
ongoing historical conflict. However, not all partnerships conform to this last pre­
condition, and so some may resemble a ‘soft HRM’.
Finally, partnership resembles a strong form of an organisation-level “constitutional 
order” (Sabel, 1997) for controlling relationships, wherein the constituent units 
jointly establish a set of rules and parameters governing the conduct of their 
relations, the alternatives being “hierarchy” (unilateral imposition of order from 
super-ordinates to their sub-ordinates) and “market ” (independent entities negotiate 
the terms of each interaction fresh each time):
42
“Constitutional orders do best when there are co-ordination problems that 
markets in their pure form cannot solve and the pace o f change -  the rate at which 
*new states o f the world ’ are being created -  outpaces the adaptive qualities o f 
hierarchies” (Sabel, 1997: pl59; see also Lane, 1998).
Of course, industrial relations conducted by adversarial collective bargaining is also 
an example of a ‘constitutional order’, but, I suggest, collaborative, trust-based, 
genuine partnership is a more efficient variant (see chapter two).
Non-union partnership.
If then partnership is a pluralist form of understanding and managing the 
employment relationship, the presence of a trade union ought to be a pre-requisite, 
argue the unions and their sympathisers. They maintain that un-represented workers 
lack the safeguards provided by professional and trained representatives, and the 
strength of collective action. Only unions can provide the independence, strength 
and wealth of networking experience that permits effective consultative 
arrangements throughout an organisation (see USDAW, 1998: p3).
The IPA Director argues instead that a union is not essential. The real issue is 
whether employee voice is “adequately and freely represented”, and that the 
organisation responds (Coupar, in conversation with author). The IPA supports 
works councils, or staff forums (Tailby & Winchester, op cit: p376) and notes the 
very successful councils operated by the John Lewis Partnership. Knell (op cit) 
considered that the differences between partnership in the non-unionised and 
unionised firms that he examined were negligible, and IRS researchers even 
suggested that non-union forms were often “more developed and deeper-rooted” 
(IRS, 2000a: p39), although Guest and Peccei (2001) note that good employee 
consultation is more likely to be observed in representative forms.
One explanation for non-unionised forms is as part of a deliberate union avoidance 
strategy. As Guest and Peccei found, even IPA member organisations expressed a 
somewhat equivocal attitude toward the true and enduring value of unions: 40% saw 
no role for them (18% “strongly” agreeing). 40% considered their presence to be 
necessary.
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The list in Appendix 1 reveals that non-union partnerships are rare. They are often 
employee-owned, or the organisation has long subscribed to overtly paternalistic 
founding principles. But this evidence does lend support to the conviction that 
partnership need not involve trade unions.
The “cancer” of partnership.15
Partnership has not been universally welcomed. There are several dissenting voices 
urging caution and even counter-insurgency. Militant commentators (including John 
Kelly, Tim Claydon, Gregor Gall, and Colin Whitston) believe that the assault on 
collective action, and the cowed and conciliatory stances of union leaders, have so 
lowered workers’ aspirations that ‘partnership’ is considered an advance, and not a 
capitulation.
Claydon (1998) contends that partnership co-opts, or "enrols”, unions into a 
management agenda that they are in no position, ideologically or practically, to 
assist, and from which - should a serious conflict of interest arise - they would be 
unlikely to be able to extricate themselves. Whitston, in an unpublished paper to the 
BUIRA conference (2001), also saw unions’ involvement in the management agenda 
as coming from a "'position o f weakness ”. Claydon reasserts the value to trade 
unions of enduring sentiments of ‘us and them’.
Kelly (1996: pp95-96) criticises unions’ “moderate” strategy under partnership for 
diminishing perceptions of the presence and impact of the inherent conflict within 
the employment relationship. At its worst, the moderate stance of partnership sub­
ordinates trade union ideology to the needs of capital. He warns trade unionists 
against a “policy-neutral contingency approach” (i.e.: one that co-opts union 
ideology to furthering the organisation’s goals).
Kelly (1999) has sought, through data sets on pay and terms and conditions in 
partnership and non-partnership companies, to test who benefits from partnership 
deals. On pay Blue Circle Cement, a partnership company, compared favourably 
with its alleged non-partnership rivals (one of which, Castle Cement, has claimed 
‘partnership’ status -  see Appendix 1), while Welsh Water was indeed low in
15 A contributor used the word “cancer " to describe partnership in a Marxist Group seminar at the LSE, 2000.
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comparison to other regional water companies. But their pay rates were negotiated in 
reference to the local market rate. In addition, both data sets omit share ownership 
and profit sharing. On job losses, both Blue Circle and Welsh Water have managed 
through more job losses than non-partnership companies, but the counter-argument 
from partnership proponents (see Warren, 1999) would be that the redundancy 
programmes were managed jointly, and can be said to have received majority 
workforce support. The real statistic of value, is the number of permanent 
displacements (i.e.: the number of employees who lost their employed status 
involuntarily) since at Blue Circle, for example, their partnership managed the 
closure of two cement works such that 76 of the 250 employees were re-located to 
other UK plants, and only 13 ‘signed on’ as unemployed (Warren, ibid).
Kelly concludes (op cit) that the unions have been co-opted onto an aggressive 
management agenda, requiring them to promote partnership and de-mobilise any 
workforce resistance. He too seeks to retain an antagonistic stance informed by ‘us 
and them’ ideology and a policy-based contingency, arguing that the modest 
advantages of moderation are inferior compared to the gains available through 
increased “militancy” (Kelly, 1996).
I return to this misunderstanding that partnership necessarily diminishes ‘us and 
them’ sentiments later; suffice to mention here that D’Art and Turner’s research in 
Ireland found that ‘us and them’ attitudes persist, even while behaviours change 
toward co-operation. Increased personal contact, the introduction of a common or 
super-ordinate goal and employee participation in co-operative initiatives with 
managers all shift attitudes (1999: p i03-4).
The majority of dissenting commentators concentrate on the ‘ideology’ issues 
surrounding partnership - rather than on the set of practices that embodies it (Kelly’s 
ongoing work being the sole exception) - and in particular they analyse partnership’s 
impact on trade unions. In doing so, they make the mistake of equating partnership 
solely with unionised organisations when, as I have argued, it is a set of practices 
that can apply equally to non-unionised organisations, as well.
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Thus, while these criticisms may be pertinent to the internal debate within trade 
unions they do not land a direct hit on the concept of partnership itself. There is 
certainly an argument to be had about the instrumentality of trade unions engaging 
in partnership arrangements: do only weak/ right-wing unions get involved, and 
strong unions reject partnership? But, as Metcalf has commented (in The Guardian, 
15 September 1999), and as the evidence in Appendix 1 suggests, very powerful and 
even left-wing trade unions are involved in partnership, including the RMT and 
GPMU. There is a further legitimate concern that these new forms of consultation 
with staff may undermine established rights to more robust input into decision­
making won through collective bargaining, but the IPA does not intend for 
partnership consultation to replace or marginalise trade union bargaining or 
negotiation, but to complement and enhance it.
As to the argument that partnership is nothing new, the latest “old wine in new 
bottles”, the chapter on context sets out an argument that what I call ‘the 1990s 
version’ of partnership is just that; the latest attempt to inculcate a spirit of 
collaboration in British workplaces, the most recent model for structures and 
processes. It is not a new idea.
However, in its unique focus on developing collaborative attitudes and behaviours, 
especially mutual trust, partnership is conceptually distinct from related 
programmes. The medium through which organisational improvements are sought is 
not corporatist joint power-sharing (in the co-determination sense) or adversarial 
collective bargaining. Its inclusion of direct forms of employee participation and 
consultation, and more inclusive and regular discussions between management 
teams and employee representatives, distinguishes partnership from traditional 
collective bargaining, however collaborative. Nor are organisational improvements 
sought through employees’ unitarist commitment to company goals (as in HRM). 
Munro and Rainbird followed this line, dismissing partnership as “merely a new 
label for employee participation initiatives aimed at facilitating change with worker 
and union consent ” (2000: p226), while Marchington has wondered (1998) whether 
partnership is a catch-all term for employee involvement or ‘best practice’ HRM. I 
hope to have demonstrated in this chapter that the more detailed conceptualisations 
present rather more than either of these limited, even sceptical perspectives.
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Partnership is best seen as a ‘halfway house’ -  a “hybrid” or “imperfect mix” - of 
jointly designed co-operative processes that allow for joint problem solving for 
mutual gain. In this, it more closely resembles the “integrative” rather than the 
“distributive” bargaining systems formulated by Walton and McKersie (1965), and 
the ‘win-win’/ ‘non-fixed sum’ rather than the ‘win-lose/ fixed sum’ situations 
described in game theory (cf. Axelrod, 1984): “I t ’s not the same conflict... unions 
have a chance to influence the decision before it is taken” (Blue Circle’s Derek 
Warren, in IRS, 2000b: plO).
More damagingly, potentially, is the accusation that partnership is little more than a 
fad, and that it distracts attention from more urgent campaigns for legislative 
protection of employees. It is too early to tell, of course, but as I argue in the chapter 
on context, the political and public policy environment in which partnership has (re-) 
emerged is unusually favourable.
Evidence of partnership.
An important caveat here: in 1997 the Institute of Employment Rights reminded us 
that partnership is “simply not on the agenda o f most workplaces in Britain, and this 
is shown in the rise o f inequality and insecurity” (cited in Overell, 1997: p29).
This is undeniable, especially after examining the data from the Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey (Cully et al, 1998; 2000). Partnership as defined by the 
IPA remains extremely rare in Britain. An approximation of the model can be 
created as follows using the WERS data set:
■ ‘Management strongly agree that employees are led to expect long-term 
employment within the enterprise’ = employment security;
■ ‘Contingent pay based on profit or some other measure of workplace or 
enterprise performance’ = sharing in the success of the enterprise;
■ ‘The presence of a consultative committee, workforce briefings and 
employee involvement in problem solving at both company and workplace 
level’ = information sharing and consultation; and -
■ For argument’s sake, ‘union recognition’ = provision for an independent 
employee voice.
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According to WERS98, just 0.68% of all private sector workplaces have partnership 
institutions.16 Even with the limitation imposed by the presence of a union, this is 
surely pitiful. Take-up of individual partnership components is similarly low (see 
Table 2).
The TUC’s figure of verified partnership organisations was 85 at the launch of their 
Partnership Institute (in the Financial Times, 21 January 2001). From my database I 
consider there to be no more than 62 examples o f genuine, IPA-style partnership 
organisations in Britain (see Appendix 2), although it is highly probable that more 
do exist that I am unaware of.
Table 2 -  Partnership practices (as depicted by WERS 1998 data):
Partnership practice All
workplaces
Consultative committee at both company and workplace level 11%
Consultative committee at company level 28%
Problem-solving groups 42%
Team briefings for groups o f employees 61%
Formally designated team working [i.e.: a form of flexible working] 65%
Employee share ownership scheme (for non-managerial employees) 15%
Profit-sharing (for non-managerial employees) 30%
Single-status terms and conditions/ harmonisation 41%
Guaranteed employment security/ no compulsory redundancies. 14%'7
There have been just two large-scale research projects into the extent of 
‘partnership’ in the UK: an IRS survey of 50 self-selecting companies (1997), and 
Guest and Peccei’s benchmarking exercise of 82 partnership companies on behalf of 
the IPA (1998; 2001). The IRS survey found that 27 of the 50 “sometimes ” or 
“always” used ‘power sharing’ -  the type that most closely resembles the IPA’s 
understanding of partnership -  although in fact only two (Blue Circle Cement and 
Caradon) ticked “always ”,
Guest and Peccei’s research found surprisingly little evidence of the “essential 
building blocks” of the IPA model, even among the IPA’s own members. In fact, of 
the 82 respondents 23 had a ‘high’ partnership profile, 32 had a ‘medium’ rating, 
and 27 were examples of Tow’ level partnership. Guest and Peccei found few
16 A preliminary figure provided by a PhD colleague at the Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
17 Employment security guarantees exist in only 6% o f  private sector workplaces.
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policies addressing employment security: 27% had a formal commitment over a 
fixed term, while only 19% offered a formal guarantee of no-compulsory 
redundancy (1998: p27). Those that did tended to have made most progress toward 
partnership, while those “who have made least progress seem to display particularly 
low support for principles associated with employee’s security and well-being” 
(1998: p22). Their agnostic assessment of the contribution of direct and indirect 
forms of representative participation points to enduring exclusion of employees from 
decisions affecting them (ibid: p31), with only a quarter reporting that staff plan 
their own work and can influence the way their section is organised (p6). As for 
input into strategic concerns, the “level o f participation in, and influence over, 
employment issues is greater than that over broader policy issues ” (p25). Further, 
the reported animosity toward trade unions among the Guest and Peccei respondents 
tends to point one toward the conclusion that, even in some best practice examples, 
old structures, old perceptions and old behaviours remain intact.
More positively, a third of the companies surveyed had a profit sharing or employee 
share ownership scheme for over 90% of their workforce (p26). Having said that, 
Guest and Peccei report a weak link between employee share ownership and the 
principles of partnership (p28), so the relationship is difficult to pin down 
satisfactorily. Of the 82 organisations, the overwhelming majority had made 
considerable progress toward harmonisation and single-status conditions.
Such a dearth of major concessions on the part of management to their workforce, in 
exchange for flexibility, would seem to be hindering progress toward partnership, 
undermining management’s business aspirations (IPA, 1997: p8), and potentially 
exacerbating the very conflict of interests that a pluralist model such as the IPA’s is 
seeking to redress. Guest and Peccei hint as much in their closing remarks:
“Organisations still have considerable scope to display greater trust in 
employees and greater direct participation and autonomy over work” (1998: p43).
It is to the notion of trust that I now turn.
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Chapter 2. Trust.
In January 2000 Clive Morton, once of partnership company Anglian Water, was 
leading a workshop session at the AnUMan industrial relations conference when, 
running down a list of key processes involved in establishing partnership, he came to 
the word ‘trust’: “Like so many other four-letter words, ‘trust’ is thrown about 
indiscriminately, and much abused” (author’s notes).
Morton’s gaffe served to emphasise the distortions that this simplest of words has 
suffered, especially in the debate about partnership, but also the widespread 
significance of trust in employee relations during the latter part of the 1990s.
In almost every case study on partnership, trust is invoked as a critical factor. 
Representatives from ‘partnership’ companies assert boldly that the transformation 
in employee relations has been produced by, or has generated, this elusive element. 
Yet seldom is it discussed what trust in industrial/ employment relations means or 
entails, nor what its implications are for ‘partnership’ of managing work. It is thus as 
important to reclaim an accurate definition o f ‘trust’ as it is for ‘partnership’ itself.
Why trust at work? Why now?
While there has been over 40 years of academic study on trust among economists, 
psychologists, and anthropologists, and increasingly sociologists, only recently has it 
entered the literature of management and industrial relations to a significant degree, 
Alan Fox’s ‘Beyond Contract’ (1974a) being a notable exception. The prevalence of 
references to, if not yet serious discussions of, trust would seem to be a relatively 
new trend. The IPD’s Research Adviser, John Baillie, commemorated this with 
something approaching incredulity in a 1995 commentary entitled, ‘Trust: a new 
concept in the management o f people? ’ (Baillie, 1995).
This finding has bemused me too in the course of my research. One is hard pressed 
to find anything more substantial than a smattering of brief citations for the concept 
in key industrial relations texts; where the idea is discussed it is typically in 
reference to Fox. This is an extraordinary omission in the literature, and it is difficult 
to account for its prolonged absence.
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Trust has now begun to permeate management literature again with, for example, the 
Academy of Management devoting an entire volume to the issue in 1998 (volume 
23, number 3, from where much of what follows is drawn), and Miles and Snow’s 
‘human investment model’, which is based on “the assumption that organisation 
members will flourish only in an atmosphere o f mutual trust and respect — the sort 
accorded to business partners and professional colleagues ” (2000: p457). In the 
same volume, Sparrow argues that trust is now “at a premium in modem 
organisations” (2000: p416). More pertinent to the debate on partnership, Guest and 
Peccei point to trust as offering a fruitful research agenda: “Clearly there is more to 
be done on the role o f trust in effective partnership at work... to identify the 
processes that must be in place for high trust to emerge” (2001: p232).
In this chapter I draw together the best of the available management literature on 
trust, with some cross-pollination with the work of sociologists, to present a 
definition of this elusive element. The particulars of the definition are discussed in 
detail. I go on to analyse the several theories and models that seek to show how trust 
is established, drawing on the trust literature, as well as game theory, and Walton 
and McKersie’s theory of labour negotiations. In chapter three I answer the question: 
what is it about partnership forms of managing employee relations that might be 
expected to improved levels of mutual trust? I distil the lessons from chapter one (on 
partnership) with the lessons from this chapter (on trust) to present my own model 
for establishing trust through partnership.
Definitions of trust.
Trust is in fact present to some extent in every social exchange, for between one’s 
own choice of action and another’s behavioural response, two elements render that 
response, if not unknowable, then at best difficult to predict (Simmel, 1950, cited by 
Lane, 1998: plO; also Misztal, 1995: p79). First, there is a time-lapse between an 
action and the response, allowing the responding party to filter through possible 
options (such as whether to harm us or not to harm us). Thus we have to cope with 
the absence of an instantaneous, predictable reaction and the time allowed to think. 
This uncertainty produces a risk that necessitates a degree, however small, of trust. 
Secondly, there are information deficiencies. We do not know, and often cannot 
know, the other party’s motives, moods, strategies and tactics, or the resource
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implications informing her/his response. But we must prepare for a set of possible 
actions, so we develop coping mechanisms for (almost) every eventuality. Total 
coercion mitigates against uncertainty, of course, but is seldom available as an 
option. Trust is another option; indeed, trust has been described as a coping 
mechanism for others’ freedom (Peccei, 1997).
So how has trust been defined? In its essence, trust is understood to be a belief one 
holds about another party. While it can be formalised in an agreement, and this helps 
to commit parties to fulfilling the implied behaviours, trust derives its true strength 
less from the wording of an agreement, than from the extent to which parties believe 
it to be present in a relationship. This belief then leads crucially to a set of 
obligations and behavioural expectations emerging between the two or more parties. 
(Such norms may not be sufficient to sustain trust, as we shall see.)
Among the most concise definitions of this belief, the one that I prefer above all 
others is that of Lewicki, McAllister and Bies, where trust is “confident positive 
expectations regarding another’s conduct... in a context o f personal risk” (1998: 
p439), or Boon and Holmes’ near-identical definition, wherein trust is “a state 
involving confident positive expectations about another’s motives with respect to 
oneself in situations entailing risk” (1991: p i94). Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and 
Camerer broadly concur. For them, trust is “a psychological state comprising the 
intention to accept vulnerability [to another] based upon positive expectations o f the 
intentions or behaviour o f another” (1998: p395). Whitener and colleagues 
emphasise the parties’ positive motives with their conceptualisation that trust 
“reflects an expectation or belief that the other party will act benevolently” 
(Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998: p513). Barney and Hansen rely on 
Sabel’s definition: “mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit 
another’s vulnerability” (Barney & Hansen, 1994: p i76). Sparrow cites Clark and 
Payne (1997) who view trust as “a willingness to rely or depend upon some 
externality ”, with “the specific expectation that the actions from such externalities 
will be beneficial rather than detrimental” (Sparrow, 2000: p425). Finally, 
Gambetta’s rather over-elaborate definition -  based on agency theory - captures 
many of the nuances:
“Trust... is a particular level o f the subjective probability with which an 
agent assesses that another agent or group o f agents will perform a particular
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action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently o f his ever being 
able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action... the 
probability that [the other agent or agents] will perform an action that is beneficial 
to us or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in 
some form o f co-operation with him” (Gambetta, 1988: p217; see also Mayer et al’s 
similarly convoluted definition in Jones & George, 1998: p532).
All of these definitions share seven key conceptual points. I have broken these into 
two strands: four involve defining the relationship concerned, while three define the 
psychological content of trust.
The first straightforward point to make is that "... the essential character o f all trust 
relations is their reciprocal nature” (Fox, 1974a: p67). It requires at least two 
parties to engage in a trust-based relationship, because it requires that each party 
expose themselves to vulnerability. We may speak of trusting oneself (or not), but in 
truth, unless we are pre-adolescent or severely mentally impaired, we are responsible 
for, and in control of, our actions. Accordingly, while tempting and reassuring, it is 
in fact illogical to consider oneself to be vulnerable to oneself. Clark and Payne’s 
identification of dependence on an externality is helpful here (1997). Gambetta 
highlights the mutuality principle when he notes that “it is necessary not only to 
trust others before acting co-operatively, but also to believe that one is trusted by 
others” (op cit: p216).
Secondly, trust must exist in a context of risk. Trust is “particularly relevant in 
conditions o f ignorance or uncertainty with respect to unknown or unknowable 
actions ” from the other party (Gambetta, op cit: p218). Trust is of trivial value if one 
enjoys certain knowledge about the other’s intentions and actions; it “cannot exist 
without the possibility o f being in error” (Bhattacharya, Devinney & Pillutla, 1998: 
p462). The “mutual dependence” between the parties (Lane, 1998: p3; Bachman, 
1998: p302; also Rousseau et al, 1998: p395) distinguishes trust from other forms of 
securing co-operation, such as power.
Relatedly, and significantly, in order that trust be meaningful there must be the 
possibility of exit from the relationship, or for defection or betrayal by the other 
party. Trust cannot exist under coercion. The relationship must be freely entered 
into, and there should be an alternative course available; the person with no option
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hopes rather than trusts. Both parties ought to be in a position to damage the other, 
and there must be in place mechanisms for coping with the fall-out from risk. (This 
has implications for the content of partnership agreements, which I discuss in 
chapter three.) This mutual risk distinguishes it from Fox’s analogy of the parents 
having to trust the kidnapper when he says he will return their daughter if they pay 
the ransom; clearly a negative arrangement based on coercion. Moreover, trust 
becomes “increasingly salient for our decisions and actions the larger the feasible 
set o f alternative actions are open to others ” (Gambetta, op cit: p218).
Trust also needs time to develop. It is iterative, emerging through “repeated 
exchanges o f benefits between two parties” (Whitener, et al, op cit: p515). Repeated 
demonstrations of trustworthy actions "generate a spiral o f rising trust” (Fox, 
1974a: p71). This insight has its roots in social exchange theory, whereby parties 
develop an understanding over a series of interactions. In experiments using the 
prisoners’ dilemma scenario (discussed below) trust in any meaningful sense almost 
never develops in relationships involving only one interaction -  it is simply not a 
sensible tactic - and it rarely emerges during the first handful of exchanges. 
However, as we shall see in the section on game theory, calculative suspicion for the 
first exchange of an ongoing relationship is a tactical error. If relations are ongoing, 
the issue no longer concerns “how much ”, but “in what areas and in what ways ” 
should the parties trust each other (Rousseau et al, op cit: p398).
The reason for this is that the belief ‘trust’ is considerably less than absolute 
certainty; instead it is an “expectation” based on evidence. It is a “probability”, 
evaluated according to a calculation of the risk, and the likely future behaviour of 
the other party. As Zand’s definition illustrates, trust is the “conscious regulation o f 
one’s dependence on another” (Zand, 1972 -  my emphasis). For McAllister, 
"evidence that a peer’s behaviour is consistent with norms o f reciprocity and 
fairness and that the peer follows through on commitments is vital” (1995: p28). It 
cannot be willed into existence (Gambetta, 1988: p220). In order to make such a 
probability judgement, before serious contemplation of trust, a series of interactions 
is required, ideally in a range of settings (Lewicki, McAllister & Bies, 1998: p443), 
to gather a sufficient body of credible evidence. Such an appraisal of the available 
knowledge, and the presence of ‘good reasons’, serve as the foundations for trust
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decisions, according to McAllister (1995: p26). This too has implications for what 
can be considered a ‘partnership’. This also allows one to assess the trustworthiness 
of the other party’s competence, as well as their motives, because one may trust 
someone’s motives, but doubt whether they can fulfil their promise. Gambetta cited 
experimental evidence to endorse the "fundamental importance o f long-term 
arrangements ” (my emphasis), as well as of "the absence o f potentially aggressive 
devices, o f the lack o f ambiguity in what people co-operate about, and o f a step-by- 
step increase in the risk involved” (Gambetta, op cit: p230). Each of these 
components in a relationship helps to constrain self-interest, and so can help to 
promote co-operation, and if successful in this, can “reinforce” trust. The 
expectation of likely positive behaviour is a pre-requisite of trust in Luhmann’s view 
(1979), as it reduces the complexity of social engagement, for to express genuine 
trust in another, as defined here, imposes considerable constraints on the other’s 
options, and encourages reciprocity.
This expectation involves a "strength o f feeling” (Bhattacharya at al, op cit: p462). 
The probability of not being on the receiving end of personally detrimental 
behaviour "is high enough to consider engaging in some from o f co-operation ” (my 
emphasis), and it means "believing that when offered the chance, the other person is 
not likely to behave in a way which is damaging to us” (Gambetta, op cit: p219). For 
Sheppard and Sherman trust is "a manageable act o f fa ith” (1998: p422). As 
Misztal writes, "what makes trust so puzzling is that to trust involves more than 
believing; in fact, to trust is to believe despite uncertainty” (1995: pi 8).
It is clear then that this judgement goes beyond hopefulness. This crucially 
distinguishes it from blind faith or stupidity, for to make oneself vulnerable to 
another without assessing the evidence in favour of such a decision is surely blind 
faith or stupidity. It ought not to be viewed as trust. This may be pedantic semantics, 
but is important to understand the difference when one is judging the extent and 
quality, if any, of trust in a relationship. Drawing reasonable conclusions from a 
sufficient body of evidence refutes Garfmkel’s claim (in Lane, op cit: pi 1) that trust 
is "unreflective ”. Just as importantly, this insight responds to Marxists’ predictable 
retort that both trust and partnership are the products of ‘false consciousness’ on the 
part of workers. It is not.
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There are however two problems with trust being conditional on an appraisal of 
evidence. When undergoing a surgical operation, or (in the UK) boarding a train, we 
have no evidence in advance, beyond that conferred by the -  assumed - 
qualifications and training that the doctor or train driver has received that (s)he can 
be trusted to be competent and behave in a non-detrimental manner toward us. It is 
chilling to reflect that, under the definition expounded here, our decision to continue 
in the relationship is predicated on blind faith in that individual. However, we can 
trust whoever does that job - or, at least, we hope we can. We base this decision on 
our prior experience of similar employees in that position, and on society’s generally 
assumed confidence in the motives and competence of our doctors and train drivers.
1 o
In short, we trust the job-holder, rather than the individual. This theoretical 
paradox at the heart of trusting strangers is interesting, but fortunately, for 
employment relations processes, I would argue that it is an incidental concern. It is 
inconceivable that either party in the employment relationship would be asked to 
trust the other party without having met them, or viewed (either at first hand or 
indirectly) the consequences of their individual behaviour. (This has implications for 
the spread of trust-based relationships at work, as we shall see.)
Between whom is the trust being forged is an important question. Salamon is correct 
when he notes that trust can only be established between “people rather than 
between organisational collectivities called 'management’ and ‘union’: inter- 
organisational trust stems from intra-organisational [and, I argue here, inter­
personal] trust” (Salamon, 1998: p79).
A problem of course is that, even in the face of evidence, trust can be unwittingly 
misplaced. And, in the event of a complete abuse of trust, what safeguards are 
available to the weaker party? As Barney and Hansen ruefully comment, “some 
level o f compensation will always exist where strong-form trustworthy partners will 
abandon their values, principles and standards o f behaviour, and act in
18 This trust is being eroded. Horrific incidents in the late 1990s, such as the Shipman murders and the 
Paddington and Hatfield train crashes, have ruptured these trust bonds; indeed, Harold Shipman killed his 
victims after they had visited him many times. He had earned their trust. The Marxist sociologist Frank Furedi 
has condemned the near-hysterical reaction to these notorious incidents fo r  the harmful impact o f  such 
widespread paranoia on fellow human beings ‘ trust fo r  each other. The problem o f  restoring societal levels o f  
trust is one that exercises the minds o f  many.
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opportunistic ways” (1994: p i79). I return to this awkward paradox in my 
conclusion.
Lewicki, McAllister and Bies do rather muddy the waters further with their assertion 
that one can simultaneously trust and distrust a party, depending on the 
circumstances. Trust and distrust are thus "distinct, but potentially co-existing 
mechanisms for managing complexity ” (op cit: p440). They offer a four-fold 
typology of “high trust/ low distrust; high trust/ high distrust; low trust/ low distrust 
and low trust/high distrust” (ibid: p445), with ‘high trust/ high distrust’ deemed to 
be most prevalent in organisations, and the optimum ‘high trust/ low distrust’ 
viewed with some concern as potentially a form of blindness. The presence of both 
trust and distrust -  what Lewicki, McAllister and Bies term “ambivalence” - 
highlights the fact that parties can accommodate contradictions and errors, while still 
judging the quality of trust overall to be worthwhile pursuing. Or they can remain 
ambivalent and non-committal. Trust is therefore “compartmentalised and 
aggregated” (ibid); see the degrees of trust (depicted in Figure 3, and discussed 
below). I personally would not choose to call this ‘ambivalence’, but a form of 
sophisticated evaluative trust.
Finally, and crucially, trust is a desired state - “an attractive option ” (Gambetta, op 
cit: p219). It is “good” and “important” (Bhattacharya et al, 1998: p462). Each 
party must want to engage in such a relationship. Parties ought to expect tangible 
benefits from the relationship. Deutsch highlighted this element when he wrote of 
trust as embodying the expectation that one will experience “what is expected rather 
than what is feared” (cited in McAllister, 1995: p25). Of course, one can expect 
what one fears, and so the positive nature of trust-based relations becomes valuable 
as a defining characteristic, as in Lewicki, McAllister and Bies’ definition. With this 
in mind, we can understand the remark, “you can trust him completely -  he’ll 
always let you down, ” as a mis-application of the word, and paradoxical precisely 
because it plays on this element of what constitutes genuine trust.
So, to summarise: trust exists between two or more parties, all of whom have 
entered the relationship willingly and positively, in an ongoing relationship with 
more than one future interaction, and in a context of risk for all parties. Trust is a
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subjective, aggregated, evolving belief about the others’ likely actions being 
positive, or at least non-detrimental toward us, based on a considered judgement 
from a body of evidence.
A crude either/or conceptualisation -  trust or distrust -  is too rigid and too 
simplistic, however. It fails to capture trust’s intriguing subtleties of degree. Jones 
and George’s categories of distrust plus “conditional trust” and “unconditional 
trust” (1998: p536) are similarly too crude since, as will shortly be examined, within 
“conditional trust” can be discerned several degrees of intensity. Moreover, as I 
have argued, trust is almost never “unconditional”, as Sabel (1997: p i63) believes, 
or if it is then it is rather naive.
In the literature I have discovered six degrees of mutual trust, and these can be 
placed along a continuum of intensity, as per Figure 3 below.
Figure 3: The six degrees o f trust on a *continuum ’ o f progress.
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Exogenous forms o f trust.
Unfortunately for clarity purposes, the terms are confused among the writers. For 
example, what Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer call deterrence-based trust is 
called calculus-based trust by Lewicki and Bunker. However, to take each in turn...
Deterrence-based trust.
By the definitions discussed above, this is not trust at all in any positive sense, but a 
manifestation of distrust. Its underlying expectation is that the other party will abuse 
any effort to build trust, and will only act co-operatively under the threat of 
punishment. All-powerful sanctions are put in place in advance of any decision. This 
is not making oneself vulnerable to any significant extent, and the relationship is
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governed by coercion rather than by trust. Nor does it imply a positive relationship, 
either. (Deterrence-based trust corresponds, albeit incompletely, to Barney and 
Hansen’s vaguely termed “weak form trust” - op cit - wherein trust emerges only 
because the scope for opportunism is purposely limited. However, in their 
definitions, these limits are not derived from governance controls, whereas they can 
be here.)
Calculus-based trust.
So named by Rousseau et al (op cit: p399), this does involve some vulnerability and 
a pre-disposition toward trust. In the literature it is understood to mean that the agent 
has conducted a valid cost-benefit analysis, and has elected to trust, not according to 
the value of the apparent benefits of trust, but from a self-interested desire not to 
incur the costs of not trusting. The only criteria is that the costs outweigh the 
benefits; trust has no innate advantage. Thus, there endures a deeply suspicious 
appraisal of the other party’s motives, and the agent’s ready recourse to the 
protections provided by deterrence, rather than by mutual ‘goodwill’ (cf. Sako, 
1992), reflects this suspicion. There is a crucial lack of confidence that means that 
this is not a positive relationship either. Collaboration comes, but only with the 
support of controlling sanctions. In Barney and Hansen’s terms (1994), this is a 
“semi-strong trust ”.
Both deterrence-based and calculus-based trust are weak forms of trust. Rousseau 
and colleagues further invite one to compare the “resilience” of the deterrence- 
based and calculus-based forms of trust with those further along the continuum of 
intensity in Figure 3 (op cit: p400). Nevertheless, they note optimistically that 
calculus-based trust can develop into more durable forms of trust over time. 
Whitener and colleagues make a similar point: “Relationships evolve slowly, 
starting with the exchange o f relatively low-value benefits and escalating to higher- 
value benefits as the parties demonstrate their trustworthiness” (op cit: p515).
Knowledge-based trust.
The pluralist knowledge-based trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1997: pl21; also Shapiro, 
Sheppard and Cheraskin, 1992) is based much more on judging the other’s 
predictability and likely motives against evidence drawn from a series of
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interactions. Armed with sufficient knowledge there is, accordingly, much less 
reliance on the threat of sanction. Indeed, between calculus-based trust and 
knowledge-based trust a threshold point is crossed (Gambetta), illustrated with the 
dotted line in Figure 3 above. To the right of the threshold point, the need for 
sanctions to reinforce collaboration is diminished, and the crucial requirement of 
genuine trust -  a “positive expectation ” - arises. Lewicki and Bunker, for example, 
call it a “frame-change”. Further evidence for the qualitative improvement in trust 
based on knowledge comes from Barney and Hansen’s view that this is a "strong 
form trust” (1994). Of interest is their argument that strong forms emerge 
independent of governance strictures, and come instead from values and principles 
that have been “internalised” by the parties involved, “despite the significant 
vulnerabilities” (op cit: p i79). Thus, as indicated in Figure 3, knowledge-based 
trust exists at the threshold point between forms of trust shaped in large part by 
endogenous factors, and forms of trust based primarily on exogenous factors.
Relational-based trust.
As behavioural expectations become self-reinforcing and evidently in each party’s 
own interest, deeper forms of trust develop. Relational-based trust (Rousseau et al, 
op cit: p399) is based on consistent evidence of reliability for mutual benefit. It 
produces a partial convergence of interests and enduring common principles that 
impose clear parameters around what is acceptable in the relationship. It can even 
lead to an emotional bond developing between parties. Commentators have 
separated the qualitative variants of trust at this point along the continuum as being 
the difference between “reliableness” and “emotional” forms of trust; between 
“cognition-based” and “affect-based” forms; between “dependability” and. “faith” 
(McAllister, 1995: p26). The former in each typology is considered to have been 
derived from a rational judgement, while the latter is based less on an intelligent 
appraisal of evidence, and is instead emotionally deeper, even “moral”. This 
distinction, I believe, is misleading and unhelpful, as it contains implicit criticism of 
the latter as somehow less intelligent than more suspicious forms, which would seem 
to warn parties away from developing more “emotional” forms of trust, foregoing 
the benefits of such a “strong form ”. In addition, the superiority of low/ “weak”/ 
calculative forms of trust is disputed as being empirically incorrect, inefficient and 
even morally bankrupt (Barney & Hansen, 1994: p i75). Trust is cognition-based (cf.
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Lewis & Weigert, 1995) and evaluative, rather than instinctive, even in its more 
emotional states.
The emotional aspect of relational-based trust ought not to be over-valued, either. 
The call from Talcott Parsons for trust-based "solidarity ” and for individuals to 
suspend self-interest in the service of a “collectivity-orientation” (Parsons, 1971, 
cited in Misztal, 1995: p67) is sentimental idealism that rather glosses over the 
disadvantages of rendering oneself this vulnerable, and the inherent conflicts of 
interest in the employment relationship (cf. Edwards). His ambition also obscures 
the point that parties need not necessarily share an enduring common agenda to trust 
each other; just a calculative self-interest in the outcome of the next few interactions, 
as per the trench-bound soldiers of the First World War.19 (See also Misztal, 1995: 
p72.) Lastly, trust is incremental: it develops over time, rather than existing, as 
Parsons implies, in its own right independent of any appraisal of the evidence in 
favour of costs and benefits.
Identification-based trust.
The explicitly unitarist identification-based trust (Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin, 
1992) is based on mutual understanding and affection, and for Lewicki and Bunker 
(1997) this alignment of goals and values is such that each party can act on the 
other’s behalf with their full confidence. Considerable attention is paid to the needs 
of the other party, and confidence is such that monitoring of the other’s motives and 
actions is relaxed, almost to a minimum. It resembles an “unconditional” trust 
(Jones & George, 1998: p536), like a love affair (Lewicki and Bunker, op cit). It is 
contestable whether this kind of an arrangement is truly possible in employment 
situations, and if it is, whether it is desirable. However, at the risk of trailing in 
advance outcomes of the fieldwork in the theory chapters, the case studies do 
provide some striking findings in this regard.
It need hardly be noted that trust is not a given in love affairs, and still more 
pessimistically, the intensity of the trust belief means that betrayal is felt all the 
deeper. Thus, reliance on an intelligent appraisal of evidence becomes all the more
19 The British and German soldiers struck up an unwritten, even an unspoken, agreement not to fire  at enemies 
collecting food parcels dropped in 'no-man's-land'. This was also notable fo r  being in defiance o f  their 
superiors’ orders (an incident cited in Axelrod, 1984).
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salient as parties’ mutual trust progresses along the continuum of intensity. Just as 
the over-reliance on deterrence fuels mutual suspicion and thus weakens calculus- 
based trust, so the lack of objective appraisal of evidence and careless performance 
monitoring can constitute fatal flaws in love affairs/ identification-based trust. 
Indeed, Lewicki, McAllister and Bies indirectly urge practitioners to trust, but with a 
healthy dose of scepticism, when they endorse simultaneous feelings of both high 
trust and high distrust; that it is best to prepare to capitalise on opportunities from 
parties’ anticipated favourable conduct toward one, but to have in place mechanisms 
to contain the effect of unexpected undesirable conduct (1998: p450). This creative 
tension is most productive and, by the definition presented here, the most 
intelligent.20
Institutional-based trust.
Finally, as I discuss later in chapter four, Britain’s voluntarist industrial relations 
would seem to mitigate against the kind of structured, institutional-based trust 
supported by national legislation and dense social networks, that can be found in 
Japan and some countries in continental Europe (Fukuyama, 1995). Such institutions 
do not exist in Britain.
That said, Lane rightly guards commentators against the inference that high-trust 
forms, such as the European institutional structures, are de facto better forms, rather 
than merely different.
We have seen then that trust is inherently dynamic. The degree of trust in a 
relationship can move in either direction along the continuum of intensity (Lewicki 
& Bunker, op cit: pi 19; Jones & George, 1998: p533). It is not a static characteristic 
of a relationship; it must be constantly made and re-made. (This makes it so 
fascinating as a subject for research.) The degrees of trust outlined here are thus 
interim stages in the evolution of a relationship.
But why should anyone bother?
20 The Russians have a proverb fo r  this - “doveryai, no proveryai” - or 'trust, but verify’ (cited in Zak and 
Knack, 2001: p295).
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Why should we trust ‘trust’?
We would do well, I believe, to reflect upon Gambetta’s conclusion: “Asking too 
little o f trust is just as ill-advised as asking too much ” (op cit: p235). Many 
commentators have argued for the extensive benefits to be gained from trusting 
people, to counter the “science o f suspicion ” (Sabel, op cit: pi 78) that has informed 
much of economics, and management and industrial relations thought.
Trust, it is argued, brokers mutual restraint of each person’s opportunism. This in 
turn should be expected to facilitate behaviours leading to co-operation. Indeed, trust 
has long been viewed as an especially “fundamental” antecedent of co-operative 
behaviour in (Deutsch, 1958; Blau, 1964) as well as being critical to successful 
conflict management (Deutsch, ibid). Lane (1998: p3) argues that trust (constraints 
based on self-fulfilling expectations) is one of three control mechanisms available, 
the other two being the market (constraints based on price) and authority (constraints 
based on hierarchy). Of these trust entails lower transaction costs, because 
performance monitoring is less necessary (Williamson, 1975). Higher levels of 
trust...
"... reduce the compelling necessity for continually making provisions for 
the possibility o f opportunistic behaviour from the other(s)... It lubricates the 
smooth, harmonious functioning o f the organisation by eliminating friction and 
minimising the need for bureaucratic structures that specify the behaviour o f 
participants who do not trust each other” (Limerick & Cunnington, 1993 - cited by 
Lewicki & Bunker, op cit: pi 15).
Sako (1992) has argued that the reverse is also true; that low levels of trust 
necessitate greater performance monitoring and so higher transaction costs. Creed 
and Miles (1996) claim, persuasively, an inverse link between the extent of control 
and the extent of trust: where there is too much control there is, by definition, too 
little trust, and vice versa. Ouchi has identified trust or monitoring controls as the 
two origins of co-operation (cited in McAllister, 1995: p30), with trust performing 
better. Typically, suspicious transactions, such as legal contracts, yield only minimal 
compliance to the letter of the contract, and in setting conditions down in writing, 
can restrict the scope of the agreement to the terms of the deal, often proscribing 
extra effort or care (cf. organisational citizenship behaviour).
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Use of power can generate collaboration, too, of course. Bachman, and Kelly in his 
jaundiced reviews of certain partnership case studies, warn us that power can be 
wielded behind a “fagade o f trust ” (Bachman, op cit: p311; Kelly, 1999). There is 
indeed a world of difference between, as Greenberg put it, “looking fair and being 
fa ir” (cited by Whitener et al, op cit: p525). This underscores the vital effort of 
distinguishing between “genuine” and “counterfeit” programmes for establishing 
trust-based relations, or indeed a partnership (cf. Wray, 2001). As we have seen, 
control and coercion only come into play when adequate trust is not present. There is 
a clear trade-off: greater controls, largely though not completely, lessen the trust, 
while greater trust obviates the need for controls.
Thus, Arrow (1974) considers trust to be “the most efficient governance 
mechanism”. However, while trust is to be preferred as potentially a more 
productive tactic, its problem is that it is more difficult to establish, can be time- 
consuming and may prove costly if deployed in error. As Sabel comments, the 
dependence on co-operation is the “cultural contradiction ” at the heart of capitalism 
(1997: pl78).
Trust facilitates change. If we have confidence in the motives of others in pursuing 
change, we are more likely to co-operate with the change. (Conversely, if we do not 
have faith in the changes or the change agents, we may either resist, or comply 
passively or half-heartedly.) Deery, Erwin and Iverson found evidence in an 
Australian car plant that if employees see “the industrial relations climate as trustful 
and characterised by a willingness to address workplace problems collectively, they 
appear to be more willing to support the adoption o f productivity or efficiency- 
enhancing programmes” (1999: p550). Freely-entered relations based on mutual 
trust elicit the stronger “attitudinal” commitment to agreed goals, rather than the 
weaker “calculative” commitment that is typically produced by direct coercion, 
adversarial bargaining, or passive compliance.
Trust allows for the de-centralisation of decision-making and employee autonomy 
deemed essential for high-performance methods such as total quality management, 
self-managing teams, etc. In Peccei’s high-trust model of HRM (1997), trust is the 
key pre-requisite that enables managers to relinquish control over work activities.
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The alternatives for managers are to retain complete control, or to permit employee 
autonomy in an ad hoc, inconsistent manner. Trust among parties tends to facilitate 
an expanded scope for shared knowledge, potentially leading to more informed and 
more realistic joint decisions.
More generally, trust is considered a valuable commodity for the “psychological 
contract” between employer and employee (Rousseau, 1995; Robinson, 1996, 
among many). In chapter one I argued that the twin facts of employees consistently 
citing a desire for job security and a positive working environment (often over and 
above pay concerns) just as many employers seem desperately keen to retain skilled, 
committed and flexible staff, would appear to offer a common agenda around which 
both parties can build trust. Herriot, Manning and Kidd argued (1997) that both 
employer and employee have complementary agendas at work which can provide a 
“simple basis for restoring employee trust”.11 However, the enduring preference of 
UK managers for short-term cost cutting (especially that of labour) may mitigate 
against this (Blyton & Turnbull, 1998).
Finally, trust is regularly conflated with the popular commodity of “social capital”, 
defined by Fukuyama in his book ‘Trust’ as “the ability to work together for 
common purposes in groups or organisations” (1995: plO; see also Misztal, op cit: 
p79). Trust creates social capital, and societies which sustain trust-based processes 
will be more successful: “Trust-based business costs less” (Fukuyama, ibid: p27). 
This is because, as Barney and Hansen argue (op cit), the goodwill inherent in 
“strong forms” of trust contributes most to performance since it is hardest for 
competitors to replicate. Zak and Knack (2001) set up an imaginative international 
experiment involving participants from 41 different nationalities demonstrating a 
degree of trust in investment brokers to act on their behalf. They found that the 
higher the levels of trust, the lower the performance monitoring, the better the 
returns on investment, and the greater the overall economic growth.22
21 Note however the bias in focus on employees bestowing trust, when trust should correctly be viewed as a 
reciprocal relationship.
22 Empirically, Fukuyama's thesis might seem dubious, since the United States -  omnipotent economically in 
recent years - does not strike one as a particularly trusting society, despite Fukuyama’s protestations. Zak and 
Knack plotted the USA in the negative area on the trust scale (2001: p309); the British are slightly more 
trusting.
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Perhaps means of sustaining trust-based relations on a society-wide, and even 
global, basis will prove a worthwhile collective response to what Giddens has called 
our “age o f risk” (Giddens, 1999). Indeed, trust has been defined as “confidence in 
the face o f risk” (Lewis & Weigert, 1985).
The establishment of trust: influences.
Debate among academics continues over the foundations for trust. I concur with 
Lane that we must not limit our analysis to cognition, behaviour, economics or 
ideology, but instead view trust as “a multi-dimensional social reality” (Lane, op 
cit: pl4; also Bhattacharya et al, op cit: p461). Her co-author Bachman (1998) points 
to a “loose coupling” between macro-level institutional arrangements -  what Boon 
and Holmes call the “situationalparameters ” (op cit) - and interpersonal relations at 
the micro-level. The former “underwrite” trust (see also Misztal, 1995), but are not 
sufficient in all circumstances to sustain it in the latter. (See chapter four.) From a 
British perspective, of course, there are no externally enforced institutional 
arrangements. Our preference for the voluntarist tradition and minimal frameworks 
has endured.
Accordingly, this sub-section considers the antecedents of, and influences on, 
mutual trust at a micro-level (i.e.: the process of negotiating and maintaining 
relations within organisations); what Boon and Holmes divide into the “history o f 
the relationship, ” and individual attitudes - or, in their rather curious phrase, one’s 
“chronic pre-disposition ” toward trust.
Attitudes and behaviours within organisations support or undermine trust, and it is 
these attitudinal and behavioural influences that are the main interest of this 
research. How might we expect to see them established and sustained?
Beyond non-behavioural sources for trust in organisations (which include legal 
contracts and formal institutions) Gambetta identifies “pre-commitments and 
promises” (1988), of which trust may be said to be an informal promise. Creed and 
Miles (1996) distinguish between “process-based” and “characteristic-based” 
sources for trust. For them, the former is, as per the definition set out here, based on 
personal experience of mutually met obligations during recurring exchanges, while
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"characteristic-based” sources include perceptions of a person’s motives and 
general qualities. This resembles Sako’s “goodwill” (Sako, 1992).
But how are these developed and sustained? In this analysis I consider, in turn, the 
lessons from Whitener et al’s prescriptions for managerial trustworthiness, followed 
by Axelrod’s insights drawn from game theory, and Walton and McKersie’s 
distributive and integrative bargaining.
Managerial trustworthiness.
Trustworthiness implies that the subject is worthy of being trusted, (s)he has earned 
it, which in turn suggests that the impression of her/his trustworthiness has been 
informed by prior exchange.
Whitener and colleagues (op cit: p516-518) cite five "categories o f behaviour” that 
managers in particular -  but, I would argue, all pertinent parties - ought to adopt in 
order to increase the likelihood of employees (or other parties) reciprocating the 
trust. The five categories of behaviour are:
1. Behavioural consistency. By this they mean reliability and, to some 
extent, predictability of actions that encourages the trustee to take the risk 
involved in trusting someone: ‘‘I f  managers behave consistently over time and 
across situations, employees can better predict managers 'future behaviour, and 
their confidence in their ability to make such predictions should increase ”.
2. Behavioural integrity. Here they echo Dasgupta in meaning telling the truth 
and keeping promises. This refers to ‘‘the consistency between what the manager 
says and what he or she does ”.
3. Sharing/ delegation of control. This includes input into decision­
making, since “the extent to which managers involve employees influences the 
development o f trust”. The importance of employee involvement is that, for 
employees, it renders their external environment controllable, to some 
comforting extent, or at least subject to their influence. This is critical: “When 
managers involve employees in decision making, employees have greater control 
over decisions that affect them, and therefore, can protect their own interests... 
When managers share control they demonstrate significant trust in and respect
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for their employees The act of sharing decision-making by definition bestows 
trust upon the other party, and increases confidence of each party in the process, 
since they are helping to co-ordinate it. (This of course echoes Fox on job- 
design.)
4. Communication. Information needs to be shared openly, and to be 
accurate, timely, and explained in its proper context.
5. Demonstration of concern. The authors borrow from the literature
on justice, which suggests that management concern for the interests of 
employees - otherwise known as "benevolence” - enhances perceptions of 
justice at work. This means managers “showing consideration and sensitivity for 
employees’ needs and interests; acting in a way that protects employees’ 
interests, and refraining from exploiting others for the benefit o f one’s own 
interests
There are a number of concerns about managers’ unilateral attempts to instil 
trustworthiness and efforts to enhance trust levels at work. Firstly, trust levels can be 
affected by several different factors, not solely an individual manager’s display of 
trustworthiness: organisational structures, cultural norms (a trusting manager may 
buck an organisation’s norms of behaviour), and complementary/ dissonant HR 
policies and practices, notably reward systems (see the SRRC reader on this issue -  
Perkins & Sandringham, 1998). Trustworthiness needs to be displayed in a 
supporting internal environment.
Secondly, such attempts can come into conflict with managers’ need to control what 
happens at work (Whitener et al: p518). Antecedents that affect managers’ 
propensity toward trustworthiness include their own value-system (whether “self­
transcendent” in the sense of seeing oneself as part of a universal whole and hence 
feeling empathetic toward others; or “self-gratifying”, by which is meant an 
inclination toward hedonism and individualism). The other key antecedent is “self- 
efficacy”. The logic goes that whether one feels confident in one’s own ability to 
engage in trust will have an impact on whether one does engage in trust-based 
relations; if one’s confidence in oneself is low, one will be reluctant to trust others. 
This echoes Luhmann’s point (1979, cited in Misztal, 1995: p76) that one requires 
an “inner security” before commencing to trust. However, this latter point is not
68
entirely convincing: while it points to the reciprocity of trust, not everyone has this 
level of self-awareness, and it is often the most insecure who are the most trusting.
Thirdly, it has been shown that the philosophy of the organisation’s founder(s) is a 
significant force in determining the level of managerial trustworthiness (Zucker, 
1986), while in the absence of founders’ guiding principles, or their decline in 
influence, Tichy and Devanna (also cited by Barney and Hansen) argue that 
organisations require the introduction of "transformational leaders” to instil 
trustworthiness.
As we shall see in chapter three, both the content and the process of creating a 
partnership agreement draw on these insights for establishing trust-based 
relationships.
Game theory.
An especially useful model for analysing the processes of establishing mutual trust, 
and thence co-operation, and thence partnership is game theory. Axelrod set out in 
his influential work, ‘The Evolution of Co-operation’ (1984), to test the 
effectiveness of different bargaining tactics for participating in a ‘prisoners’ 
dilemma’.
The dilemma is simple: two protagonists seeking the best outcome for their own 
self-interest enter into a transaction with each other. Neither can have prior 
knowledge of the other’s intentions and there is no central authority to regulate their 
behaviour. Their choice is simple: to co-operate or ‘defect’. Should both defect, both 
receive a small sum, 1 point, the punishment for mutual defection; should both co­
operate both receive the better reward for mutual co-operation of 3 points. However, 
should one co-operate and the other defect, the defector receives the temptation to 
defect -  5 points - while the co-operative player is left with the “sucker’s payoff” -  
0 points. Thus, “no matter what the other does, defection yields a higher payoff than 
co-operation. The dilemma is that i f  both defect, both do worse than i f  both had co­
operated” (Axelrod, 1984: p8).
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Does industrial relations constitute a prisoners’ dilemma? I believe so (see too 
Metcalf, 1989):
1. As I suggested above, in the UK there is no overarching authority (no 
institutional arrangements) dictating how industrial relations ought to be 
handled.
2. At the organisational level, the relationship would appear likely to remain 
permanent for the foreseeable future inasmuch as a management team and a 
workforce will continue to interact, and to negotiate the means of managing 
work activities within the organisation (where there are no plans to close the 
plant, or -  where relevant -  to de-recognise the unions).
3. Regular encounters between managers and employee representatives mean 
that each party has the opportunity to appreciate, evaluate and influence the 
other’s strategy, and so to consider developing trust as an alternative to 
adversarialism.
4. Finally, self-interest served through ‘defection’ is conceivable, and 
achievable (if not always desirable) for both sides. This is a crucial point: 
each party has available sufficient power to defect, with damage suffered by 
the other party.
So, companies and their workforces are indeed locked into a prisoners’ dilemma. 
What are the different strategies available to each player?
Consistent Reciprocity (CR).
Axelrod organised a computer tournament pitting strategies against each other in the 
prisoner’s dilemma. The strategy that performed best of all Axelrod calls TIT FOR 
TAT [his capital letters]. The name suffers from its everyday connotations of petty 
and guileless recrimination for the sake of it, but in Axelrod’s terminology TIT FOR 
TAT refers to a strategy of CONSISTENT RECIPROCITY (hereafter CR), which as 
a name I prefer.
A party using CR will co-operate on the first move, then will repeat the other 
player’s last move. Co-operation is rewarded with co-operation (3 points each); 
defection is punished with defection (1 point apiece).
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The qualities of CR are four-fold:
1. Firstly, and critically, it begins optimistically, in a mood of co-operation. It is 
willing to trust. This attracts other co-operating players, and a mutually 
beneficial pattern of reciprocated rewards is quickly established that remains 
profitable and desirable. (See below for additional commentary on this 
important point.)
2. Secondly, and relatedly, CR cannot be exploited after the first move, when 
one player may receive the “sucker's payoff’ if the other player defects. 
Thereafter it punishes defection just as it rewards co-operation, reinforcing 
the benefits of reciprocated trust.
3. Thirdly, this consistency of behaviour at all times makes the CR tactic easily 
recognisable after a few encounters. This should alert a defecting player to 
the advantages of co-operation, and CR’s forgiveness helps to re-establish 
co-operative relations. Reciprocity is an educative strategy: CR advertises for 
and rewards mutual trust.
4. Finally, as well as profiting from other co-operative strategies, CR wards off 
defectors. The principle of reciprocity means that any sneaky defection to 
exploit goodwill will not be tolerated, and will rebound on the other player, 
as well as the CR player. “Trust tends to evoke trust, distrust to evoke 
distrust” (Fox, 1974a: p67).
Intriguingly, beginning in a spirit of trust flies in the face of received economists’ 
logic, which assumes that all agents are inherently untrustworthy. Yet Miles and 
Snow put it succinctly: “We build trust by trusting and... by taking the risk that our 
trust will be returned” (Miles & Snow, 2000: p458). Conversely, by refusing to trust 
on the first exchange one indicates a personal pre-disposition not to trust and not to 
co-operate with others, but also that one does not expect trust to come from the other 
party either. Such suspicion invites reciprocal suspicion; distrust leads to distrust. A 
reasonable other party would be expected to treat a person displaying such tactics 
with caution. Trust begins by “keeping oneself open to evidence ”, and “acting as if  
one trusted, at least until more stable beliefs can be established on the basis o f 
further information” (Gambetta, op cit: p234; also Fells, 1993: p39).
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CR, once enacted and with sufficient confidence that the other parties possess the 
competences to return the favour, should encourage co-operative behaviours in 
return, and from there, generate mutual trust (McAllister, op cit: p26) that, in its 
turn, sustains the co-operation, which further enhances the mutual trust, and so on. 
This is not fanciful thinking, as the unspoken agreement between the soldiers in the 
First World War trenches demonstrates. In a situation where both sides are locked 
into an ongoing series of encounters, and both have the choice to co-operate or 
defect, and neither is constrained nor advantaged in any way, Axelrod found CR to 
be the best strategy to adopt. We might expect to observe the qualities of CR in the 
negotiation of the partnership agreement.
Axelrod offers four principles underpinning a strategy of CR. They are:
1. Enlarge the shadow o f the future. No form of co-operation can be stable 
if it does not matter what happens to the relationship in the future. The 
importance of the relationship to each party should be emphasised, perhaps by 
locating a common enemy or super-ordinate goal. In addition, the threat of swift 
retaliation should any party defect also sustains trust. Efforts to commit players 
to a regular strategy [such as with a publicly-disseminated partnership 
agreement] can also engender behavioural commitment to the cause and so help 
in the first instance to ensure the appropriate behaviours. Increasing the 
frequency of the encounters means that the payoff or payback of whatever 
selection each player made previously comes swiftly. Delayed response 
diminishes the perceived link between cause and effect.
2. Never be the first to defect. This sends a positive message, that the agent 
wishes to forego the potential riches to be had from exploitation, and wishes to 
promote mutual co-operation as the best deal for both parties. Co-operating 
parties will thrive off each other. Correspondingly...
3. Practice reciprocity. Reward co-operation and punish defection. This 
simple rule means that as well as establishing co-operation the CR-operating 
party cannot be exploited.
4. Do not be envious. The relative gains of the other should not serve as the 
yardstick for assessment of one’s own performance. This is redolent of a ‘zero- 
sum’ or ‘win-lose’ mentality which debilitates progress toward co-operation.
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Instead, Axelrod recommends assessing how another person in the same 
situation could best perform.
There are weaknesses to the CR strategy. Its main stumbling block is that as it 
punishes defection each time, this is likely to set off protracted echoes of 
recrimination through the next few moves. But such an echo is likely to last only as 
long as the other player needs to realise the robustness of CR’s reciprocity. Axelrod 
has tried to adapt this strategy to prevent the cycle of recrimination by punishing a 
defection with a defection only nine-tenths the strength of the other’s foul move 
(Axelrod, 1997). But the appeal of what might be called the ‘no bullshit’ exact 
retaliation to a defection is that neither party can be taken for a sucker after the first 
move. This also addresses Gambetta’s concerns about “'peace signals [i.e.: offers of 
co-operative relations] used as a trap
CR scored consistently the highest of all the strategies. What of the alternative 
options? One, called JOSS after the author (or, as I prefer, OCCASIONAL 
SNEAKY DEFECTION), follows the principle of CONSISTENT RECIPROCITY, 
but every so often (10% of all moves) will throw in a random defection to exploit 
co-operative players. Two other strategies known as TRANQUILISER and TESTER 
do something very similar. In a real scenario, one might imagine a management or 
union team ‘mistakenly’ or ‘accidentally’ releasing sensitive information to a wider 
audience about the other, in support of an argument and to force the other’s hand. 
Both tactics may profit from some of the more forgiving players (i.e.: 5 points 
instead of 3 or 1). However if other players retaliate, as one using CR tactics would, 
this can set off a lasting chain of defections (1 point each) until co-operative 
behaviour is restored, recognised and trusted again. Short-term advantage from 
unprovoked one-off defections can damage even long-standing relations, and break 
the fragile trust established. For whatever motive - pride, envy, spite, desperation, 
boredom - it is not worth it, i f  the other player is likely to retaliate.
One of the more sophisticated strategies, which I call UPDATE ESTIMATE OF 
LIKELY NEXT MOVE (UELNM), but is named after its author DOWNING in 
Axelrod’s work, begins out of rational self-interest, by defecting, then stores 
information on the other player’s responses and assesses whether co-operation or
73
defection will yield the best results. The cautious, analytical approach of UELNM is 
admirable in that it seeks to understand the other’s strategy and act accordingly, and 
treats co-operation as a dynamic process of negotiation and revision. UELNM 
contains one fatal flaw, however. Its pessimistic, non-trusting opening move 
produces an echo of recriminating defections from all but the most naive players 
whereas, as we have seen, optimism from the outset (i.e.: assuming the other party’s 
trustworthiness until proven otherwise) would have yielded greater reward. Also, 
unlike the simple constancy of CR, the UELNM strategy requires highly 
sophisticated analytical skills, sufficient time to conduct the analysis and a fair 
amount of good fortune. The simplicity of CR avoids this.
What about militant confrontation? One tactic is known as ALL D, or defection at 
all times. This strategy proscribes the other player’s move: there is no point in even 
suggesting co-operation, as it will be punished each time, so each player defects and 
must settle for the meagre outcome (1 point each). However, if there are other 
players willing to co-operate with each other, they will quickly cluster together and 
thrive in their dealings (3 points each, every time). ALL D’s inability/ reluctance to 
adapt its strategy to changes in the environment will eventually isolate it, and render 
its strategy obsolete (a finding that hard-line, unbending parties would do well to 
consider). Similarly, PERMANENT RETALIATION (FRIEDMAN in Axelrod’s 
work), where the player co-operates (0 points if the other defects, or 3 points apiece 
if reciprocated) until the first defection, then defects forever more (1 point each ad 
infinitum), suffers diminishing returns, as its lack of forgiveness means it too cannot 
adapt and profit from otherwise co-operative players. In the next chapter, it will be 
seen that these insights too are reflected in the process of creating a partnership 
agreement.
‘Distributive’ and ‘integrative’ bargaining.
Walton and McKersie’s work (1965) on a behavioural theory of labour negotiations 
has much in common with both trust and partnership (and the tactics of CR). In 
particular, their conceptualisations of ‘integrative bargaining’ and the ‘attitudinal 
structuring’ required to envision and achieve substantial change offer 
complementary insights into the process of establishing trust.
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Integrative bargaining is not a process of compromise, for compromise deals with 
what already exists; integration creates something new by way of a solution. 
Integrative potential "can be exploited only i f  it is first discovered, its nature 
explored and it is then acted upon by the parties ” (ibid: p i37).
Walton and McKersie expect to find the following taking place in what is, in 
essence, a joint problem solving process:
■ Both parties articulate their motivation and willingness to resolve common 
problems through joint effort (pi39).
■ The problems on the agenda are not explicitly distributive issues. They are 
phrased in shared terms: “our common problem to be jointly resolved” 
instead of “management’s proposal re: issues X ”.
■ Each party is given all relevant information with which to approach the 
problem, and the authorisation to use it (pi40). Integrative solutions cannot 
emerge "if parties are not candid with each other” (pi48).
■ Imagination and creative thinking is deployed to seek mutual gain, which 
requires that there be no fait accompli solutions.
■ Dogged persistence is needed over sufficient time to work through conflicts 
of interest in the search for integrative solutions. There should be no fixed 
timetable.
■ Each party commits themselves to developing mutual trust: "A supportive 
and trusting climate facilitates joint problem-solving. Defensive and low- 
trust atmospheres inhibit the process” (pi 41). They are emphatic about the 
need for trust. Trust allows for the information communicated during 
problem solving to be received as intended, rather than distorted by 
suspicion, cynicism and hostility. Competitiveness and defensiveness lead to 
selective deafness, and the inefficient processing of information. Trust 
supports innovation and imagination in assessing the problem. However, 
shared information must not be abused, or used outside the common agenda.
■ Gains and losses should not be too unbalanced.
Their prescriptions all have obvious parallels with what has been promoted as 
partnership: the joint commitment to the success of the enterprise, sharing the 
success of the enterprise, effective information sharing and consultative processes
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(using joint problem solving techniques), and the same commitment to building 
trust.
Walton and McKersie recognise however the inherent dilemmas in the development 
of trust (p276), principally that to trust necessarily proscribes more distributive 
tactics, which would be seen as abuses of trust. But they too note that the short-term 
gains to be had from distributive bargaining often come at the expense of 
deteriorating relations in the longer term.
Similarly, their assessment of ‘attitudinal structuring’ -  how parties mould the 
approach of the other party in negotiations -  resonates with analysis of trust. They 
argue that parties in a relationship develop a “pattern ” of interaction and a “central 
tendency” toward the other(s). These they categorise as conflict; containment/ 
aggression; accommodation; co-operation, or collusion (p i85). Partnership, as
• adescribed in this thesis, most closely resembles co-operation where there is
complete acceptance of the legitimacy of the other, concern for the other’s welfare,
and an extended and shared problem solving agenda (strikingly similar to that
advocated today) that is resolved through respect, mutual trust and friendliness:
“Productive efficiency, the solvency o f the firm, elimination o f waste, 
advance o f technology, employment security, and so on are treated as matters o f 
common interest” (pi88); “Parties do not have attitudes which prevent them from 
fully exploiting the integrative possibilities ”.
But at the same time co-operation does not “make [parties] lose sight o f their 
primary responsibilities to the separate and distinct interests” of their respective 
constituencies (p206).
The movement from a competitive, conflictual relationship pattern toward a more 
co-operative one will see the scope for distributive bargaining restricted, parties 
often electing to trade distributive gains to progress attitudes toward co-operation 
(resisting ‘defections’ to proceed further along the continuum of trust). The potential 
for integrative bargaining is accordingly extended. Integrative bargaining and 
attitudinal structuring are, in Walton and McKersie’s view, “generally mutually 
enhancing” (p279); put simply, the latter facilitates the former, while the former
23 ‘Collusionincidentally, is considered an illegal form o f  collaboration outside the realm o f  law.
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bolsters the latter. This of course mimics the trust literature: confidence in the other 
party encourages mutual-gains problem solving, which justifies the confidence...
In Walton and McKersie’s several models, attitudes shift over time, and in response 
to outcomes, in "a rational and interpersonal process " (p210). Both qualities of the 
process are significant; the change is, as indicated above, based on an intelligent 
appraisal of the evidence, and it is conducted primarily between individuals, or sets 
of individuals face-to-face.
Tactics for shifting attitudes vary according to the quality of the relationship 
between the parties, but they have much in common with both the partnership model 
and recommendations for improving trust. They include identifying commonalities 
(in interests and dislikes, language, shared problems and shared threats) and a de­
emphasis of differences. They recommend increasing the frequency of interactions, 
working on substantive issues of significance to the other, consistent reciprocity 
("returning the favour ”, in their terms, keeping one’s word and acting in "a good- 
faith manner"). Each party confers status and respect on the other, rather than more 
antagonistic attempts to undermine the other’s position. Support for each other 
during the transformation of personal attitudes and mind-sets is also considered 
important. "Recourse to institutional sanctions ”, rather than personal aggression, 
can be taken to mean referring to the principles of engagement enshrined in a 
partnership deal as controlling parameters around behaviour. A focus on securing 
mutual successes is urged, again.
Thus, the parallels between the four disparate literatures are readily apparent. Some, 
or all, one would expect to be able to observe readily in a partnership process.
In the following chapter I present my theory and model, which combine insights 
from each of these theories with the elements of the IPA model for partnership.
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Chapter 3. The development of trust through partnership.
In chapter one I argued for the IPA’s partnership model as the most coherent. In 
chapter two I presented a detailed conceptualisation of how we ought to define and 
understand trust at work, and I went on to draw the salient learning points from a 
number of the more compelling sets of recommendations for establishing, 
developing and sustaining mutual trust. This chapter constitutes an attempt to draw 
the two preceding chapters together.
Here I present my theory and model for mapping the development of mutual trust 
through partnership. I intend for the three-stage theory to explain and account for the 
progress of organisations that have embarked upon the partnership programme, and 
to predict the likely outcomes of certain incidents that might affect the partnership. It 
is set out in Figure 4. It combines all four of the main theories presented thus far: the 
IPA partnership model, the theory of trust-based relations, Walton and McKersie’s 
‘integrative’ bargaining, and game theory’s recommended tactic of ‘Consistent 
Reciprocity’. (It has also been shaped by the testimonies of participants in case study 
accounts of partnership organisations.)
The model is split into the widely acknowledged three stages of formulating trust- 
based relations: development, maintenance and enhancement. These parallel the 
“early”, “developing” and “mature” phases identified by Lewicki and Bunker
(1997), but Rousseau and her colleagues’ “building”, “stability” and “dissolution” 
stages (1998: p396) rather underplay the nuances evidenced within ‘stability’.
These three stages represent trust’s iterative progress. However, progress in trust- 
based relations is not linear, and an ever-present opportunity for exit or defection 
(depicted by the dark ‘defection filter’ box at the bottom running the length of the 
trust-building process) represents trust’s fundamentally dynamic nature: both the 
progressive and regressive movement along the continuum of intensity (from 
chapter two). The diagram serves to provide a visualisation of the path of progress 
toward mutual trust through partnership, and the interdependence between the two. 
The stages involved in developing mutual trust through partnership are set out 
below. How this actually happens is examined in the fieldwork study.
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Figure 4 -  Establishing mutual trust through partnership -  a diagram o f progress.
KEY: ^  Anticipated progression ^  ^  Simultaneous progression ^  Potential progression
Stage 1: DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST. Stage 2: MAINTENANCE OF TRUST. Stage 3: ENHANCEMENT OF TRUST.
la: lb: 2a: 2b: 3a: 3b:
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OBSERVED.
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partnership, and for a 
burgeoning, calculus- 
based trust It also helps 
off-set damaging inertia 
or cynicism.
< ....►
‘Joint wins’ provide solid 
evidence of trustworthiness 
(i.e.: “behavioural consistency 
and integrity, sharing and 
delegation of control, open 
accurate and timely 
communication, and 
demonstration of concern”). 
If acknowledged as genuine 
and enduring, this forms firm 
expectations of future 
behaviours and outcomes , 
hence knowledge-based trust. 
The trust relies on evidence in 
order to evolve further.
►
As these behavioural 
expectations of 
trustworthiness are 
reinforced from evidence 
over time, they become 
self-perpetuating in each 
party’s own interest. 
This leads to a deeper 
relational-based trust 
Such enhanced trust can 
tolerate ‘minor’ defections. 
But the partnership/ trust 
still requires evidence and 
stimulation to sustain it, and 
to avoid inertia.
- ►
Conflict is suppressed, or 
denied, as parties identify 
their own interests with 
those of the other(s). 
The relationship 
resembles a ‘love affair’. 
As deep levels of trust are 
internalised, monitoring 
of other parties’ actions is 
much reduced. A serious 
defection however is likely 
to be disastrous, even 
‘fatal’. Also, energy is still 
required to avoid 
complacency/ inertia.
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THE ‘DEFECTION’ FILTER: COPING WITH THREATS TO THE PARTNERSHIP/TRUST.
|Apart from doing nothing| there are three main options available for dealing with ‘defections’ (abuse of trust), depending on the perceived severity:
arrow a) Dissolution. Abandon the partnership/ trust - either permanently, or (possibly, i f  desired) return to Stage I to build the partnership again.
arrow b) Reaffirmation. Suspend the partnership/ trust to inv estigate the ‘defection’, and its implications. Parties should seek fresh evidence of a commitment to partnership,
arrow c) Tolerance. Minor defections can be understood as mistakes, or spontaneous expressions of discontent, if trust is well enhanced. They can be tolerated and ov erlooked.
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Stage 1: Development.
• la. Each party’s reception to the idea of engaging in trust-based relations
will be significantly affected by three factors, according to Jones and George
(1998):
o A certain value attached to the idea of trusting people in general (a pre­
disposition, however small, to consider trust as an option for regulating 
the relationship)
o A further evaluative attitude toward the benefits of engaging in trust in 
the specific relationship under consideration. This may, as Fox noted 
(1974a: p90), be constrained by an ideological perspective on the 
employment relationship.
o An overall mood, whether positive or negative, that day.
In the first stage, each party’s preliminary evaluation of trust needs to be 
nurtured gradually, toward the “leap o f faith ” that is prepared to consider trust 
as an option. It is helpful if each party, separately but ideally together, appraises 
the relationship’s situational context: the pros and cons of the present 
arrangement, and the threats and opportunities the relationship faces (cf. 
Axelrod). Open, honest and transparent information sharing is thus critical. This 
process itself can engender collaborative efforts that can increase trust levels.
• lb. From the “leap o f faith”, parties negotiate a “genuine” partnership
agreement. Such an agreement will comprise all elements of the IPA model. (See
‘Inertia’ below for the potentially damaging outcomes arising out of a weak
agreement.) In the spirit of co-operation and burgeoning trust, one would expect 
that the design of the partnership agreement will be conducted in a positive 
process of joint problem solving, rather than being imposed by one or more 
parties on all constituencies. It is important that all parties benefit in some way 
from the arrangements.
Stage 2: Maintenance.
• 2a. This stage happens concurrently with lb -  the design of the
partnership agreement - and should feature a shift in bargaining behaviour that 
exemplifies the partnership approach (as per Walton and McKersie, from
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“distributive ” toward “integrative ” approaches). It should produce joint wins. In 
layman terms, this is “walking the talk”.
•  2b. Following the endorsement of the new arrangements, and provided
that enthusiasm and energy is maintained (see ‘Inertia’ below), and wilful abuses 
of trust are avoided (see ‘Defections’ below), then the continued evidence of 
goodwill and joint problem solving for mutual gain will, over time, establish a 
pattern of consistent positive behaviour from each constituency toward the 
others. This evidence should be observable and assessed as sincere and valid by 
most, if not all, participants. This generates the “frame-shift” into positive forms 
of trust, beginning with ‘knowledge-based trust’. The mutual trust and mutual 
gains embed, reward and help sustain these behaviours. A virtuous circle 
develops.
Stage 3: Enhancement.
• 3a. Only when sustained consistent behaviour based on mutual gain is 
apparent and durable will a ‘relational-based trust’ emerge. The increased 
frequency of regular interactions, and the improving ease with which the process 
generates mutually beneficial outcomes, can lead to an emotional bond among 
those most closely involved.
• 3b. It is possible that the trust will cement into a (seemingly) permanent 
dissolution, whether real or imagined, of constituencies’ separate interests, 
similar to ‘identification-based trust’. But this is by no means an inevitable or 
necessary (or even desirable) development.
Inertia.
At any stage after the formal commitment to a partnership, the relations may 
founder. This may occur as a consequence of a perceived lack of will, or the non- 
appearance of tangible benefits. (On the latter point, it is important to recall 
Axelrod’s advice not to be envious.)
Partnership in weak and ineffective forms may only produce a weary, uninvolved 
resignation and ambivalence toward the new relations, or minimal, rather half-
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hearted efforts to develop mutual trust. Incidents of collaboration may not be taken 
as evidence of trust. A weak, still suspicious ‘calculus-based trust’ will persist, 
characterised by a gnawing anxiety about the imminent shock appearance of ‘the 
catch’. Sheppard and Sherman’s typology of four forms of trust -  “shallow 
dependence”, “shallow interdependence”, “deep dependence” and “deep 
interdependence” -  illustrate the qualitative differences (1998). A weak partnership 
would be expected to generate only “shallow dependence” (a passive concord 
between the parties, but with the weaker party neither committed to the partnership 
nor especially the relationship). A “shallow interdependence ” partnership suggests a 
calculative and fragile relationship between reluctant, or ineffective, partners. One 
would expect a stronger partnership to exhibit behaviours associated with a “deep 
interdependence”: a mutually beneficial, positive and enduring joint process. 
However, “deep dependence” -  at least, according to Sheppard and Sherman’s 
definition -  suggests that the weaker party participates in the arrangement because 
there is no feasible alternative option. This may describe the initial workforce 
rationale for some partnership arrangements - the ‘Hobson’s choice’ of partnership 
versus factory closure/ mass redundancies - but the “deep dependence ” form does 
not provide for mutual trust; only the trust of the omnipotent in the impotence of the 
weak.
Thus, to prevent the development of the partnership lapsing into one of the less 
robust forms, sustained impetus and enthusiasm, and the production of tangible joint 
wins, are essential, particularly throughout the first two stages, lest inertia and 
cynicism claim the partnership.
Defection.
More seriously, as chapter two showed, partnership and the burgeoning trust-based 
relations are constantly prone to threat from what in game theory is called a 
‘defection’: an incident, whether intentional or trivial (or not) from one of the parties 
that undermines confidence in the agreed exchange of obligations. “Violation o f 
expectations can break moves towards trust” (Fells, op cit: p38, citing Meeker); 
“dis confirmation o f expectations is unsettling” (Lewicki and Bunker, op cit: pi 27). 
In boxing terms, trust has a glass jaw.
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Worse, this threat is ever-present; the dark ‘defection filter’ box shadows the trust- 
building process above it. This reinforces the virtue of Lewicki, McAllister and 
Bies’ insight that the ‘trust’ belief is an aggregate appraisal of previous interactions. 
The risk from defection is "cumulative the deeper the trust the greater the risk 
becomes (Sheppard & Sherman, op cit: p423). Jones and George write, “the strength 
o f the perceived violation that puts trust to the test is the key contingency” in 
determining how the aggrieved party responds (also Lewicki and Bunker, op cit: 
pl26-128).
According to the perceived injustice, the aggrieved party has three options, apart 
from doing nothing:
a) Dissolution. A defection might be considered serious enough to
annul completely the entire relationship.
b) Reaffirmation. A defection may lead to the suspension of the
relationship while an investigation is undertaken into the severity of the 
defection, and the reasons for it. The aggrieved party will test for renewed 
evidence of the desire for a trust basis to the relationship.
c) Tolerance. Minor defections can in fact be tolerated, and their
consequences ridden out, if the trust is deep and confident. (Equally, 
however, the rationale for tolerance may be informed calculatively by a 
desire to avoid the even worse consequences likely after following either of 
the other two options.)
These three main options are represented by arrows ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ respectively in 
the diagram.
The decision on how to respond to a defection ought to be a calculated judgement 
based on a rational evaluation of the circumstances. However, the combination of 
rendering oneself vulnerable, and the embarrassment and loss of confidence suffered 
by misplaced trust, is such that emotions will still exert a powerful influence on the 
judgement.
In the early stages, with little history of mutually trustworthy behaviours, and so 
only a modest degree of trust between the parties, expectations might not be that
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high anyway, and confidence in the other(s) low. In these circumstances, a 
‘defection’ will undermine the relationship if it only serves to confirm one’s initial 
suspicions. However, a joint process that includes a shared appreciation that 
mistakes will probably be made, and that the trust-building will take time, can stave 
off recourse to dissolution of the relationship, but will likely delay progress toward 
deeper trust levels.
Deeper trust levels though are, paradoxically, more problematic. During developed 
stages a defection does violate established reciprocal obligations and principles, and 
“evidence to the contrary provides a rational basis for withholding trust” 
(McAllister, op cit: p27). The aggrieved party must reappraise the evidence of the 
other party’s continued “goodwill” (cf. Sako, 1992). If this is now absent, there is 
little option but dissolution. However, if the defection is an error or accidental, or 
perhaps even a ‘shot across the bows’ (cf. the ‘occasional sneaky defection’ tactic) 
the aggrieved party may be in a position to ‘correct’ the offending behaviour, 
whether through (for want of a less ominous phrase) a ‘re-education’ intervention, or 
a retaliation (cf. the ‘CR’ tactic). They may then resume the relationship. A problem 
is that the degree of trust may have diminished, or receded along the continuum of 
intensity, and will take time and renewed positive effort to restore trust to a 
qualitatively better degree. Violations of relational- or identification-based trust can 
be tolerated, if they are minor. But serious defections can be “relationship- 
transforming events” (Lewicki and Bunker, op cit: p i27).
One further paradox of trust is that it may be irrational to continue to trust, but 
alternatives are unsustainable too; the parties are, as in a bad marriage, stuck with 
each other in mutual and bitter antagonism. A positive corollary of this, however, is 
that the risk of defection is, rationally, too great to contemplate.
Trust and partnership: the role of principles.
Gambetta reminds us that the spontaneous evolution of co-operation is only just as 
likely as its opposite, unless restrictions are placed on parties’ beliefs (1988: p227). 
A formal partnership agreement is one such restriction. The early stated commitment 
to the success of the enterprise -  often the first statement of a partnership deal - 
helps to initiate the search for grounds for mutual trust. It provides the super-
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ordinate shared goal; it “enlarges the shadow o f the future” (cf. Axelrod). It also 
provides a permanent target to aim for, and reference to it can rein in contrary 
behaviours. Indeed, Sherman and Sheppard (1998: p432) recommend that changes 
in the qualitative nature of trust be marked by some form of public declaration of 
commitment. A formal partnership agreement satisfies this. Moreover, identifying 
such an uncontroversial (one would think) joint objective should motivate parties to 
begin the search, even if what constitutes “success” and “joint commitment” may 
remain undefined in the early stages.
The IP A set of joint commitments indicates that the relationship is expected to last. 
There is further merit in attaching a long-term timetable to the agreement, as Good 
recommends, this ties parties into a period of time long enough to allow trust to 
develop. There should then be patience, and no disgrace in interim periods of failure. 
If the implications of recognising each party’s separate and legitimate interests are 
carried through, then the principle embodies the “demonstration o f concern” and 
“behavioural integrity ” recommended by Whitener et al, while the implications of 
the principle, “building trust and increasing employee involvement”, for trust- 
building are self-evident. Building trust should be a “specific activity in the process 
o f reaching an agreement” (Fells, 1993: p37), rather than incidental or even 
neglected.
But, if it were only a matter of creating the perfect mission statement, management 
teams could dispense with the practices of partnership. Clearly, in itself this 
statement is not sufficient.
Trust and partnership: the role of practices.
There must therefore be an exchange of tangible benefits among all parties for a 
partnership and trust to be appraised as a worthwhile strategy. Addressing policies 
aligning constituencies’ interests to mutual success provide a pluralist framework for 
reconciling these separate interests while pursuing a joint objective. A carefully- 
drafted agreement, that commits the management to employment protection 
measures, while heralding a raft of flexible work practices, cements the joint 
approach to problems for mutual gain.
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Partnership advocates propose conducting the relationship through positive joint 
problem solving (see below), with two of the most important problems to resolve 
being, firstly, a trade-off between employment security and flexible work practices, 
and then policies for sharing success. The increased influence in organisational 
decision-making, guaranteed employment security and a share of the spoils also 
answer the “what ’s-in-it-for-me? ” cry from sceptical employees (the ‘valency’ of 
partnership, in expectancy theory terms).
Employment security provisions reduce the risk for the workforce (and their 
representatives) in, firstly, committing to a "leap o f faith” into a trust-based 
relationship, and then, to support for flexible work practices that might necessitate a 
reduction in headcount (i.e.: job losses). It can increase confidence in the process, 
despite the vulnerability; those that survive are ‘safe’ -  for the time being.
An element of sharing success ties the interests of the workforce, and indeed the 
management team, to ensuring the success.
However, if at any stage tangible benefits dry up, or appear only relatively superior 
to what might be secured in a relationship conducted according to very different 
principles, then disillusionment can set in, and the positive disposition upon which 
trust relies can be subject to a withering review. More damagingly, trust abused is 
extremely difficult to revive (see above).
Joint problem solving and information sharing.
How then is this realised? As outlined in chapter one, the process of negotiating an 
agreed settlement is one of joint problem solving for mutual gain, with significant 
influence exerted by employees and/or their representatives on the outcome of the 
decision, prior to the decision being made.
The building blocks of communicating more openly and sharing sensitive 
information and consulting frequently -  plus their sister processes of engaging in 
"integrative” bargaining tactics and applying the principles of "consistent 
reciprocity” - are essential here. It would be contradictory, if not hypocritical and
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cynical, to sign a partnership agreement, and then to revert to distributive bargaining 
tactics or adversarialism.
In the early stages of a partnership, greater knowledge of, and appreciation of, the 
other party’s agendas and plans helps to promote shared understanding, and begins 
to diminish the fear and suspicions associated with the risk of engaging in co­
operation and trust. Regular and consistent meetings to share information and 
objectives, especially over a mutually agreed common agenda, in time help each 
party familiarise themselves with the other(s), not only as combatants but as ‘fellow 
human beings’. Fells recommends information sharing, particularly over future 
agendas, as an essential catalytic step toward developing trust (op cit).
However, this is likely only to happen when an adequate level of trust has been 
established. Thus, at some stage, one party -  more usually the management -  will 
have to initiate trust-building by indicating their preparedness to trust. Sharing 
sensitive information provides a real challenge/ opportunity to the other party/ 
parties, inviting them to demonstrate their trustworthiness; to reciprocate the trust. 
Information sharing also allows each party to make the crucial “intelligent appraisal 
o f evidence” required before one can trust another with any conviction.
The parties must then approach this information with a view to producing joint, 
mutually acceptable solutions. From here an agreement can be reached. Securing 
agreement also reinforces the virtue of the consultative process. As Sabel notes, the 
use of joint problem solving “reinvokes, by redefining, the consensus on which [it] 
was founded” (1997: pi 63).
Finally, information sharing and joint consultation provide monitoring opportunities 
to discover any abuse of the spirit of the deal. Sabel notes that robust consultative 
processes blur the line between articulating the consensus and policing it (ibid).
Provision for an employee voice.
As managers have at their disposal disproportionate control over resources and 
decisions in order to rein in unacceptable behaviours from the workforce, there 
needs to be a countervailing force. Partnership implies rather more than getting on
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well; it implies a more or less equal balance of, at least influence, if not power. 
Independent and effective representation of the workforce - with sufficient 
resources, authority and legitimacy to influence decision-making prior to the final 
outcome, plus the sufficient resources, authority and legitimacy to punish 
managerial defections - is the only realistic force available. Returning to Sabel, he 
notes of ‘constitutional orders’, which partnership may be said to resemble closely 
(see chapter one), that “trust-based governance structures have rich, consultative 
institutional structures whose very existence belies the assumption that the agents 
expect their actions automatically to be harmonised by a confluence o f beliefs” 
(1997: pl63).
What is essential is that the workforce be accorded sufficient influence to shape 
organisational decision-making, not to control it. While trade unions do provide the 
best countervailing force to employers’ will, representation of the workforce, or an 
employee voice, need not require a trade union (see chapter one).
One cannot claim ‘partnership’ status for a relationship without the mutual capacity 
to resist and to punish abuse. This surely means that weak staff forums, whose remit 
is confined only to local trivialities (the so-called ‘tea-and-toilets’ agenda), ought not 
to be worthy of the ‘partnership’ title. Similarly, for unionised forms of partnership, 
no-strike clauses are antithetical to partnership, as a concession of power too far. No 
unionised partnership can have a no-strike clause.
Workforce influence and strength distinguishes partnership from helplessness, 
passive compliance to diktat, or abject acquiescence. Partnership then is not “unions 
getting into bed with managers nor is it, in Kelly’s memorable analogy, “the 
partnership o f the street mugger and his victim ” (in The Guardian, 8 August 1998). 
But this does invite the question, what punishments are available to the weaker side 
(i.e.: the employees), especially in unorganised work settings? And what is the 
potency of the threat? This is a matter of special concern in the UK where organising 
formal resistance (such as a strike) is a protracted and complex undertaking. 
Cutcher-Gershenfield (1991) found that economic adversity often led management 
“to make unilateral decisions which disturb the spirit o f co-operation ”, and noted
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the advantage o f representative participation from providing “a forum where both 
parties can formulate strategies fo r  dealing with these shocks
In summary, the process of establishing an IPA-style partnership agreement 
dovetails neatly, for reasons I set out below (see Table 3), with the complementary 
prescriptions for establishing trust.
Table 3 -  The links between trust and partnership.
Mutual trust 
element
IPA partnership 
element
Employment relations 
practice(s)
The relationship is 
ongoing and 
reciprocal.
- Joint commitment to the 
success o f  the enterprise
- Provision for employee 
voice.
- Commitment to the 
legitimate roles o f  each party.
- Mutual gains (such as 
employment-security-for- 
flexibility, and through 
sharing success).
- A mission statement to this effect?
- Representation and consultation 
provisions (at all levels, and at the early, 
'g lint-in-the-eye” stage).
- Commitment to no-compulsory 
redundancies (retraining and redeployment 
first).
- Pay deal linked to organisational 
performance, profit-sharing or employee 
share ownership.
The future is 
uncertain; 
it contains an 
element of risk for 
both parties.
- Provision for employee 
voice.
- Mutual gains through 
sharing the success o f  the 
enterprise.
- Representation and consultation 
provisions. A lso addressed through the 
employment-security-for-flexibility policy 
(sharing the risks) & information sharing.
- Pay deal linked to organisational 
performance, profit-sharing or employee 
share ownership.
All parties have 
the capacity to 
inflict damage on 
others.
- Recognition o f  legitimate 
separate interests.
- Provision for employee 
voice.
- [The option to ‘default’ 
should be available to all.]
- Excludes “no-strike” deals.
The relationship is 
a freely-agreed  
arrangement.
- Absence o f  threats (beyond evident, and 
jointly recognised, commercial realities).
- Secret ballot o f  the workforce should 
endorse the deal.
There is an 
intelligent 
appraisal of 
evidence.
- Negotiations over a period o f  
time.
- Information is shared openly 
and equally.
- Information is shared openly and equally.
- Training in basic finance and business 
context ( if  required).
The appraisal of 
evidence is 
subjective.
- Commitments taken on the 
consciously developed trust.
- Regular interactions (joint committees, 
special forums, etc).
Each party has a 
positive
disposition toward  
the other.
- Expected to emerge through 
the commitment to “building  
trust”.
- Behavioural training.
- ‘Quick w ins’ achieved.
The process of negotiating and establishing a partnership agreement (stage lb) can 
thus be seen as a moderating variable for producing mutual trust in the employment 
relationship -  at least, according to existing accounts from partnership organisations.
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The model mirrors closely that produced by Guest and Peccei (see Figure 2), with 
partnership refracted through internal behavioural transformations and attitudinal 
improvements, which in turn have an impact on internal performance.
For the reasons set out above, we would expect genuine partnership arrangements to 
produce significantly higher reported degrees of trust.
Accordingly, partnership is a model that ought to be implemented in full. To have 
only the principles without the practices is to have merely produced a facile mission 
statement. To have only the practices, but with no overarching principles, is to leave 
the practices in search of direction and objectives and vulnerable to abandonment. 
To have no joint problem solving processes demands the question: how is this a 
partnership, and not helplessness, passive compliance to diktat, or abject 
acquiescence? To have only joint problem solving, but no exchange of tangible 
mutual benefits (such as employment security for flexibility, and sharing success), 
nor a commitment to improve relations and benefits for all, does not distinguish 
partnership from any other collective negotiations.
In the fieldwork, I appraise the evidence from each organisation against these 
theories.
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Chapter 4. The history and context of partnership.
When John Monks argued that partnership represents “the highest form o f industrial 
relations”, an idea whose “time has come” (in The Times, 24 May 1999; later 
echoed by Guest and Peccei, 2001: p207), he seemed to be implying that the new 
model constituted a distillation of the finest elements of industrial relations: a happy 
medium between conflict and consensus, a balance struck between economic 
efficiency and social justice. His remark also inferred that partnership was the 
ultimate culmination of decades of painful development in British industrial 
relations. Colin Thomas, from partnership company Welsh Water, summarised this 
view of history thus:
“Confrontation was a phase that I  think we had to go through. There was an 
irresponsible use o f power on the part o f the unions, and then the overreaction 
came... We are now in a position that most people would recognise as common 
sense” (cited in Overell, 1997: p24).
As this chapter will show, we have heard this appeal to ‘common sense’ before. 
Collaboration in the workplace between employer and employee may not have been 
labelled ‘partnership’ before, but the idea has always been with us.
What I call the ‘1990s version’ may eventually prove to be only the latest 
incarnation of an industrial relations programme designed to manage away 
“pluralism’s problems” (Dunn, 1993). But this particular programme enjoys 
uncommonly broad appeal, as chapter one illustrated. Not only that, for some, like 
Monks, it has the weight of history behind it.
I have conducted this research at the micro-level, within four ‘partnership’ 
organisations. The process of conducting case studies, especially into ‘fashionable’ 
management practices (such as partnership), carries with it the temptation to get 
swept along in the current of the participants’ testimonies, and to bestow inflated 
significance upon the actions and personalities internal to the organisation (see 
chapter five). Equally however one should not assign to external factors such undue 
force that “they become a form o f morally dubious environmental determinism 
which reduces people to puppets” (Armstrong, 1971: p52). As Hyman delineated so 
concisely:
“What occurs is not simply the mechanical outcome o f large-scale social 
forces, and can only be understood by reference to the perceptions, intentions and
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strategies o f the men and women involved. Yet at the same time, people’s 
consciousness and wills are the product o f material social conditions, and these 
conditions set limits to what can be achieved through individual and collective 
action” (1989: p i79).
This symbiosis between the macro- and the micro-levels is also to be found in the 
literature on trust. Bachman argues that trust’s development is “highly dependent” 
upon the “institutional environment” in which the relationship is conducted (1998: 
p299). A nation’s institutions -  such as its legislative regulations and its governance 
structures -  “produce specific forms o f tacit knowledge ” that reproduce or challenge 
trust on a permanent basis, whether the virtuous circle of co-operation or the vicious 
cycle of hostility and recrimination (ibid).
The first section charts, in an admittedly somewhat stylised fashion, the abbreviated
t lihistory of partnership’s ill-starred near-cousins from the late 19 century until the 
Bullock reforms and the collapse of the ‘social contract’ in 1978-79. For each I 
identify from whom the main impetus for the initiative came, and whether each of 
the three main constituencies -  the State, employers and the unions -  supported or 
opposed the programme, or indeed ignored it. (For a simplified representation, see 
Appendix 2.) Note that this section is not intended to be a comprehensive review and 
study; such an endeavour is a PhD thesis in itself. It is drawn entirely from 
secondary sources such as general industrial relations texts, and is intended rather to 
convey the general pattern of response witnessed in Britain to similar nationally- 
vaunted programmes for workplace collaboration. My argument here is that 
partnership in the UK has been perennially restricted to short-lived bursts of 
resonance among a narrow band of enthusiasts, struggling against widespread 
ignorance, indifference or hostility. I note any similarities with the modem 
programme (as defined in chapter one).
In the second section, I outline the institutional environment produced by successive 
Conservative governments from 1979 to 1990, which forced at the end of the 1980s 
a strategic review among British trade unions, from whom - for the first time in 
history - the impetus for the present programme for workplace partnership has 
uniquely hailed. I discuss how and why this broad shift in union policy came about.
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The third section appraises the institutional environment pertaining at the time of 
partnership’s emergence, or more accurately (given the preceding analysis) its re- 
emergence during the 1990s. It is split into two sub-sections, divided around 1995- 
1996 when a Labour government seemed a distinct probability, heralding likely 
reforms aimed at promoting workplace partnership. As well as the direction of 
Blair’s re-constituted Labour party, the section notes also the influence of the 
philosophy and directives emanating from the European Commission, the emphasis 
on strategic people management (from theories such as HRM, etc), and, finally, 
broader programmes for social democratic renewal, of which partnership may be 
said to be a sub-set. My argument here is that the ‘1990s version’ coincides with a 
favourable set of broader circumstances and complementary trends which, 
combined, suggest that partnership may have the potential this time around to 
become a broader movement in British workplaces.
Overall I argue that all of the previous incarnations of partnership suffered from one 
or more of the following supporting features being either absent or too weak in the 
institutional environment to help sustain the idea:
■ Favourable labour market conditions (low inflation and low labour unrest 
levels)
■ A favourable public policy agenda (particularly the endorsement of the 
government, and a positive legislative framework)
■ A credible congruence of academic and expert opinion broadly endorsing 
the idea, and -
■ Benign, or at least non-hostile, attitudes among management groups and 
employees, the latter as represented by trade unions.
The chapter closes with some thoughts on the likely prospects for the latest version 
of partnership.
In each section, interspersed in the historical account of events and ideas, I indicate 
the prevailing academic take on joint problem solving and, where any comment is 
made, partnership and trust-based relations at work, drawing on selected key works 
from each age.
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Pre-World War One.
In a celebrated essay, Ramsay (1977) identified what he considered to be the first 
wave of managerial attempts to control and pacify workers through some form of 
collaborative co-partnership endeavour emerging around 1860. The limited 
experiments with financial participation, notably forms of profit-sharing, rather than 
joint consultation or extended employee involvement in organisational decision­
making, were transitory; at least half collapsed during a prolonged -  unspecified - 
depression (Marchington, 1982: p i51).
Subsequent bursts of enthusiasm for the same recurred between 1908-9 and again 
between 1912-14. Ramsay (1977: p485) cites Church’s observation that on all three 
occasions employers introduced the schemes while facing a tight labour market 
(high levels of employment) and labour unrest. The schemes were viewed with 
suspicion from all sides: damned as "a piffling palliative ” in a Fabian tract in 1913, 
and dismissed by the majority of employers as "too philanthropic” (ibid: p484). In 
Ramsay’s view, employers rather overlooked the potential for co-opting workers 
onto their agenda. Fox also records a number of small-scale "publicly staged 
conciliatory councils” stressing a search for a common consensus on workplace 
reform, meeting in 1895, 1900, 1911 and 1919 (1974a: p254).
Isolated joint collaboration efforts along the lines of a modem partnership could be 
found, notably Robert Owen’s New Lanark settlement, while in 1884 the forerunner 
of today’s IP A was established as The Labour Association for Promoting Co­
operative Production Amongst the Workforce. Its aim was to act as "a propagandist 
committee to arouse working men, and public opinion generally, to the importance 
o f the movement for making workers everywhere partners in their workshops” 
(Coupar and Stevens, 1998: p i45).
Beatrice and Sidney Webb saw that the effort to secure the co-operation and trust of 
the nation’s workforces necessitated tempering managers’ prerogative through a 
system of collective and independent organisation of workers’ interests that matched 
employer’s strength: joint regulation by equal partners on matters of workplace 
terms and conditions and organisation (cited in Fox, 1974a: p243, p253). This
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system, dreamed the Webbs, would, if conducted professionally and responsibly, 
provide long-term stability and prosperity to society.
tViThe pre-eminent management text in the early years of the 20 century posited a 
rather different view of work organisation. FW Taylor’s scientific management 
theory (Taylor, 1947) enjoined managers to waste no time investing trust in their 
workers, whom Taylor caricatured as stupid, work-shy brutes solely motivated by 
money, with no interest in how their work was planned, and even less scope for 
input. Planning work and doing work were kept separate in Taylor’s method; 
employee involvement in decision-making was considered an anathema. Workers 
were instead expected to respond willingly, and as individuals, to the ‘stick’ 
provided by strictly standardised task instructions and managerial monitoring of 
performance, for the ‘carrot’ of a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work. It captured 
managers’ attention. Taylor’s legacy was to last for decades, and in some industries 
endures today.
Whitleyism.
Toward the end of the First World War, the State and private businesses exerted 
"heavy ‘moral’pressure” (Ramsay, op cit) on unions and workers to co-operate in 
re-building the nation. But this was not their only pressing concern. Both were 
confronted in the aftermath of the conflict with a dramatic surge in union 
membership (which had doubled in eight years) and militant ambitions informed, in 
part, by the tumultuous events in Russia in 1917.
The five Whitley reports (1917-19) noted different constituencies’ different 
definitions of co-operation, and their objectives: ‘‘One looks to the gradual 
expropriation o f employers and the elimination ofprofit. The other wants to interest 
the working class in the growth o f capitalist profit” (cited in Ramsay, op cit).
To accommodate both agendas as far as possible, the Whitley recommendations
proposed joint consultative committees in firms and each industry at a national level,
in order to set up and maintain a system of co-operation in ‘workshop matters’.
Clegg laid out the agenda thus:
"... improvement o f processes, machinery and organisation and appropriate 
questions relating to management and the examination o f industrial experiments,
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with special reference to co-operation in carrying new ideas into effect and full 
consideration o f the workpeople’s point o f view in relation to them ” (1972: pi 85)
This extended agenda is comparable in scope and potential content to that put 
forward by partnership advocates today, although pay and working hours were kept 
separate in district or national collective bargaining.
At its peak the Whitley system covered 15.5 million employees out of a national 
workforce of 17.5 million (Blyton & Turnbull, 1994: p i82), and was both popular 
and fairly effective. But within months of the end of the War, and in the midst of 
severe economic depression the system had become unstable. According to Ramsay, 
the State - under pressure from employers - withdrew support for the system inside 
private firms, although Whitley committees were retained in many parts of the 
public sector, such as the NHS and local government (and still are).
Mond-Turner talks, 1927-29.
Soon after the failure of the General Strike in 1926, ICI’s Alfred Mond articulated as 
the basis for good employee relations an approximation of the classic partnership 
trade-off: "economic efficiency in exchange for increases in workers ’ standard o f  
living” (Overell, 1997: p29). He invited the TUC to engage in talks with major 
employers to discuss the viability of such a programme - an early instance of the 
impetus for joint collaboration emerging from unpromising circumstances. The talks 
embraced a very ambitious agenda indeed, much of which finds an echo now in the 
partnership agenda:
“ ...Collective bargaining, security o f employment, the raising o f the status o f 
the individual worker... legal regulation o f working hours, the formation o f works 
councils, the provision o f company information to workers, an investigation into the 
potential causes o f disputes... [and] provision o f machinery to enable workers to 
make suggestions and constructively criticise employers... Other areas for possible 
joint action were to cover unemployment, the distribution o f the proceeds o f 
commodities and services with a ‘high wages policy’, consideration o f plans for  
participation in industry, payment by results and minimum wage principles... It was 
also proposed to cover industrial rationalisation -  restructuring to improve 
efficiency, flexibility, elasticity and testing o f experimental conditions... In addition, 
institutional questions were to be placed on the agenda such as the possible creation 
o f a national industrial council and a permanent standing committee to meet for 
regular consultation on matters affecting industry... ” (Taylor, 2000: p45-46).
96
The then TUC General Secretary, Walter Citrine endorsed joint participation to 
secure ‘industrial peace’, calling it “the next step in industrial relations” (Taylor, 
ibid). But the TUC’s affiliate unions, fearful of independent worker organisation, 
greeted the high-profile talks with a “reticence to the point o f near-silence” 
(Ramsay, op cit).
The talks took place intermittently over two years, during a severe economic 
depression, but ultimately this prototype national partnership endeavour withered, 
for lack of sustained support from either the State, who stayed out of the talks; the 
majority of employers, whose fragmented employers’ associations responded with 
indifference and intransigence (Taylor, 2000: p47), and most of the trade unions, 
reflecting militant rank-and-file opinion that dismissed joint decision-making as a 
ruse for inducing passive compliance and lower pay.24
World War Two.
The demands of a second global war revived the Whitley-ist joint problem solving at 
the firm level, in the form of Joint Production Committees (JPCs), explicitly 
designed to foster collaborative relations (Clegg, 1979: p i52). The idea seemed to 
emerge spontaneously from the shopfloor (Ramsay, op cit: p490), and drew 
significant support from the TUC, and the engineering unions in particular. Indeed, 
there were calls from the unions for the initiative to be extended into a national 
programme. Employers were also keen since the war coincided with another spurt in 
union membership (which increased by a third between 1938 and 1943). The 
government, under Churchill, confined itself to a “strong recommendation” and 
eschewed issuing a compulsory instruction to set up joint arrangements until 1942 
(Marchington, 1982: p i51).
The joint committee representatives were considered “partners in a continuous 
process o f exchanging information and attitudes” (Clegg, 1972). The agenda for the 
majority of the committees was confined to matters of production and increased 
efficiency not covered by formal negotiating procedures. It did not encompass, as 
partnership seeks to do, the full agenda of employment relations in the workplace.
24 The unions ’ preferred model fo r  extending workers ’ influence over the purpose and policies o f  industry was 
socialist, with control either bestowed upon the unions exclusively, or in joint boards involving the union and the 
government, and not between workers/ unions and management.
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After the War, a hardening of local shop stewards’ bitter attitudes "undoubtedly ” (in 
Ramsay’s view) precipitated the JPCs’ decline, despite the return of a Labour 
government committed to re-distribution of the nation’s wealth and extending 
workplace democracy. The relatively weak role of the JPC as a consultative rather 
than negotiating body was damned as an irrelevance by shop stewards, who thought 
that they could secure greater power for their members through the spread of inter­
union demarcations and restrictive practices under de-centralised collective 
bargaining arrangements. Briefly revived during the 1947 fuel crisis, under the 
proviso that managers retained jurisdiction over the final decision, the death-knell 
for the JPC sounded after the surprise defeat of the Labour government in 1951. 
While MacShane (1994) commended a small number of *'far-sighted” managers for 
harnessing the "workplace creativity ” of these joint arrangements, he blamed elitist 
snobbery and lack of trust regarding workers’ capacity for autonomy and creativity -  
from both sides -  for stifling these prototype partnership structures.
A shift in focus became evident in industrial relations literature during the 1940s 
toward a concern for managing employees’ needs as a means to secure 
organisational success. Elton Mayo (1946) popularised the findings of the famous 
experiments between 1924-1940 at Western Electric’s Hawthorn plant outside 
Chicago, which had found that attention to employees’ needs and generating ‘social 
sentiments’ at work improved productivity. Mayo’s recommendations - that 
managers try to create social interaction through controlled employee participation, 
and establish direct channels of communication with the workforce to solicit their 
loyalty to the firm -  chimed with the aspirations of those for whom Taylorism was 
disquieting. However, again, trust in employees’ self-sufficiency or input into joint 
problem solving was limited. Mayo was explicitly hostile to forms of collective 
orientation and activity, and advocated breaking up the “natural solidarity ”, in 
Ramsay’s phrase, of work groups as this challenged managerial diktat -  which, 
Mayo assumed, to be an essential pre-condition of a successful workplace:
“Co-operation [for Mayo] was symptomatic o f health; and since there was 
no alternative in the modern world, co-operation must mean obedience to 
managerial authority. Thus collective bargaining was not really co-operation, but 
merely a flimsy substitute for the real thing ” (Hudson, Konzelmann & Wilkinson, 
2001).
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1951 -1968.
The idea of ‘partnership at work’ receded in significance in industrial relations for 
almost twenty years during the ‘Golden Age’ of prosperity, near-full employment 
and relative labour passivity (Hobsbawm, 1997). Industrial relations commentators 
of the age such as Kahn-Freund widely assumed that the British voluntarist system 
of de-centralised ‘collective laissez-faire’ bargaining was the finest industrial 
relations system available. If only, Flanders opined (1970: p83), other countries - 
with their institutional and statutory arrangements - could develop the same mature 
level of mutual tolerance that the British had achieved. Others were not so confident 
(or complacent); Bums and Stalker called in 1961 for the modernisation of firms, for 
de-bureaucratisation and flexibility, to take advantage of efficiencies from new 
technology (1961).
The authors of an influential American text from the era observed that “the 
management and manipulation o f employees is most productive when their co­
operation is willingly forthcoming”, and that “the range o f potential areas o f co­
operation is limited only by the range o f potential interests o f the parties” 
(Komhauser et al, 1954: pl9) - subject to challenges over the context (whether co­
operation is in fact expediency or co-optation) and content (whether it is to be 
limited or extensive in scope and agenda). In his trenchant exhortation for industrial 
harmony, Homans echoed Mond from two decades previously, and preceded the 
present enthusiasm by more than forty years:
“The two parties must, to an indefinite but recognisable degree and in spite 
o f differences o f opinion, be willing to work together actively... to increase the 
effectiveness o f the organisation in producing goods and services and [emphasis 
added in the original] to increase the human development and satisfactions o f 
persons in the plant” (Homans, 1954: p49).
Homans also reflected a tenet of trust theory when he wrote that both a pre-requisite 
and a fruit of industrial harmony is “confidence in the abilities and intentions o f 
parties”, and in terming this confidence “a form o f capital” (ibid: p54) he pre-dates 
Etzioni and Giddens by several decades.
Increased attention to the psychology of employees -  into the “human side o f the 
enterprise” (McGregor, 1960) - constituted a departure from the Puritan work 
ethic’s assumptions about work that had continued to dominate management
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thinking in spite of the lessons from Hawthorn and the rise of the Human Relations 
school. Research began to cast doubt upon Hayek’s condemnation of the instinct 
among groups to co-operate as a ‘primitive trait’; far from being “a hindrance to the 
development o f markets”, inter-group collaboration was "actually essential for 
production ” (Hudson, Konzelmann & Wilkinson, 2001). But how to manage it?
McGregor’s theories X and Y (op cit) held, respectively, that workers are lazy and 
greedy and should be managed accordingly [i.e.: Taylorism], or that workers’ energy 
and motivation for ‘self-fulfilment’ can and must be tapped and moulded for 
productive work. This could be done through skilful people management and 
devolved task responsibilities. McGregor recommended the ‘Y* approach. His 
message was echoed by Likert (1961), whose ‘participative-group’ management 
approach was judged the optimum style for securing employee co-operation, 
improved morale and trust, as well as greater productivity (in Hudson, Konzelmann 
& Wilkinson, 2001). He noted -  prudently, in the light of the trust literature - that 
such a re-imagined management style might meet with scepticism initially, and 
would need time to convince the doubters (ibid). Flanders interpreted this as an 
endorsement of “democratic” and “creative workplace bargaining” (1970: p i53).
The popular findings on employee motivation of Herzberg (1987) also urged some 
form of mutual gains exchange at work, albeit on an individual employer-to- 
employee basis. Herzberg posited good pay and employment security among his 
‘hygiene’ factors as valued pre-conditions for motivation, but his prescriptions -  
articulated during a period of sustained union militancy in the US - made limited use 
of employee involvement practices, still less joint problem solving. Indeed, he too 
wrote of the “tyranny o f teams ”. Moreover, the programme of reform relied upon 
managerial benevolence, and the wisdom of external consultants (such as Herzberg).
The Fawley productivity agreements.
The objective of the innovative productivity agreement reached in 1960 at Esso 
Petroleum’s Fawley refinery (Flanders, 1964) had been to remove or curtail 
restrictive practices in agreement with the trade unions. Through what one Esso 
manager called "the habit o f discussion” [i.e.: regular informal joint problem 
solving] (cited in Cooper & Bartlett, 1976: p i82), Esso secured from its manual
100
workers’ unions -  against opposition from the craft unions - a commitment to 
sweeping changes to flexible work practices in exchange for a 40% pay rise, with 
the safety net of no compulsory redundancies (Clegg, 1979: p i40). A deal at Shell 
emphasised employment security, improved terms and conditions and increased pay 
in exchange for productivity improvements (Cooper & Bartlett, op cit: p i85). 
McCarthy more generally explained the objective of the subsequent spate of 
productivity bargaining deals as “linking changes in work arrangements with 
improvements in pay ” (McCarthy, 1971: p84).
The deals found considerable employer enthusiasm, Ramsay wryly mimicking the 
sentiment at the time, “this time employers really mean it” [i.e.: in their support for 
joint working] (Ramsay, op cit).
While at first glance the details bear close resemblance to partnership-style joint 
problem solving for mutual gain, the majority of the deals were short-term, issue- 
specific and rather calculative exchanges, with little attention paid to developing 
joint decision-making (Ramsay, op cit: p494; also Clegg, 1979: p483), and still less 
to partnership’s central objective of improving the relationships among the key 
protagonists over the long-term.
McKersie and Hunter’s argument (1973, in Clegg, 1979: p322-6) that productivity 
bargaining led to a positive re-evaluation of the IR function in firms, and in 
retrospect, the deals were perhaps the first significant attempt to manage workplace 
relationships in a systematic and intelligent way. But this programme did not last 
long either (1965-68) once it became apparent to employers that it too could not 
deliver sustained productivity improvements (Blyton & Turnbull, 1994: p i85) and 
external threats began to undermine the industrial relations gains won under the 
deals (Cooper & Bartlett, 1976: p206-8). At this time, the American duo, Walton 
and McKersie, published their celebrated work, ‘A behavioural theory of labor 
negotiations’ (1965), contrasting ‘distributive’, win-lose adversarialism with the 
more partnership-oriented ‘integrative’ bargaining tactics. (See chapter two.)
Thus far, the impetus for each peacetime initiative for joint working had come 
predominantly from employers (the early profit-sharing, the Mond-Tumer talks,
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productivity bargaining). Apart from the Whitley reforms the State had been content 
to retain its abstentionist position, upholding the popular voluntarist principle, 
whereby the incumbent government largely eschews frameworks and regulations, 
and allows managers and trade unions to forge their own agreements.
However, at the height of (relative) trade union power and influence in the mid- 
1960s unofficial strike numbers rose steadily, while UK productivity -  exacerbated 
by the chaotic fragmentation of de-centralised collective bargaining and the spread 
of restrictive practices - remained poor: the ‘British disease’ encapsulated. The State 
intervened to try to improve the conduct and character of British industrial relations. 
In relatively quick succession, a handful of initiatives -  particularly the Donovan 
Commission and the Bullock report - sought to set pluralist parameters around the 
processes of industrial relations.
Donovan commission, 1968.
The Donovan commission (1968: pl2) famously noted of course that two systems of 
industrial relations were operating in the UK: the formal system of “official 
institutions ” of rule-making and reaching agreement through collective bargaining 
which, it still maintained, was the best available model (p50), and the informal 
“tacit agreements and understandings ” reached on the line. These were often to the 
advantage of the powerful and well-organised workforce, often in defiance of their 
trade union, and seldom codified by senior management. The Donovan commission 
held that the informal system was undermining the formal (p36), and it 
recommended efforts to “formalise the informal” through “joint regulation”, and to 
cement the strategic role of joint negotiations in corporate decision-making: 
“effective and orderly collective bargaining at the factory level” (Gilbert, 1993). 
The Donovan team ignored all alternatives for employee involvement in decision­
making as, at best, subsidiaries to collective bargaining (Gilbert, ibid: p247). The 
Fawley agreement, largely discredited by the time Donovan published, was heralded 
as a blueprint.
Criticisms of Donovan’s prescriptions are instructive. Dunn described reactions to 
the report casting it as an irrelevance for having mis-specified the problem and 
chosen the wrong solution (1993: p i69). Alan Fox, in a vital work from the period
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that, for the first time in an industrial relations text, dealt at length with the notion of 
trust (1974a), felt that restricting behaviours by strict regulatory edict resembled an 
"economic exchange” more than a “social exchange”, with the attendant 
undercurrent of mistrust implied. He explained that industrial relations systems, 
management styles and job designs produced either high-trust or low-trust relations, 
but regrettably the latter was prevailing, caused for the most part by managers. As 
Wood (2000) reflected, “workers ’ jobs were so de-skilled and workers treated by 
management in such a low-trust manner that they could not but respond in a low- 
trust way”.
Fox felt that management style was the key, and he urged a State-sponsored 
educative programme of radical pluralism [i.e.: joint problem solving] which might 
“trigger management to take more responsible attitudes towards the design o f jobs 
and the treatment o f employees ” (Wood, ibid). Indeed, Fox wrote an accompanying 
text for managers, ‘Man mismanagement’ (Fox, 1974b). McCarthy’s similar call for 
the “extension o f joint regulation ” into areas of managerial prerogative - there was 
to be no “sacred garden” - went similarly unheeded (1971, op cit: p85). But, as 
Ogden observed,
“The idea o f giving them [shop stewards] more by sharing power was 
complete anathema to [management]... The effort to ‘educate' management o f the 
need for change in attitudes -  from unitary to pluralist frames o f reference, from 
management by prerogatives to joint regulation -  deemed essential in the 
programme o f reform has generally met, with some exceptions, little success” (1981: 
p36-37).
Trade unions were just as wary of participation schemes that appeared to align 
employees’ interests with those of management, or sought to engage representatives 
only modestly in the management of an enterprise (Blyton & Turnbull, 1994: p212). 
Thus, neither party accepted the Donovan proposals.
Though Dunn argued, 25 years on, that British industrial relations had come to 
witness, as Donovan would have wanted, “managers trying to manage” (1993: 
p i82) he indicated that, with their prerogative to manage reasserted, British 
managers proved reluctant to engage with Donovan’s explicit pluralism. Forms of 
unilateral control were generally preferred.
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The Bullock report, 1977.
The mythology of the omnipotent shop steward, ruling the nation’s factories in 
defiance of managers reached its apotheosis in the early 1970s, when the young 
Arthur Scargill led two crippling miners’ strikes that contributed to the downfall of 
the Conservative government in 1974.
The Labour government established the Bullock committee in 1975 to, in Clegg’s 
words, “put the relationship between capital and labour on to a new basis which 
will involve not just management but the whole workforce in sharing the 
responsibility for success and profitability o f the enterprise” (1979: p441) -  
sentiments similar, yet again, to the joint commitment to success in modem 
partnerships.
Serious internal disagreements inside the committee required both a majority and 
minority report, but overall Bullock endorsed a system of worker directors far in 
excess of anything to be found in other European countries, including a permanent 
and exclusive role for trade unions in the corporate governance of firms. The 
committee “overreached themselves”, according to Clegg (1979). Employers’ 
displeasure over the extensive rights for unions, coupled with enduring suspicions 
among the trade unions about co-optation, meant that the worker directors proposal 
was effectively still-born, the prevailing view being that “workers simply could not 
be trusted to behave moderately or to have access to commercially sensitive 
information” (Hutton, 1995: p87).
The Bullock reforms have since been lamented as a “great, missed opportunity” by 
the current TUC General Secretary, reflecting in a seminar 1999 with the hindsight 
of 18 years of Conservative anti-union legislation (author’s notes). The few attempts 
to instil worker directors, within British Steel and the Post Office, for example, did 
not last.
A variant of productivity bargaining -  known as participation agreements -  emerged 
at the time in companies facing commercial disaster, notably GEC, Chrysler and 
British Leyland. As part of the deals the unions were enjoined to discuss the content 
of survival plans, but pay issues were left off the agenda. Marchington (1982, op cit:
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p79) reported a few innovations in ‘open-book’ information sharing. Again, neither 
lasted, nor captured the wider imagination.
The collapse of the ‘social contract’.
The ‘social contract’ between the Labour government and the trade unions (1975- 
78) facilitated an uneasy co-operation on prices and incomes restraint, and an 
enhanced role for the unions in economic policy. Employers were largely 
overlooked.
The coalition at national level relied upon good relations pertaining at the local 
level, inside firms. A team led by Batstone found that “strong bargaining relations ” 
were being achieved where ‘leader’ shop stewards were engaged in joint regulation, 
and where this worked to mutual advantage, helping to resolve managers’ work 
organisation concerns, and sustaining the shop steward’s elevated importance for the 
smooth running of the plant. “Strong” relationships produced promising “trust 
relations" (Batstone et al, 1977: p i55).
The national truce staggered awkwardly through three years, but in late 1978 the 
dam burst at firm-level. Militant union activists in key companies, starting at Ford, 
began to defy wage restraint locally. An impotent TUC was “powerless to moderate 
expectations “ (Taylor, 2000: p243). Violence at mass pickets and unofficial strikes 
equated the country’s industrial relations with a breakdown in law and order. 
Concerns about trade unions’ ability to self-regulate and control their members 
became a divisive political issue for the Callaghan administration, which could only 
look on in dismay. The public sector strikes of the 1978-79 ‘winter of discontent’ 
produced images and tales of union-induced catastrophe, which the right-wing press 
gleefully exaggerated to compelling effect (Derek Jameson, then of The Sun, 
confessing as much in a Channel 4 ‘Secret History’ programme). Unacknowledged 
by the majority of union activists, public opinion turned against them with startling 
rapidity: in June 1978 4% of the public viewed strikes as the most important 
electoral issue, an opinion that by February 1979 exercised the minds of half the 
electorate, and at the election itself in May, fully three-quarters thought union 
power the most important issue (Marsh, 1992: p63). To few observers’ surprise at 
the election the country returned the Conservative party to office.
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Cycles of history?
Thus, up to the 1980s British industrial relations as a whole followed a cyclical 
pattern of conflict and consensus, “a mix o f conflict and accommodation ” in Blyton 
and Turnbull’s phrase (1994), assuming the different shades of conflict and arms- 
length, calculative co-operation as external circumstances and internal wills dictated.
Ramsay posited in his 1977 essay that there were four possible outcomes for these 
programmes: success, a descent into triviality, instability or a change in the 
programme’s status (pp481-482). In his judgement, the fate of each of the above had 
either been the ignominious descent into triviality, or abandonment following a 
period of instability (p498) once the “cycle o f control” turned back in employers’ 
favour. Outside the demands of waging global war, the impetus for each came 
overwhelmingly from employers, acting with temporary generosity and mock- 
pluralist convictions in order to ride out a period of difficult labour market 
conditions, union unrest and militancy being a special concern. However, Ramsay 
did not consider participation to be “a worthless pursuit”, but he concluded, in the 
Marxist tradition, that “a genuine industrial democracy” would only prevail 
following the transformation of “the whole political-economic environment” (ibid).
MacShane characterised the dominant British approach toward partnership, common 
to all parties, as “100 years o f suspicion” (op cit: p6). An “historical bias” against 
worker autonomy and participation (p8) had stifled all attempts at joint problem 
solving. Dunn (1993) memorably characterised it as ‘live and let live’. This mutual 
tolerance implies that trust will have existed but, with a few exceptions, it was of a 
low level, and susceptible to disruption.
Overall, the combination of the voluntarist principle, British companies’ “fire­
fighting” pragmatism/ incompetence and unions’ avowed preference for 
adversarialism served for six decades.
Thatcher, 1979-90.
The institutional environment of British industrial relations underwent an 
unprecedented transformation during Margaret Thatcher’s period of office (Purcell,
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1991: p41). In this section I outline the hostile context advanced by the State, seized 
upon by many employers, and weakly challenged by the trade unions, into which 
partnership (re-) emerged in the early 1990s.
Thatcher believed that the main reason behind British companies’ chronic un­
competitiveness was that they were trapped in inflexible, welfare-oriented industrial 
relations processes, including dialogue with the despised trade unions. Belligerent 
commentators backed her analysis: Correlli Barnett, for example, cited the “problem 
o f the trade unions [as] possibly the strongest single factor militating against 
technological innovation and high productivity” (1986: p274). The ‘winter of 
discontent’ had lent considerable support to this analysis in the public mind. 
Business devoid of trade unions was advanced as not only a viable, but a positively 
desirable alternative by the likes of Hayek. Moreover, within the Conservative party, 
revenge for bringing down Heath’s government in 1974 was due. The unions’ 
collective shrug of their shoulders dismayed Crouch, who wrote presciently in 1983 
that such ,,tough-mindedness>, could be seen as “disturbingly complacent in the 
current Western political climate” (1983: pl29).
While the unions bore the brunt of most analyses of the ‘British disease*, other 
commentators pointed an accusatory finger at British managers, who had also been 
resistant to change. In addition, for Sked, they had become “separated physically 
from their workers”, and “failed to inculcate any sense o f identity or firm loyalty” 
(1987: p i8). Certainly Thatcher regarded many as inept cowards for failing to resist 
the unions.
She set out “not to help industry but to create the harsh economic conditions in 
which industry [was] forced to make the changes necessary to keep itself alive ” 
(Griffith, 1983: p3), and to destroy resistance from whatever quarter through a 
“reassertion o f the liberal State ” (Wood, 2000). Her attack came two-pronged: the 
uncompromising introduction of unfettered ‘market forces’, and restrictive 
legislation on the power of trade unions.
25 Len Murray explained in an interview fo r  The Observer in September 1984 that he "didn’t believe she would 
do what she said she would do " (cited in Taylor, 2000: p246).
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The essential pre-condition for effective collective bargaining, balancing economic 
efficiency with social justice, had always been the safety net of full employment. In 
the midst of a deep recession, this was removed. Mass unemployment on an 
unprecedented scale, and the accompanying fear of losing one’s job, was used as a 
tool for keeping inflation low and as a ‘motivator’ for restraining wage demands, 
and to deter any union-led counter-resistance to the Thatcherite programme.
The withdrawal of State subsidies pitched companies and workforces into a ‘free’ 
market for which many were hopelessly ill-prepared. Manufacturing in particular 
collapsed, with many companies, workforces and individuals unable to change 
strategies and behaviours in response.26 With privatisation and the de-regulation and 
compulsory competitive tendering of council and health services, public sector 
organisations also faced previously unthinkable market demands. Huge redundancy 
programmes decimated workforces and sapped trade union confidence.
The second prong -  an incremental legislative assault, in the form of eight explicitly 
hostile Acts - was designed to curb union powers and those of collective employee 
action in general, especially strikes. The “drip-drip corrosion ” of the punitive 
legislation (Dunn & Metcalf, 1997: p93), the removal of the economic and social 
‘safety nets’, and changes in occupation structures from the predominantly unionised 
manufacturing sectors to the predominantly non-unionised service sectors, combined 
to erode union power.
Thatcher had no time for ‘industrial democracy’, an idea that became, if not 
“devalued, then at least, a changed concept” from what had passed as the industrial 
relations consensus before (Bassett, 1986: p i01). It certainly did not mean a 
constructive dialogue, let alone the promotion of trust (Marsh, 1992: p62; Metcalf, 
1989: p i7). Tri-partite bodies were disbanded, and the unions effectively shunned by 
central government.
The traditionally reactive TUC and its affiliates fulfilled Crouch’s prophecy of 
complacency, as they retreated to staunch the haemorrhaging of membership in their
26 At one Midlands manufacturing firm, interviewed by the author fo r  an IPA case study, i f  one had asked any o f  
the shopfloor employees in the 1980s who their customers were and what they needed, according to the senior 
shop steward the reply would have been, “I couldn’t give a shit.”
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rapidly depleting manufacturing strongholds, and failed to mount (costly) 
recruitment drives in the developing service sectors. Len Murray’s half-hearted 
‘New Realism’ efforts, which were all too obviously only partially supported among 
trade unions, were greeted with contempt by a Conservative administration that had 
Norman Tebbitt in charge of industrial relations policy. From the sidelines of 
national debate the unions watched as their influence plummeted.
The moderate EETPU union’s single-union deals - comprising clauses on union 
participation in decision-making, commitments to flexibility and single-status terms 
and conditions, but most controversially ‘no-strike’ guarantees and pendulum 
arbitration (see Bassett, 1986) - were seen by some as a progressive response to the 
changed institutional environment, and an abject capitulation by the TUC, which 
expelled the union in 1988. This was not, one imagines, what Crouch envisaged 
when he proposed in 1983 experimentation with forms of joint consultation and 
internal flexibility, “but guided by the aim o f providing a strong constitutional place 
for union representation in company decision-making” (Crouch, 1983: pl41). The 
deals did not offer an attractive model for joint working to most trade unions, 
especially as many involved inter-union battles for recognition, which the more 
accommodating EETPU often won. But nor were the deals that attractive to 
companies. Some among those rejecting the EETPU’s overtures viewed the offer as 
“a poisoned chalice, attractive in parts (the provisions making strikes unlikely) but 
tainted in others (the regular disclosure o f detailed commercial information)” 
(Bassett, op cit: p86). It is illustrative of the mood of the period that even this 
relatively weak model of joint working was deemed to be too onerous a burden for 
some employers.
Reaction from academics to the ‘no-strike’ deals varied, some seeing them as only a 
“brittle concord”, others viewing them as perhaps “the only means o f preventing the 
expansion o f non-union employer practices ” (both cited in Bassett, ibid: p87) -  a 
further indication of the aggressive ‘managerialism’ of the age.
In the event, the deals’ limited reach -  at most covering some 20,000 employees 
almost exclusively in green-field sites, and often to secure recognition (Marsh, 1992: 
p241) -  meant that this collaborative programme did not extend far.
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British academics continued instead to propose re-configured variants of the pre- 
1979, Donovan-style, ‘joint regulation’ schema. But following Fox’s classic work on 
trust, there was a discernible emphasis on changing the attitudes and behaviours of 
the key players. Purcell (1981) outlined what he considered to be ‘good industrial 
relations: theory and practice’. It focussed on management style, and had three 
components:
1. Management should accept trade unions formally “as partners ”. Rather than 
tolerate, or seek to minimise, their influence it should be enshrined in de 
facto rights.
2. Managers should use “prospective, proactive and creative planning” (cf. 
Shields, 1979) for future industrial relations, rather than the reactive, ‘fire­
fighting’ approach.
3. Managers should take the lead; to, in Flanders’ phrase, “regain control by 
sharing it” - reminiscent of Mary Parker Follett’s call for managers’ “power 
with ” rather than “power over” employees.
Marchington agreed: “The reform o f industrial relations required not only structural
alterations, but also some change in attitudes by both parties” (1982: p9). For
Purcell, sharing information with employees about the nature of the business would
help ensure consistency and clarity of role, and remove employees’ uncertainties
surrounding change, and could perhaps lead to what he envisaged as “a set o f shared
understandings based on discretion and trust” (1981). The notion of trust had re-
emerged, but again how to establish and nurture it was barely discussed. When
Purcell later proposed a ‘sophisticated-modern’ strategy for conducting union-
management relations his eight-point plan emphasised “the need for co-operation
and partnership” (1983: p56), minimising areas of conflict, maximising areas of
common interest, and managing both processes through institutionalised structures
of joint working parties and employee involvement:
“This implies that the company will engage in behaviour which legitimises 
the role o f the unions, develops trust between the parties and encourages 
friendliness between the negotiators” (Purcell, ibid: p58).
In the US, Richard Walton published a celebrated essay, ‘From control to 
commitment’ (1985), that urged managers to engage their employees in participation
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practices to secure their commitment to the firm. Re-designed jobs, with greater 
responsibility devolved to teams of employees, were to be complemented with less 
adversarial industrial relations and more joint problem solving. Walton even 
advocated joint consultative committees. Importantly, companies’ declarations of 
their ‘philosophy’ needed to acknowledge the plurality of interests involved. 
Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1986) noted Human Resource Development practices 
in unionised firms in the United States, such as GM’s famous Saturn plant, giving 
workers more of a direct say in issues affecting their working lives, and involving 
unions in joint problem solving forums. Joint problem solving was held to be the 
future model of work organisation. But these cousins of partnership remained 
outside the mainstream of practice on both sides of the Atlantic.
Instead, British managers - newly emboldened by the government-encouraged 
backlash on the unions, and with their prerogative to manage "re-discovered” 
(Purcell: 1991) - ushered in a new era, popularly if misleadingly characterised as 
‘macho management’. Several companies, mainly in heavily-unionised and highly 
adversarial sectors facing immense commercial pressures (such as steel, the docks 
and printing), moved to de-recognise or marginalise their troublesome trade unions, 
supported by the State (notably at News International), sacking shop stewards, 
withdrawing bargaining rights.
In the mid-1980s Japanese companies -  considerably more efficient, more 
productive, more high-tech, more profitable - seemed to hold the key to success (see 
Womack, Jones & Roo, 1990; Dore, 1986). The future was exceptional customer 
service, total quality, lean production, and an individualised employment 
relationship based on eliciting employee commitment to the goals of the 
organisation. This entailed a considerable movement along the continuum of trust, 
away from the prevalent arms-length contractual relations of more ‘traditional’ 
employment relationships (Dore, ibid: p2). Some ‘new style agreements’ contained 
statements of “spirit and intention ” calling for an emphasis “on co-operation and 
partnership between management and union rather than their acceptance o f a 
conflict o f interest as a matter o f course ” (Grant, 1994). Unions had a role to play 
but, it seemed, only under the proviso that they promise no strikes, and restrict their 
input into organisational decision-making (Bassett, 1986). Grant (ibid) equated such
111
agreements with Kelly and Kelly’s characterisation of ‘new industrial relations’ 
(1990) being used to undermine adversarial perspectives on the employment 
relationship; a diminuition of the significance of ‘us and them’. Broad’s case study 
into ‘Denkico’ illustrates the only partial success of this attitudinal programme 
(Broad, 1994: p36).
Human Resource Management, or HRM - in spite of the uncertainties around its 
content - emerged around the mid-1980s as well, promising gains in performance 
from a complementary blend of business strategy planning and a strong unitarist 
emphasis on individual employee commitment. Although some of the early US 
models nominally referred to several stakeholders, including employees, being 
accorded a voice this was idealism rather than an essential pre-condition of HRM 
(Guest, 1987: p510). Most models seemed to offer no role for trade unions, or for 
extensive engagement of employees in joint problem solving (ibid: p518).
One key conviction common to the Japanese models of working, and many of the 
influential HRM theories, held that employment security and flexible work practices 
were to be valued equally. But the few UK firms that sought to implement HRM, or 
Japanese commitment models, typically did so in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion, 
favouring those practices that yielded modest short-term productivity gains (team 
briefings and performance-related pay) and disregarding the more complex features 
(such as fundamental job re-design and employment security guarantees). Writing in 
1994 Blyton and Turnbull could not bite down their contempt for the ability of most 
British managers: HRM was "simply asking too much o f them ” (1994: p85). Others 
formulated covert strategies under the guise of HRM to marginalise their unions’ 
influence (for a case study see Camfield, Fisher & Weir, 1995; for a theoretical 
argument see Kelly, 1996).
On the whole, while a few initiatives could be forced through or partially 
implemented, employee commitment and mutual collaboration for success remained 
elusive. In an opinion piece from the time, Bryan Stevens of the IPA noted that “a 
degree o f involvement is not going to be sufficient without a major shift in attitudes 
towards the relationship between management and employees” (Stevens, 1988: p5), 
leaning more toward co-operation for mutual benefit.
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Just as many managers were attracted to the American/Japanese individualised 
models for managing employee relations, so some senior British trade unionists (and 
a few managers) were impressed by the successful joint problem solving and even 
joint decision-making alternatives found in continental Europe. The TUC had been 
“at best ambivalent” about the ‘European project’, changing official policy six 
times in the twenty years prior to Jacques Delors’ semi-legendary speech at the 1988 
TUC Conference (Taylor, 1994: p i81). But when Delors spoke about a “social 
Europe” with a central role for “social dialogue and collective bargaining... as 
essential pillars o f our democratic society and social progress ” he was greeted by 
most of the audience as a Messiah.
The prospect of closer European integration teased some of Britain’s trade unionists 
with the lure of institutionalised influence and power, an USDAW official at the 
time noting that “the only game worth playing” was taking place in Brussels (quoted 
in Taylor, 1994: p i89). Yet successive Conservative governments displayed an 
openly contemptuous attitude toward European social policy programmes, a bullish 
Michael Portillo dismissing them as “an expensive irrelevance”. With the UK’s 
negotiated opt-out of the Social Chapter, and the prevailing EC principle of 
‘subsidiarity’ -  or company intransigence -  prospects for closer formal collaboration 
within British workplaces, driven from the continent, receded.
Toward the end of a fractious decade academic reviews of the condition of British 
industrial relations pointed out its enduring continuities, with collective bargaining 
processes basically intact, if less widespread - fewer than a fifth of workplaces in 
1990 had a consultative committee, compared with about a quarter in 1984 
(Millward, 1994) -  and much more de-centralised. Purcell (1991: p37) noted that 
collective bargaining was being linked to “firm-specific issues ”, but at the same 
time managers were “reducing the dependency on collective bargaining as the 
medium for the management o f change, and on trade unions as the main link with 
the workforce”. Metcalf (1989) even inferred that the Thatcherism programme 
might have produced the conditions for the formalisation of plant-level relations 
envisaged by Donovan. Edwards reported evidence of what he termed “enlightened 
managerialism” (noted in Keenoy, 1992: p i05), meaning more use of integrative
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practices such as information sharing and joint consultation and problem solving, 
but in the same year Marsh (1992) reported only modest amendments to shopfloor 
agreements and practices.
Millward (1994) concluded that there had been little in the way of a sustained effort 
to introduce ‘high trust’ HRM in the latter half of the 1990s. What participation was 
being encouraged was primarily financial, particularly the spread of employee share 
ownership, although Bassett cites a MORI poll in 1986 suggesting that this too was a 
minority pursuit, only 9% of those surveyed owning shares in their employer’s 
enterprise.
The large-scale survey method, for the most part, missed a near-invisible, but 
dramatic, change in attitude:
“Surveys concentrating on formal institutions and union membership... 
neglected the very terrain where change was occurring, the sub-institutional, the 
process o f industrial relations and the orientations o f employees and employers” 
(Wood, 2000; see also McCarthy, 1995).
With trade unions’ spectacular decline, the latter part of the 1980s saw the 
consolidation of a complementary sea-change in focus in academic research that had 
began in the US, and spread inexorably to Europe, in which attention shifted 
decisively away from investigating formalised industrial relations structures and 
agendas and procedures, toward identifying managerial methods for moulding 
productive attitudes and behaviours for enhanced employee performance. In the UK, 
for example, Metcalf argued that faster productivity growth was likely to be caused 
by investment and technological change in the country’s workplaces, but also 
improved co-operative relations between managers and unions over work practices: 
“changed attitudes [and] changed behaviours” (1989: p22-23). Dunn cited shifts in 
labour and product markets as likely spurs to changed industrial relations, but he too 
looked to “management strategy and expertise and union/ worker attitudes and 
orientations” (1993: p i72), particularly both parties “seeing the world through the 
other’s eyes". Metcalf (op cit) cited Axelrod’s then recent work (Axelrod, 1984) on 
game theory as pointing a way forward. This did not receive the attention that it 
merited.
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Reviewed from the vantage point of the next decade it was clear that there had been 
spectacular changes in the conduct of relations at work in Britain in the 1980s, with 
for our present purposes the emergence of a “representation gap” (Towers, 1997) 
for employees’ interests being one of the most remarkable, given the long-standing 
industrial relations settlement that had served until 1979. The 1990 WIRS survey 
concluded:
"Britain is approaching the position where few employees have any 
mechanism through which they can contribute to the operation o f their workplace in 
a broader context than that o f their own job ” (Millward, 1994).
In a report for the Employment Policy Institute, William Brown commented:
“We are not witnessing the emergence o f a brave new world o f non-union 
human resource management, but a tired old world o f unrepresented labour... 
characterised by backward employment practices and heavy reliance on 
performance-related pay” (1997: p227-8).
In summary, British industrial relations saw very little in the way of partnership- 
style programmes, outside the controversial no-strike deals, for over a decade. It is 
little wonder that managers and trade union officials alike invoke phrases such as 
“us and them”, “confrontational”, and “low trust” to describe the decade (and its 
predecessor). A hostile State, bordering on sadistic, had marginalised trade unions 
and strangled national debate on any joint processes at work, and had mounted what 
seemed an effective blocking manoeuvre to encroaching European policy that 
advocated such ‘heresies’. Managers had reasserted their right to manage, but on the 
whole, had failed to take advantage of this ‘freedom’ to implement progressive 
management practices (such as HRM, or TQM):
"... despite the outwardly convincing language... towards the importance o f 
building commitment through more open styles o f decision-making, we remain 
somewhat sceptical that the latest period marks a sea-change in the trajectory o f 
[employee] participation ” (Blyton and Turnbull, 1994: p207).
Nevertheless, academics continued to present them with arguments pointing to the 
commitment and knowledge of their employees as a potential source of competitive 
advantage, and a focus on attitudinal and behavioural improvements as a means of 
securing this elusive property.
The trade unions had long retained their preference for adversarialism, in the 
absence of a credible alternative. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the widely
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assumed demise of socialist alternatives to capitalism (cf. Fukuyama, 1995) seemed 
to force a revision of their tactics. As the next section demonstrates, some key 
figures in the senior echelons of the union movement were scrabbling around for a 
new strategy, even a new language, that might revive their fortunes.
The origins of ‘Partnership: the 1990s version’.
This account of the emergence of partnership in the 1990s is split into two parts, 
around one central event: the selection in 1995 of Tony Blair as the leader of the 
Labour party.
Partnership’s first public appearance in Britain can be traced back to 1990, with the 
publication of a joint GMB/UCW discussion document, ‘A new agenda: Bargaining 
for prosperity in the 1990s’ (GMB/UCW, 1990). The authors -  the two General 
Secretaries - proposed a European-style tri-partite approach “to create successful 
industry, a strong economy and a caring, sharing society” (p2). For employers this 
necessitated managing UK workforces “for mutual flexibility... free from abuse and 
exploitation” and investing more in training and quality programmes; for trade 
unionists the new approach meant abandoning traditional “reactive” positions of 
sceptical resistance to management initiatives, and instead “set an agenda which 
confronts the new issues o f the 1990s”. Workplace partnership emerged as a distinct 
theme and aspiration, if not as a fully-formed model:
“Success and security, profitability and prosperity require that management 
and labour work together to make the best use o f the talent available in each 
enterprise ” (p7); and “By working together in partnership both sides o f industry can 
create a highly flexible, highly efficient and highly paid economy” (p9).
Unsurprisingly the Conservative government and the business community dismissed 
the call for tri-partite economic management, and amid the welter of criticism, the 
report’s other core theme, of management and unions working in ‘partnership’, was 
overlooked.
Yet a few senior trade unionists found in ‘A new agenda...’, and the example from 
the few existing fledgling partnership deals, a potentially viable alternative strategy 
to restore union influence in the workplace. The 1991 TUC Congress carried a 
resolution calling for an examination of how features of the Franco-German 
approach to industrial relations -  such as works councils and greater rights to
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information and consultation -  might be adapted to British circumstances and 
traditions.
The GMB/ UCW report also sparked a supplementary initiative at the Involvement 
and Participation Association (IPA), a small and obscure not-for-profit lobbying 
organisation for whom the putative ‘partnership’ programme seemed to embody 
what the Association had stood for since 1884. In September 1992 the IPA 
concluded a two-year consultative process involving leading industry figures and 
union leaders in an attempt to define what the new agenda for British industrial 
relations might look like. A huge influence on the panel’s thinking came from the 
US Collective Bargaining Forum document (US Department of Labor, 1991), with 
wording lifted directly from that text. The resulting publication, ‘Towards Industrial 
Partnership’, sought to articulate a concept of partnership, complete with rationale, 
principles and practices. (See chapter one.)
An examination of the written responses from trade unions and managers to the 
IPA’s initial policy statement reveals what by now will be a predictable set of 
concerns and objections. Among the trade unions there was the fear of 
marginalisation and scepticism about the programme ever taking off, while from 
employers there came objections to the "institutionalisation o f the role o f trade 
unions” and the whiff of 1970s-style “corporatism”. Launched on the day the 
pound was withdrawn from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, few others were even 
aware of its publication. The Employment Secretary made plain the government’s 
indifference to partnership by pointedly indicating in a press conference that he had 
never heard of the IPA’s report (reported by Taylor, 1994: p203).
The following year Larry Adams, an American industrial relations expert who had 
been involved in early partnerships within Blue Circle Cement and British 
Aerospace, wrote a commissioned position paper for ACAS on what he termed 
‘Labour-Management Partnerships’ (Adams, 1993). Adams argued forcefully that 
such a relationship could be achieved, again, in attitudinal and behavioural terms. He 
cited mutual respect, joint problem solving processes, seeking common interests and 
mutual gains, and aiming to satisfy all stakeholders.
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Following its strategic re-launch under John Monks in 1994, the TUC mellowed its 
previous, often well-founded scepticism regarding certain HRM practices. The 
unions wanted to co-operate in the modernisation of British industry, and welcomed 
what Monks has called “positive flexibility ” (Monks, 1999). The TUC began to 
quote approvingly direct from the EPA report, now two years old, seeing partnership 
as a positive reworking of much of the HRM agenda with a clear role for trade 
unions: ‘union-friendly HRM’. Partnership does indeed share many of the objectives 
advocated by the ‘soft’ variants of HRM (cf. Storey): the search for “joint action ” 
on “common ground”, couched in terms of “respect, trust and goodwill ” noted by 
Kelly (1996: p78). The two also share many policies and practices, particularly the 
balance struck between employment security and flexible work practices. Where 
HRM and partnership diverge is over the former theory’s strongly unitarist 
philosophy, and reticence, even hostility, toward joint problem solving. The TUC 
began to urge managers to resolve workplace conflicts “in an atmosphere o f mutual 
respect, trust and goodwill” through a form of “socialpartnership” (1994: p24). 
Bacon and Storey noted the TUC’s support for “strategic engagement with HRM” 
(1996: p60). This marked a decisive shift in perspective among senior TUC players 
and certain key unions, and the new language was calculated to chime with the 
philosophies of the new leader of the Labour party.
Blair and the Labour party, 1995 - ?.
Marsh had written in 1992 that British shopfloor industrial relations was unlikely to 
change much, the unions remaining defensive in the declining companies that 
continued to recognise them. Major change would only come about if a Labour 
government was elected and, once in office, encouraged union recognition rights and 
“co-operation at work” (Marsh, 1992: p245).
Following the untimely death of their leader John Smith in 1995, the Labour Party 
threw their lot behind the youthful and charismatic Tony Blair, who as Shadow 
Employment Secretary in the 1980s had moved party policy away from support for 
the ‘closed shop’.
It quickly became apparent that Blair viewed trade unions as another interest group 
competing for his attention, as he moved to adopt a policy of “fairness, not favours ”
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toward them. Employers were heartened by his seeming pleasure that, were he to 
form the next government, UK industrial relations laws would remain “the most 
restrictive on trade unions in the Western world” (Blair, quoted in the Financial 
Times, 7 April 1997). But they nevertheless faced the prospect of union recognition 
rights, and Blair’s ‘middle-ground’ position of “partnership, not conflict” in British 
workplaces -  a position he first flagged up in his opening address to the TUC 
Congress in 1995.
In common with most pundits, and much of the country, both the main employers’ 
federations and the unions anticipated Blair as the heir apparent, heralding the real 
prospect of a paradigm shift in the political climate, with attendant ramifications for 
British industrial relations. The strategic challenge for both employers and unions 
was how to re-configure the as yet undefined concept of partnership in a way that 
would satisfy their own interests, and meet with Blair’s approval.
Scrabbling for a convincing and marketable ‘Big idea’, Blair briefly adopted 
‘stakeholding’, sparked in part by the remarkable public enthusiasm for Will 
Hutton’s manifesto, The State We’re In (Hutton, 1995) - although Peter Riddell 
noted that party officials were at pains to distance themselves from Hutton’s 
“regulatory zeal” (in The Times, 17 January 1996). In his ‘stakeholding’ speech in 
Singapore, Blair had this to say on establishing a culture of trust in employment 
relations: “By trust I  mean the recognition o f a mutual purpose for which we work 
together and in which we all benefit” at national and firm level. He identified a need 
to improve relations between government and business, but had nothing to say on 
improving relations with workers, or with unions (Blair, 1996: p3). Within a matter 
of weeks, however, Blair had jettisoned the clumsily multi-partite and, probably 
worse, suspiciously European-sounding ‘stakeholding’ in favour of the ‘Third Way’, 
and more frequently, ‘partnership’.
The TUC switched its ‘lingua franca’ in step with the govemment-in-waiting. 
Quietly dropping its own ‘Your stake at work’ report, which rather bashfully 
translated Hutton’s vision into modest workplace reforms, the TUC’s 1997 election 
manifesto for work and trade unions, ‘Partners for progress’, began:
“[Social partnership]... means employers and trade unions working together 
to achieve common goals such as fairness and competitiveness, it is a recognition
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that although they have different constituencies, and at times different interests, they 
can serve these best by making common cause wherever possible” (TUC, 1997: pi).
In 1999 Congress formally endorsed partnership as official policy, commemorated 
with the document ‘Partners for progress -  new unionism in the workplace’ (TUC, 
1999). The shift in policy had followed research (Cave, 1998) into unionised 
partnership companies that had vociferously hailed the "immense value ” of the new 
approach for its capacity to widen the employment agenda for joint debate; facilitate 
a much greater flow of information and a sense of involvement in the running of the 
firm, and for its demonstrable improvements in the quality of working life. The TUC 
derived from the research the six principles set out in detail in chapter one.
As part of its twin-pronged approach to employers - partnership with the good, 
militancy against the bad -  the TUC launched its Organising Academy to recruit and 
organise among non-unionised workforces, and its Partnership Institute to spread 
partnership practice in British workplaces. By 2000, John Monks could claim in 
public (at that year’s AnUMan conference -  author’s notes) that there was now not 
one major union that did not support the partnership route. Bacon and Storey’s 
research into nine large unionised organisations found no outright opposition to 
partnership; instead the “collectivism increasingly being adopted by unions is one o f 
closer institutional partnership (where possible) with employers” (1996: p44).
The CBI established a ‘good-cop-bad-cop’ tactic toward the trade union 
involvement in partnership, the Director-General Adair Turner remaining engaged 
with the idea of employer-friendly unions demonstrating that pluralist forms of 
partnership were possible, and even desirable. (Robert Taylor penned a news item 
for the Financial Times on 11 September 1997 titled ‘CBI Chief signals support for 
partnership with unions’.) The anti-union President, Sir Clive Thompson, retorted at 
the annual CBI dinner that “individuals achieve a lot more than groups do 
collectively”, that “third parties only interfere and harm drives for quality” and 
compared dealing with trade unions to “pest control” (in the Financial Times, 21 
July 1999). The CBI has stopped shy of offering a full definition, preferring only to
27 As Appendix 1 shows, trade unions categorised as being ‘hard-Left' -  such as the GPMU and the R M T - are 
involved in partnership arrangements.
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argue that there ought not to be one set model; they cite only a joint commitment to
28success and training in any public discussion of the idea (see Table 1).
Academic research continued to endorse a ‘people-centredness’ in workplace 
reform, with many of the prescriptions from the likes of Pfeffer (1994; 1998), 
Hueslid (1995), Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), and Delery and Doty 
(1996) recording positive impacts on productivity from certain elements of the 
partnership model, notably information sharing, team-based work organisation and, 
consistently, employment security. Pfeffer’s HRM-style best practice model in 
particular bore striking resemblance to the IPA model, comprising employment 
security; careful recruitment and selection; self-managed teams; pay contingent on 
performance; extensive skills training; harmonised terms and conditions, and 
extensive information sharing (Pfeffer, 1998: pp64-65). Guest and Peccei’s research 
in the UK (1998; 2001) looked at an HRM-influenced variant of partnership, and 
also found a link with improved business performance.
This broad-based debate on the notion of partnership for mutual gain (see also 
Ackers & Payne, 1998) emerged in an era of heightened market competition across 
international borders. Space does not permit a detailed overview of the global 
economy, but the dramatic increase in worldwide trade, facilitated by the de­
regulation of markets and the removal of barriers, and the consequent ease with 
which products and capital could be transferred around the planet placed significant 
new demands on organisations and workforces to demonstrate commitment and 
flexibility in order to succeed.
Instead of ‘partnership’ forms of working, the Anglo-American business community 
mainly opted for aggressive managerial campaigns of restructuring, informed by 
process re-engineering which prescribed ‘down-sizing’ - job losses in old-fashioned 
English - in huge numbers. The cull of jobs led the principal creators of ‘business re­
engineering’ (Hammer and Champy, 1995) to condemn their own theory as 
needlessly brutal.
28 The IPD fas it was] echoed the CBI line. In successive statements it has seen no obvious role fo r  trade unions, 
or fo r  independent employee representation fo r  that matter, in helping the Personnel/ HR profession build a 
lasting and effective ‘psychological contract' between firm  and employees (Kessler & Undy, 1996). When 
pressed to comment on partnership, in a wide-ranging policy review, the IPD judged it to be "essentially about 
particular processes o f  management rather than about structures " (IPD, 1998: p8). It merited two paragraphs.
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Herriot, Hirsh and Riley rather over-played the damage to the bonds of trust between 
manager and managed in the UK during the early 1990s, describing it as “so great 
as to threaten the norms o f collaboration and commitment” (1998). But Kessler and 
Undy’s IPD-sponsored research (1996) into the state of the ‘psychological contract’ 
in British workplaces lent support to their gloom, and was released to much 
gnashing of teeth. According to the survey, the huge redundancy programmes had 
indeed ruptured what bonds of trust and reciprocity had previously existed. Job 
insecurity drew media interest. An NOP poll for the TUC in 1996 found that 57% 
felt more insecure than two years earlier, and 55% expected to feel even more 
insecure in the years to come (reported in the Financial Times, 9 September 1996).
In the mid-1990s the diminished levels of trust in workplaces came to be seen as a 
real problem for HR practitioners and businesses in general. Charles Handy levelled 
scathing criticism at managers for their rash and arbitrary redundancy programmes 
in the Harvard Business Review (cited in Baillie, 1995). In 1998 the Academy of 
Management devoted an entire issue (volume 23, number 3) to the cause of 
regaining trust. Sparrow and Marchington, in their conclusions on the future of 
HR(M) in 1998, stressed the vital campaign to restore trust:
“We have to unravel the contribution that HRM makes to the process o f 
organisational performance to show how the potential loss o f future interaction with 
employees outweighs the profit potential that comes from violating expectations... A 
central task is to demonstrate the cost o f trust deficits [my emphasis]. One relatively 
unexplored area is in terms o f the conflict between the organisation design decisions 
[of which, I suggest, ‘partnership’ is one option] and the requisite levels o f trust 
needed to make them effective. There are [citing Creed & Miles, 1996] ‘measurable 
dollar costs associated with the failure to meet minimal trust requirements’” (1998: 
p311).
A succession of high-profile breaches of trust in UK workplaces during 2000 (at 
Rover, Corns, Matsushita and Coats Viyella) led to public indignation at the 
treatment of employees made redundant without consultation. It forced the 
government to call for a review of employee input into organisational decision­
making and greater transparency. Partnership was advanced as a remedy.
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The broader programme of democratic reform.
As well as finding favour in the specialist literature, the notion of trust at work, and 
how to develop it, formed a part of a simultaneous debate on political and social 
reform.
Five years on from his infamous essay 1990 on the ‘end of history’, the Japanese- 
American sociologist Fukuyama revealed his prescription for the challenges of the 
modem age: trust (1995). The most successful societies, and the most successful 
companies, would be those that could establish, nurture and enhance their ‘social 
capital’: in essence, their capacity to trust and collaborate. Adversarialism in all 
forms (ideology, culture, practice) was redundant. On workplace reform Fukuyama 
found much to admire in the Toyota practices of lean production. He saw in ‘just-in- 
time’ methods devolved responsibility to individual production line workers, which 
he took as evidence of “social capital” and a reciprocated trust. The “prior moral 
consensus o f trust”, involving a “shared habituation” of certain virtues such as 
loyalty, honesty, and dependability, was preferable, he felt, to the deterrence-based 
contractual obligations of neo-liberal economic theory. The solution was to strike a 
balance between trust-creating social democratic structures and the productive and 
profitable outcomes of liberal entrepreneurialism. In appraising the potential of the 
British for developing social capital, Fukuyama noted our “propensity for 
spontaneous sociability” but also our tendency toward “balkanisation along class 
lines” (p257).
In the same year Will Hutton’s socio-economic textbook setting out his proposal for 
a ‘stakeholding’ society (Hutton, 1995) became a surprise best seller. A Correlli 
Barnett for the Left, Hutton forcefully catalogued the injustices and inequalities, 
wasted potential and social upheaval that had been wrought upon Britain by, he 
believed, the unfettered experiment of laissez-faire capitalism during the 1980s, and 
he proposed as a response the “political enfranchisement” of all relevant 
constituencies in society (the ‘stakeholders’) to engage in joint problem solving for 
mutual benefit. As described above, it seemed that stakeholding would capture 
politicians’ imagination too, and even provide a programme of reform for 
government, but it didn’t. For the TUC, stakeholding at work would require 
attention not only to the interests of the shareholders, but to those of the company’s
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employees, and the community at large, although its prescriptions for stakeholding 
stopped shy of a call for systems of joint problem solving with employees (TUC,
1996). The following year Adair Turner articulated business fears that job insecurity 
was dampening growth, so much so that he was moved to hint at support for, as he 
put it, “dare I  say a ‘stakeholding ’?” (Guardian, September 1996). His wariness 
was illustrative, but an unease about the impact of business on people’s lives was 
fomenting, following the huge redundancy programmes but also growing public 
indignation at rising income inequalities, and the scandal of ‘fat cat’ business leaders 
awarding themselves huge pay rises, often entirely unreflective of their own 
performance.
Ackers and Payne (1998) interpreted the interest among private employers in the 
partnership programme as an attempt to present an ‘ethical’ take on their activities. 
Robert Taylor thought that social partnership would “save business from itself ’ 
through “an assertion o f democratic priorities over market forces” (2000: p263).
When Blair addressed the TUC in 1999, he set partnership “firmly within the same 
intellectual paradigm and political framework ” as the ‘Third Way’ programme for 
the revitalisation of social democracy and community-interdependence (author’s 
notes). Yet in the main ‘Third Way’ text, Giddens bluntly announces that ‘Third 
Way’ politics has “abandoned collectivism” (Giddens, 1998: p65), citing as reasons 
a set of seemingly irreversible social trends -  civic decline, the erosion of tradition 
and custom and old forms of community, accompanied by increasing desire among 
individuals for autonomy (echoed in Bacon & Storey, 1996). In excerpts that, 
perhaps, contain implicit criticism of unions, Giddens warns that the sought-for new 
forms of community don’t imply “trying to recapture lost forms o f local solidarity” 
(p79), and he appears to condemn these lost forms of solidarity when he writes that 
“responsibility, or mutual obligation, was there in old-style social democracy, but 
was largely dormant, as it was submerged within the concept o f collective 
provision ” (p37).
Two pages deal with reforms at work (pi25-127). The proposals, borrowed in large 
measure from Rosabeth Moss Kanter, include fostering entrepreneurialism, lifelong 
education [including the promotion of cognitive and “emotional competence”, by
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which is presumably meant the resilience and flexibility to accept disruption to one’s 
employment], public project partnerships [known now as ‘public-private 
partnerships’], ‘portability’ [of employees, to be encouraged by harmonised 
educational attainment and transferable terms and conditions], and finally family- 
friendly workplace practices. None of the above covers workplace relations between 
employer and employed directly nor, surprisingly, greater employee involvement 
and workplace democracy. On trade unions, and how they might contribute, Giddens 
has nothing whatever to say. Undy rather suspects their decline is not a ‘Third Way’ 
concern (1999: p333), and he is probably right.
Thus, while partnership at work was not officially sanctioned in any of these works, 
save for Hutton’s enthusiasm in his new role as Director of the Industrial Society 
(see their 2001 report), its arrival in the mid-1990s coincided with a public policy 
debate that was at least more sympathetic.
The issue was, to reiterate, how the next government would interpret the fine-
sounding sentiments into legislation. John Monks expressed the options thus:
"There is no alternative to global capitalism that I  can see. But are we to 
have the US model with few rights for workers, the authoritarianism o f the East 
Asian ’tigers’, or the European model o f social partnership?” (cited in Overell,
1997).
The influence from Europe.
The ‘European model of social partnership’, essentially involving more regulated 
workplace consultation between employer and employees, re-exerted its influence 
with the 1994 European Works Council directive, part of the Social Chapter.
The EWC Directive was the first pan-European initiative to encroach significantly 
upon the British way of conducting employee relations. It imposed upon firms 
falling under its remit a formal consultative mechanism with their workforce, and 
despite the UK’s opt-out, this included British multi-nationals with operations in 
more than two EC countries. With only a handful of exceptions British managers 
declined to exclude their British workforces from EWCs -  a signal of a pragmatic 
appraisal that these comparatively weak ‘information and consultation events’ were 
unlikely to infringe unduly on managerial prerogative.
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The Directive’s impact on British employment relations has so far been peripheral, 
the information and consultation rather ritualised with little or no influence on 
decisions. Only in 2001 did the first case emerge of a European Works Council 
becoming party to a strategic decision (the Ford-Visteon agreement). Trade unions 
could imagine “a kind o f trans-national joint shop stewards ’ committee, financed by 
the employer” (Hyman, unpublished paper), but this remains a distant prospect.
In 1997 the EC issued its policy statement in the green paper, ‘Partnership for a new 
organisation of work’. The statement outlined a pluralist model for managing 
employee relations: the "modernisation o f the working life based on partnership” 
(European Commission, 1997: vii). A prime objective was to strike a balance 
between “flexibility and security” (ibid, xi) which would fulfil both “the wishes o f 
employees and the requirements o f competition” (ibid, v). The policy challenges 
were encapsulated “in one question: how to reconcile security for workers with the 
flexibility which firms need? ” (ibid). This clearly echoed the partnership agenda. It 
required the replacement of hierarchical and rigid structures by “more innovative 
and flexible structures based on high-skill, high-trust and employee involvement” 
(ibid, vi).
Partnership under a New Labour government.
Partnership found official sanction as the central theme of Labour’s employee 
relations policy for the critical 1997 general election.
Having seen off the Conservatives’ election campaign allegations that a Labour 
government would deliver the fate of the country into the irresponsible unions, Blair 
secured a landslide victory (aided by a self-enforced, if reluctant, silence throughout 
the campaign from the unions).
In office Blair affirmed his commitment to partnership, signing Britain up for the
Social Chapter in the first few months of his tenure, but he would not be drawn into
setting out too explicitly what partnership entailed. He wrote in the foreword to the
white paper that he wanted
“nothing less than to change the culture o f work [of] voluntary 
understanding and co-operation because it has been recognised that the prosperity
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o f each (employer and employee) is bound up in the prosperity o f all” (DTI, 1998: 
pi).
He wrote of outmoded practices and rituals, almost exclusively from the side of 
employees; what he had in mind was that employees would co-operate with 
managers seeking to satisfy the needs of the business.
The DTI’s supplementary manifesto for partnership, ‘Competitiveness through 
partnerships with people’ (DTI, 1999b) envisaged partnership in strikingly unitarist 
terms, its research uncovering (unidentified) firms where everyone apparently held 
“shared goals; shared culture; shared learning; shared effort, and shared 
information ”.29
Blair, for his part, issued instructions during his 1999 speech at the TUC’s ‘Partners 
for progress’ conference to both employers and trade unions on how they ought to 
respond to the partnership agenda. Employers were urged to become more 
transparent and open in their dealings, especially with their own workforces, and not 
to use partnership calculatively to weather a crisis, but to make it “part o f the fabric 
of the organisation: trust, communication and consultation... ” Unions were hailed 
as "potentially” a key factor in the UK’s economic success, but they needed to 
demonstrate their "competence, added value and commitment”, and were not to use 
partnership as a "foot in the door” to press for more militant ambitions (author’s 
notes).
Partnership duly provided one of the important themes of the 1999 Employment 
Relations Act: "to replace the notion o f conflict between employers and employees 
with the promotion o f partnership”. The government’s policy came in two forms: 
setting minimum standards and encouraging best practice. The Trade and Industry 
Secretary announced a £5m fund for the promotion of partnership initiatives in 1999. 
With a minimum wage and a raft of policies to return to employees rights and
29 As part o f  a more 'Europeanised' document, with case studies from  across the continent, the D TI envisaged 
partnership as a means to create-, “a better social dialogue, involving... shared information, trust, values and 
goals with innovation and skills also important”, and “working together to develop solutions and achieve 
consensus... strategies for change involving people centrally within die process; collaboration and partnership 
while understanding the fear of failure during the process of change; building trust by involving all stakeholders 
in dialogue [on several workplace issues]; long-term thinking... perseverance” (DTI, 1999: p4-5). There also 
had to be a “balance struck between flexibility and security” (ibid). This document is not as widely disseminated 
as ‘Competitiveness through partnerships with people’.
127
limited access to legal and financial sanctions against unethical employers, the 
industrial relations reforms enshrined in the 1999 Act went some way toward 
redressing the imbalance between employer and employee (Wood, 2000), but only 
urged, rather than facilitated, partnership-style joint problem solving.
Thus, although Undy judged that New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ industrial relations 
settlement extended “social justice” and enhanced “social partnership along the 
IPA model” (1999: p332), this infers a much more robust vision of partnership than 
the government would be willing to sign up to. New Labour’s lukewarm and 
undefined support for joint problem solving (as articulated by the IPA and the TUC) 
has been illustrated by its opposition to the forthcoming EC information and 
consultation directive (likened by John Monks to “hand-to-hand combat” in an 
Industrial Society seminar on the subject in 2001).
Robert Taylor has argued that we are seeing:
"... a shift from traditional forms o f industrial relations based on voluntary 
accommodations and negotiated compromises with a recognised acceptance o f 
differing interests, towards a system that balances a partnership model with agreed 
concerns and employer acceptance o f at least a basic framework o f rights ” (in the 
Financial Times, 30 August 2001).
This vision falls some way short of the partnership imagined by the IPA, and there 
remains scant evidence of such a broad partnership programme. But it is, perhaps, a 
start.
Conclusion.
If we return to my criteria for a favourable institutional environment, then the 
present programme would appear to have much in its favour. The government 
endorses it, as does the TUC and most of its affiliate unions (although the 
differences between the government and the unions on what constitutes a partnership 
are considerable). Employers are rather less keen, but many have engaged unions 
with the concept, and some have reported considerable success. Among industrial 
relations academics, the dissenting voices number a handful, but their predominantly 
ideological objections do not seem to have landed any significant blows to the
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credibility of the idea. Supporters meanwhile are cautious in their endorsement, but 
are drawn from across the ideological spectrum.30
With this in mind, does the Ramsay thesis - that employee participation is only a 
short-term counter-mobilisation from employers to stave off worker unrest in 
difficult labour market conditions - hold good for the ‘1990s version’ of partnership? 
The evidence suggests rather that the impetus this time came exclusively from the 
trade unions, and that if anything, employers are very reluctant to discuss 
partnership, as they have yet to formulate a strong argument against employees 
being involved in decisions affecting their working lives. The State meanwhile 
supports the programme officially, but remains unimpressed by proposals to 
enshrine forms of ‘partnership’/joint problem solving in legislation. Partnership for 
New Labour is more about attitudes and behaviours than about formal structures; 
transforming the well-meant aspirations into effective and enduring reality is, in the 
best British voluntarist tradition, a matter left to the will and wit of people in each 
organisation.
Which of Ramsay’s four fates for employee participation -  whether success, 
triviality, abandonment following instability, or change in committee status - will 
befall the ‘1990s version’ of partnership? It is not possible to predict, although I 
have argued here that the institutional environment would seem to be unusually 
positive. That said, the TUC continues to complain about its marginal role in 
government debate, and its exclusion from briefings, in contrast with the regular 
meetings between the government and employers’ organisations. And, of course, the 
lack of genuine examples of partnership (just 62 known to the IPA) does rather 
undermine its claims to being a truly wide programme of reform.
A key factor will be sustaining the idea’s momentum in the minds of key 
practitioners. This requires demonstration of its potential to deliver joint wins, 
mutual gains, and -  conversely -  few high-profile collapses in partnership 
arrangements.
30 It is, incidentally, remarkable that there are so few  academic articles on partnership. However, with the two 
projects on the Future o f  Work and the Future o f  the Trade Unions, this will be addressed in the coming years.
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The imminent EC Directive requiring employers to inform and consult with their 
workforce looks likely soon to impose regulated formal contact between employers 
and employees. The proposals are weak, and do not even extend to joint problem 
solving, and yet the wranglings over the content of the legislation give some 
indication of the undercurrent of hostility toward joint problem solving that endures 
among British employers. How this directive is realised in UK law will have a 
significant impact on the value assigned to partnership.
Thus, returning to the symbiosis between the macro- and micro-levels of industrial 
relations, (,it is the history and current state o f relations between capital and labour 
within a given company, which at root is an economic relationship, which has most 
effect on the institutions and outcomes o f industrial relations in that company ” 
(Marsh, 1992: p243). This is exactly the case. Given the same institutional 
environment, some organisations have chosen to adopt ‘partnership’; others have 
not. To understand partnership we need to research it as it is being played out, inside 
organisations.
In the next chapter, I present the methodology for my fieldwork in four ‘partnership’ 
organisations.
In chapter six, split into four sections, I present four case studies of organisations 
that have introduced partnership.
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Chapter 5. Fieldwork methodology.
The initial hypothesis that I set out to investigate was: The process o f establishing 
'genuine’ partnership arrangements will increase the extent to which the 
organisation’s employment relations are characterised by, and regulated according 
to, the principles o f mutual trust.
Research findings are of course constrained by the limitations of the research 
instrument used. In this chapter I present my methodology. The chapter begins with 
a discussion of my rationale for choosing to conduct qualitative case studies. I then 
explain how I identified the participant organisations and secured access to 
respondents. The third section describes my interview technique, as well as my 
personal experiences of conducting case study fieldwork. The fourth section covers 
my analysis of the interview data, and in the closing section I address 
methodological concerns.
Selecting a research method: issues.
Lincoln and Guba (1985 - cited in Marshall & Rossman, 1989: pl45) identify four 
general issues concerning research methodology that need to be satisfied for a 
project to be effective:
■ Credibility refers to the truthfulness of the findings, whether the subject has 
been accurately identified, described and measured.
■ Transferability asks how applicable the findings are to other organisations.
■ Dependability refers to the likelihood of results being replicated by another 
researcher conducting the same research in the same organisation.
■ Confirmability refers to the extent to which the findings are reflective of the 
subjects’ perceptions, rather than those of the researcher.
In the conclusion, I return to each of these and present my methodological response.
Research into partnership: general remarks.
As chapter one revealed, partnership is an emerging trend in the UK. Definition 
remains somewhat ambiguous and even controversial, while evidence of ‘genuine’ 
examples of partnership continues to be scarce. What accounts we have of 
partnership organisations are limited either to tales from the companies themselves
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or from agencies and actors with vested interests (the IPA, TUC, Cranfield School of 
Management) - with all the attendant bias and concern for positive public relations 
that one would expect. Short case studies have materialised as journalistic reportage 
in the HR press (the CEPD’s People Management, Personnel Today, and IDS and 
IRS). But there have been only two workplace case studies undertaken in a refereed 
academic journal, those of the distiller companies (Marks, et al: 1998).
The majority of these studies have relied only on the testimonies of the HR 
managers involved and occasionally, input from senior union officials. None have 
yet been conducted that have sought accounts from a broad cross-section of an 
organisation.
There is then a clear need to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the nature 
of the burgeoning new partnership arrangements with independent scholarly 
discipline. Our first task is to discover its nature in all its nuances and subtleties.
Why use qualitative case study methods?
Yin describes a case study as “an attempt to examine a contemporary phenomenon 
in its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomena and 
context are not clearly defined” (1981: p59).
The rationale justifying my selection of qualitative case study research methods 
comes on both epistemological and technical grounds (following Symon & Cassell,
1998). Taking the epistemological considerations first, it is an obvious point that the 
choice of methodology necessarily reveals the researcher’s assumptions about the 
phenomenon to be studied and how best to study it. In appraising feasible research 
methods I felt that partnership, at bottom, is about the conduct of relationships, 
about shifts in attitudes and behavioural responses. Dealing with such complex and 
ever-shifting dynamics did not seem to offer up an identifiable and testable cause or 
set of causes and certain probable effects; organisations and relationships within 
them are typically too messy and contradictory and, importantly, ever-changing to 
accommodate that.
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Secondly, I agreed with Morse (1991, cited in Cresswell, 1994: pl20) that, for 
investigations into emerging, or in Morse’s term “immature”, trends (which 
partnership still is) it is more valuable to eschew prescriptive analysis and 
measurement tools in favour of more open and semi-structured enquiry into the 
participants’ accounts of their reality first, leaving until later the attempts to explain 
the data. It is not for the researcher to impose her/his own theoretical assumptions 
upon the participants prior to engagement in the research.
Thirdly, the participants in the organisation have created partnership; they constitute 
the subject of the research. As such they should be the narrators of the partnership 
‘story’ (ideally with as little intrusion into the content of their narratives from the 
researcher as possible, but within the disciplines required of academic research).
Finally, partnership is a phenomenon of its time; as I argued in chapter four, 
partnership is the product of a set of converging political, economic and 
management trends during the mid- to late 1990s in Britain. This context is crucial.
Given these epistemological concerns, the technical justification of qualitative
• •  ^1research methods follows logically; indeed, the former informs the latter.
Qualitative methods emphasise human processes and meanings, and the 
interpretation of subjects’ understanding, rather than fixed and measurable outcomes 
(Merriam, 1988, cited in Cresswell, op cit: pl45). Rigid theoretical frameworks and 
methodological constructs can offer unambiguous examinations of the linkages 
between variables, but they tend to overlook the nuances of how organisational and 
interpersonal dynamics affected these variables and brought the outcomes. One-off 
quantitative surveys, even in a time-series, typically only capture the mood at a fixed
31 The epistemological rationale accords with my own general understanding ofphenomenon, drawn from chaos 
theory. To grossly simplify, the specifics o f  all behaviour are unpredictable because they are inherently random. 
However, all behaviour falls within certain parameters, or observable patterns, that can be traced and used as 
predictors. These are subject to two main influencing forces: 'strange attractors ' and a phenomenon known as 
'sensitive dependence upon initial conditions ’. The latter is chaos theory’s technical term fo r  the common sense 
reasoning that what happens depends on the starting point o f  the elements concerned. (For example, 
participants ’ rationales fo r  establishing partnership tell us much about these initial conditions, as does the 
extent to which all constituencies were involved and engaged in the process.) Strange attractors meanwhile are 
elements present that compel other elements in a system toward certain patterns o f  behaviour. (A partnership 
agreement setting out the principles fo r  conducting employee relations might be considered a 'strange 
attractor'.) Qualitative case study research methods allow one to identify both the 'strange attractors ’ and to 
chart the ‘initial conditions', and responses to them: “Qualitative methods will increase in importance when 
studying potentially chaotic systems” (Gregersen & Sailer, 1993: p797).
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point in time. Such one-off snap-shots can be misleading, especially when tracking 
shifts in attitudes and behaviours. (Even within this research it was apparent in 
interviews that I had caught respondents at an inconvenient time, when they were 
otherwise pre-occupied or tired and struggling to engage with often quite 
philosophical concerns.) Design of quantitative surveys struggles to capture 
accurately the meaning, the essence and context of attitudinal and behavioural 
processes.
It is for this reason that I also elected not to conduct small-scale quantitative surveys 
of shopfloor respondents. While these might have offered me a snap-shot of 
employees’ attitudes to partnership and levels of trust at any one time, the outcomes 
were likely to be influenced primarily by whatever had happened in the immediate 
few days preceding the survey, rather than catch a reflective perspective on shifts in 
relationships overall. Interviews allow one to focus on different time periods, and 
challenge and clarify commentaries. (In addition, as I discovered in my semi­
structured interviews, generating a set of unbiased, understandable, open-ended and 
flexible questions -  which a tick-box survey would require - is very difficult for a 
phenomenon as process-driven as partnership.) I was not convinced that reductive 
methods such as quantitative ‘tick-box’ attitude surveys would, at this early stage, 
tell us much of value about the alleged link between partnership and trust, especially 
about how it is forged - if, indeed, it is. However, in my concluding remarks I offer 
suggested research agendas into partnership, for which quantitative surveys might be 
more appropriate.
A further advantage of qualitative methods is that they allow the researcher to 
remain flexible, and to adapt her/ his research to what emerges during the collection 
of the data (in this case, participants’ accounts of partnership). Use of qualitative 
research methods allow for new theories to be formulated, as the data emerges, 
which can then be examined in more detail. Once you have embarked on research 
with an approved survey of questions, it necessarily constrains what data you are 
going to collect.
With so few genuine examples of what I have called the ‘1990s version’ (and most 
of these not established much beyond a few years), it is apparent that partnership is a
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fledgling phenomenon. Qualitative enquiry methods suit better the investigation into 
such phenomenon. Marchington noted in an ESRC/ IPD seminar in 1996 that the 
lack of significant case study research was hampering our understanding of 
partnership, and therefore that qualitative examination of the reality of partnership 
was crucial.
Qualitative methods are more flexible for research endeavours seeking to learn the 
precise nature of a phenomenon, whereas quantitative methods are more helpful for 
examining established patterns of behaviour.
The experience of Guest and Peccei (1998; 2001), whose quantitative research 
proved somewhat agnostic on the genuine realities of partnership, suggests to me 
that perhaps the study may have been premature, or that the sample (of IPA 
members at varying stages of partnership maturity) may have been skewed by the 
less mature examples. Each case study here has a well-established ‘partnership’.
Qualitative research seeks to investigate process and meaning through analysing 
participants’ own words and actions, as they express themselves. Quantitative survey 
methods by contrast can proscribe subjects’ realities to a certain extent into what the 
researcher considers categorisable responses, however extensive and insightful these 
may be. Unforeseen accounts are then banished into a section marked ‘Other’. 
Confining respondents’ accounts to a set of restricted survey options is not 
appropriate for such process-driven phenomena.
Finally, qualitative research methods are also careful to set processes and shifts in 
attitudes and behaviours within the shifting context of the organisation’s situation 
(Marshall & Rossman, op cit: p49), at least according to accounts from the 
respondents. This too is crucial information. With such a phenomenon as 
partnership, context is critical, and it “can only be understood” with reference to 
this (Hayne & Allen, 1999), and quantitative methods inevitably struggle to capture 
a firm’s entire context.
In addition to these merits of qualitative research methods, my research was 
constrained by two situational factors that further recommended against the use of
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quantitative surveys. Firstly, I had a limited time-frame: my wedding, scheduled for 
May 2002, meant that I needed to complete my PhD within three years. Qualitative 
case studies suggested a more manageable research project in that time. Secondly, I 
anticipated problems securing access to each organisation if the research method 
entailed conducting surveys of a representative cross-section sample of the 
workforce, and in the telephone conversations about access my key contact was 
rather happier to facilitate a few days of interviews than a large-scale survey.
This is not to denigrate use of quantitative methods, of course. In the conclusion I 
return to consider what insights might have been revealed by use of such research 
tools, and I also offer some areas of interest for future research agendas.
A final rationale for producing case study work came from Lord McCarthy, who 
identified trust as a key factor in establishing “good industrial relations ”, and called 
upon British industrial relations researchers to “design projects to test... 
assumptions in action, in as many organisations as possible, making sure that the 
responses and reactions o f the shopfloor are recorded objectively, alongside the 
aims and achievements o f management” (1995: p31). This exhortation to produce 
more qualitative, practical case study research made a considerable impression upon 
me. McCarthy attached five pre-conditions to such research:
1. The organisations studied must be facing critical problems of performance and 
motivation arising from external pressure
2. Their managements must be committed to a given paradigm [work organisation 
method], eager to demonstrate that it works for them
3. The fieldwork should be conducted directly inside the organisation, with no 
intermediaries involved and the use of quantitative survey methods minimised
4. Those undertaking the research must be committed to drawing practical 
conclusions from the data, while respecting the most rigorous of academic 
standards, and finally -
5. Reports should be written in plain, non-academic language.
I address each of McCarthy’s pre-conditions at the close of this chapter.
Use of case studies to analyse partnership arrangements has a precedent in Marks et 
al’s investigation of the partnership agreements in the Scottish spirits industry,
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Hayne and Allen’s paper to the BUIRA conference in 1999 containing accounts at 
Legal & General and Tesco, and in numerous forthcoming works (previewed at the 
‘Assessing Partnership’ conference, May 2001). In addition, it has a long-standing 
methodological validity for examinations into employee participation schemes (for 
an example, see Department of Employment, 1981).
Thus, in embarking on this research I considered qualitative research to be of more 
value and more interest to us. However, below I address the drawbacks of this 
approach, based on my experience in this research.
Access.
I sought ‘partnership’ organisations across a wide range of sectors, with a view to 
improving the likelihood of ‘transferability’. I drew in the first instance upon IPA 
member organisations or clients as likely partnership organisations. Those that had 
reported existing policies and practices corresponding to each of the IPA model’s 
‘commitments’ and ‘building blocks’ were considered targets for access. Thus, I 
anticipated that evidence of partnership-style relations would be present already, 
based on prima facie evidence. It was further reasonable to assume that, as paying 
IPA members, these organisations were likely to be sympathetic to submitting their 
experience to academic research. So it proved.
I approached eleven organisations. Seven indicated that they were prepared to take 
part in my research; four declined. In the event I conducted four post­
implementation case studies of existing partnership organisations:
■ ‘WhiskyCo’
■ ‘EngineParts’
■ ‘SchoolWear’ and
■ ‘Northwest NHS Trust’ ,32
32 A major high street bank withdrew involvement after two extended interviews with the Head o f  Employee 
Relations, as a consequence o f  likely confrontations arising from a major restructuring programme. It was felt 
that a researcher asking about ‘partnership ’ during such a time would present problems fo r  the company’s 
employment relations. (This in itself is an interesting episode, highlighting as it does the fragility ofpartnership.) 
I  elected not to study a single-site automotive components firm  as they were similar to ‘EngineParts ’. I  also 
elected not to study an Irish organisation because o f  the problems o f  introducing a comparative element, with 
different national industrial relations systems and players.
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For the first set of interviews I secured a prolonged immersion into the organisation 
over the course of almost a full working week. This allowed me to interview a wide 
range of participants from all levels of the organisation, and also to observe first­
hand the extent to which partnership and mutual trust seemed evident in the 
everyday operations of the enterprise. A week also enabled me to gather a large 
body of documentary evidence. I had hoped to become a familiar fixture around the 
workplace during the week of research, providing opportunities for informal 
conversations - in the canteen, at the photocopier, and after work - where more 
candid insights might have been more forthcoming. This was too ambitious in 
hindsight as, on the whole, these opportunities did not materialise.
I returned to each organisation for a second follow-up visit between 9 and 12 months 
after the first round of interviews (although for SchoolWear, as I had secured access 
to them late, the two rounds of interviews were conducted 4 months apart). I had 
written a first draft of the narrative section of the case study based on the first set of 
interviews, and sent it to my key contact for comment, and to check for accuracy, 
and clarification. The second set of interviews was conducted with key participants 
selected by myself.
Interview respondents.
Access was secured in the first instance from the HR manager, facilitating access to 
all, or most, of the key participants, and a selection of employees drawn from a 
broad cross-section of the workforce. These were to a considerable extent selected 
by the organisation’s managers as ‘appropriate’ or ‘available’. For the shopfloor 
respondents I asked to speak with around half a dozen or so, drawn from different 
grades. In each organisation I asked specifically to speak to sceptics and dissenters, 
and this was granted. I can make no claim that either the percentage or the personal 
profile of the shopfloor respondents can be considered representative of the whole 
organisation. But there is no reason to suspect that they were selected for their 
docility, or harmlessness:
■ At WhiskyCo I spoke to the Managing Director, two HR Directors, other HR 
officers, senior representatives and shop stewards from all three trade unions 
involved, line managers in production, and around half a dozen ‘shopfloor’ and 
administrative staff.
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■ At EngineParts I spoke to the two plant managers, the HR team, the union 
convenor and shop stewards, production supervisers, line managers, and several 
‘shopfloor’ operatives and administrative officers.
■ At SchoolWear I spoke to the Managing Director and founder, the HR Director, 
other members of the HR team, Directors in Production and Finance, production 
supervisers and around half a dozen shopfloor workers and administrative 
workers.
■ At NorthWest NHS Trust I spoke to the Chairman, the two HR Directors, 
other managers, HR officers, senior representatives and shop stewards from each 
of the major trade unions involved, plus half a dozen ‘shop floor’ employees (in 
administration, cleaning and nursing).
The comparatively high number of interviewees across a range of organisational 
levels and grades, marks these case studies out as more comprehensive than Marks 
et al (1998: p210), the Knell report for the DTI (Knell, 1999), and IRS (2000a), each 
of whom confined their analysis to the testimonies of HR professionals and senior 
union officials. One gap that proved impossible to overcome, alas, was the senior 
managers in the parent companies of WhiskyCo and EngineParts.
Data collection methods.
I employed informal, semi-structured interviews as my main data collection source, 
for the reasons cited above. The interviews, conversations and collection of 
documentary evidence were used to compile a thorough examination of the 
organisation, and to confirm the extent to which partnership arrangements were 
present and robust. Specifically I sought to discover:
■ A narrative from a wide range of employees of the progress, if any, toward 
partnership:
■ The existing structures, processes and outcomes of the organisation’s employee 
relations (looking for evidence for the presence, or otherwise, of each of the IPA 
partnership policies and practices)
■ The informal rules and codes of behaviour (drawing on the definition of trust 
detailed in chapter two), especially looking into how dissent and/or conflict is 
dealt with.
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Documentary evidence included the organisation’s “artefacts and creations” (cf. 
Schein) such as the partnership agreement itself where one had been drawn up, plus 
internal reports and briefings, newsletters, some minutes of meetings, evidence of 
status differentials, etc.
Conducting the interview.
In my opening remarks I introduced the purpose of the interview as looking into 
“what it’s like to work here”, or “how work relationships are conducted here”, or - 
with participants already familiar with the purposes of my research -  “the 
arrangements you have here and how they might [emphasised] be linked to this 
concept o f ‘partnership ’ at work”. I explained that I wanted them to speak freely, to 
offer their own opinions, and not to try to guess what I want to hear. A line that 
seemed to reassure respondents was: “There are no right answers; in fact, every 
answer you give me is the right answer, because i t ’s your opinion ”. I explained my 
intention to remain neutral as far as possible. Relatedly, I explained why, because of 
the possibility of influencing the participant’s account, I was unable to respond as 
one would in a normal conversation, and for them to prepare for some awkwardness 
in that respect. I sought to reassure respondents of their anonymity, especially with 
regard to the tape recorder which I explained was necessary to free me from writing 
down every last word, but also so that others might check the accuracy of my 
interpretation of events. I guaranteed each participant that they would not be 
identified by name, or by distinguishing characteristics. (That said, many had no 
concerns over being linked in person to their comments, and so certain attributions 
in the case studies reflect this confidence.)
Sample interview questions -  round one.
The anticipated questions below were modified and refined in discussion with my 
superviser. It was intended that each provide adequate information to, in the first 
instance, help compile an accurate and detailed, multi-account narrative of events at 
each of the case study organisations, and then to explore on a preliminary level the 
respondents’ understanding of partnership. In particular, I hoped to be in a position 
to categorise the respondent’s overall account according to the four theoretical 
frameworks of my thesis (the IPA partnership model, trust-based relations, Walton
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and McKersie’s theories of bargaining behaviour, and game theory). Anticipated 
questions, with what I hoped they might illuminate, included:
Table 4 -  First round o f interviews: some o f the anticipated questions.
First round questions. Purpose of the question.
Please give a short biographical profile o f 
yourself, your career, and your job.
Opening remarks to hopefully set the 
interviewee at ease.
How would you characterise the employee 
relations in this organisation [prior to the 
partnership discussions]?
To gauge the extent to which trust, 
collaboration and distributive/ integrative 
bargaining existed prior to ‘partnership’.
Please describe your understanding of the 
rationale o f the following for entering into 
discussions on partnership: organisation/ 
trade unions/ the workforce.
To assess the interviewee’s understanding of 
the situational context, and what motivated 
the key participants to consider partnership.
What were the key influences or catalysts 
on this rationale?
As above.
[If involved in the discussions], please 
describe what happened in the earliest 
stages o f discussing partnership. Describe 
the mood, behaviours, and tactics.
To categorise behaviours according to each, 
or any, of the four theoretical frameworks.
Who led the discussions? How was 
partnership presented and debated? How 
were the discussions organised?
To investigate the nature of the structures and 
principles that informed the negotiations.
Describe any parameters or restrictions 
attached to the discussions.
As above.
What were the major sticking points? 
How were these resolved?
As above.
In your opinion, when was the moment 
when partnership became a feasible 
reality? Why did this come about?
To pinpoint the moment when the 
relationship changed, if indeed it did.
Describe how -  if  at all -  the moods, 
behaviours and tactics o f the negotiators 
changed. Why did this happen? How 
would you characterise the ‘new ’ style?
As above.
Describe the moods, behaviours and 
tactics o f the negotiators after the 
agreement to enter into a partnership.
As above.
Describe the partnership arrangements 
that have resulted in your organisation: 
the content o f the deal, its aspirations, 
rationale, processes and structures.
To leam how partnership is structured and 
arranged, and maintained.
Describe your understanding of 
partnership. What does it mean for you, 
and are there any general principles?
To appraise the interviewee’s understanding 
of partnership.
[If the respondent considers the 
relationship now to be one based on trust] 
Please explain what you understand by 
trust, and what this means to you.
To leam how the interviewee understands 
and values (if at all) trust.
How did the workforce endorse the 
partnership? Key selling points?
To leam how the workforce endorsed the 
partnership -  how it was ‘sold’ to them.
What evidence do you have that either 
side will not damage the partnership? 
Why?
To test for the presence of mutual trust, and 
punishments for defection.
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First round questions -  continued. Purpose of the question.
Please imagine a situation in which the 
partnership will have to be abandoned.
As above.
To what extent does partnership now 
dictate how work, and employee relations, 
are controlled in your organisation?
As above.
What are the advantages and 
disadvantages o f partnership?
To assess interviewee’s understanding of 
partnership’s benefits and costs.
Sample interview questions -  round two.
The second set of interviews was arranged to afford me an update on the partnership 
from the key players, but was primarily concerned with a more analytical further 
consideration of the nature of partnership and the alleged links with trust. For each 
response I sought evidence and examples of what the interviewee was describing. 
Anticipated questions, with what I hoped they might illuminate, included:
Table 5 -  Second round o f interviews: some o f the anticipated questions.
Second round questions. Purpose of the question.
Please update me on recent developments. To leam of any developments.
Have there been any amendments to the 
partnership arrangements, or any of its 
constituent parts?
As above.
How do you now understand, and define, 
'partnership ’? What are the positives and 
negatives/ opportunities and concerns?
To assess interviewee’s understanding of 
partnership arrangements, and perceived 
benefits/ costs.
What other options are available to each 
party in the relationship, other than 
partnership?
To examine the constraints placed upon 
participants, and to weigh up the 
benefits/costs of partnership & other options.
Is partnership a cyclical phenomenon? 
How permanent/ embedded are the 
arrangements?
As above.
What is the nature o f trust? What 
generates trust? What undermines, or 
destroys, trust?
To leam the interviewee’s appreciation of 
trust, and what factors promote and damage 
trust.
Which o f the ‘degrees o f trust ’ [see 
below] best describes the relationships 
here: at different stages o f development?, 
between different constituencies? And 
with whom is the partnership between?
To leam the nature of the trust-based 
relations in the partnership, and how and why 
this has come about. Also to discover how 
trust has evolved over time, and between 
whom it exists.
Degrees of trust.
Each of the second interviewees was presented with the following definitions of 
degrees o f trust, set along a continuum in order (as per chapter two).
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Figure 5 -  The definitions of trust presented to second round respondents.
Deterrence- Calculus- Knowledge- Relational- Identification-
based based based based based
Trust: Trust: Trust: Trust: Trust:
Not trust at all Does involve Based much Based on Based on
in any positive vulnerability more on consistent mutual
sense, but a and a pre­ judging the evidence of understanding
manifestation of disposition other’s reliability, for and affection,
distrust, with toward trust, predictability, mutual benefit, this degree of
co-operation while retaining against hence there is trust is for
reinforced or its reliance on a evidence some convergence Lewicki and
imposed valid cost- drawn from a of interests. Bunker most
through the benefit analysis, series of Enduring readily
threat of and the interactions; principles can associated with
deterrents. protections a “positive emerge that set love affairs. The
provided by expectation ” clear parameters intensity of the
deterrence arises. Much around what is trust belief
rather than by less reliance acceptable in the means that
mutual on the threat relationship. betrayal is felt
goodwill. of sanction to It can even lead to all the deeper.
reinforce the an emotional bond
collaboration. developing
between parties.
Use of these definitions is an original aspect of this research design. But they are 
not without their limitations. The main problem with them is that each is a rather 
complex philosophical conceptualisation, expressed in technical language. I wanted 
to retain the important nuances of the original definitions (discussed in chapter two). 
But this does mean that they take a while to read and to understand fully, and on one 
or two occasions, respondents felt confused and even distressed by their inability to 
clearly understand the task put before them. Nevertheless they generated compelling 
evidence and fascinating areas for discussion.
33 Other researchers have devised quantitative measures fo r  trust, but none proved satisfactory to me. Sandra 
Robinson (1996: p583) devised a seven-item scale, fo r  which respondents (in her case, graduates joining blue- 
chip firms) answered along a five-stage Likert scale (from “strongly agree ” to “strongly disagree ”):
■ "I believe my employer has high integrity ”
■ “I  can expect my employer to treat me in a consistent and predictable fashion ”
■ “My employer is not always honest and truthful ”
■ “In general, I  believe my employer's motives and intentions are good”
■ “I  don't think my employer treats me fairly ”
■ “My employer is open and upfront with me ", and -
■ “I  am not sure I  fully trust my employer ”.
These measures are subject to challenge in the light o f  the discussion in chapter two. While many o f the items do 
reflect some o f  the characteristics o f  a trust-based relationship, they do not isolate the sources o f  trust. Nor is 
there a measure that captures the individual’s innate pre-disposition toward trust, and perhaps toward trusting 
employers in general. Most seriously, there is no measure o f  the degree o f  confidence (deterrence-based, 
calculus-based, etc), based on the evidence o f  past behaviours. Nor is there an item that measures the likely 
strength o f the trust in a crisis. No item indicates that parties are operating in a context o f  risk Finally, i f  trust is 
a mutual phenomenon then there is no measure o f  the employer’s (i.e.: management’s) trust toward its 
employees. In forthcoming research work to be conducted at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, I  shall be 
working on an improved measure for trust.
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Questioning technique.
In terms of phrasing the questions, I tried to keep the options for response as open as 
possible. I sought to provide, as far as I was able, the respondent with an 
understandable and ‘neutrally’ phrased question -  which is not always easy, 
especially when responding to an unforeseen observation or comment -  that 
accorded the interviewee free rein to interpret it as (s)he felt appropriate.
I was conscious of offering single-issue, open-ended, unembellished questions, such 
as “what were your reasons for seeking a partnership agreement? ” I tried to avoid 
the temptation of giving respondents options or ‘clues’ for their reply, such as “was 
it because o f X, or maybe Yf for example? ", since giving such options might have 
restricted their accounts. I tried hard -  and for the most part I think I succeeded - not 
to offer suggested lines of thinking or angles, or to prompt the participant. However, 
for clarification, I used closed questions that on occasion did offer interviewees with 
options.
I dealt with “social anxiety” (the desire to create a coherent, favourable self-image 
that can inhibit and distort information) and participant “reactivity” (wariness) as 
best I could, the former with polite but persistent challenges to any participant’s 
exaggerated or improbable statements, the latter with the reassurances prior to the 
interview and ‘encouraging’ noises and smiles of recognition.
When confronted with an awkward silence, I tried to follow recommendations that I 
had read for three common silences:
• The “thoughtful” silence requiring encouraging noises to urge the 
interviewee to express her/himself
• The “stuck” silence when a question or idea may need to be rephrased, and
• An “embarrassed” silence when something amiss has taken place, and the 
interview is required to move on to another subject.
Throughout the interviews I was aware of the need to establish a confident but 
relaxed posture, and the importance of eye contact, while at the same time compiling 
useful and decipherable notes.
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The experience of semi-structured interviews.
In practice, being semi-structured and with the respondent’s interpretations and 
concerns paramount, many of the questions were either not needed (as the 
respondent had addressed the question’s subject matter elsewhere). Or the 
conversation deviated interestingly (or not!) and to revert to ground already covered 
would have disrupted the ‘flow’ of the interview, and perhaps undermine the 
respondent’s confidence by returning to matters (s)he, by implication, had not 
explained adequately. This is a problem, and I could find no suitable ameliorating 
technique. However, cross-referencing with the many other respondents addressed 
these deficiencies to some extent. At times interviewees did divert from the subject 
down what, for them, were important avenues or into significant personal 
grievances, but unfortunately these did not offer much in the way of insight. This is 
the downside of allowing respondents a free rein. But I was too polite to interrupt!
Though not a universal experience, the majority of non-managerial respondents were 
unprepared to analyse and discuss the nuances of relationships at the senior 
organisational level(s). Many apologised that they "can’t really comment on that”, 
or that they just "don't know”. This, in part, has skewed the narrative accounts and 
the interpretation of events.
Also, interviews late in the day tended to provide fewer valuable insights, as either 
my interviewee or I was likely to be tired, mentally if not physically, and the content 
of the discussion is complex and intense. Maintaining a comfortable conversation 
with interviewees sometimes required scientifically non-rigorous comment and 
opinion, and so when I listened back to the interviews I treated with caution material 
that I considered to have been ‘induced’ or otherwise directed by my own poor or 
unavoidable phrasing of questions. I do not believe that this happened enough to 
distort the narratives.
Data analysis.
To examine the outcomes of the second set of interviews, I used a coding technique 
known as ‘systems of arguments’ to categorise responses. ‘Systems of argument’ 
involves ascribing a code to a certain line of thinking on an issue, which helps the 
researcher to fit respondents’ accounts into theoretical frameworks. My presentation
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to each respondent of the five descriptions of degrees of trust is an example of this 
technique. Take the following hypothetical quotes from a union official in response 
to the question, “How would you describe the level o f trust in your organisation? ”
1. “Wouldn ’t trust them as far as I  could throw them
2. “How much I  trust management depends on the issue we 're talking about
3. “I  judge people by their actions, and so far management have not turned me 
over
4. “I  can take X  into my strictest confidence now, knowing that he won't do 
anything to undermine me”.
5. “I  trust X  completely; his agenda is my agenda
One may appraise the statements, as I have done, in the light of the definition of 
trust provided in chapter two: statement 1 displays no trust whatsoever, 2 might be 
considered a burgeoning calculus-based trust, 3 knowledge-based trust, 4 relational- 
based trust and 5 an example of identification-based trust.34 35
Methodological and ethical concerns.
I hoped that my role as a researcher from the London School of Economics would be 
uncontroversial. However, to ease participants’ concerns about my intrusion, and its
34 Equally, one could categorise the above responses according to F ox’s frames o f  reference (1974a), with 1 
being a Marxist/ radical appraisal, 2 reflecting a limited attempt at pluralism, 3 a stronger pluralist assessment, 
and 4 and 5 expressing more unitarist sentiments.
35 I  had intended to use another coding technique, 'attributional coding’ (Silvester, 1998). But this proved to be 
too difficult fo r  reasons I  outline here. Attributional coding is "concerned with everyday causal explanations 
that people produce when they encounter novel, important, unusual or threatening behaviour and events” (p74). 
The Leeds Attributional Coding System or LACS allows fo r  attribution to be assigned among several different 
agents and events, and focuses on the participants’ subjective assessments o f  causality (ibid: p78). Their 
judgements may not be valid in that they may not be borne out by the fa c ts ’. But from several dijferent 
respondents the system should make it possible to amass a coherent, or incoherent, organisational 
understanding o f  the relevant events [in this project, the negotiations surrounding the implementation o f  a 
partnership agreement]. The LACS comprises four components: the Agent (A), the Target (B), the Outcome (C), 
and the causality between them (x), such that 'A ’ does 'x' to ’B ’, producing ’C ‘, or 'A ’ causes (x) ‘C  to happen 
to ’B ’. It then rates the causality along six dimensions, rated 1-3 on an ascending scale:
1. Stable/  unstable: the perceived permanence o f  the cause (where 1= unstable).
2. Global/ specific: the sphere o f  influence o f  the cause (where 1— limited or narrow).
3. Internal/ external: the source o f  the cause (where 1= external, 3 internal)
4. Personal/ universal: the application o f  the cause (where 1= universal)
5. Controllable/ uncontrollable: the scope to influence the cause (where 1= uncontrollable).
6. Valency: the nature o f  the cause's outcomes (where 1= negative, 2 positive)
This method seemed to promise a distinctive, vivid and rigorous data processing technique. However, when I
analysed the interviews, it became apparent that fo r  complex, multi-variable phenomena such as changing 
employment relationships, there were few  statements in which unambiguous causality was identified, and 
certainly not enough fo r  the LACS method to form the basis o f  my analysis. Most respondents cited several 
different sources o f  causality fo r  the reason why a partnership was considered, fo r  example. Also, even when a 
respondent articulated a clear link between an event and its consequence, further probing and analysis often 
undermined the clarity o f  the initial interpretation. So, with reluctance, I  abandoned the LACS method.
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implications, I liaised with each organisation when I negotiated access on the crucial 
issue of participant anonymity. All deemed it necessary.
An important concern over possible researcher bias is my part-time paid position as 
Research and Information Manager at the IPA. I would refute charges of a clash of 
interests, or bias or compromise. To avoid accusations of bias, I reached an 
agreement with the Director, Willy Coupar, confirming that my job at the IPA would 
continue regardless of the outcome of my research (subject to my satisfactory 
performance, of course), and relinquishing the IPA of all rights to edit or amend the 
finished work. It was also made a pre-condition of taking part that the case study 
organisations relinquish all editing demands upon this dissertation. But for the IPA 
studies some prudent amendments or clarifications were made to avoid unwarranted 
and unhelpful internal upheavals within the organisations. This thesis remains my 
creation.
Relatedly, to address accusations of possible bias in my accounts of the partnership 
arrangements in each of the four case studies, I wish to set out prior to the case 
studies my own position on partnership. It is that, while I support the notion of 
genuine and robust forms of partnership (i.e.: I admire arrangements where certain 
key criterion are genuinely met, and the overwhelming majority of affected 
employees support the set-up), I am however pessimistic about its long-term 
robustness. This I consider a reasonable and agnostic stance, and it is this stance that 
has informed my research.
Method validity.
My research findings are of course constrained by the limitations of this research 
method. I am especially aware that qualitative research is prone to accusations of 
being journalism rather than scholarly research. To counter this, I designed my 
research to produce as accurate as possible an account of partnership organisation’s 
employee relations. To address Lincoln and Guba’s four research method issues 
above (op cit):
■ Credibility. Access to an unusually wide range of employees
(around 15 separate interviews in each organisation) over a prolonged period 
(a week in the first instance, with a set of follow-up interviews at a later date,
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between 4-12 months on) afforded me opportunities to check my narrative 
account for accuracy, and uncover corroborations or contradictions in 
participants’ accounts. I interviewed a broad cross-section of participants, 
including shopfloor employees, middle management and, where possible, 
senior Directors. This depth and variety of testimony is, I believe, a 
significant strength of my fieldwork evidence. While not perfect -  such an 
incontrovertible account is not possible -  I am confident that in each of the 
case studies I have produced a balanced account of behaviours and views, 
reporting negative assessments as well as positive accounts, to mitigate 
against any unconscious researcher bias - see Confirmability below. 
Marchington’s warnings over producing “fairy tales” (1995) helped to guard 
me against the somewhat zealous nature of participants’ accounts of 
‘partnership’. An unwary or non-sceptical researcher might accept, for 
example, that the partnership arose as a consequence of the inspired and 
meticulous genius of certain key participants. Another of Marchington’s 
concerns (ibid) was that dissent and disruption could often be ‘air-brushed’ 
out of final accounts in case studies. While I found it difficult in a polite and 
unstructured interview with, at best, compliant (rather than enthusiastic) 
participants to grill them and challenge every assertion, I believe that my 
questioning generated sceptical/ hostile perspectives where present, and 
certainly did nothing to deter such interpretations. Employees’ concerns and 
reservations about partnership arrangements are given extensive coverage in 
each case study. My determined effort to phrase my questions as ‘neutrally’ 
as possible allowed interviewees to interpret my questions as they saw fit. I 
confined my note-taking technique to facts or quotes only, and recorded all 
conversations onto cassette, retaining the interviews for subsequent assessors 
to verify the accuracy of my account. Throughout the creation of this 
research project, I used my supervisor as a ‘devil’s advocate’, testing my 
assumptions and constructs.
■ Transferability. Transferability is problematic for all research,
and the nature of qualitative research is such that it “does not pretend to be 
replicable” in all cases (Marshall and Rossman, op cit: pl45). Having said 
that, the theoretical models that I have outlined and applied in my research -
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especially trust - are all applicable to other relationships in other 
organisations. In addition, the case study organisations have been drawn 
from a wide range of sectors -  engineering, drinks manufacturing, clothes 
design and distribution, and an NHS Trust. Should a consistent ‘story’ 
emerge across a disparate collection of organisations, one can reasonably 
draw some firm conclusions, albeit tempered with cautions, on the potential 
of transferability. That said, it is my firm belief that partnership arrangements 
are created by the participants themselves; I would resist any overly 
deterministic assumptions.
■ Dependability. I am confident that the precautions outlined
above, and my efforts to “triangulate the data” -  combining my own 
interviews with documentation and other existing reports and articles -  have 
to a satisfactory degree ensured that what I present in my case studies is an 
accurate account of the situation within each of the organisations. It is 
unlikely that many respondents presented deceitful data, whether by lying or 
by wilfully distorting the ‘truth’. It is probable that respondents will have 
edited out uncomfortable details, or self-censored. Others, especially from 
among the most important players, may have felt tempted to rewrite history 
in a personally complimentary light. Corroboration between participants’ 
accounts, as well as the evidence from documentary evidence, and my own 
observations (including where relevant, challenges to the orthodox view) 
have all helped to counter the potency of such benign distortions. External 
access to the cassette recordings of all interviews also helps to affirm this. It 
is difficult for me to imagine that a set of replica interviews conducted by 
another researcher would generate a significantly different view of the 
history of the arrangements, or of the reflections on trust. One source of 
regret is that the definitions presented to the respondents were perhaps too 
complex, but I believe that most coped well with them, and produced 
interesting and considered responses.
■ Confirmability. Subject validation of my accounts of the change 
programmes in each organisation, for accuracy only, helped reduce skewed 
reportage. While one caveat is that the validator tended to be the HR/
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Personnel manager, each case study was published in a modified version by 
the IP A, and no employee to my knowledge has objected to the account.
Conclusion: McCarthy’s pre-conditions.
To return to Lord McCarthy’s five pre-conditions on practical case study research 
(1995):
1. All four organisations can be said to have faced considerable challenges for 
both performance improvements and employee motivation. The explicit 
change management programme selected was, of course, partnership.
2. In all four organisations senior management teams were committed to a 
given ‘paradigm’, or work organisation method (i.e.: partnership), and all 
four were keen proponents of their model and methods.
3. My fieldwork was conducted directly inside the organisation, with no 
intermediaries involved, and I used no quantitative surveys.
4. As will be seen from each of the studies, and from both my putative model 
for establishing trust through partnership at work and in my concluding 
remarks, I have not shied away from "drawing practical conclusions from 
the data At the same time, I hope that this chapter has indicated the lengths 
I have gone to "respect the most rigorous o f academic standards ”. Finally -
5. I have tried as hard as possible to avoid jargon, gibberish and fancy terms for 
what are simple concepts already served by an extensive and accurate 
lexicon!
I am confident that these precautions have enabled me to produce an accurate 
account of each organisation’s partnership arrangements and employee relations.
In the next chapter I present my four case studies of partnership organisations. Each 
is split into three sections: a narrative account of the progress to partnership, 
followed by two analysis sections on partnership, and then trust.
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Chapter 6.
Case study 1: WhiskyCo. Narrative section.
I  first met a representative (the HR Manager) from WhiskyCo in April 2000 to secure 
access. The first week of interviews took place in July that year. I  returned in July and 
August 2001, to conclude my follow-up interviews.
Background.
WhiskyCo is the collective name for a number of distillers, bringing brands such as 
Ballantine’s, Teacher’s, and Laphroaig under one umbrella organisation. Now the 
flagship subsidiary of a British-owned food and drink multi-national, WhiskyCo 
produces over ten million cases of Scotch whisky, gin, vodka, liqueur and specialist 
products from its 19 sites throughout Scotland, with a gin plant in southern England. 
The company employs around 1,000 people [2001 figure], mainly across several 
sites around Dumbarton, although distilling distinctive whiskies means that some on 
the headcount are located in several of the most inhospitable regions of Scotland.
Before changes in global markets and customer tastes registered among the big 
players in the whisky business, each was doing well. With very good profit margins, 
‘product-to-market’ was paramount -  a preoccupation also noted by researchers 
from the Universities of Edinburgh and St Andrews in their study of partnership at 
WhiskyCo and their local rivals (Marks et al, 1998: p212). Extra costs in production 
could always be passed on to a loyal customer base in price rises. As such the 
company could afford to pay their staff very well, and any changes in work 
practices, though fiercely contested by a highly unionised and well-organised 
workforce, could be “bought”. The guiding rule for managers was “anything to 
keep production going, and to maintain the status quo ” (HR manager); the price for 
industrial peace was worth paying “to get the stuff out o f the door” (production 
manager). WhiskyCo had 72 shift patterns, rigid demarcations, and 32 grades of pay. 
Lucrative and “institutionalised” overtime schemes bolstered take-home pay 
considerably. There was almost no employee turnover.
The company always had extremely high union membership levels, shared between 
the GMB (production) and the AEEU (the engineers), with the MSF -  only 
organised within WhiskyCo in 1980 - representing only a modest percentage of
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office staff.36 Prior to 1995 industrial relations policy was enshrined in two 
agreements, one from 1973 and one from 1977, with the numbers in one or the other 
amended by the annual pay deals. "If it wasn’t written down in either o f these two, it 
didn’t happen” (HR manager). Outside the annual pay bargaining, conducted 
separately, general industrial relations policy was settled between the company’s IR 
specialist and the works convenor, meeting daily, who developed a close friendship. 
Line managers were typically left out of the decision-making: "we had next to no 
say, the unions had it, because they knew the rules and just bypassed the first line 
management” (production manager). Widespread employee involvement was 
considered neither valuable nor necessary. A GMB shop steward recalled his 
‘training’ in a bottling hall: "they just showed you the ‘start ’ and ‘stop ’ buttons, that 
was it”. Management style was vintage command-and-control: "They didn ’t want to 
know you ”. Given a highly organised workforce in a traditionally militant part of the 
country, and with production at a premium for managers, this rather detached 
procedure for resolving problems at work generated confrontational attitudes on 
both sides, with "no trust whatsoever” (HR manager, also a union convenor).
Events leading to ‘partnership’.
In the mid-1990s, the decline in the appeal of whisky in the broader market for 
alcohol, particularly among the so-called "lost generation ” of young drinkers in the 
previous decade, began to hit business performance. When in 1995 the parent 
company established each of its international subsidiaries as a cost centre rather than 
a profit centre, it benchmarked costs between them, as well as with direct 
competitors and comparable companies (such as Coca Cola). The benchmarking 
highlighted the flabbiness of WhiskyCo’s production methods: hardly any 
automation, and almost no flexibility in tasks, work times, or employee skills. 
Output per employee was lower than rivals, and yet WhiskyCo was one of the best 
payers in Scotland. The parent would no longer tolerate the mismatch between pay 
and performance. Head office demanded that all of its subsidiaries absorb inflation, 
and save costs year on year (totalling some £5m), including those for labour. The 
catalyst for change was this veiled threat, or imperative to change, depending on 
your point of view. This demand spawned a mantra that remains a company
36 By their own admission M SF’s influence within WhiskyCo has always been limited, and so they provide only a 
peripheral role in the narrative.
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standard: "The minimum level o f performance that [WhiskyCo] is prepared to 
accept equals the best o f the competition”. Tackling inefficiencies included -  to 
managers, at least - the ritualised structures and processes of conflict-based 
industrial relations.
Negotiating partnership: the 1st and 2nd attempts.
Prior to 1995 WhiskyCo had tried to initiate a change programme on two earlier 
occasions. Both failed, including the STAR initiative, which stood for "Skilled 
Teams Achieve Results” (described in Marks et al, 1998 as “ambitious but ill-fated” 
(ibid: p214).
Although the managers had come up with a sound theoretical basis for change, the 
unions felt that the company was incapable of articulating exactly what changes 
would be required. For STAR they had tried a ‘blank-sheet-of-paper’ joint 
brainstorming approach. But this style was entirely new to WhiskyCo 
representatives, more at ease with the ‘old-style’ industrial relations culture: “a 
quantum leap from what we were used to” (AEEU shop steward). Anyway, the 
suspicious unions did not consider it their role to offer suggestions on how to run the 
company. When pressed it became apparent that the managers had “a big list o f 
issues up on a flipchart” (shop steward) that could have filled several sheets of 
blank paper. The effort to conduct open discussions while concealing a hidden 
agenda, reviewed by several respondents from unions and management alike as 
“naive”, had been exposed. “Management had to eat humble p ie” (production 
manager). Although the unions returned from analysing the wish-list with the 
insistence that they be involved in the changes from the outset - something the 
managers were “quite happy to do ” - vital goodwill was lost. Managers 
subsequently hired in from outside judged that STAR lacked an industrial relations/ 
HR strategy for pushing the reforms through in a well-organised union environment 
(also in Marks et al, ibid: p215).37
Renaming supervisors ‘team leaders’ and talking about ‘empowerment’ had little 
impact. A production manager reflected: “We went into it believing things would
37 Incidentally, Marks et al found in their interviews dissent among the GMB shop stewards and resistance in the 
form  o f  an “informal boycott" o f STAR, in defiance o f  the supportive stance adopted by their convenor. None o f  
this was mentioned in my own interviews.
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happen i f  you made superficial changes... We grossly under-estimated the task” 
(quoted in People Management article, 26 March 1998).
Momentum toward a joint problem-solving approach faded. It proved a ‘false 
dawn ” (production manager). One engineering shop steward corrupted the original 
meaning of the STAR initials to “Skilled Teams Achieve Redundancies” - an 
indication of the considerable suspicions abroad within WhiskyCo at the time. But a 
production manager suggested that the effort at joint working had provided a 
“grounding” for subsequent revisits to the same ‘partnership’-style way of working.
Not all of the Board had offered their full support to a ‘partnership’ programme 
(production manager; HR manager). Resistance at the top was hampering progress. 
This was addressed directly during the latter half of 1995, when every senior 
manager went through a weekend assessment centre, and each was tested for the 
competencies and attitudes deemed essential for the forthcoming changes: to think 
strategically (called ‘visioning’), to facilitate major innovations and to manage 
people effectively. As part of this ‘operational review’ a third left their seats at 
Board level, and the entire Personnel department was disbanded and re-built. It was, 
conceded one HR manager, “quite brutal”.
New, younger managers were deliberately targeted from outside the industry, many 
being young Scots returning home from posts in England. Much more business- 
minded, and used to a quicker commercial pace (HR manager), they arrived 
unencumbered with the ‘baggage’ of historical precedent in the industry.
The new HR department, as it was re-christened, took the findings from the 
operations review, and drew up a change strategy to present to the Board of the 
parent company. A ‘partnership’ deal of some sort with the unions and their 
members was regarded as phase one, paving the way for phase two: merging the 
operations of three plants into a huge all-in-one production and bottling site at 
Kilmalid, on the edge of Dumbarton. Included within the partnership plans was an 
outline of the type of deal sought, how it would be promoted, as well as profiles of 
key change agents, including the union representatives, and how best they might be 
persuaded to endorse the change programme. The partnership programme would
154
cost £8m to implement in full (HR manager). The Board signed it, and the move to 
Kilmalid, into action.
The HR team approached front-line production managers about the plans, and for 
the most part they were relieved to encounter “goodwill’ but also some apathy... It's 
important to sort the managers out first because they have to deliver the 
partnership ” (HR Director). They then identified the company’s top half a dozen or 
so most pressing problems, and in private over dinner approached the full-time 
officials of the two production unions (GMB and AEEU) to raise their concerns. The 
response was cautiously positive, but with clearly expressed stipulations for the 
future security of the workforce, and for the dignity of those who would be leaving.
But first came the 1995 annual pay rounds. The new managers imposed a single­
table arrangement, seeing no reason why they should conduct three separate 
bargaining rounds when one could suffice. The unions had never sat down with each 
other previously. The company offered a 7% pay rise and invited the unions to 
debate potential ‘partnership’ arrangements. The GMB representatives were broadly 
in favour of such a discussion. As a senior union official (then only recently elected) 
recalls, it was clear that attitudes, tactics, even the terminology of workplace/ 
industrial relations were all changing, and at a national level his union had begun to 
warm to the idea of partnership. The electricians and engineers were not so 
enthusiastic. The partnership programme, with unfamiliar flexible working practices, 
“was like a skeleton; there was no meat on it because there was no discussion with 
us about what was necessary”, recalled the AEEU convenor in an interview with 
People Management magazine (26 March 1998). This meant “there was no trust, so 
the [engineering] worlforce said ‘N o’”, he later expanded for this case study. An 
AEEU shop steward elaborated on the lack of trust: “We didn’t trust what was not 
written down in black and white, because managers could play their old games 
otherwise ”. The members defied the endorsement from their full-time official, and 
many of their own shop stewards, and balloted for industrial action. Returning to the 
table with 90% ready to strike, the AEEU requested their original 4% flat increase, 
“and none o f this 'partnership ’ stuff” (senior AEEU official). They got it. The 
second attempt at negotiating partnership had foundered.
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WhiskyCo elected to pursue a partnership agenda in the first instance with the GMB 
alone, going down to their college in Manchester for joint teambuilding/ getting-to- 
know-you sessions. These informal exchanges, repeated interactions in a safe 
environment, helped to challenge the validity of perceived barriers between 
managers and the union representatives: "If you know the guy [as a person], you can 
trust him, and you can separate the person as an individual from the guy doing 
business with you ” (HR manager). A formative trust began to develop between the 
new cadre of managers and the GMB’s senior officials. The convenor was asked by 
the company to become full-time. His salary is now paid out of the HR budget.
In March 1996 the then Managing Director addressed almost the entire workforce in 
the warehouse at Newtown with what was termed a ‘Presidential Address’. Those in 
far-flung locations were sent a video of the same speech. Written by the HR team, 
his speech began: “I t ’s time for some straight talking”. WhiskyCo’s productivity 
and quality levels no longer justified the exceptional salaries and terms and 
conditions enjoyed by its staff. After indicating several areas where the company 
lagged behind competitors, such as overtime costing £2.2m per year, the MD made 
it clear that retention of the status quo was not an option, as the parent company 
would almost certainly take many of WhiskyCo’s operations elsewhere. (Certain 
constituencies were more vulnerable than others, for while the blending of Scotch 
whisky obviously had to remain in Scotland bottling and distribution -  accounting 
for the majority of employees - could be handled elsewhere.) The only option was to 
“adapt rapidly”. There were signs of progress already happening, and he cited the 
encouraging work of the ‘Toward Partnership’ committee involving the GMB and 
the MSF. “But it's not enough and not enough people are involved”, he concluded. 
The change process “means that we all have to talk and work earnestly toward 
solutions ” (all quotes from the video).
The first edition of the company’s new in-house newsletter reported a “silence that 
says it all” from the assembled workforce, although many of those quoted seemed to 
appreciate the lack of “fancy showmanship” and “hearing it straight”. For the 
managers it proved to be “a watershed” (HR manager).
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Negotiating partnership: the 3rd attempt.
In the middle of 1996, with the MD’s exhortation still fresh, the company initiated a 
programme of small question-&-answer sessions (styled ‘Breakout! ’ events) giving 
employees opportunities to leave their work to sit face-to-face with company 
directors to discuss their working life and the proposed changes. According to 
reports in the company newsletter, these were well received, and alerted directors to 
serious inefficiencies in the production process.
Momentum gathered for reviving formal talks with the unions about partnership. 
After a couple of informal meetings over dinner to resurrect the process, the 
management team held what was called a “joint agenda workshop This featured 3- 
4 Directors and some 50 employees (drawn from the two main unions, some non­
union employees from the more remote sites, plus a few managers). The seating plan 
was pre-arranged to avoid factions grouping together and, it was hoped, to 
demonstrate that “we were all o f us [WhiskyCo] employees, and not with our other 
‘hats ’ on ” (HR manager). The idea was to engage in joint exercises, then split into 
syndicate rooms for ‘breakout’ discussions on what a new joint agenda might look 
like. “It was a disaster” (HR manager). The AEEU insisted on enforcing their 
‘listening brief only’, and left the table to sit together at the back. The GMB duly 
followed suit, and so there were precious few other options but to show the MD’s 
video and adjourn. One shop steward at the time said, “You’re being too 
sophisticated for us. This is HR, and we ’re used to IR The meeting resumed, with 
the acknowledgement that the joint process as presently arranged was not working, 
and it was agreed that each party go away to draw up their own agenda for change, 
before trying again two months down the line.
Negotiating partnership: the 4th attempt.
The parent company brought in a new HR Director, whose brief was to pull together 
the trade unions and deliver change. He had done this at other divisions in the 
company. In November 1996 the company booked a nearby hotel for three weeks, to 
thrash out a new agreement with the unions. The six managers were accompanied by 
and the full-time regional officials from all three unions plus, deliberately, all forty 
local union representatives (to the fury of the “punters’’ back in the Dumbarton
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plants, according to one of the convenors). This was to share information equally, 
but also to maintain managerial control of the rumour machine.
The managers had learned from the mistakes of the previous attempt to discuss 
partnership, and arrived well prepared. "The new guys knew what they were talking 
about” (senior union official). “Leaked concerns” had laid the groundwork for a 
serious engagement with the company’s commercial position; "everyone knew the 
circumstances o f change and the performance targets ” (shop steward).
The management team, under new leadership, changed tack, and reverted to the 
company’s more familiar ‘industrial relations negotiating’ style. Delegates sat 
together in constituency groups around a large table; the employee representatives 
were largely happy to let their full-time officials negotiate on their behalf. Clear 
ground rules were established: to be open and honest with each other, and to allow 
others to speak freely. Then the HR Director, in his blunt and direct fashion, told the 
unions, “you will listen” (production manager), as the company shared a 
considerable amount of sensitive commercial information, for the first time in any 
sustained manner. This was designed to set the imperative behind the move toward 
partnership in its business context. Interestingly, one union rep interpreted this 
“repetitive” exchange of incontrovertible business information as “dampening [the 
unions’] enthusiasm ”.
This time the managers went on to share their eight-page wish-list up front. It 
included an end to demarcations and the introduction of flexible work practices, a 
simplified pay structure and multi-year pay deals. And there would have to be 
redundancies.
The managers had expected a process of joint design over the wish-list, but again the 
trade unions were unwilling initially to engage with the management agenda on a 
joint basis. The AEEU delegation was suspicious that they were being “prompted 
and programmed” to support management (shop steward); the GMB demanded to 
know whether anything had been left out, whether the management team was telling 
the truth, whether the unions were going to be treated like adults (GMB union 
official). All three unions however reiterated that they wanted to be involved in the
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design of the revised terms and conditions, and work practices, and insisted that 
there be “no losers ”.
The first week comprised efforts to break the ice, and establish common ground over 
such a controversial set of demands. This still involved a good deal of “jostling for 
position ” between the different constituencies present. The HR Director, and his 
Manager, had complementary styles, the former a “shoot-from-the-hip” straight 
talker, the latter “calmer” (AEEU shop steward). In the formal meetings 
breakthroughs proved difficult, as for many participants -  managers and union 
officials alike -  the setting and the requirements of their role seemed to compel 
certain “posturing” and “playing to different audiences” (HR Director). In formal 
meetings it was felt that people were hostages to what they said. This is perhaps 
inevitable given that, for one union rep there, joint working parties and the like 
constituted “uncharted territory” (AEEU shop steward). The breakthroughs often 
came in informal chats outside the official process, where end-points could be set 
out in rather more vague terms, policy drafts circulated in confidence, and perhaps 
more importantly, individuals could not be compromised permanently by their 
utterances.
The catalyst for progress came early, with the formal declaration that there would be 
no compulsory redundancies for three years (unless the site closed), and an 
agreement that there would indeed be no losers cash-wise. Guaranteed employment 
for the duration of the three-year programme, and a commitment to re-training those 
who remained, provided a safe framework within which the other changes could be 
negotiated, the former appealing more to the GMB, the latter rather more to the 
AEEU. Both offers met many of the concerns of the unions, who knew it would be 
“a vote winner” (union convenor) and would smooth the way for voluntary 
redundancies since many of the ageing workforce were likely to welcome early 
retirement. The no-compulsory redundancy pledge meant it would be “so easy to 
sell the job losses” to the workforce (production manager); it afforded those 
remaining a “good umbrella ”.
From there the negotiations centred on many of the finer points of the flexible work 
practices sought by the managers, with all parties going through the text with a fine
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tooth-comb. Negotiations were, according to those who were there the whole time, 
“tortuous”, “tiring”, and “hard work”. A senior AEEU official remembered that 
“we would sit down and discuss matters and we wouldn't leave until both sides o f 
the table had reached an agreement”. Many did not go smoothly; challenges from 
the unions on the implications of certain changes to working practices had not been 
foreseen by the management team, and so supplementary research and amendments 
to drafts wasted time, leaving the shop stewards with little else to do but sit around 
the hotel, unable to leave, and wait. Although ‘win-win’ solutions were sought, the 
unions conceded that on some matters they would not get what their members 
wanted.
In the second week, the company bussed over more managers to sit in joint working 
parties to thrash out the detail. The AEEU union went with managers to local 
colleges to research new working methods. One convenor felt that his union, and the 
other two, enjoyed “quite a bit o f influence” over framing each policy. A shop 
steward felt that in the joint working parties “our opinion was asked, not just the 
FTOs”.
The intensity of the sealed venue, and the long and intricate debates, increased each 
party’s familiarity with each other, and gradually the efforts to seek mutually 
beneficial solutions built a tentative trust between them. As more issues were 
resolved, and the agreement took shape and disagreements over the details were 
ironed out through joint problem solving, the conversation turned during the third 
week to methods for selling the idea to the workforce.
“Selling” partnership.
Having agreed the text of the agreement over one intensive three-week period, the 
communication campaign began to sell the idea of partnership to a sceptical and 
likely hostile workforce. With Christmas behind them, the management team 
launched its multi-dimensional communication campaign. The proposed ‘Change 
Agenda’, as the partnership deal was christened, was written in “plain English”, 
then printed in pocketbook format and distributed to every employee. Remarkably, 
this was the first time that staff had had their own copy of their own terms and 
conditions. At the front of the booklet were eight quotes from the leading players -
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managers, lay union reps, and full-time officials -  all endorsing the deal. The 
booklet consisted of an introduction to the revised terms, a summary of benefits, an 
overview of the commercial aspirations of WhiskyCo and the business context, and 
a set of nine appendices setting out the new grading schemes and shift patterns, how 
the headcount reductions would pan out over the three years, and then some working 
examples of new job descriptions and even what a typical day at work under the new 
arrangements would be like. This last detail was included to introduce workers to 
their new skills and responsibilities, such as: "llam: Production o f order 
terminates... All necessary paperwork for order completed by Operator” [when 
previously it would have been done by administration].
With the US election going on at the same time, the joint campaign team mimicked 
Clinton’s tour of the States. Joint presentations by the management team and the 
trade unions were made at each site, even those buried deep in the Scottish highlands 
and on remote islands, like Laphroaig. They were given to 20-30 employees at a 
time in the larger sites. The joint panel explained the whole agenda and the specifics, 
and then fielded questions. In addition, further ‘breakout!’ sessions allowed groups 
of employees the chance to challenge managers and directors on the terms of the 
deal. The company planned for forty such sessions per week. Shop stewards were 
released from their duties to explain the details. According to union officials, they 
received far more "grief’ than the company managers, but among the key players 
there was considerable personal support and encouragement. The company 
conducted exit polls and returned to wavering constituencies to present again. The 
joint platform was felt to be a contributing factor to workers’ eventual faith in the 
deal. This experience -  of a long and intense joint tour around Scotland, pitching 
themselves in front of often enraged groups of employees - cemented and 
augmented the deep personal levels of trust among the ‘key players’ (the managers 
and union officials).
The company magazine ‘Straight Talk’ led with the story of the partnership 
agreement, and the company liased with the town’s newspaper to sell the deal as a 
good thing for Dumbarton. The local MP publicly endorsed the agreement, and sent 
a letter to the homes of each employee urging them to support the deal. The 
company and trade unions had also sent a joint letter explaining the deal, and
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eventually a similar letter was sent to wives, husbands, partners and even friends of 
employees, urging them to persuade their partner of the need for change and the 
value of the proposed deal. This was not a popular move at the time, but was felt by 
management to be necessary. Finally, the company worked with the local college to 
run a course on partnership-style employee relations, and made the course available 
to interested employees.
The workforce verdict.
The AEEU took the deal to their open meeting, without a management presence (a 
strategy that had been agreed with the managers). Explained one shop steward: 
“There was still no trust from our members. I t ’s historical: workloads had gone up, 
there had been some de-manning and our members felt undervalued. Plus, the 
engineers have always been a 'bolshie’ bunch! So we didn ’t invite them [managers]. 
But we thought we could sell it to our members on our own. The workforce realised 
there had to be some changes, and we said that basic pay was going up, and there 
would be multi-skilling and training. We told them we'd done our best ”. An almost 
unanimous show of hands signalled that union’s support for the deal.
The GMB members resisted the original text of ‘Change Agenda’, because of the 
company’s insistence on transferring production workers from weekly pay over to 
monthly salary. The managers misjudged the distress and anger that this seemingly 
peripheral element set off within the workforce, despite numerous union warnings. 
In the end, the text was rewritten, offering existing employees the choice between 
weekly or monthly pay, while tying new recruits to the more cost-efficient monthly 
system. With the revised clause receiving a huge cheer when it was read out in one 
bottling hall (shop steward), the agreement was endorsed by 75% in a ballot. On the 
subject of the dissenting 25% the HR Director responded pragmatically that there is 
“not enough time to try and convince everyone”. One union official for the 
production workers concurred, accepting that “20% o f those members that voted 
‘No ’ would have done so regardless o f the deal on offer! ” Two production managers 
pointed to “ingrained attitudes” in the west of Scotland, with one feeling that 
expectations of a “total win” are “naive”. Intriguingly, there is some confusion 
about whether there were two ballots, or only one, for the GMB workforce. The 
union insists that the deal was rejected in a first ballot; the management recalls only
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one ballot, after the amendment on monthly pay. The signing of the deal, staged in 
the hotel where the talks had taken place, happened on 24 January 1997.
Partnership’ at WhiskyCo: ‘Change Agenda’.
The deal comprised a joint commitment to the classic ‘partnership’ trade-off: an 
agreement to a whole raft of flexible work practices in exchange for guaranteed 
employment security for everyone remaining after the voluntary redundancy 
programme, which involved 221 phased over three years. The reduced headcount 
and flexible work practices would lower costs and improve company profits, in turn 
helping to sustain employment in WhiskyCo sites: “Failure to achieve the savings 
will directly affect the viability o f WhiskyCo ”, the introduction warned.
The deal saw the end of demarcation at a stroke; employee workloads would be 
determined by ability only, within health and safety restrictions. The company 
committed to extensive skills training and education for all workers at a total cost of 
almost £2m. Operators have been trained to know every machine on their line, and 
even to repair any machine (up to 24volts), and some employee involvement 
initiatives have given staff an increased taste for learning new skills and undertaking 
training: “they've really enjoyed it and want more” (shop steward). However, 
company-wide and especially among the engineers, the skills training has proved 
difficult to implement. Five years on from ‘Change Agenda’ multi-skilling has yet to 
be fully realised.
The company also bestowed upon production workers at the huge Kilmalid plant a 
system of self-managed break times, which has since become an extraordinary 
battleground (see below).
Nobody lost out in terms of money; in fact, everyone’s salary increased from 
between 1 and 18%, depending on a skill appraisal. While the discrepancy in pay 
increases angered those who did less well, one shop steward felt that, relative to the 
local labour market and the whisky industry, “nobody can say they 're hard done by, 
or have poor terms and conditions A series of lump sum bonuses was staggered at 
different stages over the three years, once the changes had been effected. Everyone 
moved to staff status. The 32 pay grades among production staff were reduced to
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just four. A gainsharing committee implemented a 0.75% bonus dependent on 
overall company performance, but which was subsequently re-directed to reward 
low wastage figures. Finally, an investigation into the feasibility and effectiveness of 
profit-related pay was promised.
Partnership at WhiskyCo -  structures and practices.
To oversee the new arrangements the deal established a new joint union- 
management Steering Committee, and a complement of specially convened Project 
Teams. The Steering Committee was charged with the responsibility for offering 
advice, establishing policy and providing guidance to the project teams, and was 
heralded as “one o f the best ideas ” of the partnership programme, since “in the past 
it would have been a management initiative. It gave us an opportunity to find out 
what was going on” (AEEU shop steward). The Steering Committee was to 
comprise no more than nine members (three convenors, three full-time officials, and 
three company Directors). It would act as the final forum for managing disputes 
arising out of Change Agenda. Said the GMB convenor in the People Management 
article (26 March 1998): “It was quite a chance for the company to take but it 
showed the amount o f trust they were prepared to put in the trade unions For one 
production manager, the engagement by the unions demonstrated to sceptical 
colleagues the value of unions; that “they can help [the business] rather than hinder
• i  99It .
In the event, the Steering Committee faded in significance the longer the change 
process went on with few major problems. Its work has now been subsumed into the 
joint project teams that have been variously set the task of resolving issues 
surrounding the up-skilling of production workers, the multi-skilling of the 
engineers, the possible profit-related pay scheme, and the problem of the cyclical 
nature of the business. These continue to meet. Consultation is now largely ad hoc, 
as and when required, and typically confined to the key players, or their delegated 
representatives.
The negotiations over ‘Change Agenda’, the implementation, and the Steering 
Committee had also brought the GMB and AEEU into a common forum working
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together for the first time, in spite of some long-held reservations about each other’s 
interpretation of what constituted a union’s role in the company.
The unions say they are now much more involved in the business decisions that 
affect their members, and according to a key production manager have become 
“much more proactive ” in the decision-making process, becoming engaged in the 
planning and process improvements when previously this would have been regarded 
as the sole terrain of managers. The GMB, for example, is now "consulted over 
everything” (senior union official). In fact, according to the disgruntled engineers’ 
union, the company’s formal consultation processes have to some extent been 
rendered subject to the increasingly close working relationships between the GMB 
convenor and plant management, ironically mirroring the arrangements deemed 
unsatisfactory prior to 1995. (See ‘Analysis’ below.) Describing life as a shop 
steward post-‘Change Agenda’, a GMB steward outlined how he now attends 
regular meetings with management, and has been closely involved in drawing up 
plans for training and production. The company delegated full responsibility to him 
for the induction of temporary employees at the Dumbarton bottling hall. Some 
employees have been involved in decisions regarding new equipment purchases.
As part of the constant benchmarking against rivals, and best performing companies, 
WhiskyCo initiated a series of Joint Reviews. This involved its maturation 
processes, its transport division, and its security staff. The joint Transport Review 
was the first time that many of the firm’s 40-odd drivers had been asked for 
suggestions for improving their performance, and they produced pages of ideas, 
including an unprecedented move to annualised hours, as well as simple logistical 
amendments to travel routes. When benchmarked against rival bids, the internal 
scheme won. The Maturation review was much more controversial. External 
consultants reported that twice the productivity was possible with half the staff 
numbers. The changes to practices were agreed in joint working parties, and 
presented jointly, but nevertheless were far from popular in what has always been a 
unique and “dissident ” part of the business (Company communications). The cost 
reductions did indeed necessitate half of the maturation workforce losing their jobs, 
although all were secured voluntarily and a ‘labour pool’ agreement was established. 
Work, which managers conceded was already “cold, shitty, and tough”, has
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undoubtedly intensified: "the guys are busting a gut there”, admitted one HR 
respondent. The men at the Dumbuck site have sought to retain as much control over 
their work as possible, and resist directly management edicts, and a production 
manager felt that only compliance had been secured, rather than enduring 
commitment to the changes. But productivity has increased from 2.8 casks per 
person per hour to 9 per hour. The extensive selection process and training for the 
new team leaders have reaped their rewards, according to one who works there. The 
review process is ongoing. The company’s security staff could not secure the cost 
reductions required of them, and they were outsourced in 2000 with, according to 
HR, a very good compensation package written into the new terms and conditions 
under TUPE.
WhiskyCo operates a Sharesave scheme that allows employees to buy a stake in the 
future of the company. There is a 20% discount available to staff. Around 80% of 
employees have taken advantage of the scheme.
The company has a wide-ranging and innovative communications strategy, 
including an internal television station, and the use of a freelance journalist who 
interviews staff for the monthly in-house newspaper, ‘Straight Talk’, named after the 
former MD’s keynote speech in early 1996. The independence of ‘Straight Talk’ is 
appreciated by the shop floor, according to the shop stewards interviewed. The 
journalist sees his role as providing a "two-way communication, as much for the 
shop floor as for management” (Company communication). Briefings are almost 
always jointly worded and endorsed - a production manager revealed that "any 
communication” to the workforce at his site "now involves the unions” -  and 
cascaded with colour-coding, where ‘red’ requires the line to be stopped, while the 
more usual ‘green’ missives are disseminated weekly. There is also an annual 
workshop for employees representing each site. 600 people attended in 2000. The 
MD also undertakes an annual roadshow to all 20 production sites. In January 2000 
WhiskyCo secured Investors in People accreditation.
The future? Sustainability.
The ‘Change Agenda’ deal was an "enabler” (production manager), a framework 
for "getting what has to be done, done and... a jointly agreed method for doing so”.
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When interviewed in the summer of 2000 the then HR Director recognised that 
difficult commercial decisions were imminent. Consolidation and discarding of 
brands among the industry rivals, and a putative merger with one, fuelled a sense of 
uncertainty. But he professed himself “socially committed to protecting employment 
in the area ”. The then MD agreed: “Future success depends on how we deal with 
this uncertainty, especially when working with people who have been brought up to 
expect that senior managers have all the answers. But ‘partnership ’ is definitely the 
general direction in which we are heading. ”
The terms of ‘Change Agenda’ were endorsed a second time in early 2000, 
extending the employment security guarantee for a further year to 2002, and then 
again in 2001 to January 2003, albeit after a hiatus when the unions were asked to 
postpone this demand until the turbulence in the spirits industry settled (and, 
interestingly, after senior WhiskyCo managers had needed “a bit o f convincing” -  
hinting that perhaps employment security is not viewed, by managers at least, as a 
pre-requisite ‘building block’ of partnership but something to be bargained and 
traded). This has meant five years of employment security through a promise of no 
compulsory redundancies, and jointly managed manpower levels. For the GMB’s 
chief negotiator the ongoing employment security is worth ‘‘an extra 1-2% on top o f 
pay” to his members, and in a quote in ‘Straight Talk’ he argued that the changes to 
production could proceed ‘‘without any disruption for wage negotiations” -  an 
indication of his union’s concern for business priorities. The 2000 pay deal, a two- 
year agreement (a 3% increase in the first year; an increase linked to the Retail Price 
Inflation figure in the next) was endorsed two-to-one by the AEEU, and 74% of the 
GMB voted to accept. (It is noteworthy that four years into the ‘partnership’ era 
union members’ voting inclinations had barely shifted.) One of the convenors is 
examining disparities in pay awards in the forthcoming [2002] wage round. There is 
a ‘‘two-tier system ”, with managers receiving on average 9% salary increases while 
production workers last received a 2.3% rise. ‘‘The disparities create a ‘them and 
us’... it stinks”. It would be fascinating to return to WhiskyCo to learn how this 
debate fared under the strictures of partnership principles.
The closure in January 2001 of three sites, and the £20m move to Kilmalid’s 
purpose-built, fully integrated bottling manufacturing and office complex, was
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achieved with only a few teething problems. Senior managers interviewed are 
unanimous that this would not have happened without the buy-in secured with the 
‘Change Agenda’ agreement. According to the then MD, “the workforce's 
‘philosophical' support for the move was crucial". (A production manager recalled 
a round of applause greeting the announcement made by senior managers -  this in 
spite of some job losses.)
In March 2001, following deliberations in joint working parties, Kilmalid introduced 
a permanent nightshift to increase its productive capacity, on a voluntary basis, 
although this has still not been well received by the engineers, who prefer their 
overtime premia.
And yet despite the sophistication of the policies and practices in place, and the 
substantial investment secured from the parent, the WhiskyCo partnership is 
potentially under threat. Whispers of discontent, among the engineers in particular, 
were heard in the summer of 2000, during my first round of interviews: “The 
partnership is not working, we need to revive it" (AEEU shop steward). Managers 
with too much to do and too little time had prioritised other work matters, it seemed, 
but also the unions had “let it [partnership] slip ” to the point where relations were 
“getting dangerous”. The senior union representatives at the time would not 
elaborate further, as they had yet to meet with WhiskyCo’s managers to outline his 
concerns.
When I returned a year later relations had deteriorated for three main reasons:
1. Several of the key players during the ‘Change Agenda’ era had left
2. The GMB and the AEEU had “fallen out ”, and
3. A potential “battle " loomed over the issue of self-managed breaks at Kilmalid.
Taking each in turn, as indicated above, the partnership had been built on the 
exceptionally close working and personal relationships formed among the key 
players, from both the management and the main unions. These relationships had 
developed to such an extent that the joint problem solving and candid information 
sharing had become a kind of ‘second nature’. A powerful trust had been 
established. The success of the move to Kilmalid saw three of the chief managerial
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architects of the move, and of the partnership -  the Managing Director, HR Director, 
and the HR manager -  transferred away to other positions within the parent. At the 
time of the second round of interviews, no successors were in place in any of the 
positions, save for a stopgap acting HR Director. In addition, the senior AEEU 
official retired due to ill health, leaving his deputy with what he himself described as 
“a poisoned chalice” working as the replacement. He put the predicament 
succinctly: “The partnership was formed by different people to those in here now”. 
His GMB counterpart, who has remained in position, described the consequent state 
of affairs following the key departures as “a void... turbulent... a wavering ship”.
In late 2001 WhiskyCo was awaiting the arrival of a new Managing Director, with 
cautious optimism mingling with trepidation about the future direction that the new 
leader might take in industrial relations. The GMB had asked him directly for his 
support for partnership, and received affirmation, but judgement is suspended.
Although the ‘Change Agenda’ period had led to the unions working closer together, 
with management, it had always been an uneasy alliance. The departure of the 
AEEU convenor, and his replacement with a reluctant heir who is rather less 
combative than his GMB counterpart, has seriously damaged inter-union 
relationships. Slights and public criticisms have been exchanged, and they now do 
not speak to each other. Only rarely will they attend the same meetings, reversing 
the single-table arrangements secured during ‘Change Agenda’. The closeness of the 
GMB to managers, and one official in particular, galls the engineers. The extent of 
collaboration between the GMB and the managers also means that, in the eyes of the 
AEEU, if managers reach agreement with the GMB, then agreement with other 
unions and constituencies is assumed as a virtual fait accompli. “The AEEU is 
standing just outside the door now ”.
The story of the self-managed breaks at Kilmalid is a compelling insight into what 
happens when partnership relations come up against a serious conflict of interest 
between the managers and the employees. At the time of ‘Change Agenda’ 
management agreed to let production workers in the bottling halls manage their own 
break times, known as the ‘minutes’ system or ‘self-managed breaks’. What has 
materialised as a self-managed system is that teams organise their work so that one
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team member, in rotation, takes a break for up to 20 minutes in the hour while her/ 
his colleagues double up to take her/ his position on the line. There is no detriment 
to production quantity or quality, and no health and safety implications, and the 
system can allow employees to take breaks amounting to two and a half hours a day 
(production manager).
Needless to say, the employees love the system; it is “their last family jewel ” (HR 
manager). But, unsurprisingly, managers seeking continuous productivity 
improvements want to “tackle it”. (The booming cackle of one particular female 
production worker enjoying her break in the canteen below the managers’ open-plan 
offices is clearly grating their nerves...)
A joint working party has met to discuss the issue, in which managers were advised, 
“don’t touch it... i f  you want a battle you'll get it” (production union official) since 
resistance would be severe: “The union has bonded on this issue, we have renewed 
strength The GMB suggested the company look instead at quality control of their 
suppliers, etc, as a more fruitful source of efficiencies. At one stage the regional 
officer was called in, and threatened industrial action if managers sought to remove 
the system. The company backed down.
The issue has soured the industrial relations atmosphere, and according to the senior 
union official, destroyed what trust had been built up between the workforce and 
managers, though not between himself and the managers he negotiates with. The 
‘breaks’ issue is in delicate balance -  a “stalemate”, but “people know it's 
coming... ” as one manager put it -  with the managers keen to “retain control [over 
production]", as one admitted, but both union and management alike conscious of 
the fact that were the GMB to surrender the hugely popular system, it would 
effectively “disenfranchise” one of the most powerful advocates for the partnership 
approach, and the process would lose much of its impetus among production staff. 
Hence, stalemate.
One could argue that this demonstrates a mature appreciation of the limits of 
partnership relations. But, it seems more likely from the evident determination of the 
management team to “tackle” the ‘breaks’ system head-on, over and above
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addressing other areas for improvement, that this relatively minor issue may yet cost 
the goodwill o f its staff. It is not clear who would win the subsequent battle, but the 
GMB does not fear strike action if necessary, and sees it not as the end of 
partnership, but as a tool to reinforce adherence to the partnership’s principles 
(senior union official).
Case study 1 -  WhiskyCo. Analysis section: Partnership.
In this section I first examine the extent to which the people management practices 
within WhiskyCo coincide with the IPA partnership model. I then go on to discuss 
how the partnership developed, relating its progress to the model in Figure 4, and 
then I assess the nature o f the partnership arrangements.
Table 6 indicates that ‘Change Agenda’, and its amended follow-ups, constitutes a 
partnership agreement:
Table 6 -  Partnership at WhiskyCo.
Partnership element Present?
Joint commitment to the success of the enterprise ©
Recognition of the legitimate interests of each party ©
Building trust-based relationships ©
Increasing employee involvement ?
Extensive information sharing ©
Consultation with employees at workplace and organisational level ©
Employment security provisions (in exchange for flexible work
practices)
©
Sharing the success of the enterprise ©
Principles.
The text o f the ‘Change Agenda’ makes explicit the ambition for both the 
management team and the workforce to work toward achieving success in the future, 
and the numerous quotes from senior members in each of the main constituencies -  
WhiskyCo, and the three unions -  endorse the joint approach as being one founded 
on constructive industrial relations and trust-building. However, there are signs of 
the partnership principles rubbing up uncomfortably against conflicting commercial 
imperatives, and facing contrary attitudes in certain interpersonal relationships.
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Practices.
Throughout the negotiation of the ‘Change Agenda’ agreement, the management 
team shared sensitive commercial and strategic information with the recognised 
trade unions. Indeed, it could be argued that this precipitated the successful 
conclusion at the end of the fourth round of discussions on partnership.
The unions, especially the GMB at Kilmalid, are consulted extensively across a 
much wider agenda of workplace issues. Another feature is the succession of 
extensions to the employment security guarantee, and the peaceful management of 
the reduction in headcount following ‘Change Agenda’.
Finally, in terms of sharing success, all employees received a salary increase as a 
consequence of the partnership deal, as well as staggered bonuses and gainsharing 
bonuses, and the option of participating in the company’s share option scheme.
What remains contentious perhaps is the quality of shopfloor employee involvement 
within WhiskyCo. The multi-skilling programme has only yielded partial successes, 
and other initiatives appear rather patchy in implementation. There remains a 
concern that the partnership and involvement is restricted to certain key individuals 
(see below).
Analysis: the nature of partnership at WhiskyCo.
Reflecting on the general conduct of industrial relations and the attitudes now 
exhibited within WhiskyCo, key players and affected parties interviewed used 
similar metaphorical devices to describe the transformation since 1996: "chalk and 
cheese”, “night and day”, etc. It “turned [WhiskyCo’s] world upside down” (HR 
manager). Relations are “unrecognisable” from four years previous (senior 
manager). The terms of the agreement “took a lot o f the threats away: no 
compulsory redundancies, no losers, the importance o f the employees... It 
demonstrated trust” (senior manager). See below for further analysis of 
respondents’ interpretations of the shifts in trust levels, and of the nature of trust- 
based relations.
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Partnership enjoys widespread -  but not total, and in places minimal - approval 
within WhiskyCo; it seems optimistic to claim, as did one of the union convenors, 
that everybody “recognises the value o f the [partnership] route”. That said, few 
would dispute the view of the then HR Director that partnership helped deliver the 
long-term stability of the company: “The investment scale [from the parent, notably 
the Kilmalid site] would have been impossible without partnership, it would never 
have been authorised. [‘Change Agenda’] guaranteed industrial relations stability... 
and there is long-term employment stability there i f  they work at it... There is no 
other sensible route [for all parties] ” The unions agreed: “Partnership protects the 
site. The workforce attitude is that i f  we hadn’t done partnership we wouldn ’t be 
here... With partnership we can compete” (senior union official).
Asked to reflect on what partnership means, a senior union official offered 
“communication, working together, sit down and discuss a problem - how to solve 
it”. Partnership is, for one (since departed) production manager, “the only way to do 
business. I t ’s not easy, it’s not to be undertaken lightly, and it needs tangible results. 
You have to be open and honest, and to develop trust-building relationships ”. The 
same manager could nevertheless see how partnership threatens the position of shop 
stewards, and argued that “you cannot afford to drop them... and never compromise 
them”. The former HR Director revealed that this uncovers one of partnership’s 
blind-spots; that there remain “fundamentally different agendas at work [between 
employer and employees], and you cannot expect groups to take partnership beyond 
their own interests... There is a ‘greater good’programme, but there’s a limit to it, 
and points beyond which the unions cannot go. You cannot expect it to go on 
forever... I f  the company oversteps ‘reasonableness’ then it de-legitimises the 
partnership and it breaks down.” He declined to speculate on where these 
parameters of acceptable compromise might fall, but condemned transgressions on 
the part of managers as “madness”. However, a comment from a current senior 
union official for the AEEU illuminated the range of retaliatory options available to 
the unions in response to a managerial ‘defection’. When asked why his union no 
longer presented more substantial pay claims, he explained that his members would 
now not allow militancy if it threatened the long-term viability of employment. (This 
may be because this official is, as indicated above, a reluctant and not especially
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militant leader.) More assertive countervailing tactics would thus seem limited for 
the unions.
However, WhiskyCo has seen instead evidence of sly resistance from the employees 
and unions that still retains compliance with partnership principles: ‘constructive’ 
questioning of managerial plans, challenges to the content of policy and practice, or 
evoking delaying reviews of policy. Some powerful employee groups have also 
orchestrated their own independent resistance (including one production shift co­
ordinating their annual leave for the same day -  something that was unlikely to have 
been a coincidence).
Everyone involved is aware that the partnership is not set in stone: "You ve got to 
work at partnership, to keep going. You cannot let it stall” (union official). The then 
Managing Director also cautioned against the assumption that partnership 
immediately eliminates conflict, and that "everybody is happy now ”.
Witness the company’s attempts to quantify elusive qualities such as improvements 
to employee morale and feelings of employment security. Gallup was commissioned 
to conduct workforce attitude surveys, and results early in the life of ‘Change 
Agenda’ point to heightened perceptions of employment security, and greater pride 
in working for the company. However, the transient nature of employee relations 
threw up negative results, as well, including low levels of trust among the 
workforce. The HR manager elaborated: “Results can tend to reflect what has just 
happened in the company. And the measures can be imprecise: when an employee 
says they don’t trust their manager, do they mean their team leader, their line 
manager, their divisional head, or the Board?” The findings however are 
illustrative; see the conclusions below.
The joint presenters at the 1999 IP A conference set out the following as lessons 
learned:
“Be sensitive to employees' feelings. Treat one another as adults, being 
honest and open. Trade unions are a resource. Recognise that management don’t 
have all the answers. Identify best practice, and be creative. Maximise employee 
involvement in the project. Use creative communication. Build trust and reduce 
fear”.
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Many of these echo the recommendations from the academic research.
Analysis: progress toward partnership and trust.
WhiskyCo’s experience of partnership corresponds closely with the model outlining 
progress toward trust that I have put forward in this thesis. Prior to 1995, it was a 
successful and complacent business whose adversarial style of conducting industrial 
relations had a tolerable impact on operations and profitability. There was, as most 
respondents volunteered, “no trust whatsoever”. Factors contributing to this 
negative state of affairs were held to be the cultural peculiarities of the region -  the 
workers of the west of Scotland being traditionally militant -  but also managerial 
preference for command-and-control, and the lack of employee involvement and 
even the marginalisation of elected shop stewards in discussions over work matters. 
All of them exacerbated the mutual suspicions. The partnership at WhiskyCo began 
from ‘square one’.
The catalyst for change was not a crisis as such, but certainly a potentially serious 
threat to the viability of the company. The parent designated each site as a cost 
centre, and created internal competition among the sites for investment. The difficult 
new circumstances and the implications for ways of working were explained by the 
most senior management, who stressed the imperative of change: "enlarging the 
shadow o f the future”, in Axelrod’s term. New key players arrived (management 
side) or emerged (unions’ side), providing an opportunity for a new approach to 
industrial relations.
Thus, the conditions were in place for the “entry into talks” (la), but for the first 
three attempts the management side failed to initiate trust-building or collaborative 
processes. On the first occasion, prior to the arrival of the ‘new breed’, managers’ 
lack of organisation and ill-judged secretiveness over their agenda, while claiming 
publicly that they had none, demonstrated dishonesty and inconsistency, and 
undermined efforts. For the second attempt, now under the direction of some among 
the new breed, lack of information (doing little to ease people’s anxieties) and the 
distraction of pay talks (inhibiting attention on the development of new attitudes and 
behaviours) distracted and stalled the initiative. For the third attempt the managers 
used inappropriate methods -  “more HR than IR ” -  that confused and alienated the 
union reps, and heightened suspicions. At no stage did the unions feel confident in
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taking the ‘leap of faith’ into talks. The conduct of the fourth attempt fitted more 
appropriately with the industrial relations culture; it was not novel and strange, and 
thus unnerving. Paradoxically, the blunt, ‘no-nonsense’ manner of the main 
managerial representative appealed to the unions more than the ‘pseudo- 
collaborative’ “HR” methods tried previously. The transparent ground rules and the 
pressurised sealed environment of the hotel also helped spur the common search for 
solutions, it seems. However, most respondents cited the sharing of sensitive 
information about the business and its prospects as a key factor in moving the talks 
onto a common, joint agenda (as recommended by Walton and McKersie, Axelrod 
and Whitener and colleagues -  “communication
The fact that the problem-solving talks secured an early and significant ‘joint win’ -  
the agreed exchange of an employment security for the introduction of flexible work 
practices - was also instrumental in demonstrating the mutuality that partnership 
could potentially offer (2a). This was in line with Walton and McKersie’s, and 
indeed Whitener et al’s, call for joint problem solving/ sharing of control and 
Axelrod’s “practice reciprocity” principle. A further enabling ‘joint win’ came with 
the promise that no employee would lose out financially, by signing up to the new 
flexible regime. As these joint wins materialised, and each party’s behaviour became 
more consistent and more predictable, it is clear that this galvanised the quality of 
the talks, and confirmed the viability of the joint problem solving that, previously, 
had been greeted with suspicion.
The ‘Change Agenda’ needed the clear endorsement of the workforce in order to 
have any legitimacy, and to this end WhiskyCo’s decision, with the unions, to allow 
sufficient time for ordinary employees to have a significant input into the final 
wording of the agreement accorded the final text this validity. Their representatives 
may have made the ‘leap of faith’ into the talks and produced a partnership, but the 
staff had yet to begin the process. The extensive information sharing, across a wide 
range of mediums, alleviated concerns for the workforce. But it was the amendment 
to hourly pay that, according to a senior official in the GMB, demonstrated crucial 
trust. Explained one of their senior negotiators: “I  said to them, ‘where’s the trust? ’ 
You need to show good faith here’. So they relented”. The HR manager viewed the 
incident rather differently: “It showed that we were prepared to listen, and it was no
176
big deal in the grand scheme o f things Allowing the AEEU to present the deal to 
their members without a contribution from management might also be said to have 
demonstrated trust (2b), as an HR manager claimed. Requesting a management 
presence could of course have equally been a monitoring tool, and so indicative of a 
weak trust.
What is intriguing about this case study is the deterioration in relations in 2001, for 
the reasons outlined above. This has clear implications for the robustness of the 
partnership, and the trust-based relations, not least of which is the question, between 
whom does the partnership/ trust exist? And, to what extent is the partnership/ trust 
reliant on certain individuals closely involved in the process from the outset, or to 
what extent can an organisation inculcate a widespread ‘partnership’ culture? The 
damage to organisation-wide trust levels from the row over self-managed breaks 
also highlights the susceptibility of partnership’s principles to issue-specific 
conflict? Is partnership illusory/ a ‘false consciousness’, the fragility of which is 
exposed by the first serious disagreement?
Case study 1 -  WhiskyCo. Analysis section: Trust.
I returned to WhiskyCo to interview six respondents, selected by myself. I had 
already interviewed five of them for the narrative section. (The exception was the 
acting HR manager who had been absent for the narrative round of interviews.) 
Each was shown the degrees of trust diagram set out in the Methodology chapter, 
and given enough time to read and digest the implications of each definition before 
offering their thoughts. (I turned the tape recorder off to prevent any anxiety that the 
long silence being recorded may have caused.)
In this section I discuss the respondents’ appraisal of the degrees of trust present 
within the organisation, with their explanations and justifications for their analysis, 
including any evidence provided in support of their assertions. Where any were 
offered, I discuss the respondents’ own definitions or commentary on the nature of 
trust at work, and also their thoughts on what might assist in the development of 
trust at work, and what might constrain or threaten it. Their responses are captured 
in Table 7 below.
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Before I discuss the views captured in Table 7, a valuable finding from this case 
study is that many of the respondents in the first-round interviews offered the notion 
of ‘trust’ as a critical determinant of the changes in employment relations. This is 
valuable because in the first round of interviews I deliberately tried not to engage the 
interviewee in a discussion on trust, unless they raised it first. For example, a 
convenor from the period considered that the experience of ‘Change Agenda’ “built 
up trust: what management said they delivered: on training, everything ”. An AEEU 
shop steward suggested that trust necessitated “a leap o f faith But the 
“approachability o f the managers, and the open forums, helped to contribute [to the 
development of trust].” This “management adequacy”, to quote another shop 
steward, is considered vital to embody and demonstrate the joint working and trust: 
“They need to be able to carry the trust though, to ‘defeat ’ the shopfloor [with 
trust]”. Trust for this rep comes, in the first instance, during the honest briefings, 
which have increased reps’ appreciation of the company’s commercial situation, and 
of the necessary efficiencies. “We know we’re not going to get any crap, and that we 
will be listened to... I f  there is a business need for change, and it’s explained to us, 
then it becomes a question o f how to present it [to the members] ”. A senior union 
official commended managers for their changed attitudes: “they know how to speak 
to people now”. Managerial competence in their own job - a sense of 
professionalism - engenders a degree of trust through exhibiting consistent 
behaviours, argued one shop steward.
Similar reflection on the need for a consistent approach to management came from a 
production manager: “Nothing speaks louder than actions. I f  you say you 7/ do it, do 
it”. But this takes time and effort, and an AEEU representative conceded that often 
managers “don’t have enough time to come back to the idea ”, especially if their 
performance appraisal is very demanding. The then MD -  who had been transferred 
overseas by the time of the second round -  provided an insight into the depth of the 
trust secured among the key players, when he said that he could trust one of the most 
active senior union officials “completely. His agenda is mine. When he demands 
well-paid, skilled and committed employees, that’s what I  want” -  a view clearly 
reminiscent of identification-based trust. But he counselled against pushing any 
partnership too hard, too fast. He recommended parties “listen to each other”, and 
try to create “commonality ” as a process for achieving mutual trust.
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The depth of reflection on trust struck me as being deeper within WhiskyCo than in 
any of the other case studies. Although I have only my own impressions informing 
my appraisal of why this should be the case, I would nevertheless suggest that this is 
in part due to the dramatic shift in the quality o f trust-based relations; put simply, 
respondents have experience o f relations at the opposite end of the trust spectrum 
with which to compare and contrast the new relations. Sophisticated reflection on 
what trust involves comes from just such a comparison with its opposite. Another 
reason is that ‘trust’ has been extensively debated within WhiskyCo during the 
course of the partnership since 1996.
1 0
Table 7 -  WhiskyCo respondents on trust continuum.
BEFORE 
P ’SHIP 
(< 1995).
AT
P’SHIP
(1996).
AFTER
P ’SHIP
(>1996).
2001.
HR DIRECTOR 
(1996-01)
I-b/T I-b/T;
K-b/T;
[D-b/T]
HR MANAGER 
(1995-01)
D-b/T R-b/T to I-b/T; 
K-b/T
- K-b/T (?)
HR MANAGER 
(1998-01)
- - - R-b/T; 
C-b/T to K-b/T
UNION CONVENOR 
(1995-01)
- [R-b/T] - R-b/T;
D-b/T
SHOP STEWARD 
(1993-01)/ UNION 
CONVENOR (2001)
D-b/T C-b/T K-b/T C-b/T;
D-b/T
PRODUCTION 
MANAGER (1996-01)
[D-b/T] - - K-b/T to R-b/T; 
C-b/T to K-b/T
The semi-colons separate respondents’ comments on the nature of different 
relationships at work. I discuss them below.
Each of the respondents in the final round of interviews expounded at length on the 
nature of trust, and what sustains and damages it. Taking each in turn, the HR 
Director, one of the chief architects of the deal, argued passionately in the first 
interview that “partnership is based on trust. Without trust there can be no 
partnership. ” Presented with the continuum of degrees of trust, he not unreasonably 
rejected the implied linear progression and pointed out that there are many different
38 KEY: D-b/ T = deterrence-based trust; C-b/T = calculus-based trust; K-b/T = knowledge-based
trust; R-b/ T = relational-based trust; I-b/ T = identification-based trust.
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employer-employee relationships present in a workplace. Thus, while he had, around 
the time of agreeing the ‘Change Agenda’ deal, built identification-based trust with 
the key players -  even, he confirmed when challenged, to the extent that interests 
had converged and blurred - he felt that he could probably have only elicited 
knowledge-based trust from the workforce as a whole, post-‘Change Agenda’, and 
that a minority of employees would not have trusted him at all... “But i t’s bound to 
be that way in a large business ”. Because trust comes from observed experience of 
an individual on a one-to-one basis ( “you don’t tend to trust someone on hearsay, 
but by what they do”, he argued), “the workforce only sees your reactions [as a 
manager] in a limited number o f circumstances, but others [i.e.: in this case, the key 
industrial relations players] see you in a range o f circumstances ”. Thus, he accepted 
that perhaps the trust is only forged between the key players: “In reality, what 
you’ve done [with a partnership agreement] is convince a finite group o f people to 
work with you ”. Returning to the exceptionally strong relations with the key players, 
he distinguished between partnership as a “tactic” and as a “value”, and felt that the 
exhausting and intense process of establishing partnership meant that “you couldn’t 
sustain it without fundamentally believing in it”. Removed from WhiskyCo now, he 
worried about the consequences for workforce attitudes of something going wrong: 
“My gut-feel is that we’ve only moved [them] a fraction along the way” [toward 
either calculus-based or knowledge-based trust].
The HR manager at the time of ‘Change Agenda’ (1995-01), also since transferred 
away, echoed these concerns. He too considered that among the key players trust 
had developed to either relational-based or identification-based quality, because 
these individuals “were immersed in the process”. He acknowledged that line 
managers might have seen the key players becoming “too close ”, but he branded 
this “mutual respect” [rather than collusion]. In the first set of interviews he had 
argued: “Trust, for me, is knowing that the unions won’t abuse it when we share 
sensitive information with them. This is not a 100% risk, we can be quietly confident 
now that they won’t, but we needed to spend time building up the trust, to confirm 
that we could rely [on them].” He explained that he had tested the union officials by 
disclosing something in confidence, to see if he heard it from another source at a 
later date. (The unions did the same with the managers.) In the follow-up interview, 
as can be seen from Table 7, he reiterated that partnership is “built on a bedrock o f
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trust”, but he was rather more cautious second time around: trust is “fragile” too. 
Although he left in early 2001, he speculated from rumours -  accurately, it would 
seem - that relations might have reverted to a less powerful degree of trust (though 
still optimistic at ‘knowledge-based’). The several departures among the key 
players, and subsequent small-scale, unofficial conflicts had worsened relations. As 
with his Director (above), this also prompted reflection on whether the partnership/ 
trust was confined to relationships among the key players, and had not been 
established as a set of all-encompassing principles for governing how WhiskyCo 
conducts its employee relations: “It really shouldn’t make a difference [if the 
original ‘architects’ leave] i f  the process is bedded down and you use the 
[partnership] systems... ” But participants need to keep focussed on sustaining the 
application of partnership principles, lest either “entrenchment from a lack o f 
understanding” or “short-termism: winning the battles but losing the war” start to 
contaminate relations.
The incumbent HR manager, who had arrived two years after ‘Change Agenda*, 
commented only on present relations, judging that the quality of trust depended on 
whom she was working with. The manager enjoyed rather better relations with the 
convenor that she saw more often {“he trusts me completely”), suggesting that 
regular face-to-face interaction is a key determinant of trust. Consistent behaviour is 
also a factor: “We’re open and honest with each other, we’ll say \you’re talking 
bollocks’ and bring each other into our confidence, and I ’ve never ever said 
something and done something else”. On the shopfloor at Kilmalid however, this 
manager felt that workers might point to either calculus-based or knowledge-based 
trust, if asked to decide: “They see a degree o f co-operation, that decisions are not 
just taken for the business”. But, wariness and suspicion has soured relations, 
principally over the ‘breaks’ quarrel.
The GMB convenor agreed that he enjoyed relational-based trust with the managers 
with whom he is in daily contact: the HR manager and the production manager. He 
typified analysis of trust as behavioural consistency and integrity with the remark: 
“For me, [trust] is a case of, ‘the proof o f the pudding is in the eating’. Try them out, 
and if  they don’t let you down, you can trust them. ” However, he cautioned that trust 
requires timely and accurate communication: “The earlier I ’m told about something
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the quicker I  can react and influence my members, because at some stage news will 
get down to the shop stewards or the shop floor. Tell me late, and that’s where 
confrontation begins”. (One manager expressed gratitude for the GMB convenor: 
‘‘He fights a very good rearguard action to protect the partnership, but he cannot 
fully stem the tide... ”) I was unable, in the course of this interview, to solicit 
reflection on differing trust levels during the process of negotiating ‘Change 
Agenda’, but the content of his interviews suggests that he too enjoyed at least 
relational-based trust with the key management players during ‘Change Agenda’.
The interview with the other convenor, recently elected to the position within the 
AEEU, offered the only fully longitudinal assessment of shifts in trust. He described 
relations pre-1996 as “bleak”, conducted on the basis of deterrence. ‘Change 
Agenda’ challenged many of the company’s previous assumptions about union- 
management relations, and led to a calculus-based trust; a weak form, because “we 
[the unions] weren ’t used to trusting them [managers]”. Following ‘Change Agenda’ 
the union reps reached a state of knowledge-based trust, arising from “judging 
people by their actions ”. The positive agenda of the steering group, compared with 
more traditional grievance committees, moulded behaviours and attitudes; the joint 
problem solving processes, conducted “openly and above board”, and the 
(occasional) disclosure of sensitive commercial information, demonstrated both a 
willingness to trust, and to be trusted on the part of managers. Key individuals drove 
the partnership, however. When the HR manager left is when the “slippage ” began: 
“Partnerships tend to get built on personalities”, he concluded. In 2001, relations 
had indeed worsened for the AEEU, with the convenor’s personal relationships with 
managers back to calculus-based, decision-by-decision judgements ( “more reactive 
again ”) and his members feeling no trust whatsoever, having -  in their view -  been 
mistreated over the introduction of the nightshift, marginalised by alleged 
managerial preference for dealing with the GMB, and their professed 
disappointment at the failure of the multi-skilling programme: “Expectations had 
been raised and have been dampened again... trying to resurrect something is a 
tremendously difficult job. ” He has become much more cynical about the process, 
but not to the point where he has contemplated withdrawal of co-operation -  yet?
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Finally, the production manager, the person most directly affected on the company 
side from the fall-out over the ‘breaks’ system, betrayed contradictory thinking over 
both partnership and trust. It would seem that, while he might want to believe in it, 
and tries hard to believe in it, he remains at heart unconvinced. Although he arrived 
at the time of ‘Change Agenda’ he observed evidence of deterrence-based trust in 
union-management relations. This has since improved to, in his judgement, either 
knowledge-based or relational-based trust, “depending on the issue” -  the ‘breaks’ 
system doubtless uppermost in his mind. “Tactics shift according to the issue. We 
might aspire to [relational-based trust] because it makes change easier, but the 
communication takes longer. The thing is, do you manage a war o f attrition, or a 
partnership?” The workforce, he guessed, might respond less positively: calculus- 
based or knowledge-based, again depending on the issue. “We've not yet got the 
hearts and minds o f the employees ”, and impressions suggest that this is a long way 
from happening. He considered the partnership to be in need of a “rebirth ” based on 
a joint agenda on business improvement. Asked how he defined trust, he offered 
“being open and honest, being able to discuss difficulties... But is making difficult 
decisions seen by employees as a break in trust? ”
His comments underline the pressures of business, and the implications of 
competitive demands, jarring against partnership relationships; as the Director above 
observed, eventually relations will reach a Tine in the sand’. What then for 
partnership?
Conclusion.
The findings from this case study illustrate the dynamic nature of partnership, and of 
trust. The responses highlight considerable progress achieved among the key 
players, whose close personal interactions led to a converging of minds and agendas, 
and provided clear evidence of each player’s integrity and consistency. There is 
rather less evidence to suggest that the workforce as a whole went along with the 
enthusiasm of their representatives or managers, and on certain contentious issues 
the employees nurse ongoing and serious animosities. WhiskyCo is by no means one 
happy family now. It would seem that the partnership at WhiskyCo has been heavily 
dependent on the goodwill secured, on a personal level, among the key players. 
When many moved on, the process stalled, or even reversed, suggesting that a
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‘partnership ethos’ had not percolated throughout WhiskyCo. The comments from 
the unions also highlight the extent to which the conduct of relations on a 
partnership or trust basis might be issue-specific. In particular, the -  to my mind, 
either unnecessary or badly managed - row over the ‘breaks’ system has undone 
much of the positive outcomes secured through the ‘Change Agenda’ agreement. 
Perhaps an organisation’s partnership is, to paraphrase the old football manager 
cliche, “only as good as your last result
The WhiskyCo findings demonstrate what can be achieved through partnership. 
Relations have qualitatively improved, and helped to secure the long-term future of 
the company and employment for its workforce. But they also serve as a warning not 
to expect too much from partnership, and point up its inherent fragility.
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Chapter 6.
Case study 2 -  EngineParts. Narrative section.
I  first met two representatives (one of the two plant managers, and the works convenor) 
from EngineParts in April 2000 to secure access. The first week of interviews took place in 
August that year. I  returned in July 2001 to conclude my follow-up interviews.
Background.
EngineParts is the UK division of a US-owned multi-national, based in Chicago. 
The plant near Bridgend in south Wales manufactures automotive components and 
systems. Its status as a relatively small supplier to the major car manufacturers, and 
as a subsidiary of a foreign-owned multi-national, leaves EngineParts vulnerable not 
only to the customers’ demanding contracts, but also, often regardless of its own 
performance levels, to the cyclical and spontaneous commercial turbulence that 
afflicts the motor industry.
EngineParts currently employs around 200 employees at its plant in south Wales. 
Since a few years after its inception in the late 1960s it has recognised the main 
engineering unions; the staff union, ASTMS, declined in membership during the 
1980s, and no longer has a presence. Staff and shopfloor alike are now represented 
by a single-union recognition agreement with the AEEU (now part of Amicus).
In its early years the plant was organised hierarchically, with seven layers of 
management and supervision between the shopfloor and the Directors. The 
managers managed everything through a system of foremen and quality inspectors. 
The company only rarely sought employee involvement in decision-making, 
deploying instead “a traditional ‘only do what you are told to do’ work method” 
(shop steward).
Industrial relations was conducted in the Negotiating Committee in the British 
tradition: explicitly adversarial, with the territory between management’s 
prerogative and employees’ resistance -  co-ordinated by the very powerful unions - 
fought over on an almost daily basis, against a background of bountiful local 
employment. It was the expected role of the shop stewards to “oppose anything from 
managers -  no questioning o f the members, no reasoning, just opposition... We said 
we’d listen to them [i.e.: managers], but we wouldn’t. We’d just give our point o f 
view, which was the right point o f view, and then we’d say our point, and... turn
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management’s view around to suit our members. We had the District Secretary in 
every week” (then shop steward). Another shop steward recalled: “I f  management 
wanted any type o f change, the answer was ‘No ’. ” The union’s tactics were 
“rejection, disinterest, asking ‘why? ’ ” Managers felt that the unions effectively ran 
the plant, vetoing movement of members among the machines, etc. The shop 
stewards readily conceded the point: “We did run the plant, to a certain extent. We 
were too strong... and because o f our customers, whatever we said went” (then shop 
steward). Viewed in retrospect as the national mood of the time, but “especially in 
south Wales” (then shop steward), in the familiar parlance “a ‘them-and-us’ 
attitude” prevailed between managers and employees (manager; also an operative). 
“Trust was never, never there” (then shop steward). In its place was an all-pervasive 
assumption that each party was “out to screw the other” (then convenor). This was 
exacerbated by the high turnover of managers, who developed a reputation in the 
locality as ‘hirers and firers’ before moving on (manager). When it came to the 
annual pay bargaining union tactics were simple: “We were not interested in the 
profit and loss figures o f the company. We demanded 25%, knowing they couldn ’t 
afford anything like that much... and then we played the ‘percentage games’, and 
had a head-banging competition for about 5-6 weeks ” (then shop steward). While 
there were few strikes the threat of industrial action and use of overtime bans were 
both used regularly, and the workforce engaged in secondary action for the 1974 
miners’ strike. (Interestingly, however, most of the long-serving operatives 
interviewed for this case study did not recall such industrial relations mayhem in the 
early years, some even considering the union to have been moderate. The 
implications of this will be discussed in the ‘Analysis’ section on partnership.)
In spite of the apparently poor conduct of industrial relations, the plant flourished 
throughout the early 1970s. Its 1,700 employees were operating at close to 
maximum capacity, serving huge customers in a buoyant product market.
Events leading to ‘partnership’ (crisis 1).
There is no doubt among respondents that the partnership at EngineParts was bom 
amid crisis: “The need to fight for the future o f the business was the start o f the 
partnership ”, confirmed a present plant manager. A ‘sister’ plant in Letchworth had 
closed in 1980, and the Welsh site was now EngineParts’s last remaining European
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plant making its particular product. But when the anticipated penetration into 
European markets -  EngineParts’ raison-d’etre in the eyes of HQ -  failed to 
materialise, a new MD was despatched with a remit to introduce productivity 
improvements, or oversee the plant’s closure over three years.
The orders dried up, and the redundancy packages were agreed. The plant went into 
‘closure mode’. But, according to a conference presentation in 1997, it was the 536 
remaining employees who demanded that something be done to save the plant. This 
‘crossroads’ initiated a first tentative break with the old adversarial relations in 
favour of a burgeoning collaboration: it prompted "unprecedented co-operation ” 
(manager).
For key players on both sides, steeped in the traditions of adversarial industrial 
relations, this was very difficult. A catalyst for the new style of working, according 
to the then convenor, was the new MD’s insistence that he brief the workforce 
directly on the situation. His candid presentations explained to staff for the first time 
the state of the business. He set out the implications for the workforce of continuing 
as they were, and the prospects for the future if they prepared to permit dramatic 
changes to working practices. Initially, the union - long accustomed to secrecy - 
viewed this unilateral disclosure of sensitive information on the part of the 
management team with suspicion, and accordingly the convenor "tip-toed” into the 
more collaborative working relationship, "testing management’s words against their 
actions ”. But the new MD "demonstrated the strength o f his convictions ” (then 
convenor). He "generated... and demonstrated trust. We went from apportioning 
blame to face-to-face resolution ” (then shop steward). This included seeking out the 
unions’ opinions and arranging for joint benchmarking visits to research best 
practice elsewhere.
The relatively simple move of sharing information, being open and honest and 
calling, for the first time, for greater employee/ union input into the firm’s future 
plans demonstrated to the union representatives, and all but a few sceptical 
‘militants’ (or "dinosaurs”- then shop steward) that a trust-based engagement with 
the new managers was both feasible, and could even prove desirable. According to 
the joint conference presentation in 1997: "The ‘them-and-us ’ scenario and other
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strict working practices quickly disappeared... It was time for the barriers to come 
down. Management, the union and employees had to work together if the plant was 
to survive. The crisis gave us: a common vision - we are going to survive; a common 
aim - to keep the plant open, and what needed to be done - working together”.
‘Project Phoenix 536’; survival.
The jointly agreed plant-saving ‘Project Phoenix 536’ - so named after the number 
of remaining employees - demanded from the remaining employees “technical 
ability, flexibility and trust-based industrial relations” (then convenor). The last 
objective was supported by a six-year pay deal in 1985, described as "astonishing” 
in Bassett’s ‘Strike Free’ (Bassett, 1986: pp98-99). The deal was split into two parts, 
with set salary increases for the first three years, and a commitment to negotiable 
further increases in the second period subject to performance. Another objective -  to 
"write ‘redundancy’ out o f the company’s language” (then MD, in a conference 
presentation) -  was dropped, as events were likely to place it under intolerable 
strain. While under the obvious "duress” of potential plant closure, the deal 
stabilised pay issues, and thence, to a large extent, the plant’s industrial relations 
problems for the foreseeable future, and secured a wary commitment to the 
necessary changes in working practices. The plant’s then Personnel manager 
commented at the time, "We’re trying to get away from the concept o f competition 
between management and employees, and replace it with competition between 
ourselves and our competitors ” (Bassett, ibid).
An independent audit set out to learn whether the plant could be run more 
productively with fewer employees. The findings revealed that employees were 
prepared to welcome many of the proposed flexible work practices, but they felt 
stifled by excessive performance monitoring from the foremen. The plant’s problem, 
in short, was a poor management style (manager). The audit’s proposals for 
encouraging more autonomy for the production workers meant stripping away a 
layer of supervision: the foremen had to go. This caused considerable anguish 
among the union representatives: "Our honesty led to fellow trade unionists losing 
their jobs ” (then shop steward). The company invited the union to debate how best 
to implement these plans, and the plant underwent a restructuring in 1988, phasing 
out the ‘foreman’ grade (some were redeployed; most left) and collapsing a number
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of production-based jobs into one ‘operator’ position. The levels of hierarchy fell 
from seven layers to the three that still exist today (four senior managers at the 
‘Strategic’ apex; eight plant supervisers/ group leaders in the ‘Tactical’ group, and 
the ‘Operatives’ organised into teams).
Responsibility for quality inspections and workstation cleanliness now lay with the 
operators. Quality circles were introduced too. However, the production workers 
could not get to grips with the new foreman-less team working. Most had already 
served the company for around 15 years, and although many had resented the 
foreman’s orders, they had nevertheless become used to being told what to do. 
Under team working, confusion reigned: with no foremen, who was managing, and 
who was obeying? Were team leaders ‘management’? If so, did this mean they had 
to leave the union? The team system unleashed near-anarchy: “We had 10 people 
bossing each other about instead o f one! ” (then shop steward). It took the next ten 
years to resolve satisfactorily (see below). The then convenor felt that the sheer 
quantity of process improvements - “largely management-driven ” - began to affect 
the quality of the outcomes: “The changes were far too dramatic, with large 
numbers o f shopfloor people being more involved in discussion groups than in 
producing parts... Some thoroughly enjoyed the new environment, while others 
despised it ”.
Two cross-functional groups -  both initiated by the union -  were charged with 
generating a more co-ordinated set of process improvements. These too achieved 
only partial success, generating plenty of learning points about the process, but 
rather fewer productive business outcomes. Learning points reported to an IBC 
conference in 1994 included: “Excessive discussion at management/ rep level 
almost to the exclusion o f employees; the belief that TU status is being eroded by 
bypassing TU reps, particularly as information flow becomes more direct and 
employees are more involved with operational issues, and the most frequent and 
recurring IR problem we face is in equating the need for rapid decisions with the 
need for maximum involvement”. However, according to one manager, the joint 
consultation did at least help strengthen the emerging trust. But, admitted the then 
convenor, the trust had not reached a level of sophistication and ‘mutuality’ capable 
of securing consistent and credible ‘joint wins’.
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Despite the difficulties, and modest triumphs, the increases in productivity allowed 
the US parent to bestow upon EngineParts greater levels of autonomy and decision­
making authority. The improvements helped to win new contracts to convert the 
plant into one capable of manufacturing different products. It was widely expected 
that this would secure the factory’s long-term viability.
Events leading to ‘partnership9 (crisis 2).
When in the early 1990s two business alliances forged with Saab and Volkswagen 
failed, the order book dried up again. This time the managers began consulting with 
the AEEU on how best to respond 3-5 months prior to the final decision’s deadline. 
A manager explained: “We told [the union and the workforce] what was happening, 
why we were struggling, and what we would have to do”. Joint analysis over the 
consequences to the business took place in the main consultative forum existing at 
the time, as well as in a set of cross-functional working parties. It was accepted that 
closure could be averted, but only if the headcount was reduced to around 180 from 
over 400. The job losses presented a major challenge to the emerging ‘partnership’, 
since although the union, and much of the workforce, understood that redundancies 
had to happen, the union flatly objected on principle to any alternative selection 
criteria than ‘LIFO’ (last-in-first-out). The problem was that, were EngineParts to 
apply ‘LEFO’, the plant would lose 18 or so of the firm’s most technically able, and 
essential, employees.
In emotionally-charged meetings, the MD presented what was accepted, eventually, 
as incontrovertible proof that EngineParts could not continue to produce goods 
without a qualified version of ‘LIFO’. Reluctantly, the union representatives agreed 
to support the management’s argument. But they had to persuade their members 
first.
The ‘aggregate’ [all-member] meeting is the decision-making forum for the AEEU 
at EngineParts. All union members are entitled to attend; the handful of non-union 
members may attend, but may not vote. The aggregate meeting to discuss the 1993 
redundancies, and the changes to ‘LIFO’, had everyone present. It was “the most 
hostile I  have ever known here”, recalled a prominent shop steward at the time,
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whose position was made worse by the fact that he was one of “the blue-eyed boys 
the ‘chosen 18’.39 “The members threatened to vote all o f the reps out: ‘How can 
you be so gullible? ’ [they asked]. ‘You ’re a traitor to your union ’... ‘You’ve sold us 
down the river’...” There were calls for strike action. But the union’s full-time 
official, and the shop stewards, “proved” that serving certain industry customers 
with product “could not continue” without the 18 employees, “and that getting rid 
o f ‘LIFO’ was not to create a monster for the company to treat us as they want” 
(then shop steward). The convenor and the shop stewards explained that “we, as a 
union, believed in [management’s] honesty and in the team working proposals... to 
keep the site open...[but that] we [the union reps] were not going to endorse the 
deal; the meeting was”. In the end the meeting voted by something like 4-1 (then 
shop steward) to lose the cherished ‘LIFO’ seniority principle to save the plant.
It is clear that the experience was immensely difficult for all concerned, especially 
so for the union representatives caught between the wishes of their enraged 
membership and the evident consequences for the plant of sticking to a no longer 
appropriate, and potentially catastrophic, principle. (One suspected a desire among 
the managers to “teach the old guard a lesson ”, but this hint of a strategic intent was 
not shared by anyone else.) The selective identification of redundancy candidates 
based on essential skill levels upset many, even with an in-built appeals system: 
“not as honest as it could have been ” (ex-convenor). The company did its best for 
those leaving, providing mock interview practice, CV preparation sessions, and a 
‘job shop’: they “took a lot o f care" (non-production group leader). For their part 
the managers resent the inference, and outright accusations from some quarters, that 
they enjoyed getting rid of people: “I  know these people too...how dare you?” 
protested one.
The changes “generated an air o f survival”, a “sense o f comradeship” (shop 
steward). For that year’s pay round tensions were, not surprisingly, running high. 
The union was expecting nothing to be offered. But the MD wished to placate the 
workforce, and to help instil a sense that the management wished sincerely to restore 
the damaged trust. He offered an above-inflation pay rise and acceded to a number
39 By way o f  an indication o f  the atmosphere around the plant at the time, the shop steward said that he was spat 
at, and at one stage had to call the police to deal with threatening phone calls to his home.
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of union-proposed fringe benefits and added, with the certain knowledge of 
sufficient orders for two years, an enshrined guarantee of no redundancies for the 
two-year period.40
The 1993 deal afforded EngineParts another relatively long period of "harmony and 
a lack o f strife ” (ex-convenor). In the hiatus management approached the AEEU 
with the suggestion that both parties should seek to codify formally the new joint 
problem-solving arrangements. The AEEU readily agreed: there had been a shift in 
attitudes among the union representatives in favour of joint problem solving (then 
shop steward), and for the union to assist managers in carrying out a plan if it had 
been discussed openly and fairly.
In 1994 talks began, and took 18 months, in part because of ongoing problems with 
managing the team working. Models and theories of partnership were discussed at 
length. When asked how the talks went, it seems that time, and the long slog over 
several months toward agreement, have rather clouded memories. No respondent 
could cite either a decisive breakthrough in negotiations, or any particularly fraught 
sticking points: “We just talked and talked and talked about a partnership until we 
got it right”, offered one manager. “There were no impositions. We put the deal 
together, together” (another manager). The first issue of a document that was 
initially called the ‘10-point plan’, but which became known as ‘The [EngineParts] 
Way’, was produced jointly in April 1997. At a special aggregate meeting the text 
was endorsed, without fuss it seems, by a majority show of hands; it did not merit a 
ballot.
Partnership at EngineParts -  ‘The [EngineParts] Way’.
This text is the company’s partnership agreement. It has the status of a collective 
agreement, so to rescind its terms would require the formal annulment of the deal, 
by one or other of the parties. (The option to withdraw is enshrined should either 
signatory party judge that, “despite discussions ”, the “partnership-based plan will 
not work”.) In this section the text is reviewed, followed by an assessment of the 
accompanying policies and practices as they currently operate.
40 This action incurred the -pure ly  ideological - wrath o f  the parent company: “We were told ‘don’t ever do 
that again’” (manager). The offer even led to accusations from HQ o f  "communism
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‘The [EngineParts] Way’ acts as the embodiment of the plant’s ‘Common Mission’ 
statement, which commits all those working for the firm to “customer delight 
through continuous improvement”. The statement aspires to create an environment 
of “honesty, trust, and consistency o f purpose”. The text has been amended and 
upgraded over the years to what is now a lengthy document, over 50 pages, and it 
remains a “live document ”, its terms subject to regular reviews by a dedicated team. 
The last amended issue came out in February 1999, although it was converted into a 
staff handbook in 2001.
The document articulates in the first paragraph a joint commitment to the success of 
the enterprise, linking the pursuit of good industrial relations and business 
objectives:
“The Management, Trade Union and Employee Representatives have agreed 
with the purpose o f this agreement, which is to meet the needs o f the customers and 
to achieve long term success for both the Company and its employees ”.
The opening section sets out the philosophy behind the agreement, and the manner 
in which it is to be realised:
“The Company is committed to progressive employee relations; and all 
parties will demonstrate their commitment to the achievement o f the Company's 
objectives through their adaptability and co-operation, and will facilitate the 
efficient and productive use o f new and advanced technology, flexible attitudes and 
working practices. The nature o f this ‘[EngineParts] Way ’ is dependent for its 
success on the active participation and co-operation o f all concerned, in line with 
the desire by all parties to work in a ‘partnership’”.
An observation on the incremental process of partnership then follows: “It is 
understood that it will require some time for confidence in the method o f operation 
to grow, and the parties commit to fully discuss any difficulties with a view to 
resolving such problems as may arise”.
Each of the sections detailing company policy for different aspects of employment 
opens with a statement of “general principle ”, to guide the implementation of the 
policies that follow. Appendices provide the concrete detail of company policies. 
Taking each of the ‘partnership’ components, ‘The [EngineParts] Way’ addresses 
each:
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Employee voice: joint consultation and information sharing.
The text formally confirms the single-union recognition/ partnership agreement with 
the AEEU trade union, subject to their membership exceeding 35%. (It stands at 
98%.) It reads:
“The Company will support the involvement o f the Trade Union in the 
partnership forum, in working with the company to ensure harmonious working 
relationships, and an effective competitive organisation ”.
EngineParts commits support and facilities and resources to the AEEU, including 
‘check-off.
Joint consultation is articulated as a general principle:
“It is recognised that there needs to exist a single forum in which all parties 
can discuss, consult and communicate with that sense o f collective identity; that all 
parties should be represented at that forum; and that all parties should 
communicate the proceedings in a consistent form ”.
In the first instance it was envisaged that the joint forum, meeting for strategic
deliberations on matters of plant-wide policy, would “be approached on a
discussion and consultation basis... ” However, the eventual aim was “to equally
share the decision-making, planning, and communication process throughout all
sections o f the workforce”. Again, the text acknowledges the need for relationships
and processes to mature over time:
“As confidence and maturity in the process grows it is envisaged that the 
system will develop into a genuine partnership which will allow for mutual and 
collective responsibility to be taken for all forum decisions ”.
Employees, primarily through the union channel, are involved in planning and 
administering the business. Union representatives attend senior management 
meetings where they are party to business plans, and have considerable input into 
putting the plans and budgets together. The now full-time convenor meets with the 
managers on a monthly basis to discuss workplace matters: “I ’m part o f the team 
that takes the decisions here ” (convenor). Regular informal contact takes place on a 
daily basis. The forum established under ‘The [EngineParts] Way’ exists on an ad 
hoc basis, as and when required, for what one manager called “corrective action ”. 
The forum comprises the HR department, the two plant managers, and the works 
committee (the convenor and his six shop stewards).
194
As well as the partnership forum, EngineParts creates and disbands cross-functional 
teams for specific initiatives, or to address particular problems. These have included 
securing ‘Investors in People’; ‘kaizen’ and quality; a system of ‘staggering’ staff 
holidays and the plant’s environmental audit. Due to the firm’s uncomfortable 
business circumstances, “the ‘what ’ is going to be implemented is rather autocratic 
now, but the ‘how’ is up to the team” (group leader). In addition, a further 24 
‘process teams’ are charged with continuous improvement, to “challenge the status 
quo and improve the processes”, in ‘time to market’, production, and supply chain 
management.
According to the plant managers, and the union, “there are no secrets here. We 
operate on total openness... no hidden agendas. We tell them everything we know”. 
There is an ‘open book’ policy wherein information on costs, sales, and profits is all 
made readily available to all staff, “warts and all”. All employees, especially the 
union representatives, are entitled to view the financial records, including long-range 
plan forecasts and ‘activity costings’ (the cost and benefits of each production 
section). The union, if it chose to, may send the plant’s financial books to their own 
officials for scrutiny ( “to check we ’re not having the wool pulled over our eyes ” -  
they have never felt the need). At the time of the first set of interviews, the wages 
clerk was also a shop steward. Performance at company, departmental and team 
level, including financial outcomes, are reviewed regularly in weekly and monthly 
briefing sessions led by the group leaders. Any unanswered questions from the 
shopfloor are sent to the forum for an official response. Much of the information is 
also posted up on notice boards. At least twice a year the two plant managers 
address the entire workforce on the state of the business; ad hoc addresses can take 
place at other times. At other times the two engage in regular ‘walkabouts’ (although 
one operative felt that they tend to speak to the same people each time). Finally, the 
union’s aggregate meetings are allowed on ‘company time’.
Employment security for flexibility.
The agreement makes explicit the joint determination to provide secure work at 
EngineParts:
“The Company and the employee representatives recognise that a high 
labour turnover rate does not serve the best interests o f the Company or its
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workforce. Therefore the Company is committed to seeking ways to actively retain 
employees ”.
The agreement records the mutual exchange of jointly designed employment 
security policies for the introduction of a raft of flexible working practices, including 
an end to demarcations, multi-skilling and team working. It describes the reciprocal 
commitments to team working and flexibility (with conditions attached to moving 
people within the organisation).41
However, it is widely understood and accepted that the commitment to employment 
security does not amount to a job-for-life, or even the broader guarantee of 
employment-for-life. Neither is realistic. After HQ’s criticism of 1994’s no- 
compulsory redundancy promise “the reps understand that we can ’t write it into any 
agreement now” (manager). ‘The [EngineParts] Way’ instead details jointly agreed 
and jointly managed procedures in the event of redundancy. Volunteers are always 
sought first, then any temporary employees. After that, protocols allocate points to 
each employee based on length of service, attendance/ absenteeism and discipline. 
An element of ‘LIFO’ has been returned, since if two candidates’ points totals are 
equal, length of tenure decides. The selection process is conducted jointly with the 
union. There is an appeals procedure, again involving the union if necessary. The 
process is considered by most respondents to be the “fairest system possible”. 
Implementation may not always be diligent enough, with some operatives hinting 
that group leaders are slow to issue warnings, or keep track of them. There are two 
classes of employees when it comes to redundancy pay-offs, with those hired before 
1991 enjoying much more lucrative terms than those hired after. Outside the agreed 
redundancy programmes employee turnover is negligible at 0.5%.
The magnitude of the site’s collective agreement in the event of closure (with 
considerable liabilities sunk into the redundancy terms of the longer-serving 
employees) is such that closure is an expensive decision for Chicago. (One 
employee mentioned a pay-off sum of around £6-8,000, which one can infer is a
41 Elsewhere, the text sets out jointly agreed start and finish times fo r  meal breaks and shift patterns, and the 
recruitment policies (including various job  profiles, and the protocols fo r  the use, should it be required, o f  
temporary labour).
196
handsome sum for south Wales; the convenor intimated that it would cost Chicago 
£30m overall.)
Sharing the success.
A clause enshrines the principle that all employees, apart from the two plant 
managers, should receive the same incremental pay increase at the same time, based 
upon the plant performance.
Pay continues to be subject to collective bargaining with the AEEU. Once a 
protracted and debilitating process, it “now takes half an hour and fits into our 
teamwork philosophy ” (conference presentation, 1997 - an assertion supported in 
interview by the key players, with 200l ’s deal taking three short meetings). The 
comparison between the union’s current and prior tactics is stark: “We used to 
present a shopping list o f demands, about double what we could expect, and then 
fought as management tried to beat us down. We didn ’t know the financial figures, 
and didn’t ask for them” (shop steward). Since the partnership, pay bargaining 
strategy has become, in the same rep’s words, “more realistic, more reasonable. We 
consider ‘what can we justify?’ I t ’s easier”. The convenor explained that, “if  the 
company says they can only afford 3% we know it’s right”.
In 1999 the 5% rise was considered “an excellent deal for the members” by the 
convenor. 2000, with commercial circumstances having turned against the plant, saw 
3% matching inflation, plus changes to bonuses and plant-level incentives for 
improved performance. One of the plant managers, formerly HR, considers it his 
“responsibility to improve the employees’ benefits year on year, to make every 
attempt to do so”. The works convenor considers the company’s terms and 
conditions to be “second to none... the best in the area ”. This view was widely held 
among the non-managers interviewed, all of whom affirmed that EngineParts was a 
“good company to work fo r”, offering “good terms and conditions”, and generally 
being a “people-oriented company” (various). The company’s single-status staff 
terms and conditions apply to everyone.
Another part of its employee reward policies is the company’s staff suggestion 
scheme. Any suggestion enacted upon puts £5 into a ‘pot’, then the resultant savings
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attributed to the suggestion is shared: 35% to the pot, and 65% to the company 
(since some monies may have to be spent implementing the suggestion). Thus, the 
scheme is self-financing. The initial split had been 25%-75%, but three years ago, as 
part of a pay deal, the plant management offered the union the more favourable split, 
to which the union said "great”, and the negotiation "took less than a minute” 
(plant manager and convenor).42 The ‘pot’ is distributed evenly around the 
workforce twice a year, regardless of individuals’ record on making suggestions, on 
average paying £500 annually to each employee. (The two plant managers have their 
own bonus schemes, all based on financial performance, administered by the parent 
in Chicago. These were previously linked to plant performance, but have since been 
amended to reflect corporate performance worldwide.)
An attendance bonus was introduced to combat absenteeism running at levels of 
25% following 1993’s traumatic events. It works out at around £20 per month. 
Attendance -  encouraged by the bonus -  is around 98%.
EngineParts does not use profit-sharing or a profit-related bonus, or employee share 
ownership, as it is not considered "focussed enough ” [on employee performance], 
and anyway is "too complicated” (manager). In 2001 there was talk of looking into 
share distribution, however.
Shortly after ‘The [EngineParts] Way’ enshrined joint collaboration into the 
collective agreements governing the plant, the problems over team working were 
resolved, at least formally. Complete devolution of authority had been a disaster in 
the mid-1980s. Nor did the system of ‘detached’ team facilitators prove successful, 
since the position resembled too closely the foremen of old (especially with a 
proposed extra £40 a week). The union and management examined possible 
solutions in a joint cross-functional working party: "We sought ideas, and tried to 
let them [the production staff] make the decisions”, recalled a group leader in 
production. It was agreed to appoint leaders from within the team rather than have 
them supervise from without. In concert with the group leaders, each team leader 
now co-ordinates production on a line as well as conducting weekly and monthly 
briefings on performance. For the convenor the system is "now hugely successful,
42 It has since been increased again to a 50-50 split, according to the new employee handbook.
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the best thing to have happened at the company ”. He, and many other respondents, 
attributed the change of outcome to the improved union-management relations 
following ‘The [EngineParts] Way’. Engineers are rather less effusive, noting that 
the supposedly self-managing teams remain reluctant to solve their production 
problems without recourse to the group leader.43
The future? Sustainability.
The cancellation of a promised order from Rover Group precipitated another 
potential closure crisis in 2000: "We didn’t know if we would be here or not next 
year” (manager); "we came so close” to closing permanently (HR officer).
The union and management met regularly to refine the plant closure deal, and to 
agree additional incentives to keep the workforce meeting customers’ orders when 
defeatism might have reigned: “ (win-win ’ solutions ” (manager).
But to keep the plant running EngineParts needed to lay off around 30 employees. 
The procedure was by now well established. Meetings to consider suggestions to 
safeguard jobs took place, often four a week, but no other option was feasible: "The 
union could see that there was nothing that could be done. They were obliged to try 
to save jobs, but they knew it was not possible” (HR officer). Two further sets of 
redundancies, some compulsory under the terms of ‘The [EngineParts] Way’, went 
through with anguish for those leaving, but otherwise uncomplicated. One operative 
said: "It was all done properly [according to the agreement]. We didn ’t have enough 
work for people to do... we understood exactly”. (The same operative did feel 
though that the announcement informing everyone at the same time in an aggregate 
meeting could have been prefaced with some private briefings for those teams 
affected.) An interesting consequence of this round of redundancies - in which some 
technically valuable people had to leave while others had, in the words of an HR 
officer, "fortuitous” absence patterns - is that EngineParts may look to revise the 
selection criteria, to accommodate ‘specialist skills’ as a factor, perhaps using NVQs 
as an objective measure.
43 The impact on performance is not the subject o f  this thesis. However, fo r  interest, internal rejects fe ll by 50% 
between 1997 and 1999, supply-chain rejects by 75%, warranty costs were reduced by 80%, and the number o f  
accidents by a half
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Could the AEEU have prevented job losses with a more aggressive reaction? Not 
according to the convenor, who identified his members’ enemy not as EngineParts, 
but "those taking our business away” -  echoing the Personnel Manager’s 
aspirations from the 1983 crisis. “There is no doubt in my mind that without the 
partnership this plant would have closed, ” he declared. A shop steward said: “My 
job [as a shop steward] is to keep people in work, not get them out o f work ”, the 
inference being that union defiance would have cost more members more jobs. 
Another shop steward reflected a widely held perception among the representatives 
that there is “not much support for industrial action ”; the convenor declared that 
“the traditional methods turn people off now ”. (See ‘Analysis’ below.)
The mood in summer 2001 was one of stoicism -  “here we go again” -  but also a 
determination, at least from the managers and union representatives, to “prove to 
Chicago that we have the right attitudes” [for success] (convenor). From other 
accounts this rather glosses over the cynicism of many who were less than keen to 
stay the fight. Some investigated with HR the viability of taking early retirement, 
but only to “learn how much they’re worth...the maggots came out” (HR officer). 
Representative of those staying an engineer’s comment was typical: “the only thing 
keeping this plant going is the cost o f closing it down ”.
On the brink of closure, a sizeable order came through from Hyundai that is good for 
the next five years, with volumes set to quadruple. “We won ”, exclaimed one of the 
plant managers in an informal unrecorded conversation; ‘they survived again’ is 
surely more accurate, but it seems churlish to deny them their sensation of triumph. 
The plant mangers and the union described the support from the workforce as, 
respectively, “first class”', “nobody ever gave up, from the top to the bottom”. 
Again, this rather glosses over the pessimism and cynicism on the shop floor.
Meeting the order is dependent upon EngineParts working to exacting ‘lean 
production’ methods in a short period of time. Intensive training at the nearby Ford 
plant has inducted staff into the way of lean production, and the union has consulted 
with its Ford colleagues. Respondents’ appreciation of the new methods was tinged 
with apprehension, but also a determination to prevail. There may be repercussions
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for the team working and devolved autonomy since, in the words of one manager, 
lean production is “aprocess that drives the individual, not the other way round”.
In late 2001 a Vice President of Operations, a former employee at the factory, was 
scheduled to arrive from Chicago to oversee the business.
The workforce is back to around 200, from 1994’s low of 183, and extra recruitment 
may be possible in 2003 or 2004. The first people to be contacted will be those who 
took redundancy (HR officer).
The partnership, now 18 years old, is entering another new phase.
Case study 2 -  EngineParts. Analysis section: Partnership.
In this section I first examine the extent to which the people management practices 
within EngineParts, coincide with the IPA partnership model. I then go on to discuss 
how the partnership developed, relating its progress to the model in Figure 4, and 
then I assess the nature of the partnership arrangements.
Table 8 indicates that the arrangements for employment relations at EngineParts 
amount to a strong example of a partnership organisation, although some of the 
practices are rather modest in scope:
Table 8 -  Partnership at EngineParts.
Partnership element Present?
Joint commitment to the success of the enterprise ©
Recognition of the legitimate interests o f each party ©
Building trust-based relationships ©
Increasing employee involvement ©
Extensive information sharing ©/?
Consultation with employees at workplace and organisational level ©
Employment security provisions (in exchange for flexible work
practices)
©/?
Sharing the success of the enterprise ©
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Principles.
The testimonies of respondents make it apparent that the principles of partnership -  
to pursue a common objective of success through collaborative trust-building 
relations and employee involvement, while recognising different constituencies’ 
separate and legitimate interests -  are firmly embedded within EngineParts, and 
upheld by the key players.
One potential challenge to the existing order may be any change in direction enacted 
by the new MD, although this is not envisaged.
Also, it may have been an oversight, or it could be a revealing insight into the 
change in mood, but when in 2001 the partnership agreement was refashioned into 
an employee handbook only one of the 1997 principles was copied into the 
handbook: that recognising the AEEU in a section on good employee relations.
Practices.
Each of the partnership practices outlined in chapter one is readily discernible in 
EngineParts, although ambitions are compromised by the plant’s vulnerability.
Theirs is not an especially strong commitment to employment security (hence the 
*?’). This is a consequence of EngineParts’ perennially precarious status. But the 
jointly designed and administered policy does manage carefully employees’ 
expectations, and the protocols are as fair as is practicable, and they are recognised 
as such throughout the firm.
Options for sharing success are similarly modest, but according to the union 
convenor the terms and conditions are excellent, and the bonuses do provide extra 
money for relatively little effort; just turning up is sufficient in the case of the 
attendance bonus.
There is a clear willingness on the part of the managers to disseminate information 
about the business, and the range of practices to do so is extensive. The two plant 
managers insist categorically that they communicate everything they know, albeit in 
carefully prepared statements, and that when they don’t know the answer they admit
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as much. However, suspicion still remains widespread on the shop floor about how 
much they are prepared to divulge: “they know more than they can tell” and they 
withhold information so as not to jeopardise production (operative). But most 
conceded that the factory managers “are as much in the dark as we are ”, and that 
the key decisions on the plant’s future are taken in Chicago. Among the group 
leaders and managers, there came a sense that the operatives were not being told 
what they “want to hear ”, rather than any concerted effort to maintain ignorance or 
a deception (group leader). The cynicism was “slowly being chipped away a t”, 
although one manager ruefully admitted, “you can't persuade everyone, and it's 
wasted effort trying”. It is a source of some frustration to the managers that on 
occasion they are not believed. I would suggest that the suspicions are almost 
certainly a by-product of the cycles of upheaval, and EngineParts’ vulnerability, 
rather than scepticism toward the honour of the plant managers. Of course it is 
possible to argue that repeated dissemination of bad news acts as a control on 
employees’ ambitions, but no union official at EngineParts suspected this to be 
managers’ covert strategy.
Joint consultation takes place at every level of the firm but, from anecdotal evidence, 
is much more advanced at the ‘Strategic’ level (between the union convenor and the 
managers) than among the operatives. Nevertheless, according to the union, 
employees at all levels are able to influence the firm’s decision-making. 
Consultative arrangements are present, but are not being utilised to the full. It would 
seem that some among the operatives lack either the enthusiasm, the will or the 
ability to manage their own work confidently.
Analysis: the nature of partnership at EngineParts.
In a presentation to attendees on an IPA visit to the factory in 1999 the then MD 
expanded on the firm’s rationale behind partnership:
“Partnership will develop through open, honest and consistent participation 
(face-to-face, good news and bad). It maintains the involvement o f people. 
Partnership creates know-how and understanding o f business needs. It provides 
input and feedback from the “base” (from those who carry out and 'action' the 
business). Partnership minimises [note: it does not eliminate] conflicts, 
misunderstandings, suspicions o f hidden agendas, false perceptions, and surprises. 
[It] will ultimately create and grow trust, and provide a basis for real co­
operation
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This analysis clearly moves the focus of industrial relations away from structures 
and agendas toward generating appropriately collaborative attitudes and behaviours. 
One present plant manager echoed this view; for him ‘The [EngineParts] Way’ was 
intended to concentrate minds more on “the way o f discussing [employee relations], 
not the detail... ” and, for one manager, it “has built up the behavioural practices 
and the way this company thinks ” (manager). An ex-union official noted the switch 
as one from a “prescriptive” agreement toward a more “conceptual” agreement, 
revolving especially around the notion of trust.
In fact, the bulk of the text is taken up with detailed outlines of ‘substantive’ matters, 
such as shift premia and employment policies, and certainly the translation into the 
employee handbook downplays the ‘procedural’ principles. However, this comment 
is illustrative of the emphasis given to attitudes and behaviours, rather than the 
content of the bargaining exchange, which merited little analysis from any of the key 
players. In one of the several conference presentations that the company has been 
invited to make, EngineParts has explained the shift in the approach to industrial 
relations thus: “The traditional ‘wasteful ’ negotiation has been driven away from 
our organisation and replaced by jointly agreed goals and objectives ”. They listed 
the required partnership attributes: “To be more open; Honesty; More consistent; To 
listen more; More involvement o f employees and union in planning the business; Not 
talk... but action; Tell the truth”. A determination to maintain the joint problem 
solving approach, and importantly, to work to secure mutual gains from any change 
programmes has kept the process intact.
The partnership agreement in 1997 -  itself the culmination of a process that began 
much earlier in 1983 - has been one of the decisive business strategies that has kept 
the plant operating: “Partnership has kept this plant open for seven years” 
(convenor). The sensible text set out realistic joint aspirations, and imposed 
parameters around behaviours beyond which nobody would be tolerated to venture. 
Attention to attitudinal and behavioural compliance has extended to the design of 
HR policies. Both the suggestion scheme and the attendance bonus were 
constructed, and are administered, to “reward the behaviours we want” (manager). 
The attendance bonus, for example, “creates a culture o f coming in to work, even in 
uncertain times ”, which both the managers and the union want.
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These strictures have caused resentments within both the union and managers (see 
below), but productivity improvements, and the survival of the plant, vindicate the 
approach for many. Indeed, the enduring achievement of the partnership/ joint 
problem solving has been its adaptability to change, and resilience in the face of 
such challenging circumstances. Consistency in the personnel since the mid-1980s 
has helped: the two plant managers have been at the plant for over 15 years, and the 
union’s succession process for its convenor has maintained consistency of purpose 
since 1983’s crisis. Three of the four plant convenors are still employed at the site, 
and the present convenor has been working there for 24 years. Most other managers, 
many long-serving, subscribe to the partnership ethos. But, as elsewhere, there 
remain pockets of discontent and antagonism among managerial grades who 
consider the joint consultation approach as an imposition. However, senior managers 
and HR are confident that the joint and cross-functional consultative structures are 
set in stone, and can even be imposed on the “mavericks ”.
What is also worth noting is that the partnership managed to transcend a powerful 
and entrenched local culture of adversarialism and a still enduring consciousness of 
work-based conflict. (One operative explained that suspicions of management are 
“a matter o f instinct for anyone working for someone else ”, and was instilled in 
one’s upbringing. However, one manager also suggested that the gregarious Welsh 
mix together well, and stick together too.)
On the delicate balance of interests needed for EngineParts’ joint problem solving to 
work effectively, a manager presented the challenge thus:
“We do not have, nor do we want, autocracy, and rarely can we afford the 
luxury o f total democracy. Our challenge then... is to define the workable levels o f 
involvement and participation, not in cliches, but in real terms, measurable, and 
clearly understandable, so that all o f us know what it really is. We will then have a 
basis to measure our improvement, and it will clarify a common aim which we are 
searching for (e.g.:) openness, shared views, decision-making at the lowest levels. 
Having done that, more than anything, it will enable us to build on our successes, 
thus achieving our single most important common aim, a successful [EngineParts], 
in which we all enjoy ourselves and prosper” (conference presentation).
A manager denied that this meant “we all have to think the same way on how things 
are done. But it does mean that we all have to have the same working beliefs and at
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least agree on what needs to be done ”. A current manager felt that it was important 
to raise the knowledge and competencies of the union representatives.
Staff members, when they offered an opinion, were weakly sceptical, agnostic or -  
at best - lukewarm in their support for the partnership. None objected outright, 
although it is known that there are dissenters. In phlegmatic fashion many had failed 
to notice a discernible difference between working life in the adversarial 1970s and 
under ‘partnership’, since the conduct of the firm’s industrial relations had so 
seldom registered on their own job. An operative, asked to reflect on partnership, 
had read ‘The [EngineParts] Way’ and had no problem with it; beyond that ‘7 can ’t 
really say”. Another refuted EngineParts’ claim to partnership status, arguing that if 
it were a real partnership the managers would be open and truthful all the time; 
something, of course, that the managers and the AEEU insist they are being.
The union’s officials are subject to considerably more antagonism from the shop 
floor than are EngineParts’ managers. When members commented on the union, a 
pattern emerged in the responses: quick to express disappointment, even contempt, 
for their present representatives, none indicated a groundswell of energy for ousting 
them, or demanding forcefully more militant policies. This comment was typical:
"They [union officials] walk a thin line between the managers and the 
workers... They run with the hares and the hounds. But they have to, given the 
situation they’re in. They have to retain respect from the managers, but they get 
hounded from inside the union ” (operative).
Another dismissed the union as "ineffective... not popular”. One was more positive, 
describing the union and management as "hand in glove... they work together by 
consensus”, compromising each other for mutual benefit. "Many o f the better 
company policies are supported by the union”, he added, citing absenteeism 
procedures. Many argued that the older generation were more critical than the 
younger recruits, but in the interviews age did not correlate at all; young operatives 
expressed enthusiasm for more aggressive union campaigns, while some older 
operatives were content with their lot.
Members voiced concerns over the quality of union democracy: "Demands are put 
to the managers before the members. We get no requests for information, or 
feedback, and no reports on progress ” (operative). Another had the impression that
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the union often failed even to pass on members’ demands, let alone argue for them: 
“Everyone wants more, but the union officials just tell us, ‘like it or lump it’... We 
get presented with the first offer, [and the choice is] yes or no ” (operative). Another 
felt that, while the union representatives did argue on behalf of the members, they 
could put up a better argument, and not “back down” quite so readily. This 
operative put the union’s weakness down to “the quality o f the questions” asked, 
and a refusal to call for external AEEU support, as this might imply a self-assigned 
perception of ineffectiveness. This perception led a number of members to accuse 
their representatives of being “more ‘management ’” [than union] and even “there 
for a free ride ”. But another, who confessed herself reluctant to criticise anyone, felt 
that the union was “committed to getting the best deal for us ”.
A petition for an external representative to be present at 1999’s negotiations over 
redundancy terms was rejected, as was a request for an emergency meeting to 
discuss the union’s response, and a more general ‘digestion period’ to assess the 
management team’s offer. One union member had his suggestion for an operative to 
sit in on union-management meetings as an observer “laughed a t”. The members 
have, however, secured the posting of minutes up on notice boards.
Responding to the accusation that the union has “got into bed” with managers [i.e.: 
been co-opted by management] EngineParts’ union officials and shop stewards were 
candid: “I  can understand the concerns. So you have to be clear on why we ’re doing 
it [a new policy or initiative, or agreement] and be open as a representative. But you 
have to be careful about building up too much expectations” (admin-based shop 
steward). That said, resisting management edict and ignoring business realities is 
“very difficult”, and few members seemed to have the will to engage in industrial 
action. Another former senior representative hypothesised about the options 
available: “You have two choices as options for influencing the [workplace] agenda: 
one that is trust-led and one that is distrust-led” - the clear preference, from a 
person whose nickname used to parade his communist credentials, being for the 
former, but only as long as it is reciprocated by management.
The convenor is rather more forthright. He is passionate about the virtues of 
partnership, as he sees them, and about the advantages of the strong bonds of trust
207
that have been forged at EngineParts. He expanded on his tactics: “We have had a 
shift in attitude as union reps. The aim is to get everyone treated the same. It is not 
to create a monster for the company to deal with”. He repeated the mantra: “We 
need to fight our rivals; they’re the enemy, not our managers”. Describing the joint 
problem solving, a shop steward considered the industrial relations to have 
“matured to such an extent that problems are dealt with informally, day-today on a 
one-to-one basis”, while in the forum “instead o f two mind-sets we now have 12 
opinions”. The convenor did hint at the problem of ‘fait accompli’ decisions: “Most 
o f the time we reach the right decision after an exchange o f views, and i f  you’ve seen 
the figures and you’ve got all the facts you have to support management i f  they are 
correct ”. His stance has emerged from the history of relations at the plant, however; 
the two previous convenors also believed union participation in decision-making to 
be “a good thing”.
The uncertainty from operating in a very precarious product market has constrained 
the union, of course, but equally there is little effective support for militancy: “I  ask 
[the complaining members] for an alternative, because it’s easy to say ‘N o’... Some 
just want to have a moan... [and] some will never trust managers while there’s a 
hole in their backside ” (convenor). On the prospect of a return to what he himself 
called ‘1970s-style’ tactics, the convenor explained that the members did not want 
the union to pursue that, as the foremen would return; a poor argument, since the 
plant is not in a position to hire anyone, let alone reintroduce a long-abandoned 
additional layer of management. He also claimed that he would be dismissed from 
his union position for engaging in those tactics.
Intriguingly, while he described the ‘pendulum’ of influence at the plant being 
presently “in the middle” [i.e.: falling between union and management], a number of 
comments -  such as his assertion that “the managers only manage with the union’s 
co-operation” and his hope that should the factory improve its market share in 
Europe to the point where it became a major asset for the corporation, the 
workforce’s bargaining muscle would be greatly enhanced and could yet facilitate 
more assertive unionism -  revealed dormant enthusiasm for combative ‘us-and- 
them’ tactics, directed more at Chicago than at the local management team.
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The managers and group leaders stay out of the union’s internal politics, although 
they were able to offer some of their own insights. One group leader said that the 
convenor “does not tolerate anti-partnership behaviours”, while a manager 
explained that the representatives “don ’t want to go back and forth to the members 
like yo-yos; i f  they think a deal is fair, they want to see it through
The convenor’s position is strong, and under no serious threat from within the 
membership. A shopfloor operative, in sentiments echoed by a shop steward, 
suggested that if everyone is being treated fairly and equally under partnership the 
few militants, with their half-hearted calls to arms, would remain marginalised. This 
seems to be the case, perhaps reinforcing the convenor’s ‘moaning’ theory.
The partnership is intact and robust, if not universally lauded. It faces no serious 
foreseeable challenge For the union’s part, this would require a special vote at an 
aggregate meeting, and according to the present convenor, the AEEU’s District 
Official would demand adherence. The company, as represented by the present plant 
managers, would never unilaterally withdraw.
Yet the plant remains under a near-constant threat: “We’re reactive because 
circumstances are out o f our control” (group leader). For the convenor, 
“partnership won’t close this plant down; company politics will” -  with Chicago 
HQ deciding which plants should receive investment (with a transparent preference 
for supporting American workforces). EngineParts’ status as the corporation’s only 
site in Europe has certainly helped its cause. But the union is under no illusions. 
Asked if HQ plays its plants off each other, the convenor replied, “Of course they 
do! That’s taken as read. But we accept that, and the obstacles thrown in our 
way... ” The impression is that the parent company is, currently at least, favourably 
disposed toward their Welsh plant (manager). Chicago appreciates EngineParts’ 
impressive systems, and that it operates in a very different work culture. But the 
Americans remain highly sceptical about the value of unions, from scarring conflicts 
with the UAW union at home. The local managers’ twin concerns - managing a 
productive factory and improving the living standards of the employees - have from 
time to time brought stinging rebukes. The Americans’ emphasis on short-term 
[financial] planning systems and hitting targets -  “as long as you make them money
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they don’t care [what EngineParts in Wales does]” (manager); "there’s no 
sentimentality involved, they only see dollar signs” (convenor) - mean that they 
show “little concern for building trust”.
The convenor referred to the workforce having been “under duress for 34 years 
The Hyundai contract may have given them temporary respite, but the partnership 
has endured worse, and from this research I can predict with confidence that the 
existing personnel are committed to retaining the partnership ethos and practice into 
the future.
Analysis: progress toward partnership and trust.
While memories differ among the union respondents the majority characterised the 
industrial relations in the early years as typical of the adversarial, low-trust approach 
of that time. The unions’ aggression and obstinacy may have been exaggerated, but 
for the present convenor, then a shop steward, trust “was never, never there Nor 
was there any concerted effort, from either party, to investigate the potential for 
conducting relations on a more collaborative basis.
The first ‘entry into talks’ (la) in 1983 was forced upon the parties by the very real 
prospect of the plant closing down. Yet, even facing this mutual threat, the union’s 
willingness to collaborate with the plant’s managers was weak. As is often the case 
in the early stages of putative ‘partnership’ efforts, it was a series of candid 
presentations setting out in simple terms the realities of the situational context that 
served as the spur toward more co-operative relations, at least to overcome the crisis 
at hand. The MD’s unrealistic talk of removing redundancy from the company’s 
language was, wisely in the light of the literature on trust, played down, and 
dropped, since such unrealisable ambitions can be counter-productive, as unfulfilled 
expectations can damage trust and lead to cynicism, making it very hard to 
resuscitate trust again. Sharing information demonstrates a willingness to trust, and 
invites one to be trusted in return; from the evidence proffered at EngineParts it is 
simple and very effective.
The first ‘deal’ comprised the classic partnership exchange of employment security 
(over six years) with the introduction of a raft of flexible work practices, but with
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suspicions still raw, and no other option available, the 1983 agreement -  whether 
“astonishing” or not - was more of a calculative exchange than a ‘partnership’. 
From respondents’ accounts, in the crucial attitudinal terms, it did not constitute a 
positive mutual gains arrangement.
This evidence reinforces the point that an impressive deal on ‘substantive’ matters 
might not translate into a convincing partnership arrangement without discernible 
shifts in attitudes from all parties.
Importantly, both the managers and the union elected to persist with the joint 
problem solving/ trust-building approach when a more calculative reversion to 
adversarialism/ management diktat might have been a comfortable option. This 
provided modest, and in truth patchy, evidence of burgeoning partnership (2a). But it 
served to translate the calculative trust into trust based more on appreciation of the 
other party’s likely motives and actions (2b).
The information sharing and consultation also saw both parties through what might 
have proven a serious ‘defection’ in 1993’s redundancy/ ‘LIFO’ crisis. The 
unexpectedly favourable pay offer the following year may have been a move to 
pacify the furious ‘survivors’ - 1 was not able to interview the MD from that period 
-  or, more positively, one can view it as a ‘demonstration of concern’ and a desire to 
provide evidence of the commitment to mutual gains (arrow ‘b’ to 2a). Both are 
valid hypotheses; in fact, both may have motivated the move.
It is clear that the actual ‘partnership’ agreement (lb) emerged from the parties’ 
ready energy and desire to formalise the existing joint problem solving. Thus, the 
pre-disposition to trust for the ‘entry into talks’ (la) was already high. Here my 
narrative analysis falters rather, since none of the participants in the off-and-on three 
years of talks that produced ‘The [EngineParts] Way’ could venture a detailed 
account of their progress. None could recall any major conflicts, but all gave the 
impression of a steady and even unspectacular procession toward the final text, and 
its endorsement.
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Four years on from ‘The [EngineParts] Way’ the plant has lost more staff, the 
redundancies now jointly managed almost by routine (suggesting, at least, 
progression to 2b, perhaps even to 3a). To the evident relief of many, the Hyundai 
project has restored some much-needed stability for at least the next five years.
A new MD is scheduled to arrive, who may or may not disturb the partnership; the 
union and the plant managers expressed a confidence that the partnership would 
remain intact. “I'm not anticipating any changes ” (manager).
So, where would I place relations at EngineParts now? The respondents in the 
‘Analysis’ section on trust will afford further insights.
Case study 2 -  EngineParts. Analysis section: Trust.
I returned to EngineParts to interview seven respondents, selected by myself. I had 
already interviewed all of them for the narrative section, except the newly- 
appointed shop steward who accompanied the convenor. Each was shown the 
degrees of trust diagram set out in the Methodology chapter, and given enough time 
to read and digest the implications of each definition before offering their thoughts. 
(I turned the tape recorder off to prevent any anxiety that the long silence being 
recorded may have caused.)
In this section I discuss the respondents’ appraisal of the degrees of trust present 
within the organisation, with their explanations and justifications for their analysis, 
including any evidence provided in support of their assertions. Where any were 
offered, I discuss the respondents’ own definitions or commentary on the nature of 
trust at work, and also their thoughts on what might assist in the development of 
trust at work, and what might constrain or threaten it.
Their responses are captured in Table 9.
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Table 9 -  EngineParts respondents on trust continuum.44
BEFORE
P’SHIP
AT
P’SHIP
2001.
PLANT MANAGER (1) D-b/T to C-b/T K-b/T R-b/T; 
C-b/T to K-b/T
PLANT MANAGER (2) D-b/T to C-b/T [unspecified
movement]
R-b/T
HR OFFICER (1) - R-b/T K-b/T to C-b/T; 
D-b/T
HR OFFICER (2) C-b/T to K-b/T R-b/T to I-b/T
AEEU CONVENOR D-b/T K-b/T; R-b/T;
(+ NEW SHOP 
STEWARD)
D-b/T C-b/T to K-b/T
GROUP LEADER C-b/T K-b/T K-b/T
OPERATIVE [No reply] [No reply] [No reply]
The semi-colons separate respondents’ comments on the nature of different 
relationships at work.
The first o f the two plant managers considered that, prior to the first serious 
upheaval in 1983-84, relations flitted between deterrence-based trust and calculus- 
based trust. He argued that, since the US was “pulling the strings... the behaviours 
were driven that w ay”. The six-year pay deal reflected the then MD’s convictions on 
extending employee involvement and his habit of carrying out his promises. Positive 
trust began to emerge around this time, leading to the development o f knowledge- 
based trust. For this manager the present relationships can be characterised as 
relational-based trust. Asked to consider again the demanding definition, he 
reiterated his assessment, although he admitted ‘‘we don *t have every item ” in the 
definition. He did record the presence of ‘‘an emotional bond” however: ‘‘We ’re like 
a family...we don *t always get on, but w e’ve all got to get on together!” he offered. 
When asked in the opening round of interviews what he felt contributed to trust the 
answer highlighted many of the key components, namely ‘‘just telling the truth”, 
“respect fo r  each other and belief in each other” and ‘‘trying to come to a joint 
solution... i t ’s to sit down and listen to each other’s views. Trust comes from the way 
we are prepared to come to solutions, not to have dictates. Trust comes through the 
solutions” [i.e.: consistent reciprocity, and integrative bargaining]. He charged 
managers with the responsibility for achieving consistency between the sincerely 
held beliefs captured in ‘The [EngineParts] Way’, and day-today actions: ‘‘We have
44 KEY: D-b/  T = deterrence-based trust; C-b/T = calculus-based trust; K-b/T = knowledge-based
trust; R-b/  T = relational-based trust; I-b/  T = identification-based trust.
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had to be consistent in our beliefs, with longer-term goals, and not float in and out 
[of partnership] like a ‘flavour-of-the-month’. We are the prime leaders and our 
behaviour sets the role model”. He did concede that among the workforce a 
calculative weighing up of each situation endures, in part because of an imported 
habit of deterrence from the parent company, in part due to the ever-present threat of 
crisis. He guessed that the production staff might be less trusting than the key 
players, but that the quality of the trust was still strong: knowledge-based, in his 
estimation.
The other plant manager had said in the first round of interviews that “without trust 
partnership is liquid, not solid”. Trust, for him, had been built up because, firstly, 
the workforce shared with management common characteristics of nationality; a 
strong sense of ‘Welshness’ permeated many of his comments. He had attributed 
what trust might be present at the factory to the management pair understanding the 
business and knowing the workforce, even feeling part of them. He also cited being 
“open and honest, and if  you do that consistently... you know, we’re all o f us in the 
same boat, and I  think that brings people together”. He praised the employee 
representatives for working hard as well to build trust. Around the start of the 1990s, 
relations between the company and the workforce fell between deterrence-based and 
calculus-based trust, due to “immaturity on both sides ”. Improvements began after 
the 1994 crisis, which he called “thepits”. There was a heightened need for each 
side to trust each other after that time. He cited the continuity of personnel, and the 
honesty policy, observing that “as long as you ’re honest and straight with people 
[trust will emerge], but i f  you change to conceal information and not being as open 
you can pull [trust] back the other way”. In 2001 he considered relations to be at 
relational-based trust, but he expressed some reservations over the possible approach 
of the new MD: “I f  the new person is inconsistent trust can diminish very quickly”.
A demoralised HR officer described relationships “six years ago” [i.e.: following 
the survival in 1994] as relational-based trust: “The union leadership had respect for 
management and vice versa... There had been a genuine effort to see the other’s 
side ”. For this officer the workforce knew that whatever the charismatic MD “put 
up on the board was the truth”. Following his departure -  lamented by this 
respondent - the uncertainties of the business contributed to movement toward “a
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position o f mistrust”, which she felt was reflected in the definition for knowledge- 
based trust. The workforce understood that everyone was “trying on their behalf’, 
but calculative suspicions and doubts still crept in. The fact that both plant managers 
were officially only ‘caretaker’ managers “sent a message...” In 2001 the trust, at 
least between the production workers and the corporation (implicitly including the 
local management), had evaporated into deterrence-based forms. What concern 
might have been displayed toward staff had been replaced with indifference and 
even aggression. A galley-ship analogy was used to describe relations: the 
workforce had the option to “paddle, or you get cracked over the head with a whip... 
people don’t care i f  you fall overboard”. Meetings had become “more 
confrontational, more heated... a totally different approach”. (This wholly negative 
perspective was not shared by any other respondent, and may have been shaped by 
the recent downgrading of this individual’s role.)
The second HR officer was much more upbeat. She cited the development of ‘The 
[EngineParts] Way’ as the point in time when trust relations shifted favourably from 
calculative wariness toward knowledge-based trust. Even after the recent upheavals 
the officer generally depicted dealings between the union and the company as being 
relational-based trust, with even identification-based trust emerging on some issues. 
Asked to justify this assessment, she pointed to the fact that the company is open 
and honest with the workforce, and that the employees know the financial situation 
of the firm and, with 2001 ’s redundancies, the workforce "knew the reasons why”. 
She felt that the key players had become “comfortable ” with each other, and “built 
up a bond” such that “if  you give them a confidence, you do not expect it to be 
broken ”. Trust comes from “telling me the truth, not the words I  want to hear”. Her 
optimistic statement that identification-based trust had emerged on some issues was 
undermined by her later comments that, as an HR officer, “you have to retain some 
information — as a manager you are the representative for the company, so you 
always keep something back”. Reflecting further, she conceded that “there’s bound 
to be a conflict o f interest between the employer and the employee ”. (Perhaps in the 
first instance she had wanted, for reasons of positive self-image, to assign some 
relations to the ‘best’ of the categories. That she retracted her earlier view quickly 
suggests that it was not a robustly held view. This small incident does indicate the 
strength, incidentally, of qualitative research methods.)
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The AEEU convenor and one of his shop stewards reiterated that relations in the 
1970s really were characterised by use of deterrence by both parties, with the union 
enjoying the “strongest hand”. Relationships improved among the key players after 
1983, as the joint problem solving approach became the norm, producing a 
knowledge-based trust that helped sustain the process. The convenor explained that 
trust is “based on judging others... you can say what you like, I ’ll judge you on 
your actions ”, He felt that the key players had to mould themselves into a team built 
on trust before putting the notion of joint working/ trust-based relations to the 
shopfloor. There the tradition had always been to distrust management, and the 
unforeseen crisis in 1993 confirmed their suspicions. At the time the production 
“boys” [sic] perceived trust as “dumping 200 [work colleagues] out the door... 
‘Your trust and team working has caused 20 lads to go that shouldn ’t have gone’” 
[they said] (convenor). Both managers and the union tried to level causality not at 
the trust developing between them, but at the loss of the Saab order, but this did not 
seem to convince. Since 1994, when in the words of the convenor the AEEU at 
EngineParts was rather like “a freemasonry” in its secrecy, the union 
representatives have tried to “open it up” to the members, but -  on the evidence 
gathered here -  with little success. Asked to describe relationships in 2001, the 
convenor pointed to relational-based trust, attributed to his having worked with the 
same men for over 20 years, and having seen the transition in attitudes and 
behaviours: “They've come on 100%", he remarked. But on the shopfloor, some had 
come to trust the managers with confidence (characterised as knowledge-based), but 
for others -  whom he judged to be “dinosaurs” -  enduring suspicions were 
overwhelming, and they were probably more calculative in their trust of 
management.
The shop steward, for his part, argued that he observed knowledge-based trust 
within EngineParts, and that this was “about the healthiest you can get... the ideal to 
aim for, because it doesn ’t harm you to be wary, there’s nothing wrong with that”. 
He explained his selection in somewhat calculative terminology, however: “Trust is 
earned and lost based on your last action; ‘you ’re only as good as the last game you 
played’ sort o f thing” [to use the football manager cliche]. This highlights the 
slippage between the two (calculative and knowledge bases for trust), and the
216
threshold between them (see chapter two). Later, he commented that in order to be 
trusted parties must “practice what you preach -  i f  you say you ’re going to do 
something, do it. Be as good as your word. You’ve got to back up your own words ”. 
This is consistency and integrity. Both men declared firmly that in a workplace 
situation identification-based trust was unattainable: “you ’11 never never never get 
[there], because you always have at the back o f your mind, ‘why does [management] 
want to do this? ’ ‘Is there a hidden agenda ’? There is always a thin dividing line 
[presumably between manager and worker]. In order to represent our members 
identification-based trust is not possible ”. Even though he confessed readily that he 
personally would trust something that the managers said, including the new MD, he 
would check for veracity “for the peace o f mind o f the members, not for my own. 
I t ’s what [the members] expect o f me”. During the course of the discussion we had 
talked about globalisation -  the Genoa riots had happened the week before -  and 
relations with Chicago are clearly strained. Both men said that deterrence-based trust 
prevailed in the minds of the local workforce toward Chicago: “We’re just numbers 
to them... It doesn’t matter how well we do here, the decision lies with the Yanks, 
that’s the galling part”. Asked to consider what might constitute a massive 
defection, or abuse of trust, both opted for a decision from Chicago to close the 
factory even if it is profitable. That they can envisage such a decision is indicative of 
the lack of trust.
One further insight from a former senior union representative highlighted one of the 
potential blind-spots of trust-based relations. The overriding commitment to secure 
an acceptable solution has sometimes meant that debate is stifled, with use of the 
word ‘negative’ to describe reservations or hostility toward a policy or strategy. Too 
ready a recourse to the word ‘negative’ could be corrosive of effective 
communication and joint decision-making, he felt.
The group leader, who was not involved in production, described relations in the 
early 1990s as calculus-based trust; it was “certainly not” as bad as deterrence- 
based trust. The “jum p” toward knowledge-based trust happened around 1994, after 
the crisis and the formulation of ‘The [EngineParts] Way’, and the changes to 
structures and certain individuals in certain positions (which remained unidentified 
by the respondent). In 2001 relationships had maintained a knowledge-based
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character, or “getting towards it they had not advanced as far as relational-based 
trust. Asked why, the group leader pointed to those employees who had once worked 
with 1,700 colleagues and were now working with just 200. They could “never 
forget” that. When the workforce composition changes, as new entrants arrive 
without the “baggage o f history”, relational-based trust may then prove possible.
Finally, the operative was reluctant to offer an opinion: “I  wouldn 7 like to point one 
out for my own opinion, or the factory’s ”. When pressed, she differentiated between 
people who “don’t trust the company whatsoever” -  primarily among the older 
generation -  and others who “want to believe that the company is working in their 
best interest... ” The former will not trust managers because “they’re not in control 
o f the company, and they ’re the worker, and [management] don’t really care about 
us, they just want to get the numbers out”. She personally did not feel that she had a 
“bond” (cf. relational-based trust) with EngineParts, but she did feel that the 
managers would try and sort any problems affecting her. Trust levels had not 
changed in her seven years at the plant.
Conclusion.
Much of the conclusion to the WhiskyCo case study can equally apply to this study. 
In both examples the testimonies of the key players indicate a long and positive 
history of close personal interactions that has led to a converging of minds and 
agendas, and provided clear evidence of each player’s integrity and consistency. As 
at WhiskyCo, EngineParts’ production operatives are much less enthusiastic about 
the partnership, but their criticisms also seem to lack the sufficient indignation to 
initiate a search for alternative courses of action. The partnership at EngineParts, 
again as at WhiskyCo, is heavily dependent on the goodwill secured, on a personal 
level, among the key players. That there has been a remarkable consistency in 
personnel has greatly aided the development of the relationships.
The catalyst for the improvement in relations was the greatly increased information 
sharing and willingness to engage in joint problem solving -  consistency and 
integrity, and integrative bargaining -  but since then the plant managers’ desire to 
reward the employees as well as run a profitable factory has helped generate a series 
of mutual gains that has demonstrated concern, and contributed to dampening
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workforce militancy. If this joint ‘mutual gains’ approach were to be suspended, the 
consequences for such a long-standing partnership would be serious.
The partnership is unquestionably a local phenomenon: what was especially 
interesting in the second round if interviews was the capacity of the Welsh 
employees to appreciate the trust-based relations at their site, but to harbour deep- 
seated animosities toward the parent company. This invites the reflection that even 
the most enduring local partnership can be undone in a moment by events or 
decisions taken elsewhere in the globe with little or no regard for the quality of the 
local relations.
That EngineParts is still there in south Wales is, in part, testament to the partnership 
relations nurtured at the plant. The partnership has withstood a series of 
extraordinary assaults on its founding principles, and so the case study serves as a 
valuable example of partnership’s adaptability, and endurance.
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Chapter 6.
Case study 3: SchoolWear. Narrative section.
I  first met a representative from SchoolWear (the Managing Director) in April 2001 to 
secure access. The first week of interviews took place the following week. I  returned once 
more, in July 2001, to conclude my follow-up interviews. The short gap was precipitated by
my deadline to finish my PhD.
Background.
SchoolWear was formed in 1988 as an entrepreneurial venture by its Managing 
Director with his school tutor and mentor. Both men invested £5,000 each in the 
idea of selling “personalised sports gear to anyone who’d buy it”. After 
experimenting in a number of markets the pair struck a mine of contracts with 
schools, and SchoolWear took off.
SchoolWear is a privately-owned enterprise encompassing three businesses: one 
division provides “personalised school wear” such as sweatshirts and satchels to 
over 3,000 UK schools (a sector in which it is the market leader); another does 
likewise for the health and leisure industries. A separate management training/ 
consultancy arm, Beanstalk, seeks to “promote [SchoolWear’s] philosophies and 
values ” as well as generating revenue. The entire operation is based on a single site 
on the outskirts of Sheffield.
The business process is uncomplicated: a national team of sales agents secure 
contracts with schools and organisations, and the orders are processed at 
SchoolWear’s headquarters. Designers create computer programs of the 
organisation’s logos and emblems. The finished program is then loaded onto disk 
and run on machines that either embroider or print the designs onto sweatshirts and 
satchels (sourced from external suppliers). The finished product is then packed, and 
despatched from the warehouse to the customer. As the majority of customers are 
schools, the work is highly seasonal, with the summer months prior to the new 
school year in September being intensely busy. To cope with the massively 
increased workload the firm uses a small pool of ‘casual’ staff.
Events leading to partnership9: the founders beliefs.
One of the noteworthy aspects of the formulation of SchoolWear’s version of 
partnership is that it has evolved from the birth of the firm, rather than coming as a
220
consequence of any one critical incident, or from a realisation that relations at work 
were not as effective as perhaps they could be.
The MD’s employee relations philosophy, then only beginning to coalesce into a 
coherent model, but since set out formally in the ‘Community Company’ document, 
was to create an enjoyable work environment for himself personally. (The Personnel 
Director borrowed Charles Handy’s phrase of “proper selfishness ” to describe his 
friend’s intentions.) This meant creating a “community ” at work based on shared 
interests, while fostering an ethic of individual ‘self-actualisation’ (cf. Maslow), or 
as the MD puts it, “vesting power back into individuals to sort out their own 
destiny... to shape their own futures. [SchoolWear] employees have a genuine 
capacity to affect their livelihoods”. This is a common ambition among the 
company’s managers: “[The MD] is genuinely motivated by a desire to want to see 
other people succeed. He gets a great deal o f satisfaction from taking something, 
nurturing it, seeing it grow, and developing people... He knows it’s good business to 
develop people ” (Personnel Director).
The founder’s ideas took root early - “with the first hire, [SchoolWear] became 
everyone s ” (MD) -  but when his mentor died suddenly and his widow elected to 
sell all but 5% of her 40% stake in the company, this presented an opportunity to 
enact the emerging philosophy. The MD offered the shares to SchoolWear’s staff.
Around 1994-95, six years into SchoolWear’s life, it had become apparent that the 
spirit inside the firm was something of "a rarity The senior managers were keen to 
examine this culture that, based on the foundations of the half-formed principles 
articulated above, had been inadvertently and incrementally established. The two 
men sought to define its qualities, what it was built upon, but also what might have a 
negative impact on it, and what steps could be taken to address such threats. A 
weekend workshop for all staff produced the text of a company ‘mission statement’ 
that year.
The firm continued to reflect annually upon its culture, but swift business growth 
postponed a fuller appraisal until 1998, when it was decided to hold a new series of 
staff workshops, lasting a whole day. There had been the temptation to take a short-
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cut, presenting staff with a pre-ordained model to comment upon. But for the 
managers, and many of the long-serving staff, "the model is more potent and 
meaningful because it has come from the staff... [accordingly] the culture is more 
tangible and decipherable. More concrete ” (MD).
In small cross-functional teams, facilitated by a trained member of staff from the 
superviser levels, the workforce asked themselves ‘‘Why does the company exist?” 
As part of this they debated the philosophical nature of democracy in society 
(viewed in retrospect as the "weakest section ”, as it sent the discussions off in an 
unhelpful direction), and then democracy in the workplace, before moving to 
consider the practicalities of trying to establish a democratic work organisation 
within SchoolWear. From these discussions the teams generated overall themes that 
sought to encapsulate what seemed to be the company’s beliefs and values: “Stuff 
like ‘listening to each other’, ‘being honest’, ‘beingfriendly’” (Personnel officer). A 
production worker recalled “job security, flexibility and security, employers ’ duties 
and employees ’ duties... ” These admittedly vague themes remained broadly defined, 
deliberately so since agreeing on final wording was likely to waste time and descend 
into pedantic debate. A few were put to a general vote as to whether they should stay 
or go.
The twin aspirations of community and individual success were embodied in the 
resultant statement, ‘We believe’, an update on the firm’s previous mission 
statement:
“It is the mission o f  [SchoolWear] to offer people with shared goals and values, the 
opportunity for continued personal and professional development, by cultivating a 
caring and rewarding environment where people feel inspired, respected and 
appreciated. ”
It is noteworthy that the statement eschews completely any profit motive, and is 
wholly employee-centric.
Over the following two years senior managers returned to the workshops’ themes, 
and decided that the firm’s core beliefs -  as identified - required underpinning 
support in the shape of, in the first instance, a further declaration of principles, but
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also a set of formal policies and practices. These ‘pillars’ were needed if the 
community were not to crumble. A second ‘Development Day’ took place the 
following year, again off-site and again involving the entire workforce. Follow-up 
interviews with individuals clarified points, and the text was finalised by The MD 
and the Personnel Director “according to the spirit o f the staff input”. The theories 
on cultural management from Rob Goffee and Gareth Jones were a huge influence, 
especially around developing ‘sociability’ at work. (SchoolWear’s culture is heavily 
slanted toward norms of sociability.) A revised draft was sent back to the group 
leaders and staff for one last nod of approval and became the company’s official 
philosophy in March 2000.
Partnership at SchoolWear -  ‘The Community Company’.
Within an expansive document entitled ‘The Community Company model’ is the 
firm’s “vision ” statement, and its partnership model. For the firm it provides “living 
proof that fiscal accomplishment can be derived from a philanthropic culture that 
accords every individual equality in respect o f perceived value within its 
community” (SchoolWear, 2000: p7).
The model comprises the six ‘pillars’ upon which the community relies upon for its 
continued coherence and viability. The document explains: “The fortification o f 
organisational culture beyond the altruism o f a few well-meaning individuals is 
essential i f  substance and longevity is desired” (ibid: p9). To each pillar is assigned 
a classic mutual exchange of ‘rights’ with corresponding ‘responsibilities’. Each pair 
is intended to provide acceptable mutual “obligations ” between the company and 
the individual employee, but to be balanced to “ensure that the company and the 
individual employee do not intrude too much on each other” (a Director). The 
essential underlying theme is how best people interact with, and treat, each other. 
The pillars, and the rights and responsibilities, are detailed in Table 10. They have 
been incorporated formally into the firm’s constitution -  “set in stone” (MD) - to 
commit the community’s members to its strictures, independent of individuals’ 
altruistic vision (and for the MD’s own peace of mind, should anything happen to 
him). It would require 76% of the shareholders to amend it. (Over a third of the 
workforce is a shareholder.) At an individual level, a legally-binding agreement to 
abide by the model’s strictures is written into the employment contract,
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institutionalising the principles further: “It is a psychological contract, what we ’re 
asking people to sign. We do ask people to think very carefully about what they ’re 
taking on ” (Director).45
Table 10: SchoolWear ‘pillars’, rights and responsibilities.
PILLAR RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES
Information and 
involvement
Access to information and 
involvement in decision­
making
Open and honest participation
Fair reward Fair reward, avoiding 
indecent salary differentials
Honest endeavour and 
commitment
Shared
prosperity
Shared prosperity through 
profit-sharing and share 
ownership
Full contribution to the 
community effort
Employment
protection
Employment protection Flexibility and adaptability
Application of 
organisational 
values
To be treated with fairness, 
consistency, respect and 
support
Protection and enhancement of 
the community by showing 
fairness, consistency, respect and 
support
Development
opportunities
Training and opportunities 
for development
Commitment to meeting training 
objectives and to developing in 
harmony with the needs of the 
community
The full text of the ‘Community Company’ is now viewed as rather over-blown and 
in need of trimming, and indeed over the 55 pages (plus appendices) the rambling 
text does become rather repetitive and imprecise, and feels only loosely structured.
The re-drafting is being done because the firm is keen for the community model to 
be disseminated more widely and tested in other firms: “I t ’s redundant i f  it is just 
[SchoolWear]-s/?ecz/zc”. The ‘pillars’ and ‘vision’ are “fine, and w on’t really be 
changed”, but more needs to be said about “the heart and soul o f  the company, and 
its values ” (MD). Likely omissions will be the unnecessary and overly prescriptive 
expanse o f specific detail on the firm’s operational processes, and the opening 
section on globalisation and the primary purpose of business etc, which is, as one 
Director conceded, “a bit o f  a rant!”
45 The terms o f  a SchoolWear employee's contract have never been tested in a tribunal, but the firm's lawyers 
are confident that they are indeed legally enforceable.
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Partnership at SchoolWear: structures and practices.
This section takes each of the ‘pillars’ in turn, and describes how each is reflected 
and enacted in SchoolWear’s employment policies.
‘Information sharing and involvement in decision-making’.
This entails comprehensive information sharing and the entitlement to be consulted 
on significant work concerns of both immediate interest and strategic interest. 
Information shared covers “anything significant relating to the trading performance 
and financial prosperity o f the company, together with any other items o f general 
interest that may impact positively on people’s feelings o f ownership and attachment 
to their company The consultation part is defined as “the engagement o f people in 
the discussions that take place about issues affecting the direction o f their roles and 
the organisation as a whole” (SchoolWear, 2000: pl4-15).
What this means in practice is that employees are entitled to receive pertinent and 
timely information in a variety of forums (both team-based and company-wide), and 
to be consulted prior to business decisions being taken, whether through an 
invitation for suggestions on policy direction, or for comment on a proposed policy. 
Staff input thus falls short of frequent joint decision-making, but is rather more than 
a token solicitation of views after the event. A Personnel officer compared what 
(s)he considered consultation outside SchoolWear to be - “Managers saying to staff, 
‘we’re going to do this; is this all right?’” -  with her representation of their 
particular arrangements: “ 'Here is what we ’re thinking about this; any ideas?”’
Practice is split among four meetings that take place every month sequentially. The 
first takes place at the most local level in different sections of the company (teams 
within departments: production, sales, etc), and are known as Action Groups. 
Typically led by the team leader or relevant manager, the meetings cover the team’s 
specific operational issues, key performance indicators, plus matters of direct 
concern and company-wide issues that require input from the staff: “I t ’s important 
to give the ‘big picture’ and to revisit it” (a Director). They are primarily 
information sharing exercises, and a number of management respondents conceded 
that information tends to be disseminated on a “need-to-know ” basis. Not too many 
staff had noticed this discretion, though. Staff members have the opportunity to raise
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issues that can then go to the senior-level committees, and shopfloor respondents 
confirmed that this often happens. Examples are given below. Participation (in the 
sense of contributing suggestions or comments) is not compulsory: “Some find it 
easier to speak out in public than others ” (a Director), but while it is “OK to say 
nothing in the meetings, it is not appropriate to moan [about the meeting] 
afterwards ” (a Director). Clear ground rules are set out in the model: to be punctual 
and conscious of time limits, to participate (but not to dominate or hesitate), to 
respect others’ opinions, and to take decisions (both in the consultation process and 
in the ownership of the final outcome).
Following the series of Action Groups the ‘Departmental’ meetings are scheduled a 
week later, and can last for half a day. Led by the departmental Director, the 
department discusses its performance as a whole, as well as any department-wide 
concerns arising from the previous Action Groups.
The ‘Managers-Directors’ meeting follows later in the month after the 
‘Departmentals’. Proposals for company-wide strategy and decisions are formulated 
here in the first instance, informed by data from the firm’s key performance 
indicators, as well as discussion of personnel issues from each department: 
recruitment, disciplinary matters, absenteeism, etc. Directors tend to prefer 
submitting consultation papers for discussion, rather than the arguably more 
democratic -  but, equally arguably, the more cumbersome -  ‘blank-sheet-of-paper’ 
approach. The former works better for SchoolWear, but the Directors are sensitive to 
presenting decisions as a fait accompli. One manager felt it was rare that the 
Directors “just make a decision without involving sta ff\ Any significant 
recommendations or corrective measures for improving performance or changes to 
employment conditions are taken back to the Action Groups for staff input prior to 
the final decision.
Finally, there is what is known as the ‘Figures’ meeting. The entire company 
assembles in the canteen to hear about financial performance, sales records, 
projections, and business issues. All are communicated openly, in line with the right 
enshrined in the pillar, but also to stop speculation and rumours flying. The 
Directors are committed to informing the community about significant business
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developments. Shopfloor input here is limited, perhaps because the forum is so 
large, but also the company clearly prefers that the Action Groups remain the most 
appropriate forum for staff input. To supplement communication the company 
produces a weekly A4 newsletter.
There is also provision for ad hoc meetings as issues arise, especially for critical 
incidents. Two examples were the decision to abandon a failing and costly business 
venture, and an offer put to the MD to sell up. Once some careful wording had been 
put together the whole workforce was called in to the canteen, and both situations 
were explained candidly. All those interviewed valued the MD’s honesty.
‘Fair reward’.
In the ‘Community Company’ fair reward for community members arrives “through 
the collective efforts o f citizens and is structured to ensure that all benefit fairly from 
the wealth created by the community”. Actual levels of reward are set within the 
constraint of keeping the community together as a coherent and harmonious group. 
The firm is especially mindful of keeping the ratio between salaries and turnover the 
same, and avoiding wherever possible large income differentials which might 
damage community cohesion. And yet a seeming paradox is that, although the 
‘Community Company’ model cites “collective effort, ” basic salaries are set 
according to individualised performance-related pay, measuring abilities but also 
each employee’s “attitudes ”. The points of reference are the pillars and rights and 
responsibilities, which “make it infinitely easier to gauge [attitudes] by” (MD). An 
example might be the employee’s commitment to ‘shared effort’ shown in the hectic 
summer months. Individuals’ salary increases are set annually in the ‘Managers- 
Directors’ meeting, whose collective judgement provides checks and balances 
against victimisation or favouritism.
A further constraint dictates that the highest salary should not stray beyond 10 times 
that of the lowest paid member of the workforce (ibid: p51).46 Large discrepancies in 
salary levels within a job group are held in check by salary bands. For the firm this
46 In addition, there are further efforts to reinforce the principle o f  a curb on excessive levels o f  inequality, 
including a stated ceiling o f  £25 per night on overnight accommodation (or at least "getting best value, as it's 
everyone else’s money y o u ’re spending"), and Directors' express reluctance to indulge in expensive cars and 
the like, fo r  fear o f  "the bottom o f  the company becoming detachedfrom [the top]
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policy is “a philosophical question about how people should be rewarded” based on 
principles of “justice... Across-the-board increases are completely unfair and de­
motivating, because it doesn ’t reward individuals ’ own effort, and going the ‘extra 
mile’” (MD). When asked to comment upon what might seem a conflict between a 
community culture and a pay scheme that rewards people individually, the MD 
denied there was “an inconsistency as long as it is kept within the realms o f 
decency ”.
There are concerns, conceded by the Personnel team, that in basic pay terms -  see 
below for ‘shared prosperity’ -  SchoolWear is “underpaying” some of its staff. All 
non-managerial staff are comfortably above the minimum wage, and none are on 
less than £10,000 p.a., and if the market median is judged within the (low-paying) 
textiles industry the company is confident that it pays above that mark. But from 
benchmarking around comparable firms in south Yorkshire it is apparent that pay is 
low throughout the organisation - especially so for managers, interestingly, who earn 
considerably less than they might do elsewhere. Employee turnover is seldom over 
pay, it was claimed, and in thirteen years’ operation only four managers have left the 
company (none over pay). For this case study no employee complained about his or 
her basic salary package. “Most people would rather we have a sensible pay policy 
than increase our fixed costs and put the company at risk” (MD).
‘Shared prosperity’.
Basic pay can be bolstered by company-related performance bonuses. The 
articulated exchange of ‘rights’ and ‘responsibilities’ is that to enjoy the fruits of 
shared prosperity each community member must make a full and fair contribution to 
the community effort.
To describe first the employees’ entitlements from the ‘right’, the company operates 
a profit-related bonus, with each member below Director level receiving an even 
share of the spoils regardless of status within the firm. (Part-timers and those 
arriving part-way through a year receive a share on a pro rata basis.) The profit 
bonus is triggered once the firm has secured more than 5% net pre-tax profit, which 
is enough to keep the company in operation. Based on turnover of £5m a 10% bonus
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would mean £39,356 shared between the 90 employees; 5% would mean sharing 
£14,363.47
A “key principle” (MD) is that all employees with more than two years’ service are 
entitled to buy shares in the company. The ‘Community Company’ document posits 
the rationale as being “about offering people the opportunity to acquire a stake in 
their own future. Providing people with a real opportunity to significantly impact 
their long-term financial security and well-being, directly, through their own efforts, 
both motivates and inspires” (ibid: p35). The model discusses owner-managers’ 
risk, but offers no comment on the risk undertaken by employees. Appendices set 
out formal commitments on the percentage of shares to be offered to the workforce 
as the company’s history lengthens. Thus, 5% of shares should be in employee 
hands by the firm’s fifth birthday, up to 15% between 11-15 years of existence 
[where SchoolWear are now], to the eventual goal of 20% after 16 years. The annual 
distribution of shares is “extremely well publicised” through newsletters, monthly 
meetings, and in a fact sheet (MD). Much of the publicity exercise is educational, so 
that employees know the implications of participating in share trading. Over a third 
of the workforce (37.8%) own shares in the firm, including almost 29% of all those 
in the non-managerial grades (a total holding of nearly 2.4% of all the shares). 
Managers and Directors own 1% and 0.072% respectively. The holding company 
controls the majority: 93.5% [from company figures].
When asked whether the firm had seen employee-owners seeking to exercise their 
ownership rights over company decision-making the MD reported none: “But that 
say is already there, the opportunity for that input is already there ”. The Personnel 
Director cited an emergency meeting of the firm’s shareholders for which nobody 
turned up, a number of employees telling him that they trusted the senior 
management to act in their best interests.
The corresponding ‘responsibility’ requires of all employees a full contribution of 
effort to the success of the firm. All employees, when interviewed, accepted this 
‘pillar’ without serious concerns, one warehouse worker seeing it as the embodiment
47 2001 had been a successful year, with around £60,000 profits to share equally among the worfforce. Prior to 
that, three years ago was the last good year (around 10%); the intervening two years — compounded by the 
failed business venture — had seen a bonus around half that figure.
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of "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay The most contentious challenge comes 
in the summer when extra weekend working -  two Saturdays in June, July and 
August - is required of everyone, including the Managing Director. A rota appears 
on a noticeboard in April and each employee must sign up at times convenient to 
himself or herself wherever possible. The ‘Community Company’ strictures are 
often utilised to secure equitable compliance -  and not only by managers. For some, 
on occasion, the obligation to work extra hours is annoying, especially during the 
summer when the temperature in the warehouse can get uncomfortably high, even in 
south Yorkshire. A new time banking system (amended following suggestions and 
observations from the staff) has helped smooth the process. In essence, time worked 
over and above contractual hours (in half-hour ‘denominations’) can now be taken 
off, with the agreement of one’s line manager, at a later date. The aim is that 
everyone reaches zero by April each year. Before the time banking, employees were 
calculating their actual hours worked (including the ‘unpaid overtime’ as they 
perceived it), relating it to their take-home salary, and coming up with a very low 
hourly rate. The time banking is very popular.
A complementary sickness absence bonus rewards 100% attendance with £100, and 
each day taken off removes £20 from this total available bonus. With the tacit 
approval of the managers employees use the ‘time banking’ system to protect their 
absence bonus.
‘Employment protection’.
The company rationale on its employment security guarantee was developed after 
the MD watched with dismay a fashion for “laying staff off at the first signal o f a 
drop in profitability... [It begs the question] ‘Why does a company exist? ' To make a 
profit, yes, but also for the benefit o f its people. Profit... should not be the be-all and 
end-all. It's 'people before the profit’ [at SchoolWear].” The intention is to give 
employees “security o f mind... I f  life is about giving and taking, rights and 
responsibilities within a cohesive society, then i f  [employee X] has given their 
commitment, loyalty and dedication -  and ‘time served' is a simplistic measure, but 
it's the best we can come up with - surely there is a right to some [employment] 
security and peace o f mind in return? "
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All those with two continuous years’ service have a guarantee that they will not be 
subject to enforced (i.e.: compulsory) redundancy. Expectations of staff are high, so 
"using the ‘give-and-take argument, it’s a fair balance... After two years [here] 
you’ve earned that security o f mind” (MD). Also, ‘‘i f  they’re good people we don’t 
want to let them go. But they have to be flexible” (Personnel Director).
Guarantees of employment security are often criticised as a luxury in good times that 
can be easily withdrawn when fortunes turn for the worse. The Personnel Director 
was not concerned: ‘‘It doesn’t really constrain the company. I t ’s not that big a 
risk”. Provisions for major programmes of redundancy are not set down in a written 
policy, as yet. But, ‘‘we would take every step before cutting the staff overhead cost” 
(MD). Volunteers would be sought first, then employees who had been with the firm 
less than two years, and so are not covered by the guarantee, would have to go next. 
“Then, i f  we think about this as a true community, with mechanisms for enjoying the 
good times together, we also have to share some o f the pain. So everybody might 
have to take less out for a period...” If that did happen, the MD predicts, “those on 
the periphery [of the organisation, and its values] would most likely jump ship, thus 
easing the burden for others... The majority would want to tough things out”. The 
fall-out from the failed business venture meant that the few of those recruited for the 
endeavour that wished to remain within the firm were redeployed.
‘Application of organisational values’.
SchoolWear’s stringent set of values requires significant staff buy-in at all levels, 
lest the community ethos be weakened and undermined. This is well recognised.
The firm clearly relies on identifying, recruiting and retaining suitable people to the 
community from the locality, a point not lost on several respondents from all levels. 
‘Cultural fit’ is the most important criteria for appointments, by which is meant a 
person’s motivations and what a member of Personnel termed “emotional 
resilience”. Before the interview, a copy of the ‘We Believe’ statement and the 
community model is sent to each candidate, with the expectation that they arrive at 
the interview prepared to discuss their impressions of both. In the selection 
interview, that can last over two hours, candidates are grilled on their own 
compatibility with the model and its implied attitudes and behaviours; what
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Personnel explained as “getting at the heart o f the person - the human beinz, not 
the human doing” [i.e.: a person’s character as depicted by their passions and 
response to difficult decisions, rather than their vocational experience and abilities]. 
Interview questions probe the lessons for life gleaned from schooldays, and 
incidents when work required the candidate to do something (s)he didn’t enjoy. In 
addition, each candidate is asked to fill in the Kolb Learning Styles inventory. 
Personnel denied that using Kolb was a screening process that only nominated 
certain personalities for selection, but SchoolWear is predictably full of 
‘accommodators’: “I f  you’re looking for a culture without interdependence [with 
other people] you will struggle here! ” At the interview stage candidates are given 
the opportunity to “de-select themselves” if they are unlikely to fit in with the 
culture.
For those who are accepted into the community considerable lengths are undertaken 
to inculcate the articulated values, in particular urging participation in what might be 
described as ‘cultural education schemes’. These include the bi-annual company- 
wide ‘Development Days’, which the MD ensures are not postponed or relegated to 
secondary status. This in any case would send contrary signals. Company trips -  
such as treasure hunts - also have an educational, cohesive purpose as well as the fun 
involved.
But the most important tranche of the cultural education programme is the 
‘community classes’, which have the objectives “to protect, evolve and develop the 
culture One Director described them as putting “the meat on the bones ” of the 
model. The seven classes run from October to April and are open to all on a 
voluntary basis, although it is apparent that internal career progression requires an 
effort to engage at a more advanced level with the organisation’s philosophy and 
values. They have “unquestionably aided the development o f future managers. You 
simply don ’t become a manager if  you haven’t done z/”(MD).
Attendance is not sufficient; there is homework too. This consists mainly of relating 
the lessons to real-life examples, and reflecting on key learning points. Personnel 
assesses, rather than marks, employees’ thoughts, and offers feedback and
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supplementary guidance, as required.48 The classes would seem to be popular, 
enjoyable and worthwhile if measured by employee participation rates, which have 
risen year on year: “There is a significant number o f employees that do want to 
delve a bit deeper... And the more [educational and cultural] work is done the 
healthier company becomes ” (MD). "Knowing it [the community ethos, through the 
classes] is an added bonus ”, agreed one supervisee
How does the company deal with dissent, conflict of interest, or employees 
‘slacking’? In the words of one Director, the company cannot ignore “damaging 
behaviours”. The community’s values -  to which all employees have formally 
subscribed -  place clear parameters around what is acceptable behaviour at work. 
Part of the appeal of the firm’s ‘rights and responsibilities’ psychological contract 
with each member is that the same rules apply equally to all. They are the 
company’s rules. While “the closer you are to owning the values, the less [the 
requirement to] *care’ restricts your behaviours” (Director) it is nevertheless 
apparent that when behaviours diverge from the model the community “self- 
polices”. A Personnel officer described how: “You can take people back to the 
pillars and say ‘you’re not doing that’ [i.e.: pointing to one of the pillars]” or 
“‘What is the consequence to the community o f your behaviour?’... You can take 
them into a room to put the emphasis back on them and how they look to others. It 
nips things in the bud”. A senior member in production elaborated on the attitudinal 
emphasis of the self-policing: “We encourage people to deal with [conflict] because 
you can get a lot o f good out o f conflict... We would deal with [human error] as a 
training issue. We want to coach them through it. I f  someone doesn’t take seriously 
[their responsibility to minimise wastage, for example] we need to treat that attitude 
seriously... So, i f  someone’s not pulling their weight you ’re looking at [the pillar of] 
fair reward’... ” Similarly, the values and the culture engendered seem to have 
generated their own powerful peer pressures to conform, and to contribute (a more 
or less) equal effort to the cause49 Managers find the set of values a useful
48 One such example o f  homework, from  a member o f  the production team, reads: "I found the community 
classes quite beneficial, giving you the philosophy o f  the company and spelling out the expectations o f  being able 
to work in a relaxed atmosphere. The classes allowed you to meet other people, find  out about them and their 
roles within the company. It showed how we could benefit from each other by sharing our ideas. The company 
vision being, being able to share our goals and values. To be treated as part o f  a team and working in a caring 
and rewarding environment".
49 During the course o f  this research, several sta ff members, including summer casuals, volunteered to arrive at 
work early in the morning to complete a self-imposed despatch deadline.
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restraining tool, since it is “very important that managers need to identify when the 
wrong messages are being sent out and processing that, [by] listening and being 
there for people ”. Said a Director, “we’re there to help, but the person must address 
the problem ”. Intriguingly, some managers wondered aloud whether the firm is too 
tolerant at times, too keen to pursue joint problem-solving, while one or two non- 
managerial employees recounted minor incidents when managers’ reaction to non- 
compliance seemed harsh. But the reluctance to resort to disciplinary procedures 
was seen as a sign of the community’s strength by the MD.
Securing adherence to the values is “interwoven ” into managers’ daily activities: “It 
is the responsibility o f the managers and Directors to uphold the culture. The formal 
role is to facilitate the rights and responsibilities, but the informal role is treating 
people fairly, and being open and honest” (a Director). Management by walkabout 
and maintaining a high visibility around one’s teams is considered critical, and was 
readily evident to all team members: “We are really receptive to team mood, and 
are constantly testing the temperature” (Director). Mediating and resolving conflict 
is a key element of the training given to SchoolWear’s management team, the 
content including “group dynamics and helping people to deal with issues... team 
training, dealing with concerns and conflict, and disciplinary and grievance 
procedures ”. Mentoring of managers and supervisers by more senior managers aims 
to improve understanding and practice. The mentoring works on three levels -  
‘thoughts’, ‘feelings’ and ‘actions’ - with programmes to promote understanding of 
the first two, and specific training to improve the last category.
‘Development opportunities’.
The model explains that development “activates people’s desire to take 
opportunities for personal growth” in line with Glasser’s four ‘need pathways’: the 
need for fun and excellence, the need to belong, the need for power and 
responsibility, and the need for freedom (SchoolWear, 2000: p29), but also so that 
the firm can “grow and flourish ” (ibid).
Each employee is entitled to two appraisal interviews scheduled a year, and the 
company promises “appropriate support and training” under the proviso that 
individuals’ development “can only occur in the context o f the needs o f the
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community... I t ’s everyone’s money we’re spending... I t ’s reasonable to ask 'what 
value is this going to have? ” '(MD). Managers’ coaching of their staff through the 
‘learning cycle’, plus the skills and cultural classes all contribute to this pillar.
Sustainability? The future.
A curious feature of the SchoolWear case study is that there is rather little narrative 
to recount. With the exception of the failed business venture in 2000 the firm has 
not seen too many significant business events, and even this episode does not seem 
to have been too traumatic. It did not feature prominently in respondents’ accounts 
of the history of the firm. Most expressed sadness for the MD that his energy and 
effort had gone unrewarded, and that the firm would continue under different 
strategies.
Otherwise SchoolWear has continued to expand and grow. In 2001 it posted 
£650,000 profits on a turnover of £6.5 million, and after weathering a downturn 
following the collapse of the business venture the company has restored its profit 
margins again, and is looking forward to further growth.
Staff input into strategic issues came under review in 2001. The management team 
considered the consultative arrangements to be “reasonably effective... getting a lot 
better. Employees are reasonably interested, but it’s the local issues that get the 
most response, or input ”. The management team was “seeking the balance between 
staff input and delivery”, and in particular how the Action Groups feed their 
contributions into the strategic discussions. One Director argued that the firm is 
seeking “the right balance where the stafffeel valued, but they’re not under too 
much pressure to participate ”. A special working party -  the Strategy Group - was 
established to look at possible improvements. Everyone received a summary report 
of research into the likely future business direction, and the Strategy Group’s 
recommendations for action. Staff input was expected to follow, initially in the 
Action Groups, and reported directly back to the Strategy Group. The company is 
also examining ways of making it “as certain as possible ” that shareholders have 
more freedom to sell, while retaining the majority of total shares within the 
SchoolWear workforce. The Directors are keen to confer certain, as yet identified, 
business decisions to the discretion of the workforce.
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In November 2001 it was considering the purchase of nearby land for a second site 
to accommodate its expansion. This strategy has been debated with the workforce, 
at specially convened all-workforce meetings, and in ‘Departmentals’. As a 
consequence its payroll may soon come to exceed 130, which many of the Directors 
concede could prove to be a threshold for sustaining such a values-based and 
intensely personalised community. The aim is to avoid having too many people on 
any one site which, it is felt, might diminish the intensive personal contact time that 
sustains (and in part, monitors) adherence to the company’s strong values. The 
challenge then becomes a selection of which "seam” to break the company up 
along to retain a "connectivity, togetherness and camaraderie”. (See ‘Analysis’.)
In addition, sustained expansion will require extra capital funds, and the firm may 
need to solicit outside investment, introducing potentially alien ambitions and 
objectives into the community. The MD is insistent that the company could only 
engage into an alliance with people compatible with the company’s values, and 
thought that their suppliers might prove interested in the first instance. In any 
scenario no more than 25% of the firm would be allowed to pass into external 
ownership. The whole workforce would, as a matter of principle, be involved in the 
final decision. During any expansion company decision-making will remain "as 
true as possible” to the community’s original values; the firm would be "in 
trouble”, he predicts, if primacy was given to shareholder demands over 
community needs. Because of its relative youth (13 years) and size (around 90 
employees) SchoolWear has been able to sustain its culture during expansion. This 
will remain its key challenge for the future.
Case study 3 -  SchoolWear. Analysis section: Partnership.
In this section I first examine the extent to which the people management practices 
within SchoolWear coincide with the IPA partnership model. I then go on to discuss 
how the partnership developed, relating its progress to the model in Figure 4, and 
then I assess the nature of the partnership arrangements. Table 11 indicates that the
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people management practices within SchoolWear correspond closely to the criteria 
for a strong partnership arrangement, with one notable and contestable exception:
Table 11 — Partnership at SchoolWear.
Partnership element Present?
Joint commitment to the success of the enterprise ©
Recognition of the legitimate interests of each party ?
Building trust-based relationships ©
Increasing employee involvement ©
Extensive information sharing ©
Consultation with employees at workplace and organisational level ©
Employment security provisions (in exchange for flexible work
practices)
©
Sharing the success of the enterprise ©
Principles.
SchoolWear has, like its employee-owned counterparts the John Lewis Partnership 
and St Lukes Communications, sought to define, codify and institutionalise its 
cultural norms, and to design and implement a complementary set of principles, 
policies and practices that support this culture.
The firm’s ‘Community Company’ model and ‘We believe’ statement articulates its 
common objective. However, interestingly the definition, or conceptualisation, of 
“success” for SchoolWear is not expressed in commercial or even operational 
terms, but instead emphasises as its ‘raison d’etre’ the personal advancement and 
welfare of the employees.
Its distinctive culture has not been consciously designed to develop trust, but 
considerable energy is invested in the behaviours identified by Whitener et al as 
being conducive to “trustworthiness”. The principles enshrine a curious mix of 
individual responsibility and reward, combined with a clear call for collective, 
mutually beneficial effort. In addition, the culture encourages and relies upon an 
agreed exchange of empathy, bolstered by monitoring of adherence to community 
principles. (See ‘Analysis’ below.)
The model has rather less to say on the principle accepting that there are legitimate 
and separate differences between employees’ interests and those of the firm. This is
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not acknowledged, and the SchoolWear management team do use strongly unitarist 
language to describe themselves and the firm. But I would argue that with the firm’s 
attentive paternalism there is extensive focus on satisfying these employees’ 
interests (decent pay, a positive working environment, provision for an employee 
voice, and opportunities for personal advancement). A Director identified “the 
access to information, the involvement in decision-making, and employee share 
ownership” as indicative of SchoolWear’s focus on its workforce’s needs which, he 
believed, then had “an impact on the business [performance]”. Indeed, if anything, 
the interests of the employer (efficiencies, productivity improvements, profitability) 
are downplayed.
Practices.
Representation of the interests of the workforce, and informing and consulting the 
workforce, comes in a variety of forums at SchoolWear, which are not pluralist in 
the sense that they accommodate separate interests, but they clearly satisfy Coupar’s 
criterion for non-union firms that the employee voice be adequately heard, and 
acted upon (see chapter one).
Employee involvement in decision-making may seem modest, but it does not appear 
to be a cosmetic exercise either, and it is very popular. From the anecdotal evidence 
gathered in this case study it would seem that the ‘shopfloor’ and management 
agree that staff input is frequently and consistently sought, and that non-managerial 
staff wield significant influence on the fate and direction of the firm: “There is an 
abundance o f evidence that it lives on a daily basis ” (Personnel officer); a Director 
argued that staff are “hugely influential” on workplace decisions. Non-managerial 
staff broadly concurred, albeit more cautiously: they had “a lot” of opportunities 
for input into decision-making, and this was “very good”; it made one “feel 
valued”. Shopfloor employees found the local-level Action Group meetings 
valuable, even “rowdy”. One, however, suspected that Action Groups elsewhere in 
the firm might not work as well as that of her own team. Another employee looked 
back over her two years with the firm, and could not think of a decision she thought 
had been unfair, or that she hadn’t agreed with.
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Examples of staff influence over company policy were several: the profit-sharing 
bonus scheme was amended extensively after Action Groups “found holes ” in the 
Directors’ original idea. A set of options was presented to the workforce in the 
Action Groups as to what should be company policy on retirement age, and the 
consultation revealed a preference for 65 over 60; it was adopted as company policy 
shortly afterwards. The workforce has also amended policy on dress codes, and 
made suggestions for the company’s welcome pack. At the local workplace level, 
the warehouse Action Group proposed some sensible amendments to invoicing 
processes that saved £8,000 in postage, and also came up with their own system for 
locating boxes for despatch among the several thousand stored.
As for the other elements of the IP A partnership model, SchoolWear’s ‘Community 
Company’ makes explicit the trade-off between a guaranteed employment security 
and the introduction of flexible work practices and sufficient effort on the part of 
the workforce.
Finally, while SchoolWear concedes that its pay levels are, against some standards, 
rather low the profit-sharing and share ownership scheme do offer employees the 
chance to share in the firm’s success. Furthermore, subscribers to SchoolWear’s 
idiosyncratic definition of what constitutes “success” might include the ‘community 
classes’ and the training opportunities as going some way toward fulfilling this 
element.
Analysis: the nature of partnership at SchoolWear.
The first point needs to reiterate the central importance of the community 
continuing to identify, recruit and retain suitable people to the community from the 
locality, a point not lost on several respondents from all levels. Once in SchoolWear 
for more than six months it is apparent that people thoroughly enjoy working there.
All respondents described a positive, very friendly, and respectful work 
environment, although a number indicated that there were occasional tensions. First 
impressions were admiring, tinged with bemusement and traditional Yorkshire 
scepticism. The concern that the rhetoric might not be matched by reality was a 
common response. One manager thought upon her first reading of ‘We believe’:
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“This is good stuff, perhaps a bit ‘touchy-feely [I wondered] Can it work in 
practice? ” Another manager wondered whether the cultural aspirations were “fluffy 
nonsense ”. But, he went on to explain, “I  saw the evidence during visits, and I  
thought ‘this is i n c r e d i b l e Shopfloor employees were less expansive, but 
reiterated comparably enthusiastic sentiments. The people met at the first interview 
were “great”, “everyone was dead nice” and “really smiley”, although at the same 
time the atmosphere was “really weird” and “very strange”. The friendliness took 
many aback, as most had indeed been used to distant and indifferent styles of 
management.
Many employees, from all levels, sincerely argued that there is minimal hierarchical 
status within the firm, although this would seem to be derived more from the general 
atmosphere at the headquarters offices than a study of the firm’s organisational 
chart, since a list of employees reveals a striking number of job classifications. That 
said, it is true that the informal dress code, open-plan office (and lack of comer 
offices), plus the overall friendliness of many of the employees, does mean that 
easily recognisable symbols of organisational status are not apparent to the visitor.
Respondents were unanimous about the significance of the ‘rights’ and 
‘responsibilities’, albeit with varying degrees of conviction and detailed analysis, 
and when asked to explain the six ‘pillars’ most were able to provide a sketch, if not 
quite a word-perfect recitation. Unsurprisingly, after the two main authors of the 
final text (the MD and Personnel Director), the other managers and the Personnel 
support team were most effusive. Managers are more inclined to engage with such 
nebulous issues (and at SchoolWear have been recmited, in part, for their interest 
and enthusiasm for such matters). The ‘pillars’ “underpin the whole model” (a 
Director); they are “the glue that holds us all together ”; they constitute a sort of 
“moral code” (Personnel officer); “it lives on an everyday basis” (Director). 
Another Personnel officer argued that setting the pillars down on paper, and then 
enshrining them in employees’ contracts, means that “it’s not ‘up-in-the-air’, nicey- 
nicey waffle, i t’s more concrete”.
What of non-managerial staff? Every shopfloor/ administrative employee expressed 
unambiguous support for the SchoolWear way of working, albeit with varying
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degrees of conviction. All agreed that the ‘pillars’ are reasonable and make sense to 
them. They are, for one sales employee, "probably totally” responsible for the 
culture engendered, one (s)he described as a "caring, rewarding, and inspiring 
environment”. A production superviser enthused, "it’s fantastic... When I  read it 
and went to the [training] it really made sense tome... You can’t go wrong with it”. 
A warehouse worker said, "it’s a very positive way o f running a business ”. Another 
involved in production described it as "common sense, and in practice i t’s brilliant. 
98% o f the time it works” - the other 2% he put down to individual reactions to 
frustrations. But, he concluded, "the company is great, i t’s a good thing”. An 
administrative officer claimed that her home life had improved as a consequence of 
the positive atmosphere and friendly people she works with: "sounds sick really, ” 
she confessed. Someone in the sales team did not regard the pillars as "just a piece 
o f writing. The philosophy is for a nice working environment, and putting it into 
practice ”. A young man working in the warehouse confessed that SchoolWear had 
given him a fresh chance to make something of himself, after failing at school.
It is not the case that all scepticism and conflict has been eradicated. One otherwise 
enthusiastic production employee admitted the cultural aspects were, for him, "a 
load o f nonsense... I  take it as it comes, and don’t bother about it”. A  colleague’s 
attitude was similar: "I don’t think about [the culture], Ijust come and get on with it. 
But you don’t have to throw yourself into it, you can be an interested onlooker”.
Tellingly, a few production/ administrative staff could not remember too many 
precise details, and one or two confessed to having forgotten, or not studied, much 
of the model.50 One or two others appear to have ‘slipped the net’, and have not 
seen, or seen but not read, the final version of the community model. There are some 
reservations about the strict adherence to the cultural edicts demanded by the 
company: "The culture and community stuff is a bit brainwashy”. Another felt, "in 
some ways we are acting a part, I  mean, we have a ‘script’... ” Another admitted 
that there are several "Mr and Mrs [SchoolWear]’5 . Some put on a face in front o f 
certain people... ” A  Finance employee proffered the assessment that, given people’s 
disparate backgrounds, educations, and ambitions being "stifled by give-and-take ”,
50 The ignorance o f  the fu ll model among SchoolWear sta ff does lend credence to findings from  the other case 
studies that 'partnership' seems not to instil a powerful, all-encompassing cultural programme. (See the 
conclusion.)
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the firm’s “ideals can’t be lived up to”. However, all argued that the culture to 
which the firm aspires is, for the most part, lived out.
I believe that what ambivalence there is among SchoolWear’s non-managerial staff 
can be attributed, in the main, to the commonly observed phenomenon wherein 
many such employees prefer to turn up, do their job, work hard enough for decent 
pay and go home, with little regard for workplace issues beyond their immediate 
work environs and still less concern for loftier ambitions around organisational 
culture and philosophy.
The management team is aware of this. Buy-in to the community values might not 
reach the same intensity at all levels of the workforce, but the founder has come to 
relax about different individuals’ depth of conviction as well as about the time 
required to win people over: " You need the emotional buy-in o f people, lest the 
values be weakened over time. But i f  ‘X ’ sees the need to fulfil their responsibilities 
then that's fine; the problem is struggling to fulfil the responsibilities ”. A Director 
estimated that “80%-plus share the company’s values”, and those for whom the 
values have been internalised “can see why when they’re challenged on contrary 
attitudes and behaviours ”. However, they can identify certain individuals who find 
the culture harder to cope with: “Only one or two visibly struggle with them. 
Because they’ve not been internalised. They know what is expected, but they don’t 
believe it, and so you can see them constantly trying to display the appropriate 
behaviours. But what they’re really thinking is going to come through at some 
point”. The company would, explained this Director, try to address this kind of gap 
between thought and action early, before it becomes a “source o f resentment”.
The MD is conscious of the ‘thought police’ accusation, but it is not one that he 
accepts: “I ’m aware that there are some ‘conspiracy theorists ’ out there, but many 
have been won over over time... We try to create opportunities, not to determine 
whether people take them or not. I t ’s not something that can be force-fed down 
people”. This seems fair. But it is possible that the firm is expending unnecessary 
energies on its cultural education programmes, when what its workforce values 
above all is the management team’s simple consistency of attitudes, behaviours and 
treatment, thoughtfulness and support, and benevolence. In response, The MD
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argued [in an unrecorded telephone conversation] “it is questionable whether 
without this cultural training we could develop the managers to sustain the culture 
[and the company]”. He also felt that the amount of time resources spent on the 
‘cultural education’ was “incidental” to the time taken up with operational 
activities, and was in any case “proportionate to demand, since i t’s all voluntary”. 
So, while a concern might be that, though the firm’s structures and practices 
resemble closely a ‘partnership’, the method of monitoring and even enforcing the 
firm’s philosophy can seem rather authoritarian, instead of mutually negotiated, this 
would, in my judgement, be unfair. The firm goes to considerable lengths in its 
recruitment stage to outline the nature of the work, and the strictures of the cultural 
norms with which all employees are expected to comply. Each recruit is invited to 
sign up formally to this compliance. Once employed, evidence suggests that 
managers provide ample opportunity to employees to adapt and self-correct. 
Recourse to the disciplinary procedures -  a proxy perhaps for authoritarianism - 
remains rare.
The culture at SchoolWear has a predictable effect on employee turnover, running 
high at around 20% overall, but which breaks down interestingly according to time 
served. Judicious use of the probationary period is employed to deal with 
incompatible employees who get through the exhaustive and highly personal 
recruitment procedure: “We would have a talk *without prejudice’ about severance 
i f  something breaks down” (Personnel Director). During the first six months 
employee turnover is “quite high ” as people from elsewhere struggle to adapt to 
“the integrity”, as the MD sees it. But after two years’ service -  when among other 
things the employment security guarantee comes into effect -  employee turnover is 
“very low”. Few long-serving employees contemplate ever leaving. No employee 
professed to hating their experience at SchoolWear, but it is the case that employees 
have reason for occasional resentment.
Why no trade union?
SchoolWear is a defiantly non-union enterprise. When asked why this was so the 
founder explained that, while he considered that “unions have a vital role and 
function, ” from his upbringing and entrepreneurial predilections he is rather 
dismissive of their value in the workplace. Alarming stories from new recruits to
243
SchoolWear of abuse, harassment and poor working practices in unionised 
workplaces have cemented his scepticism. In a paradoxical twist he voiced one of 
the concerns from the ‘left’ about the notion of partnership: that some unions may 
have moved too close to the establishment, and to managers.
The managers argue forcefully that:
"a trade union as a body representative o f a large section o f the workforce is 
entirely inconsistent with the community model... Something has gone wrong i f  in 
the structures there is a polarisation o f needs to the degree that external intervention 
is required. The structures are already in place to effect change. I f  the power to 
effect change in a meaningful manner is already invested in individuals, and the 
organisation’s structures and constitutions are set up to reflect this, then I  struggle 
to see a meaningful role for a trade union ” (MD).
A Personnel officer agreed; trade union intervention would be:
“a sign o f failure... Confrontation and third parties are unnecessary. 
Conflicts can be resolved without them. I f  the culture is right for open and honest 
dialogue there is no need for third party representation... and you are very likely to 
be listened to here [over pay issues]”.
Another Personnel colleague added, “we spend so much time on the 'people ’ side o f 
things here ”. For the Personnel Director collective bargaining was an "anathema ” 
because it does not accept individualised performance-related pay.
That said, the MD claimed he would be “completely comfortable” with union 
recognition if the majority of employees wanted it. This is highly unlikely; no non- 
managerial employee interviewed expressed any desire for a union presence. (The 
recruitment procedure that effectively controls community membership would be 
expected to screen out such personalities.) One from the shopfloor area felt that a 
union “wouldn’t work here. There are all sorts o f safeguards in place. We are free 
to discuss things with our line manager. A trade union might jump in... ” Another 
attributed the lack of a “divide ” along them-and-us lines to the extent of employee 
involvement. A trade union official has visited the site only once in its history, when 
an employee asked to be accompanied at a disciplinary hearing. From the MD’s 
account of the incident, it seems that the official could find little fault with the firm’s 
processes, and “said, ‘gosh, what a nice company ’. ”
It is obvious from the evidence gathered here that the mutual gains available -  a 
classic exchange of flexibility for employment security and sharing in success, as
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well as the enforced consistency of behaviours and attitudes of all the employees -  
has brought the enterprise success, and its members considerable satisfaction.
Analysis: progress toward partnership and trust.
One noteworthy aspect of SchoolWear’s progress toward partnership and trust- 
based relations is that it did not emerge in response to a crisis, or from a need to 
improve relations, but began at the very inception of the firm. ‘Partnership’ was 
already a feature of work at SchoolWear, independent of it being enshrined in any 
text or agreement.
As such the entry into talks (la) was not a fraught step. The ‘Development Days’ 
involved the workforce fully in the brainstorming of much of the agreement’s 
content, and demonstrated both a willingness to share decision-making and 
managers’ obvious concern for the welfare and well-being of the employees (2a). 
The text itself was not at all contentious when it received the workforce’s assent. 
The rigid adherence to consistent behaviours, and to the provision of mutual gain, 
mean that the partnership is sustained by itself (2b to 3a). While there remains 
always the possibility of a major defection it is difficult from the evidence gathered 
here to conceive how one might materialise. Even the costly failure of the business 
venture did not embitter the staff.
It is perhaps more illuminating then to track the progress of an individual 
employee’s relationship with the firm, from recruitment into employment and 
beyond, to assess the development of trust. In the pre-recruitment stage the 
candidate receives a copy of the model, with the expectation that he or she will be 
required to comment upon it. The interview, and the signing of the employment 
contract -  with its clause specifying compliance with the ‘pillars’ -  constitute the 
agreement (lb). It is in the first few weeks that the recruit experiences the joint 
problem solving, and the requirement to exhibit and reciprocate partnership 
attitudes and behaviours (2a). If the recruit is willing and able to adhere, then -  as 
the comments below testify -  her/his attitudes will likely progress toward enhanced 
levels of trust. If, however, (s)he struggles with the cultural norms, then one of two 
responses seems available: exit or passive compliance.
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Case study 3 -  SchoolWear. Analysis section: Trust.
I returned to SchoolWear to interview five respondents, selected by myself. I had 
already interviewed four o f them for the narrative section. (The exception was the 
production team leader who had been ill for the narrative round of interviews.) Each 
was shown the degrees of trust diagram set out in the Methodology chapter, and 
given enough time to read and digest the implications of each definition before 
offering their thoughts. (I turned the tape recorder off to prevent any anxiety that the 
long silence being recorded may have caused.)
In this section I discuss the respondents’ appraisal of the degrees o f trust present 
within the organisation, with their explanations and justifications for their analysis, 
including any evidence provided in support of their assertions. Where any were 
offered, I discuss the respondents’ own definitions or commentary on the nature of 
trust at work, and also their thoughts on what might assist in the development of 
trust at work, and what might constrain or threaten it. Their responses are captured 
in Table 12.
Table 12 -  SchoolWear respondents on trust continuum.51
BEFORE
P’SHIP.
AT
P’SHIP.
2001.
FOUNDER/ MANAGING 
DIRECTOR
- - K-b/T to R-b/T
PERSONNEL DIRECTOR - - R-b/T
PRODUCTION DIRECTOR - - R-b/T to I-b/T
PRODUCTION SUPERVISER - - I-b/T; 
K-b/T to R-b/T
PRODUCTION TEAM 
LEADER
- - R-b/T to I-b/T
The responses are illuminating. None, when invited to compare and contrast 
between perceived shifts in degrees of trust over time, felt able to offer such a 
longitudinal reflection. All preferred either to emphasise their present experience, or 
to avoid an assessment o f the past. Or, as seems more likely, based on the 
testaments of these and other respondents, the SchoolWear culture and work 
environment has remained, for the most part, constant over the lifetime of the firm.
51 KEY: D -b/ T = deterrence-based trust; C-b/T  = calculus-based trust; K-b/T = knowledge-based
trust; R-b/ T = relational-based trust; I-b / T = identification-based trust.
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Not even March 2000, when the workforce endorsed the ‘partnership’ document, 
was considered by any of the five respondents to have been a particularly 
significant watershed. (Hence the scant narrative content of this case study.) Unlike 
the other case studies it would seem that SchoolWear has not experienced a 
qualitative shift in degrees of trust, and certainly not from any position of distrust. 
Rather, it has sustained a high degree of trust over time.
To examine each response in turn, the MD ignored both deterrence-based and 
calculus-based degrees of trust as being utterly without foundation at SchoolWear: 
"we can discount” them, he said. He considered that a new employee would likely 
feel knowledge-based trust in the first few months, derived from the clear 
expectations of what work would be like outlined as part of the recruitment process 
(see below for an extended discussion of the importance of SchoolWear*s 
recruitment). Suspicions and wariness may still be present in the employee’s mind, 
he conceded, and this probably stemmed from upbringing or previous employment 
experiences, or from a misunderstanding of the cultural aspirations of SchoolWear. 
But, after a sustained period of time, the MD felt that the employee’s degree of trust 
would progress toward relational-based trust, once (s)he had experienced the culture 
of the firm. Interestingly, and perhaps as a consequence of my articulating concerns 
about the sometimes overbearing culture, the MD reflected that ambitions toward 
securing identification-based trust (which, on the surface the ‘Community 
Company’ would seem to aspire to) might indeed herald a propensity to instil 
‘thought police’-style monitoring. He also argued that an identification-based 
culture would cease to be dynamic, reluctant to challenge or to question under the 
weight of assumed commonality of interests, and so could "grind to a halt”. The 
rejection of both extremes, especially the wariness over the most positive forms of 
trust, suggests a more sober appreciation of workplace dynamics than the 
occasionally evangelical tone of the ‘Community Company’ text. I asked him to 
account for the absence of the notion of trust in the text. He replied that it had not 
been a conscious effort to remove reference to trust, or to pay it little mind. It is 
indicative that it is not considered to be a significant characteristic of the firm’s 
people management aspirations, however. The MD suggested that this is perhaps 
because the high degree of trust is "already there” (i.e.: it has not evolved from an 
observably less powerful trust, or even from a situation of distrust). "I would like to
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think it is implicit ” (MD), arising from the consistent attitudes and behaviours of the 
managers. He interpreted his fellow colleagues’ failing to even mention trust as a 
characteristic of the relations at the firm as signifying trust’s relative low-level 
significance compared to less '‘abstract” and more easily observable characteristics 
such as “openness and honesty
The Personnel Director felt that “undoubtedly ” SchoolWear exhibits relational- 
based trust. He pointed out how the model sets out clear parameters around what is 
acceptable, and he talked of the emotional bond forged among employees. As direct 
evidence he cited the non-attendance at the shareholders’ EGM of the share-owning 
employees (see above). He too was wary of the virtues of identification-based trust, 
agreeing that employees need to feel confident of challenging decisions.
The Production Director agreed; relational-based trust best described the attitudes 
within SchoolWear. She cited as reasons for this the importance placed on values, 
and the consistent demonstration of the values in the day-to-day interactions among 
employees, and especially between the managers and their sub-ordinates. She also 
cited the level of openness in disseminating information about the business as both 
an antecedent of the high degree of trust, and further evidence of it: “Anyone can 
challenge the information i f  they don’t trust the Managers and Directors
The superviser from production was a fully-fledged convert to the SchoolWear way. 
(S)he considered that, on a personal level, (s)he enjoyed identification-based trust 
with the company. When challenged that this implied that her/ his interests were 
completely as one with those of the firm, (s)he affirmed this as a characteristic of 
her relationships at work, citing mutual respect and everyone working toward the 
same goal as evidence. (S)he also took me into extraordinary confidence to relate 
the company’s benevolent reaction to an acutely personal crisis as testament to the 
extent to which interests have blurred. Interestingly, however, in her supervisory 
role she concurred -  independently -  with the MD in assessing that new recruits 
typically arrive with knowledge-based trust, and progress toward relational-based 
trust. This mirrored her/his own appraisal of new recruits; (s)he felt confident in the 
new recruit’s abilities and ‘cultural fit’ in the first instance, but judged them on
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evidence: "You need to work alongside a person to build up a picture o f what 
they ’re like. You’ve got to know the person before you can trust them ”.
Lastly, the production team leader was also effusive in her praise for the firm. (S)he 
too selected relational-based trust as best describing the atmosphere at work. Her 
comments revealed the depth of her emotional attachment and investment in the 
relationship: “I f  the company betrayed my trust I ’d be shattered”. This, until now, 
has not happened, and (s)he could not conceive of circumstances in which it might. 
The reasons for feeling this way were the consistency of behaviour among the 
managers, and her/his subsequent confidence in them. (S)he also cited the firm’s 
benevolence.
How should we account for the impressively high levels of trust that are reported 
consistently across the sample of employees here? The responses are unambiguous, 
and point to a very powerful sense of mutual trust.
Referring back to Whitener at al’s five “categories o f behaviour” that people ought 
to adopt when developing trusting relations -  “behavioural consistency, 
behavioural integrity, sharing and delegation o f control, communication and 
demonstration o f concern ” -  it is apparent from the testimonies provided by the 
participants in this case study that SchoolWear’s partnership arrangements meet all 
of the criteria. There is abundant evidence of efforts to secure mutual gains, and to 
treat people in a manner consistent with predictable benevolence and procedural 
justice.
The demands of the cultural norms, and the close monitoring of compliance, is also 
important. Indeed, paradoxically, the firm’s enormous efforts to instil in its 
workforce commitment to the cultural strictures - far in excess of a standard 
induction and ‘understanding-the-company’ kind of programme - is a rare source of 
conflict between the managers and a number of those on the ‘shopfloor’.
In addition to these, other evidence gathered in this case study points to four further 
antecedents, or explanations:
■ The inclinations of the charismatic founder
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■ The relatively small and compact size of the company’s building
■ The recruitment and selection of people with certain a priori attitudes and 
propensity to certain behaviours, and
■ The absence of a trade union.
To take each in turn, the MD has personally always struggled with the separation of 
employer and employee. While he acknowledged the possibility that there exists an 
inherent conflict of interest between the two, and its likely existence in "most 
organisations to different degrees”, when asked to assess whether even within 
SchoolWear the conflict might be present, he insisted that the company’s 
“community exists on the basis o f its stakeholders accepting the rights and 
responsibilities that support the values ” of SchoolWear. His vision in particular has 
set the standard from the outset throughout the firm, and the ‘pillars’ have been 
designed, in part, to align and then manage both sets of interests for mutual benefit, 
and to instil a consistency of behaviour. Accept and enact the required behaviours, 
and the conflict between employer and employee can be (as good as) eliminated. 
The Personnel Director, when posed the same challenge, considered that it is 
people’s experiences at work that dictate how they might perceive any conflict of 
interest, and SchoolWear’s personnel policies and practices seek, as far as possible, 
to reduce the potential for conflict. The MD is held in very high regard within 
SchoolWear, and yet in person is not a spectacular, table-thumping charismatic 
figure capable of inspiring as well as terrorising his workforce; he comes across 
instead as a principled and thoughtful, caring man who does seem sincerely to put 
people before profit.
One might argue that the small size of both the workforce and of the company’s 
buildings result in intense proximities in interpersonal relations, and so trust might 
be expected to follow. However, it is a facile point, but nevertheless true that not all 
small firms could report such positive relations. Guest and Hoque (1994) surveyed 
122 small firms, and found that 8 corresponded to the “ugly” typology (employees 
denied rights in exploitative conditions) and 28 matched the “bad” criteria (no HR 
strategy, and no significant employee involvement either in process or reward).
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Several of the respondents commented on the importance to the sustainability of 
such a culture of the firm’s stringent recruitment procedure. If new members join 
the community who are inappropriate, or who may prove disruptive or cynical, this 
could damage the coherence of the community and undermine the strength of its 
behavioural norms. The recruitment practices control access to community 
membership, selecting those that ‘fit’ culturally. The questions test for likely 
compliance with, and enthusiasm for, the ‘pillars’, and any candidate unable to 
exhibit sufficient support for the pillars is likely to be rejected. Thus, the 
community reinforces itself. While it is possible for candidates to deceive the 
interviewers, once inside SchoolWear, those employees who fail to understand and 
adopt the community’s principles face corrective attention (an opportunity to 
change, as the firm would have it), or face a benign and mutually acceptable 
dismissal. Those who can adapt witness ample evidence of their influence on how 
work is organised and conducted through the exchange of ‘rights’ for 
‘responsibilities’. That only four out of five are believed to be culturally compatible 
suggests that the recruitment process is far from flawless, although the MD could 
not identify any obvious dissenters.
Another possible explanation is that the firm’s hostility toward independent 
representation of the workforce in the form of a trade union has complemented the 
recruitment process to produce a non-radicalised workforce, unaware of the 
inherent conflict of interest between employer and employed. But this does not 
seem a valid analysis to my mind. Many of the non-managerial staff have worked in 
unionised workplaces before, but have not brought with them an overt 
consciousness of conflict at work. None could see a role for a trade union.
Conclusion.
There seems little scope to refute SchoolWear’s claim -  were they keen to make it 
themselves -  to being a ‘partnership’ organisation. SchoolWear clearly has all of the 
essential components of a partnership company, and the respondents asked to assess 
the degrees of trust operating within the firm all reported consistent and 
impressively high degrees of trust.
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The strong institutional parameters set around what is acceptable as an attitude and 
behaviour at work, to which all employees (or community members) are free to 
subscribe, provides for a consistency and integrity, and -  some gripes and 
grievances notwithstanding - a mutually beneficial, trust-based employment 
relationship. (The SchoolWear respondents were unanimous in rating their trust 
levels exceptionally high.)
A challenge will present itself should the firm exceed a manageable headcount level. 
However, the stability of personnel and the robustness of the firm’s constitution and 
systems mean that SchoolWear should be capable of retaining its unique culture 
during any future expansions.
SchoolWear is perhaps most useful as a successful and benevolent example of the 
partnership model working without the presence of a trade union. I selected to 
investigate it for this purpose, to move the debate on partnership beyond the narrow 
confines of a union-management ghetto.
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Chapter 6.
Case study 4 - NorthWest NHS Trust. Narrative section.
I  first met a representative from NorthWest NHS Trust in May 2000 to secure access. The 
first week of interviews took place in July that year. I  returned twice more, in February and 
October 2001, to conclude my follow-up interviews.
Background.
The NorthWest NHS Trust [now merged with a local Trust -  all of the detail in this 
case study pre-dates the merger] was created in 1993, from the former Area Health 
Authority. It is spread across four sites, with a further twenty community sites for 
services such as District Nurses. The Trust employs around 5,000 staff, and has 
annual revenue of £130 million. NorthWest NHS Trust recognises eighteen different 
trade unions, of which there are ten major unions, the rest being small professional 
associations. The four largest are UNISON, RCN, MSF and the GMB. UNISON has 
the largest presence. Around three-quarters of the workforce are trade union 
members.
Around 1996, when the first effort to examine a partnership way of working was 
attempted, the business ethos and demanding new performance targets sought by the 
then Conservative government had encouraged an aggressive reassertion of the 
managerial prerogative on the wards that was achieving the required results, but 
sapping staff morale. So, while performance levels were generally satisfactory, and 
there was no crisis to speak of, internal enmities among the different professional 
constituencies and unproductive industrial relations were felt to be stifling 
programmes for change improvements.
Reflections on the employee relations climate at the time differ, but most 
respondents considered it to be “typical o f the public sector at the time” (Chairman): 
confrontational without stepping over into outright hostility -  "it never got nasty” 
(senior union rep) - but certainly characterised by mutual suspicion and mistrust. 
The tactics deployed by each side exacerbated the bad feeling. Both sides "arrived 
at the meetings [the quarterly Joint Staff Consultative Committee - the JSCC] with 
their fighting gear on ” (Chairman). Typically, the management team would table an
52 One longstanding member o f  the JSCC on the management side counselled me to be wary o f  new recruits 
exaggerating the problems o f  the past to render the present more impressive... echoing Marchington’s own 
recommendations about fairy tales ’ (Marchington, 1995).
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idea as a paper for formal consultation. The ‘staff side’ - as trade union 
representatives are known in the NHS - would argue that they needed plenty of time 
to consult their members. But managers were usually unwilling to dither, and so any 
fundamental union objections were overruled, with only modest window-dressing 
efforts to acknowledge the staff side’s concerns. The trade unions were perennially 
on the defensive, recognising that with what one called their “minimal influence” 
they were unlikely to change the substance of any policy. Instead, they sought 
loopholes in the proposals to stall them, otherwise “ 'redpenning’” the wording to 
amend it for any future tribunals (technician union rep). On occasion the trade 
unions threatened but never carried out local industrial action; the workforce is not 
especially militant, lamented one shop steward. Managers were not callously 
authoritarian; it would be more accurate to describe them as under considerable 
pressure, and therefore reluctant to engage in time-consuming periods of joint 
consultation. All respondents agreed, however, that there was little sharing of the 
agenda, and few efforts at joint problem solving, let alone strategic planning. The 
quality of trust in the Trust was poor. When asked why this hardly positive state of 
affairs persisted, the general consensus was that confrontation “was the way things 
had always been done ”; “the atmosphere at the time ”.
Events leading to ‘partnership9.
A new Chairman arrived in 1996 from a smaller neighbouring Trust that had 
enjoyed good relations. NorthWest NHS Trust struck him as an organisation “happy 
to call itself ‘unhappy’”. He observed the debilitating conduct of industrial relations, 
and resolved to try and inculcate a more productive and constructive spirit. 
Additionally, within a few months, the return of Blair’s partnership-inclined 
government (May 1997) meant that efforts to address the inadequacies of traditional 
adversarial styles of industrial relations now found favour at a national level. The 
Chairman and the senior managers felt that the existing culture in the Trust no 
longer fitted with the tone set by the government. When the Trust’s Executive set 
itself two main objectives -  to “change the patient experience” and to “change the 
staff experience” -  this laid the ground for a review of the Trust’s industrial 
relations.
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A new Head of HR arrived at the same time, and at the sharp end of industrial 
relations he too immediately decided that the confrontational way was proving, in 
his word, “pointless ”. There had to be a better way, he felt. The Chairman and the 
Head of HR secured support from the Chief Executive and the Board for research 
into a ‘partnership’ set of values to inform and direct the Trust’s culture and 
practices. The pair presented the ‘business case’, arguing that change in work 
practices could come about through managerial coercion or through employee 
involvement, but that the latter was more likely to produce more effective employees 
working in more effective ways (Chairman). An endorsement from the very top of 
the hierarchy was considered vital, to endow the initiative with legitimacy and 
gravitas, and offset staff cynicism. But the lines of responsibility and project 
management were clearly laid out: it was important for the Chief Executive to be 
seen “leading the idea, i f  not the process ”, the latter being HR’s job (in the eyes of 
the then Head of HR).
In 1998 the Chairman took part in the nationwide initiative, the NHS Taskforce on 
Staff Involvement, for which he visited around 50 of the more ‘employee 
involvement-minded’ NHS Trusts. He viewed at first hand partnership-style 
relations and employee involvement practices, and returned to NorthWest NHS 
Trust, inspired and determined to repeat the successes he had witnessed. From the 
Taskforce tour he had identified for himself five core themes of successful 
partnership programmes in the NHS:
1. The partnership had been “led from the top ”. The Chief Executive and her/ his 
team had been “deeply and personally involved” in promoting and supporting 
partnership.
2. Partnership was “a long-term game”. Because it was radically different from 
previous methods, advocates had to realistically expect that the first two years 
would be spent, in part, overcoming cynicism and mistrust, before tangible and 
lasting outcomes would show through.
3. It was inextricably linked to better industrial relations. This meant the close 
involvement in decision-making of the recognised trade unions, but also of 
employee involvement in day-to-day concerns.
4. It meant prioritising organisational development. By this it was evident that 
partnership was a resource-intensive approach that required support from
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training programmes and facilities for managers and staff-side representatives to 
fulfil their joint duties.
5. Finally, it had eventually become “the way we do things round here ”. In the best 
partnership-based Trusts involving staff in decision-making and joint problem 
solving had become an instinctive response to organisational issues, rather than 
an afterthought.
For the first informal approach to the staff side’s Chair and Secretary in June 1998, 
the Trust Chairman and Head of HR explained that they were looking into new ways 
of conducting industrial relations, with the aim of re-establishing a degree of trust 
between the unions and management. They indicated that the idea of partnership 
might be of some value, but they had no pre-set definitions, and wanted to invite the 
unions to debate the idea. Material on partnership was circulated to stimulate the 
discussion.
Despite a wariness about what ‘partnership’ with managers might entail for them as 
union reps, the staff side representatives accepted that trust had to be re-built, and so 
they tentatively agreed to discuss the issue further: “We had nothing to lose, we 
could always go back to adversarialism. But we did have everything to gain from 
being true partners -  i f  it could be achieved”, reasoned one technician 
representative. Another union rep outlined her rationale for engaging with the 
programme: “It could be anything from a really good idea to a trap to make stooges 
o f us”. She too said that any abuse of the trade unions could have meant their 
withdrawal from the process. A senior staff side representative agreed: “We were 
wary, but we figured, ‘i f  you don ’t try it, you 7/ never know ’. We checked with our 
full-time officials [at the various union headquarters -  who had been briefed in 
advance by the Chairman about the initiative] and with other companies, and the 
feedback we got was, even i f  the outcomes are the same, the process is better. Less 
fraught. More sensible”. After lengthy internal debate, the staff side “decided it was 
worth a go ”.
The first joint meeting, in September 1998, was introduced as a ‘blue-sky’-style 
exchange of views and ideas (Head of HR). Issues included a desire to de-centralise 
decision-making, to improve communication with staff, and to address the
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widespread mistrust stifling progress in the organisation. However, localised 
criticisms and complaints dominated the early stages: questioning how there could 
be talk of partnership when ‘such-and-such’ was happening? Wondering aloud how 
senior managers ever thought they could get ‘so-and-so’ to sign up to this? It also 
became quickly apparent that partnership would be a resource-intensive way of 
managing the Trust, and particularly that there would be major problems to 
overcome surrounding time off work for both reps and managers. These posed 
formidable obstacles (and still do). But, the Chairman accepted that these fears and 
objections needed to be voiced, for the air to be cleared, before progress could be 
made.
Outside the formal meeting, fears were articulated: "They were telling me, ‘this all 
sounds good, but is it real? ’ We had to prove it, ” recalled the Chairman. A few 
meetings in, the working group heard a case study presentation from another Trust 
that had gone a long way down the partnership route. The extent of collaboration 
alarmed many of those present, but it succeeded in impressing upon both parties that 
a partnership way of working was indeed possible. It was a modest breakthrough. 
Small efforts to share information among the parties and gestures of goodwill began 
to materialise, and the Chairman wanted to supplement these informal positive 
exchanges with some “quick wins”, small-scale but achievable and encouraging 
results that would give the initiative some impetus, and demonstrate to each other 
the potential of the joint working approach.
The group broke up into sub-groups to review jointly some relatively low-level HR 
policies. Several new policies were drafted jointly, presented to the group as a 
whole, and agreed there and then, before being sent to HR for technical amendments 
and rubber-stamping. The joint policies showed what was possible at NorthWest 
NHS Trust. One union rep confessed to feeling initially dismissive of the joint 
process, but after seeing the results, he hailed the experience as “a breakthrough for 
relations From that moment, according to the Chairman, “the meeting snowballed 
into a ‘can-do ’ mentality
By May 1999, the participants felt sufficiently confident of their purpose that the 
partnership programme required a special committee to oversee developments.
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Rather than set up a formal committee in the traditional manner, it was agreed to 
christen the existing working group the Partnership Forum.
The Chairman sensed that the group needed a focus and further impetus to improve: 
“As with any organisation development effort it is sensible to start with an agreed 
statement o f purpose”. (‘Start’ is being a tad disingenuous, since the initiative was 
now almost a year old.) A statement would, he hoped, define and frame the new 
relations being sought. It was also, for the Trust Chairman, another " feel-good’, 
‘do-able’” project. A senior staff side representative viewed the statement as a 
means of advertising to staff what they might expect from the partnership 
programme. External consultants were brought in to help the Forum draft the Trust’s 
‘Strategic statement of intent’.
Partnership at NorthWest NHS Trust - 1st version: the agreement.
The final, jointly worded text of the Trust’s first partnership statement was produced 
in July 1999. The text is aspirational in tone in that it outlines principles and 
ambitions for ideal-type attitudes and behaviours, rather than making firm 
commitments or setting targets. Most of the requirements of a partnership are 
referred to, but are not covered in detail (see the ‘Analysis’ section).
The statement begins with the assertion that “partnership is the most effective way o f 
involving staff in achieving the aims and objectives o f its Service Plan ” (NorthWest 
NHS Trust, 1999: p2), since it is held to encourage “better patient care” by 
involving everyone more, as well as demonstrating to staff the importance of their 
input, to make them feel “more valued”, and make their work more “satisfying” 
(p2-3). It sets out what partnership means for the parties involved:
1. “A commitment to working together at all levels in the organisation to 
deliver the Service Plan
2. An understanding o f the relationship between employment security and 
employee flexibility
3. Building relationships within the organisation that maximise employee 
involvement through reliable, robust and timely communication ”, and -
4. Strategic representation o f the employees ’ views at the Trust’s Management 
Board” (NorthWest NHS Trust, 1999: p2).
The statement then lists a further set of twelve jointly-agreed attitudes and 
behaviours that, the joint partners expected, would act as “guiding principles, which
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will govern the way we work in the future” (ibid: p3). They include familiar 
partnership-related attitudes, such as "openness and honesty, trust”, and “respect 
for legitimate roles/ views”, but also what might be considered behavioural 
obligations for the parties, such as “sharing o f information -  equality o f knowledge 
and opportunity, respect for what is confidential, a shared understanding o f the 
'givens ’, good communications, not compromising representatives ”, and “time to do 
the job properly ” (ibid).
The statement explained that this joint process would be introduced at all levels of 
the organisation: line manager/ Operational, Directorate, and Strategic. At the last 
level, as well as the continuation of the Partnership Forum, it was intended to 
appoint a staff side representative onto the Trust’s Board (proceeding incrementally, 
with the Management Board first, described as the “engine-room” of the Trust’s 
decision-making by the since departed Chairman).
Over time the partnership programme had as its ambition to “increase and improve 
the full involvement o f staff in operational and strategic decision making that affect 
patients, services and organisations” (1999: p4). One of the first moves would be 
“an educational programme for managers and employee representatives to support 
and develop this cultural shift” (ibid: p5). The statement mentioned, but declined to 
elaborate upon, “clear processes” (ibid: p6) that would be in place for resolving 
conflicts arising out of the potential failure of the new consensus making to reach a 
fully accepted decision.
As the statement was one of intent only, the implications for the conduct of 
industrial relations and work organisation of these Trust-wide aspirations were not 
accorded additional commentary. (See below for the outcomes in terms of operating 
polices and practices.) When asked to elaborate, the main author, the then Head of 
HR, pointed to the principle of building relationships through “reliable, robust and 
timely communication” (p3) as being the most important foundation of the 
partnership. By this he meant comprehensive information sharing: “everything that 
the staff side reps needed [in order] to come to informed and reasonable conclusions 
on policies. No secrets would be kept”. In practice, this included laying open the 
Trust’s financial records and future plans for union scrutiny; whatever the Board got
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to see would be made available to the staff side as well, except all confidential items. 
There was little risk involved in this, but it nevertheless constituted a leap of faith 
for many, especially among the strategic management team. The appointment of a 
staff representative on the Board was similarly considered to be contentious by the 
managers, according to the then Head of HR. However, it was his argument at the 
time that “if  we were going to be serious about partnership, there was no logic to 
excluding representation at the highest level o f the organisation ”.
The Statement was sent out as an attachment to staff payslips, reported in the Trust 
newsletter and disseminated across the organisation’s intranet. The Forum sought no 
response to it, and little was received “But then they could hardly disagree!” felt 
the then Head of HR. In retrospect several of the key players conceded that an 
attachment to staff wage packets was not an ideal dissemination tool, and so it 
proved. None of the staff on the wards or in the administrative offices, when 
interviewed for this case study, recognised the original booklet when it was shown 
to them. However, from a brief perusal of its contents, none objected to the 
sentiments. “But”, commented one union rep, “we've had that many mission 
statements!” The statement, though jointly created, had little impact on the wards 
and in the departments.
Partnership at NorthWest NHS Trust - 1st version: structures and practices.
Most interviewees noted, “partnership is not about warm words, it's about doing 
things... but you need the means and wherewithal to do something about it” (senior 
staff side representative). One manager also suggested that the ambitious new 
relationship was prone to challenge from hypocritical behaviours. Both of these 
problems -  securing joint wins and maintaining a consistent approach -  have since 
emerged within NorthWest NHS Trust.
In the months following the dissemination of the ‘Statement of strategic intent’, the 
Partnership Forum concentrated on developing their relationships and improving 
their consultative processes at the senior [Strategic] level. Rather less energy was 
directed into extending partnership into the different workplaces within the Trust.
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An offshoot of the Forum, the joint Policy Development Group, continued the 
earlier work of jointly drafting and agreeing HR policies. Taking generic policies 
from an external adviser, the Group tailored them to be appropriate for NorthWest 
NHS Trust, having debated and agreed upon a set of ideal terms, within realistic 
parameters. These were then sent back to the Forum for amendment and eventual 
approval, and on to the HR department for implementation. The Group drew up 
thirteen joint policies in its first eighteen months, ranging from principles of 
recruitment and employment (fixed-term contracts preferred to temporary contracts, 
no temporary employment longer than 12 months and easier access to secondment 
opportunities -  all perceived as significant gains by one union rep) to a policy on 
‘job security and change’ arising from the then imminent merger with a nearby 
Trust. The process, in this early incarnation, sought a merging of views and ideas, 
and one participating manager was very enthusiastic: “We undertook an open, free- 
for-all discussion about the policy in front o f us, and as we did we started losing our 
respective identities as either ‘staff side’ or ‘manager”’. Another management 
respondent (from Finance) was also impressed: “It was a real collaborative attempt. 
It was not just ‘win them [the unions] over, but have them fully involved in the 
production o f the policy”. Where intractable differences of opinion on the final draft 
occurred, these were presented in the report: “The approach is about maturity and a 
mutual respect for others ’ views ” (then Head of HR).
Progress toward more harmonious joint working relationships took a knock in the 
early stages, and trust was damaged, by what one union perceived to be hypocritical 
and inconsistent actions. The Trust took part in the King’s Fund/ UNISON report on 
partnership, approaching participation jointly. (NorthWest was the only Trust to 
send a joint delegation to the launch conference, and the union representative was 
the only such attendee.) However, in the internal report on the project the Trust 
named the senior managers involved individually, but only referred to “some staff 
side reps ” also taking part. At least one rep resigned from the Forum. The incident 
was attributed, probably fairly, to “carelessness ” (Chairman), and the fact that the 
aggrieved rep returned to the partnership process after an official apology suggests 
that this was taken sincerely.
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The Trust attempted to measure the impact of the new style of working through its 
first employee attitude survey in November 1999. This too was jointly devised and 
conducted by an external consultant. The survey covered issues such as consultation 
and communication, management and employee relations, working conditions, pay 
and benefits, health and safety, training and development and career progression. 
The overall approval rating of the Trust as an employer was 67%, which for the then 
Head of HR was quite encouraging.
In March 2000 the Trust sought to disseminate the partnership ethos throughout the 
Trust with what were called the Staff Involvement Days, or the ‘SIDs’. The idea was 
to augment the quantitative survey findings with qualitative evidence drawn from 
soliciting staff opinion and suggestions for improving the Trust, as well as promote 
the partnership initiative and demonstrates joint working, to the wider workforce this 
time. One senior manager and one staff side representative paired up together and 
walked about the organisation to seek direct staff input, the ‘walkabout’ element 
distinguishing it from “another bloody questionnaire The pair asked each member 
of staff that they approached the same three questions:
1. How can the Trust introduce more employee involvement in your area to provide 
a better service for users of the Trust?
2. How can the Trust introduce more employee involvement in your area to provide 
a better working environment?
3. Give two ways in which working life in your area could be improved.
This was widely acclaimed by managers and staff side representatives alike as “the 
best thing we have ever done " (union rep), and the union reps were unanimous that 
such a joint effort could not have happened without the new approach to industrial 
relations initiated 22 months earlier. The outcomes “opened a few eyes It was the 
first time that many members of staff had met a senior manager face to face. As well 
as the perceived benefits of showing an interest in the working lives of staff -  the 
event seemed to have a kind of ‘Hawthorn effect’ on many -  a number of long­
standing staff grievances, many of which were barriers to better work performance,
53 86% expressed satisfaction with their working conditions (split half and half between respondents saying they 
fee l a "great deal” and a 'fa ir"  amount). 78% were "fairly" to "very" satisfied with work relations with their 
immediate manager. 69% were satisfied with the support they received from their manager, but only 38% fe lt 
that they received adequate support from the Directors. The Directors were considered approachable by less 
than half the workforce.
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that had only ever required a nod from higher up the Trust, got the nod. These were 
more “quick wins ” - more demonstrations of partnership’s potential, according to 
the Chairman.54
Quantitative findings were drawn from other staff surveys, collated together with the 
anecdotal evidence from the ‘SIDs’, and sent to the Partnership Forum for action 
plans to be drawn up, in a process summarised by a member of the HR team as “this 
is what you ve told us is going on, and this is what we ’re going to do about it. ” In 
the event, the SID outcomes became subsumed into other lists of staff ‘hygiene 
factors’ (cf. Herzberg), then bureaucracy delayed funding, but in December 2000, 
nine months later, £650,000 was earmarked for expenditure on areas of staff 
concern. The funds were finally released to the Directorates in October 2001, a year 
and a half on from the ‘SID’ -  an indication of the protracted decision making 
process confronting the key players.
Shortly after the SID event, the Head of HR left the NHS, professing himself 
relieved to be getting away from the pressure and conflicts of dealing with trade 
unions. The Trust, supportive of the progress toward partnership, included in the 
remit of the new HR Director an explicit objective to take the endeavour forward.
Partnership at NorthWest NHS Trust -  2nd version: the agreement.
The successful candidate’s approach has split opinion. While admiring much of the 
undoubted progress so far, the HR Director (appointed in March 2000) was rather 
dismissive of some of the efforts, notably the ‘Statement of strategic intent’ and the 
‘SIDs’: “nice noises” (HR Director). Less pointedly, a senior non-HR manager 
confirmed that the partnership programme had thus far been “a good debate ”, but 
the Trust had “yet to capitalise”. For the new HR Director the principles of 
mutuality in the 1999 statement needed to be made more explicit, moving the 
language, stances and tactics of the main industrial relations protagonists away from 
what he called “power-based” positions toward positions where a more 
“proportionate” exchange of concessions could be facilitated. In his view the Trust
54 The logistics meant that certain constituencies across the two dozen sites were overlooked, such as the 
domestic cleaning staff, and the style o f  the venture irritated some: one employee, when asked by the Chairman 
fo r  his views, stormed out o f  his depot in disgust, angrily denouncing senior management fo r  never asking staff 
fo r  their opinion. The Chairman wondered whether it had been the perceived "falseness " o f  the 'walkabout ‘ that 
had so riled him.
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had been “the ‘giver’ more than the ‘receiver’” thus far. The programme needed to 
make more sense, necessitating “a reappraisal o f the terms o f engagement ” between 
the Trust’s managers and ‘the staff side’. Ironically, the participating unions agreed 
that the rules of engagement needed to be reviewed, but disagreed on the balance of 
influence: “We’re still not being treated as equals”, explained the aggrieved rep 
from the King’s Fund project. The very different interpretations of what the new 
“terms o f engagement” should be have generated sources of conflict between HR 
and UNISON, and among the unions, who vary in levels of enthusiasm for the 
revised programme.
The HR department began to wrest some of the decision-making authority away 
from the consensual process that the Director had inherited, as part of a desire to 
assert a managerial prerogative (to be “the one who signs the policy off”, according 
to one union rep). The Policy Development Group began to receive drafted policies 
from HR for comment, in contrast to the blank-sheet-of-paper approach of before. 
The charge that the new style was undermining the partnership, as previously 
constituted, was rejected by the key players in HR, pointing out that no formal 
complaint had been received. But, privately, a number of the staff representatives 
expressed dismay and a weary cynicism at the change in style. Similar sentiments 
could even be heard from within the HR department (which fractured along pre- and 
post-new HR Director lines, many from the former camp choosing to leave).
Almost a year on from his appointment, the HR Director presented a discussion 
paper outlining a future model for partnership, and a set of recommended actions 
over the 12 month period between Spring 2001 and Spring 2002. In interview, he 
described the endorsed model as “a policy to govern the processes as well as 
indicate an aspiration for where we want the partnership to end up, that aspiration 
being to bring the partnership as close as possible to people’s jobs, with a 
representative body overlaid on top o f that... ”
In what follows I confine myself to the narrative and the basic details of the 
governance of the partnership; see the ‘Analysis’ section for commentary on the 
proposals, and the assumptions that would appear to inform them.
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The Director’s ‘discussion document’ intended for partnership to permeate all levels 
of the Trust. Reiterating the aspirations of the earlier 1999 statement, partnership 
was envisaged on three organisational levels, re-christened the Corporate, 
Directorate and Local levels. The overall objective was to devolve partnership and 
employee involvement down to the Local level, in an ongoing "de-centralisation o f 
authority ”. This necessitated a re-constituted role and purpose for consultation at the 
Corporate level. At Corporate level it was initially proposed that the JSCC and the 
Forum be restructured into one overarching, more representative Partnership Forum 
to act as the co-ordinating body for all of the partnership/ joint initiatives at the 
Trust-wide level. The Partnership Forum would oversee the establishment in each of 
the Directorates of their own Partnership Forums, which might be based on the 
localised groups formed for the national NHS self-assessment exercise. Directorates 
would present proposals for their own local joint initiatives (such as quality circles, 
suggestion schemes and undisclosed joint projects) to the Corporate-level Forum, in 
a process intended as a “Iearning experience”, rather than as an accountability 
mechanism. The trade unions and management group were to be the major 
stakeholders in the partnership process, with other parties involved as appropriate.
Rolling out the process would comprise two stages between the initial discussion 
and joint implementation: “consultation” in the existing forums, with “negotiation” 
only as a fallback option, should consultation fail (NorthWest NHS Trust, 2001: 
section 5.2). Overall direction of the programme would be transferred to the HR 
Director [note: away from the Partnership Forum], with the Executive retaining its 
supportive and monitoring roles. Managers were urged to demonstrate participative 
management style, which included trust, information sharing, co-operation and 
“joint decision-making where possible ” with staff. Employees were encouraged to 
“avail themselves o f the opportunities to be involved in decision making which 
affects them” and to hold their managers to account (2.5.1 and 2.5.2). The 
responsibilities set out for the staff side representatives meanwhile were revealing: 
to be “involved in developing participation arrangements and procedures and... 
provide their co-operation and support as parties to this policy”, and to “accept that 
partnership shall only work where all employees have the opportunity to become 
involved in decisions affecting them irrespective o f whether they are members o f 
trade unions ” (2.4.1 and 2.4.2).
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The Forum discussed these ideas between February and April 2001. After 
consultation the JSCC was retained in parallel -  “kept in the fridge” as the HR 
Director put it - for formalised industrial relations negotiations such as on pay, 
disciplinary matters and for any breakdown in the overall partnership process. Staff, 
it was felt, were reassured by the JSCC’s continuing substantial role, many 
appreciating its Whitley heritage as conferring upon it a “more representative” 
identity.
The revised partnership model was ratified in May, after “not much debate” (HR 
Director). Different recollections conjure up either an aggressive debate (technician 
rep), or a constructive exchange of views (HR Director), or the unions shrugging the 
proposals through as a fait accompli (HR manager). Perhaps significantly, one of the 
more combative shop stewards was away that meeting, and greeted the ‘agreed* 
policy with an incredulous “Eh?!”
Partnership at NorthWest NHS Trust -  2nd version: structures and practices.
Partnership now exists in loose form on all three levels. At the Corporate level, as of 
October 2001 the Trust was still looking, three years on, to appoint a staff 
representative to the Board. The delay was attributed initially to protracted 
disagreements over the content of the employee representative’s job description, and 
then to the staff side - wary of the practical and ideological implications for their 
independence - prevaricating over whom to appoint. They sent six different 
observers to six consecutive Board meetings to learn more about the process, but 
could not agree among themselves; a number of managerial respondents put it down 
to inter-union jockeying for power positions. Following the adoption of the May 
2001 partnership, disagreement flared up again over disputed clauses in the 
agreement. None of the reps present at its signing-off recognised the clause allowing 
the Trust Chair to veto the staff side representative (as is legislated for other Board 
members), nor the one installing the Chair of staff side automatically.
Elsewhere at the Corporate level, the Forum continues to convene, with various 
senior managers and members of the HR team attending alongside ten staff side 
representatives, divided among the various recognised trade unions (although, since
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eighteen into ten does not go, this has caused some inter-union animosities). The 
frequency of the meetings has been cut from monthly to once every six weeks, as 
part of what the HR Director sees as ‘‘a rationalisation ” of the number of meetings, 
the idea being that as de-centralisation of authority is achieved, joint meetings at the 
Corporate level need not be as often. At the time of my final set of interviews the 
previous Forum had been cancelled, and attendance levels had fallen. The JSCC 
remains, but its meetings have also been halved, to two per year, albeit with the 
provision for emergency meetings at 21 days’ notice.
The Policy Development Group was already on the wane in July 2000, and while it 
still meets, it does so infrequently and it too is susceptible to cancellations due to 
unavailability.
The HR Director considers that a robust and credible policy on employment security 
is ‘‘an absolute pre-requisite for change management”, yet beyond the ‘job security 
and change’ policy for the merger, a local policy has never been discussed at 
NorthWest NHS Trust, and remains an aspiration for future attention. An HR paper 
has been tabled to the Forum.
Beneath the Corporate level partnership is “a patchy process... pockets o f 
excellence, but on the whole 4 or 5 out o f 10” (HR Director). Setting aside the 
myriad of schemes imposed upon the NHS by central government (including a self- 
assessment tool for departments that measured seven dimensions of ‘employee 
involvement’; each Directorate convened a special focus group of staff and 
managers to rate themselves), there have been some NorthWest innovations. In 1999 
the Forum devolved responsibility for spending each department’s Staff Amenities 
Fund (around £5,000) to staff, with the expectation that departments produce a joint 
statement on the proposed expenditure for the Forum’s interest.
Among the various Directorates some have developed their own initiatives, but only 
one had reported -  under duress, it seemed - to the Forum by the time the fieldwork 
was completed. ‘‘Where we’re doing it, i t ’s more than a ‘tick-in-the-box’... but 
where it’s not [happening], i t ’s [line management saying], ‘Oh God, we’ve got a lot
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on our agenda, here’s something else we ’re having to do ’, and ‘can’t quite see the 
value ’... Some see it as just another performance requirement” (HR Director).
Nursing was cited as having one of the more advanced initiatives. The Director led 
has a programme called ‘Leading Empowered Organisations’, and introduced the 
Directorate’s own statement of intent, ‘Commitment to my co-workers’. The 
document comprises a set of behavioural commitments in the first person singular 
( “I  will... ” and "I will not... ”), similar in intent and content to the Trust’s 1999 
statement. The text exhorts staff to use ‘‘the three C ’s -  creating, choosing and 
collaborating”, rather than “the three B ’s - bickering, backbiting and blaming”. 
Joint problem solving is urged upon all staff, and valuable contributions should be 
rewarded. The past should be forgotten, allowing for mistakes to be rectified and 
their threat to working relationships nullified. This ‘commitment’ was, by the 
Director’s account, very well received. The main nursing union, the RCN, declined 
to participate officially, a fear put down to a lack of confidence in the process by the 
Nursing Director.55 In June 2000 the Nursing Director submitted the statement for 
consideration by the Forum. It has since been incorporated into a forthcoming Trust- 
wide staff code of conduct. A working group of Nursing staff has met to identify 
competencies to support these commitments. Other examples cited approvingly by 
HR were in Acute Medicine (with its own Partnership Forum), Clinical Support 
(with a set of informal mini-Forums and team co-ordinators) and Mental Health 
(joint efforts to improve work routines).
But, on the wards, or in the administrative departments, partnership has yet to 
translate into anything approaching joint problem solving, the efforts above 
notwithstanding. Most departments have no consultative practices in place at all, 
according to one union rep. A nurse interviewed failed to relate his day-to-day 
involvement within his department to the overall ‘partnership’ programme (he had 
not seen the ‘Statement of strategic intent’), but he appreciated the regular ward 
meetings that offered staff an opportunity for input into decisions affecting their own 
work and the co-ordination of the ward’s activities. He found the ward management 
“supportive, not autocratic ”. However, any proposed changes at local level required
55 It was not possible to interview a union representative from  the RCNfor this case study.
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the go-ahead from senior management first (where, he felt, there was a “lack o f 
sympathy” for ward-specific concerns).
Tellingly, the establishment of each scheme was attributed by many respondents, 
including the nurse above, to the personal enthusiasm and management qualities of 
the Directorate’s senior management. The extent of penetration depends “on the 
quality and character o f individual managers in those divisions” (non-HR 
manager); “some managers involve you, some leave you to it” (administrative 
officer). A cleaner claimed that partnership “doesn't apply” to her department, 
although she appreciated her team’s daily informal briefings. Even within the 
department represented by one of partnership’s strongest union advocates, joint 
decision-making remained elusive, the rep feeling that managers lacked the 
confidence, or “empowerment”, to take local decisions themselves, without 
referring up to superiors: “I f  we'd done the management competencies [the 
education programme planned in 1999] we'd have had this [management 
confidence/ empowerment]”. From the shopfloor respondents it would seem that the 
majority “don't really think about” partnership. Their concerns are local or 
personal, rather than strategic: “how often they 're going to get a new uniform, and 
what colour it is”, as one example from a ward-based union rep! Those with a fully 
formed opinion on partnership are supportive but sceptical, rather than hostile.
The future? Sustainability.
Following the May 2001 reforms partnership at NorthWest NHS Trust is in 
transition. The programme has been re-modelled, and the changes will take time to 
become embedded, if they do. Despite the ambitions of the 2001 plans, and the fact 
that nobody within NorthWest NHS Trust is campaigning actively against 
partnership (this comment coming from one of the more cynical union reps 
involved), the programme has struggled to maintain its early impetus.
Both the Policy Development Group and even the Forum have witnessed falling 
attendance levels. Only one manager from the first meeting in September 1998 
remains, while one union rep noted that HR had become rather better represented, 
their number in proportion to the union presence increasing. Both forums had had 
meetings cancelled around the time of my third set of interviews (although non-
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attendance over the summer holidays could have been a factor). The enduring 
problem of staff representatives being unable to secure time off from their busy 
work schedules, coping with the resentment of their short-staffed line managers, was 
affecting union participation in the process: “The joint approach does take more 
time, and with partnership and all the other initiatives, then my normal rep duties, 
and then my actual job -  where there’s been no reduced case-load -  time is a real 
problem” (ward-based union rep). The same union rep pointed out that the 
Corporate level has not applied much pressure upon the Directorate managers to 
release reps involved in partnership, and that none were on paid time off; indeed, the 
Trust’s senior managers insist that each union should pay for their representatives’ 
time off for union duties, even those to do with partnership. One manager, a 
disillusioned architect of the original forums, felt that the twin loss of momentum 
was a signal of both forums’ perceived lack of worth in the eyes of the HR Director. 
Others also expressed concern about their decline in influence. But the HR Director 
prefers to interpret this as the passing of the ‘old’ partnership programme for the 
revised and improved version.
Given the stagnation, the unions have reverted to the certainties, and the strong 
negotiating position, provided by the Whitley-ist JSCC. During the first round of 
interviews for this case study [July 2000], there had been some uncertainty as to the 
future role of the JSCC, since it appeared that widespread support for the Partnership 
Forum might eventually render the ‘old-fashioned’ Whitley committee an unneeded 
anachronism. But when the partnership process stalled during 2001, the agendas at 
both the Forum and the JSCC began to overlap. The Forum saw ‘Any Other 
Business’ being filled with union grievances, in contrast to the desired joint problem 
solving approach. A number of the sceptical/ disillusioned unions also brought 
unresolved agenda items from the Forum to the more combative negotiations in the 
JSCC: “The agenda’s not changed in both. I t ’s the same, month in, month out. I t ’s 
sat still” (manager). A union rep concurred: disagreements, pedantic amendments 
and the cancellation of meetings mean that seeing the same items on the agenda each 
time is dispiriting, and acts as a disincentive to turn up. A frustrated HR manager 
criticised one of the main unions for “playing games ” with attendance to stall the 
partnership, and one rep did confess that, on occasion, with a deadline looming for a 
policy to be signed off, (s)he will use attendance as a bargaining tool. The staff side
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representatives’ insistence that they need to consult properly with their members has 
slowed the process of producing policy; the staff side seem to lack, or are 
uncomfortable with, a permanent mandate to endorse policy decisions. The HR 
Director discerned two different “temperaments” in each of the forums. The JSCC 
has managers preoccupied with the costs of initiatives, and the unions anguishing 
over concerns about their members’ interests being compromised. The Forum is 
“softer, nicer, constructive”. This is in spite of the fact that, but for two individuals, 
the same people sit on each. The contrast in style is indicative of the contradictions 
bedevilling partnership in NorthWest NHS Trust.
From the interviews, and general NHS press cuttings, it is apparent that partnership 
demands a style of management that has not been encouraged, still less nurtured, 
within the NHS for some time. The ‘partners’ accept that their process of employee 
involvement in decision-making has the potential to disenfranchise managers, to 
“dilute their power” (technician union rep); “the senior management want employee 
involvement, but the line managers feel threatened” (ward-based union rep). 
Managerial resistance points to “a significant lingering o f the old [macho 
management] culture”, the since departed Chairman believed. Disciplinary cases, 
from one or two per quarter (in May 2000, according to the then Head of HR) have 
“gone through the roof ’ (according to a technician rep, who attributed it to HR’s 
new combative style of recommending to line management the disciplinary process, 
but stressed that this was contrary to the Director’s devolved vision).
Accepting the hitherto negligence toward training and organisational support for the 
new behaviours and attitudes, the Trust has discussed what might feature in a 
competency framework to support partnership, with the unions taking the lead. One 
has tabled suggestions and set up a project team. (See the ‘Analysis’ for contrasting 
accounts of which competencies should feature in the finished training programme.) 
The educational programme remains in the pipeline, having been through “umpteen 
hoops ” (HR Director). The competency framework may eventually form part of the 
appraisal of managers, as well as guiding the Trust’s future recruitment into those 
positions.
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The next move forward [as at October 2001] was a joint effort to write a(nother) 
mission statement of shared values.
In summary, employee relations at NorthWest NHS Trust have advanced a long way 
toward partnership since the first meeting in 1998, but differing accounts suggest 
that the campaign has either taken a new direction, or has stalled, or even gone into 
reverse. The inconsistency of viewpoints does point to a fractured and discordant 
process. In any case, the Trust’s priority of meeting performance targets - “whatever 
the government tells us to do” - has sidelined the partnership programme; 
partnership is no longer considered, it would seem, the route to secure these targets, 
but an adjunct to it.
Before his departure in May 2001 for a strategic national position in the NHS, the 
Chairman articulated an aspirational path from information sharing and consultation, 
toward joint influence, and eventually joint decision-making. It is not, as yet, clear 
by which route the Trust will cross the threshold from the former to the latter, if 
indeed it will.
One of the senior staff side representatives explained that he viewed the partnership 
process as being one of evolution rather than revolution, and that this incremental 
approach was probably the best to take. NorthWest NHS Trust would appear to be at 
a crucial stage in evolution that may see partnership spread throughout the Trust, or 
slowly wither under other pressures.
Case study 4 -  NorthWest NHS Trust. Analysis section: Partnership.
In this section I first examine the extent to which the people management practices 
within NorthWest coincide with the IPA partnership model. I then go on to discuss 
how the partnership developed, relating its progress to the model in Figure 4, and 
then I assess the nature of the partnership arrangements.
Table 13 indicates that there is a burgeoning partnership taking shape, according to 
the IPA model, but ambiguities and confusions and even conflicts require one to 
suspend judgement on several elements (indicated with a *?’):
272
Table 13 -  Partnership at North West NHS Trust.
Partnership element Present?
Joint commitment to the success of the enterprise ©
Recognition of the legitimate interests of each party ©/?
Building trust-based relationships ©
Increasing employee involvement ©/?
Extensive information sharing ©/?
Consultation with employees at workplace and organisational level ©/?
Employment security provisions (in exchange for flexible work
practices)
©
Sharing the success of the enterprise ©
Principles.
All parties aspire to the success of the Trust’s service to its community. This is not 
contentious, and is widely endorsed, as one might expect it to be throughout the 
NHS. The imperative to improve the Trust’s industrial relations processes, in 
particular forging greater levels of trust by involving all stakeholders, has also been 
explicitly acknowledged. Similarly, the principle that all parties should collaborate 
to extend employee involvement will find few, if  any, dissenters.
But the unresolved paradox is that these principles lend themselves to competing 
interpretations, and competing prescriptions for implementing them in practice. 
Especially contentious would seem to be the role of the recognised trade unions. 
(See ‘Analysis’ below.)
Practices.
The intended structures for information sharing, staff consultation, employee 
involvement and joint problem solving are comprehensive, across all three levels of 
the organisation. Moreover they are intended to encompass far-reaching agendas 
from the Trust’s strategic direction to workplace activities in every department. 
However, the evidence gathered here does not suggest that what presently exists as 
consultative machinery and joint problem solving mechanisms matches the 
ambitions of the May 2001 model. Partnership throughout NorthWest NHS Trust is 
“patchy”, and predominantly confined to discussions at senior level, with one or 
two initiatives in partnership-minded Directorates. Even at Corporate level there are 
mutterings of tokenism and lip service, and a lack of real conviction.
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The clashes between managers and unions in each of the Trust’s key forums - the 
JSCC, the Partnership Forum, and the Policy Development Group - over such 
fundamentals as composition, agenda, frequency and style of the ‘partnership’ 
consultation are testament to a weak and incoherent process. Furthermore, while the 
reduction in formal exchanges has a logic arising from the agreed ambition to 
devolve joint decision-making to the Local level, this is surely a curious 
development at a time when partnership at the local level is so haphazard and 
unconvincing in the majority of the Trust’s workplaces.
It is still more bewildering that the devolving process will be allowed to “evolve”, 
and that the Forum exists only to encourage partnership, rather than to impose it as 
the Trust’s ideal approach to managing its operations. The proposed system of team 
briefings meanwhile - to “receive speedy and regular feedback from employees as to 
their views on the information provided” [by the senior Partnership Group] - sound 
more like occasions requiring managers to ‘listen’ to their staff than a determined 
effort to introduce joint problem solving.
In terms of the other components of partnership, the need to balance the Trust’s 
desire for more flexible work practices with employees’ concerns over employment 
security was acknowledged in the first statement, but not the second, although the 
HR Director is keen to address the issue. However, in the NHS employment security 
is less of a concern than it is for other sectors.
Similarly, sharing success is difficult in monetary terms in the public sector, but it is 
clear that NorthWest NHS Trust has sought to promote its partnership credentials 
and celebrate its joint wins (when they happen, and if the management remembers 
all of the ‘partners’).
Analysis: the nature of partnership at NorthWest NHS Trust.
The paradox of partnership at NorthWest revolves, firstly, around what its stated 
principles -  to which all parties have signed up - imply for the conduct of formalised 
collective employment relations and particularly for the role and influence of
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recognised trade unions; and secondly, how partnership principles should be 
implemented in a traditional, multi-union environment.
The May 2001 partnership is potentially a very strong model. It provides for joint 
strategic discussions between managers and employee representatives (including the 
recognised trade unions) at both the Executive and senior management levels. This 
consultation is then reproduced at the strategic apex of each Directorate, and locally 
tailored employee involvement practices spread joint problem solving and staff input 
into each individual workplace. The question is one of where the emphasis falls.
As the HR Director co-ordinates the programme, almost unilaterally, his definition is 
critical. When interviewed, he confirmed partnership’s elasticity: “It can mean what 
you want it to mean if  the partners agree to the definition”. Under this 
conceptualisation the content of a partnership is restricted only by what can be 
negotiated among the ‘partners’, or even imposed by one or more ‘partners’ on the 
others; partnership itself has no a priori requirements philosophically, such as those 
argued in the IPA model and others (see chapter one). He explained in his 
proposition paper for the May 2001 reforms that NorthWest NHS Trust’s 
partnership was “representative-based” [i.e.: conducted through the trade unions], 
rather than “individual-based”. In interview, he saw partnership including 
“representative mechanisms that allow the organisation to transcend traditional IR 
positions, and allow for an involved workforce. ” But it is clear that, for him, direct 
employee involvement was “the big prize”, particularly as a “management ethos ”.
Thus, there is a tension, perhaps even an ideological dilemma, at the heart of the 
developing conceptualisation of partnership between direct and indirect forms, or 
inputs. This was articulated in the proposition paper thus: “We need to agree on 
whether partnership is a substitute for joint consultation or joint consultation is a 
necessary part o f partnership” -  an extraordinary, almost rhetorical, question to 
pose given what had been formulated before.
In trying to position the programme’s leader in terms of his support for the role of 
trade unions, the bulk of the evidence implies that he is, at best, equivocal. During 
one interview he voiced general scepticism about the value of collective forms of
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representation in today’s more atomised, individualistic society, even going so far as 
to suggest that with effective management the need for "independent 
representation ” of the workforce as “an interest group ” can be eliminated. When 
directly challenged about marginalisation of the unions, he denied this was his 
intention, and endorsed trade unions as “a good thing”, providing “checks and 
balances”. However, later in the same interview he addressed the difficult issue 
about joint processes, that they can be slow and cumbersome, with a comment 
highlighting “a conflict between [the unions’ need to ensure their own internal] 
democracy [i.e.: consulting their members continually and adequately] and 
administrative effectiveness... You have to continually pose the question, ‘what is 
the purpose for using partnership? ' Is it for employee involvement and ‘inclusivity’, 
or for better policy outcomes? ” (When he saw this comment in black and white in a 
draft of the case study for the IPA he retracted vehemently, citing his Scottish 
socialist upbringing. But the ready sacrifice of democracy -  implied - raised a wry 
smile from one or two of his colleagues.)
Elsewhere in the same interview he wondered aloud whether certain issues lent 
themselves to a partnership approach or to a more ‘traditional’ approach. The 
traditional and partnership approaches may not be mutually exclusive. As might 
have been predicted, mixing and matching between the two approaches has 
presented the ‘partners’ with a number of awkward confrontations. So it has proved, 
with the contrasting styles in the Forum and the JSCC. Additionally, several 
respondents -  not exclusively from the unions -  commented that other senior 
managers support “partnership when it suits them ”\ “when the cap fits ”.
It would not be fair to lay the majority of blame for the inertia and apathy upon the 
HR Director. Commitment to the process should come from the unions, as well: 
“We [the Trust’s senior managers] have to go out and sell partnership to line 
managers... But the staff side reps have a parallel duty to ours to promote 
partnership to their members ”, argued the former Chairman. In interview, managers 
lamented staff side representatives presenting negative experiences, grievances and 
“shock stories” to the joint committees. Union participation is itself fragmented, and 
for the most part, would seem to be either ‘enthusiastic but frustrated’, or ‘involved 
but cynical and calculative’. One union rep (for technicians) offered that the unions
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representing the lower-paid echelons of the workforce (primarily UNISON) were 
threatened by employee involvement, since it entailed a challenge to the union as the 
single channel for employee voice. This union rep saw no problem with managers 
consulting staff directly about change, and only envisaged unions being 
marginalised if they "walk away... But i f  we get involved our skills as reps should 
convince people that are not union members that we’re best for them, whether as 
union reps or as staff reps”. The different levels of conviction in the process, as 
presently constituted, among the unions is undermining progress.
With partnership, union reps are prone to the accusation from some among their 
membership of being little more than "management ‘lackeys’... You see, I ’m 
supposed to go in and shout at managers, that’s my job!” one joked. A Finance 
manager set out the predicament of a clash of responsibilities for union 
representatives: to represent their members’ best interests while engaging with the 
managerial agenda that in all likelihood might challenge those best interests. A 
technician-based rep saw no such conflict in member representation under 
partnership:
"Under partnership the edges do get blurred... But my job is to improve the 
working lives o f my members, and as long as partnership does not disadvantage 
them, I ’ll stay involved. I  can’t really influence decisions on pay and terms and 
conditions [still set at a national level; they have not introduced local pay bargaining 
at NorthWest], but I  can influence the working environment: facilities, processes 
and policies, management style... We need, though, to show partnership’s gains to 
our members. ”
Another reflected on the fear of collusion with management thus: "We can see 
[partnership] is a 'good thing ’, but with caveats attached. Plus, there’s the ‘what’s- 
in-it~for-[members]?’ question to answer”. For this rep, it was up to the union reps 
to ensure that their members did not view partnership as collusion, and 
incorporation. One union rep agreed that, while the unions "do genuinely see 
partnership as a worthwhile exercise”, many colleagues feel "frustrations and 
cynicism” from time to time, particularly when dealing with disinterest, even 
hostility, at line management level.
Persuading line managers of the virtues and potential of the changes when they may 
feel threatened by, and resentful toward, its incursion into their domain is another 
challenge. A ward-based union rep described the reticence: "When you test their
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genuine commitment, it can seem more like a ‘tick-in-the-box’ exercise” than 
partnership. In the week before he left, the former Head of HR concluded ruefully 
that “HR can set a partnership up, but sustainability comes from leaders 
elsewhere... We have to trust leaders - management and union reps -  to drive the 
process. The management style -  at whatever level, it doesn’t matter -  is the most 
important thing. ” Contradictory behaviour on the part of managers can “allow the 
‘old wine in new bottles ’feeling to fester. Cumulatively this builds up, to resistance 
and cynicism. I f  your behaviour is not in line with your thinking, and people pick up 
on this, then partnership is an illusion ”, he said. An awareness of, and sensitivity to, 
staff issues were also important, but difficult to inculcate.
Partnership implies fresh attitudes and behaviours. When asked what these might be, 
the answers from interviewees were illuminating. For the Chairman, the primary 
skill needed is a “coaching” style of management, away from the “comfort zone o f 
traditional command-and-control”. This involves an ability to communicate well, to 
administer praise and criticism effectively. Also cited was leadership, “both 
transformational” (eliciting staff commitment to major change programmes) and 
“transactional” (the collaborative conduct of everyday relations over comparatively 
minor matters). The HR Director spoke too of “management competencies that 
facilitate individuals to be true partners at work... and that enhance patient care”, 
such as the “ability to see things objectively, patience to deal with the forward and 
backward movement o f relations during the process ”, as well as “an act o f faith ” 
and “force o f will: hard work, in other words ”. An HR manager identified as critical 
“recognition o f employee involvement as being a ‘good thing’ in itself ', as well as 
“openness” when communicating with staff, rather than secrecy and hoarding 
information. One manager opted for “confidence and ability to do your job, because 
i f  you know your work you are not afraid to open up, and can be an equal among 
staff and pool everyone’s ideas into a strong plan ”.
In summary, the emphasis of the partnership at NorthWest NHS Trust has been 
shifted toward direct forms of involvement, to the dismay of one or two of the 
original architects among the managers, and to the annoyance of UNISON, which 
remains involved, but from an “exasperated” and “cynical” standpoint. The evident
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lack of a commonly shared vision, being enthusiastically pursued, does not appear to 
bode well for the future.
Analysis: progress toward partnership and trust.
Progress toward partnership has followed the trust model (Figure 4) quite closely, 
although it would seem that momentum has stalled in Stage 2, the “maintenance” of 
trust.
There was no crisis at NorthWest that precipitated the move toward partnership, 
more a desire to improve industrial relations. The catalyst was the arrival of the new 
Chairman in 1996, and the impetus from the election of the New Labour government 
the following year helped. The inception of the ‘talks’ (la) was secured on the 
understanding that they were exploratory, with no prior commitment to any process; 
this allowed the wary unions to take part, and make the ‘leap of faith’ into the 
process, confident that they could withdraw at any stage. The talks themselves began 
badly, with bickering and complaints, but the Chairman recognised -  shrewdly, 
given the recommendations in the trust literature -  to allow for the grievances to be 
raised, and the air to be cleared, before moving on. This required considerable 
patience and understanding. (One union representative thought that, in retrospect, all 
parties might have benefited from a ‘bonding’/ ‘getting-to-know-you’ session prior 
to the first formal engagement with the controversial partnership agenda, and again 
the literature suggests that this would have been helpful.)
The determination to generate some small-scale joint wins (2a) in the early stages 
demonstrated a commitment to joint decision-making from all parties - “All o f these 
efforts move us to higher and higher levels o f trust”, the Chairman declared - and 
clearly propelled the process toward the first joint partnership statement in July 1999 
(lb). The ‘SID’ event in March 2000 seemed to cement the new joint process (2b).
The first agreement had three main weaknesses, at least in so far as developing 
partnership and trust is concerned. Firstly, it contained only aspirations and 
platitudes, rather than firm commitments and recourse to sanctions; as such it was 
almost impossible to contest, but equally very difficult to implement and enforce. 
Secondly, the lack of firm proposals, and the delay in acting upon the few firm 
objectives contained in the text (particularly the “education programme” for line
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management) meant that the process failed to advance significantly. Finally, the 
agreement neither sought nor received the approval of the wider workforce, 
marginalising the programme and denying it the strength of a mandate from the 
workforce. This too appears misjudged, since it seems that it would likely have been 
well received. All three weaknesses meant that when a new leader for the 
programme arrived, the terms of engagement were susceptible to revision.
The Trust wanted the new HR Director to improve the partnership, and he used his 
prerogative to re-direct the programme according to his own vision. This he did, 
breaking to a considerable extent with the consensual joint decision-making process 
that had been established. A number of participants interpreted this shift in style as a 
‘defection’ and, while none withdrew from the partnership (arrow ‘a’), these partial 
reverses seemed to breach some of the goodwill built up, and induced a sense of 
apathy. Some -  including managers - reverted to a search for evidence of the Trust’s 
continued desire to conduct relations on the basis of partnership and/or trust (arrow 
‘b’). Others did not see the May 2001 reforms as a ‘defection’ however, but 
lamented the stasis, a union rep typifying this interpretation of events which has 
arisen, he believes, from the gradual progression away from “antagonistic” relations 
to parties agreeing on the nature of the problem, but feeling “uncomfortable with 
discussions on the next moves forward, because we might enter a conflict-zone ”. For 
him, the key players have come to resemble:
“a club... with cosy monthly discussions. I t ’s lost its edge... too much patting 
on the back. We’re not actually doing it [partnership]. I f  joint decision-making isn’t 
taking place at the bottom, or at the top, then nothing’s happening! We need a bit o f 
conflict! ”
The inertia may be because the new model is taking time to become 
embedded but the programme has been poorly managed, and the fractious relations, 
while still cordial, do not appear to have advanced toward enhanced levels of trust.
Case study 4 -  NorthWest NHS Trust. Analysis section: Trust.
I returned to NorthWest NHS Trust to interview four respondents, selected by 
myself. I had interviewed each of them previously. Each was shown the degrees of 
trust diagram set out in the Methodology chapter, and given enough time to read
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and digest the implications of each definition before offering their thoughts. (I 
turned the tape recorder off to prevent any anxiety that the long silence being 
recorded may have caused.)
In this section I discuss the respondents’ appraisal of the degrees o f trust present 
within the organisation, with their explanations and justifications for their analysis, 
including any evidence provided in support o f their assertions. Where any were 
offered, I discuss the respondents’ own definitions or commentary on the nature of 
trust at work, and also their thoughts on what might assist in the development of 
trust at work, and what might constrain or threaten it. Their responses are captured 
in Table 14:
Table 14 -  NorthWest NHS Trust respondents on trust continuum.56
BEFORE 
P’SHIP 
(before 1998).
AT
P’SHIP
(1998).
2001.
HR DIRECTOR 
(March 2000 -  present)
K-b/T to R-b/T 
(I-b/T); 
D-b/T to I-b/T
HR MANAGER 
(before 1996 -  present)
D-b/T C-b/T to K-b/T 
(R-b/T)
C-b/T to K-b/T
UNISON REP K-b/T - C-b/T to K-b/T
MSF REP D-b/T K-b/T R-b/T
The semi-colons separate respondents’ comments on the nature of different 
relationships at work.
Taking each in turn, the HR Director sees the Forum as still a positive experience, 
reporting relations “tending toward” knowledge-based trust, and "possibly” 
relational-based trust among the key players. The work on defining the Trust’s 
values (the revised mission statement) even saw agendas converge to the extent that 
an identification-based trust was (briefly) fostered. Quality of trust would seem to 
depend upon who is involved, and accordingly runs the full gamut from deterrence- 
based trust (some protagonists, including a few "class war types”, retain a clear 
preference for conflictual relations as the best strategy for industrial relations)
56 KEY: D-b/ T = deterrence-based trust; C-b/T = calculus-based trust; K-b/T  = knowledge-based
trust; R-b/ T = relational-based trust; I-b/ T = identification-based trust.
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through knowledge-based trust to identification-based trust. This dispersal of 
approaches emphasises the fractious nature of the partnership, I would suggest. 
Reflecting generally on the influences on which quality of trust emerges, he cited 
"fairness and consistency [feeding] perceptions o f trust”. In addition, "diplomatic 
skills ” -  the ability to deal with problems -  were useful. But in particular, "certain 
people you like. You can be prepared to give them the benefit o f the doubt, i f  you like 
them, but i f  someone you don’t like does the same thing you get suspicious ”. He 
conceded that most of the Trust’s employees probably had a low degree of trust in 
the organisation: "They still see mistakes as a conspiracy, not a cock-up ”.
The HR manager had been in on the partnership programme from the outset, and in 
interview regularly indicated her transparent preference for the original vision over 
that being implemented after the May 2001 reforms by a boss that she did not 
especially get on well with, and so these comments ought perhaps to be considered 
with these personal enmities in mind. She described relations prior to the partnership 
effort in 1998 as being wholly without trust (deterrence-based). Around the time of 
the joint composition of the ‘Statement of strategic intent’ relations thawed into a 
cautious, tentative calculus-based trust that, as parties "made in-roads... doing 
something together”, moved toward knowledge-based trust. The participants got to 
know each other well during the frequent meetings. After the success of the ‘SID’ 
event, when "the ‘staff side’ and managers got something out o f it”, relations 
developed, in her view, toward relational-based trust. What she referred to as 
"changes in personnel" led to a reappraisal that inserted a certain distance between 
parties -  it “put the heckles up” among the staff side, and restored the 
"vulnerability” - returning to a knowledge-based trust. Relations now "swing 
between” calculus- and knowledge-based trust. She too cited different personal 
characteristics as being important antecedents for trust-based relations, by which she 
meant "being open ” and "wanting to take things forward”.
The UNISON representative examined the definitions of the different degrees of 
trust, and considered that, with the relations between the senior players, little had 
changed from the time before partnership to the present day. She had always found 
relationships to most closely resemble knowledge-based trust: "We never did have 
table thumping, and ‘everybody out ’ here, we never had really bad relations ”. She
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mused that perhaps the more compact, smaller group involved in industrial relations 
then meant that personal relationships were easier to manage. As for relations under 
partnership, “I  don't feel they 're out to stab us in the back; I  don 't think they 're 
playing games with us ”. But, she added that this view might reflect more her natural 
pre-disposition toward trust than a dispassionate assessment of the Trust’s industrial 
relations: “My own manager has a go at me about this, but I  tend to see the positive 
in most people. I  like most people ”. Her negative views toward the partnership do 
not revolve around the quality of trust, but “more about people's sincerity " -  itself a 
part of trust, of course. (This comment illustrates the limitations in presenting 
respondents with these complex definitions ‘on spec’.) In a previous interview she 
had highlighted the problem of instilling a partnership ethos at the local level, and 
the potential for the key players’ debate to become detached from the realities for 
the workforce as a whole: “Can you trust your line manager? That's the thing. Staff 
don't have a working relationship with the senior management. ”
The MSF union representative elected to separate relations at senior level from those 
within his own department. On the former he agreed with the HR manager that prior 
to the first talks on a putative partnership, relations were “definitely” deterrence- 
based: “There was mistrust on both sides, there was always an ulterior motive to 
whatever they [management] did” (respondent’s emphasis). The partnership 
initiative meant that “we had worked enough together that there was much less 
reliance on the threat o f sanction... ” However, the King’s Fund incident (see above) 
did undermine trust, and did lead to the union having recourse to sanctions - 
resignation from the Forum - to reinforce the anticipated behaviours: “Once you 
make a statement and you 're found to have lied”, he said, “the whole package goes 
out o f the window. ” In a previous interview, reflecting on the Kings’ Fund incident, 
he had admitted: “It takes a lot to maintain this new way o f working; it needs 
pushing all the time”. In 2001 relations “might have swung a bit too far the other 
way” [from deterrence-based trust] toward a too cosy relational-based trust: “We 
need to get the balance back”. He cited as roots of trust “openness, complete 
openness” and “not being afraid to make difficult decisions, i f  you have the 
arguments to back it up ".
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In summary, there is some evidence from the three respondents who have been 
involved in the programme from the outset that the process of engaging in some 
form of partnership did indeed improve the quality of trust in the organisation’s 
industrial relations. Two reported a move from deterrence-based trust to knowledge- 
based trust, and even relational-based trust; the other saw no damage done to 
relations. In the second phase of the partnership, the era led by the new HR Director, 
opinion fragments rather, with some individuals reporting a decline in trust levels, 
but others reporting improved quality in relations.
How to account for this? The respondents’ analysis was disappointingly limited. 
However, I would argue that the fact that respondents each see markedly different 
degrees of trust operating within the Trust, and that the degrees of trust seem 
dependent upon personal pre-dispositions and the conduct of one-to-one 
relationships, offers some evidence that the NorthWest partnership is not an 
established, convincing and widely endorsed programme. One hypothesis, suggested 
in the introduction, is that in a fully-functioning partnership organisation one would 
expect there to be rather more consistency in favourable viewpoints than in a less 
robust partnership. Similarly, reporting of conflict and antagonisms ought to be 
much reduced in a strong partnership. Sadly, even within the partnership group, the 
process at NorthWest NHS Trust suffers from fissures (between HR and the unions; 
among the unions themselves, and even within HR).
The literature on trust and co-operation suggest a number of reasons for these 
findings. The first suggests that the 1999 agreement was simply too weak a 
commitment to partnership principles: too easy to agree to, too easy to ignore in 
certain circumstances. Its vague aspirations were not enough to sustain partnership; 
they needed a complementary set of partnership practices to support, enforce and 
‘police’ the principles, either in place already or installed quickly before the warm 
afterglow of the agreement faded. Secondly, partnership -  as any change programme 
-  is prone to upheaval upon the arrival of a new leader; there needs to be processes 
in place to manage changes among key personnel. Steps to implement partnership 
practices -  as suggested above -  can address this weakness. Thirdly, the present 
process seems preoccupied with structures and agendas, and has thus far neglected 
to attend to developing and enhancing (and policing) participants’ attitudes and
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behaviours, in particular their efforts to build mutual trust. If anything, it would 
seem that senior managers, and some of the union representatives, have reverted to 
‘distributive’ bargaining tactics, and away from ‘integrative’ joint problem solving. 
In addition, one union would appear to be using ‘Consistent Reciprocity’ (see 
chapter two). A cycle of mutual suspicion has begun (although, I concede, neither 
party chose to acknowledge this formally when confronted with the continuum). 
Fourthly, the senior managers’ switching of styles -  from partnership to bargaining, 
as the issue (apparently) demands, with at least one of the main trade unions reacting 
with appropriately defensive behaviours -  mitigates against the demonstration of 
consistency and integrity. This further renders the trust-building process harder to 
realise. Further, although the new partnership structures were approved among the 
key players, the endorsement does not appear to have been made with much 
conviction, and the workforce has not been given any input, or the chance to 
approve. The absence of universally-acknowledged legitimacy means that contrary 
behaviours, from both sides, can continue almost with impunity, even though all 
parties remain engaged in the partnership process.
Finally, the new partnership structures are not firmly embedded at any level, and few 
organisational resources are being made available for them to be implemented. Thus, 
the ambition of partnership can be undermined by contrary behaviours at any level, 
and can come to be seen as the cosmetic, half-hearted exercise that some within the 
Trust already suspect it to be.
Conclusion.
The experience of partnership at NorthWest NHS Trust highlights a number of the 
idea’s major implications. The first is that the respondents’ reported degrees of trust 
indicate, again, that partnership can and does improve relationships. But the process 
must be sustained. While it is a difficult process to stop, and certainly cannot be 
switched on and off at will, the need to demonstrate joint wins must be ongoing. 
This is because partnership, and trust, raises parties’ expectations that need to be 
met, but also because inertia undermines progress, and induces cynicism that is hard 
to overcome. However, more positively, the enduring process here -  despite a 
prolonged bout of inertia and even low-level conflict -  suggests that, as long as there 
are no serious ‘defections’, parties engaged in partnership can tolerate inertia and
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even ineffectiveness if their own convictions remain high. Relatedly, while there is 
no serious defection, the alternative of adversarialism remains unattractive. 
Partnership may seem little better, but of the two, it is preferred.
Less optimistically, partnership can have many definitions, and these can assume 
very different ideological hues, particularly over the role and influence of trade 
unions, and partnership is susceptible to radical alteration or termination by the 
arrival of new leaders, unless it is either embedded or the upheaval caused by change 
in key personnel is managed sensitively and jointly. Finally, without a clear and 
legitimate mandate, or enforceable parameters beyond which no participant is 
allowed to cross, partnership is susceptible to being undermined by contrary 
behaviours, and these contrary behaviours may come from any part of the 
organisation. Partnership implemented in a piecemeal fashion -  as it would seem to 
have been done in NorthWest NHS Trust -  is unlikely to succeed.
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7. Conclusions.
These conclusions must necessarily be tempered by a number of disclaimers about 
the limitations of my research. What follows ought not really to be considered 
‘facts’, as such; more properly, these are my inferences from the evidence that I was 
able to gather based on the personal testimonies of a relatively small number of 
selected respondents in each organisation. This points up two unavoidable 
weaknesses of qualitative case study research methods. The first concern is, ‘whose 
voices are we hearing here?’ The second is, ‘are the testimonies honest?’
Time and resource constraints prevented me from conducting interviews among a 
larger, and perhaps more representative cross-section sample of the workforce. I had 
to restrict the number of respondents, and also the characteristics of respondents. 
Although I requested access to, and conducted interviews with, a uniquely wide 
range of employees in each organisation -  including most of the ‘key players’, as 
well as uninvolved ‘shop floor’ employees and ‘dissenters’ -  it would not be right to 
claim that each set of respondents constitutes a representative sample of opinion in 
their organisation. In particular, I was not able to consult with workers who might be 
considered peripheral to the partnership process (those on part-time contracts; those 
in departments not directly involved, such as marketing, and also those actively 
opposed to the partnership - although I was led to believe, in each case, that this was 
very much a minority viewpoint). That said, what insights I could glean from the 
‘shop floor’ respondents were somewhat under-developed, and their lack of detailed 
reflection on partnership has necessarily diminished the ‘shop floor’ voice in these 
studies. (This is certainly not to imply criticism of the ‘shop floor’ respondents, 
incidentally, merely an observation.) I consider below the theoretical implications of 
the paucity of shop floor commentary, but methodologically, it is a regret that I did 
not ask ‘shop floor’ respondents to discuss the five degrees of trust (although when I 
did -  in EngineParts - the respondent declined to comment!) Another silent 
constituency here is the strategic decision-makers in EngineParts’ and WhiskyCo’s 
parent companies, and NorthWest NHS Trust’s Board and the Department of Health, 
for whom partnership may have been critical to their decisions (as implied in both 
EngineParts and WhiskyCo), or an irrelevance.
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The second significant weakness of case studies’ reliance on partial narrative 
accounts is that the ‘key players’ -  in this case, the architects of the partnership -  
might be expected to have a vested psychological (and perhaps career) interest in 
promoting as favourable an image as possible of their own ability and 
accomplishments, their own competence and character. There is a temptation to edit, 
distort, play down and play up incidents and interventions in a personally favourable 
light, and perhaps to ‘smoothe’ out the narrative flow of events -  something 
Marchington warned against (1995). While my efforts to triangulate the data, and to 
corroborate testimonies among the respondents, have reduced the possibility of such 
distortions (see the methodology chapter), it is likely that some will have slipped 
through.
Finally, my own input: in producing these studies I have necessarily had to select 
and edit respondents’ testimonies in order to describe and explain the partnership in 
each organisation. I do not claim that the case studies are definitive accounts (no 
such ‘truth’ is possible), but they do portray as accurate as possible an account of the 
partnership in each organisation, and I would be astonished if another researcher 
went into any of the four enterprises to interview the same people, and came out 
with a markedly different interpretation of what happened.
With these disclaimers in mind, the case studies do nevertheless generate an 
abundance of intriguing common themes, generalisable learning points and testable 
hypotheses for future research.
It is clear from the four case studies presented here that the partnership model of 
managing and controlling work is a viable one. It has demonstrated its potential and 
attractiveness in four very different settings (private and public, unionised and non­
unionised, and in different sectors).
It is also a programme that can become embedded and last for many years, rather 
than be yet another peripheral, or flavour-of-the-month, initiative. In all four 
organisations the partnership has overcome significant challenges and threats to its
57 While the decision on when the ‘partnership' era began in each case study is a matter o f  personal discretion, I  
would argue that the time-spans range from 18 years (EngineParts) and 14 years (SchoolWear) to 6 years 
(WhiskyCo) and 2 years (North West NHS Trust).
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viability and even its underlying principles. (Indeed, it will be interesting to learn 
what would be considered a crisis too far, when partnership is no longer 
conceivable.)
The bulk of the self-reports from the respondents in the second round of interviews 
suggest an identifiable causal relationship between partnership and increased levels 
of trust. While a certain caution must necessarily be flagged up about respondents 
commenting upon different relationships (separated by semi-colons in the case 
studies’ tables), and also their analysis being influenced by their own pre­
dispositions toward trust (witness the NorthWest NHS UNISON rep, and 
EngineParts’ HR officer) and personal experiences, nevertheless respondents’ 
accounts of shifts in degrees of trust tallied consistently with the overall narrative of 
the partnership. Trust improved, often dramatically, following the partnership 
agreement in the unionised studies (particularly at EngineParts and WhiskyCo, and 
to some extent at NorthWest NHS Trust), while the experience of non-unionised 
SchoolWear is that the ‘partnership’ bundle of principles and practices had already 
generated very high levels of trust without a formal agreement.
I would further venture to argue that the diagrammatic representation of the progress 
toward partnership and trust detailed in Figure 4 has proved accurate, and is 
potentially predictive of future outcomes. For example:
■ In each case study, with perhaps the exception of SchoolWear, there was an 
identifiable ‘leap of faith’ into talks (la). Information sharing, including of 
commercially sensitive data and plans, was found to be a powerful catalyst 
for initiating the debate (notably at EngineParts and WhiskyCo).
■ Producing a jointly designed partnership agreement (lb) did act as a catalyst 
for improved relationships based on trust, as did demonstrations that joint 
problem solving could generate mutual gains (2a). In EngineParts, 
WhiskyCo and NorthWest NHS Trust the very process of joint problem 
solving, in particular over the design of the partnership agreement itself, led 
to a reappraisal of trust relations before the deal had been approved -  
justifying the conjoinment of boxes lb and 2a.
■ The experience post-partnership (2b, 3a and 3b) of continued joint problem 
solving and mutual gains does appear to have had a powerful positive effect
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on the quality of trust reported. Reports of identification-based trust 
constitute an extraordinary finding, especially given the antagonistic histories 
at WhiskyCo and EngineParts.
■ NorthWest NHS Trust and WhiskyCo both experienced ‘inertia’ when the 
joint problem solving began to struggle to deliver joint wins, or a satisfactory 
process for one constituency.
■ Responses to ‘defections’ appear to have fallen into the three categories 
suggested -  dissolution, reaffirmation and tolerance -  at the stages indicated 
in my theory. Both WhiskyCo and EngineParts experienced a ‘reaffirmation’ 
response from the unions to a perceived managerial defection, while the 
failed business venture at SchoolWear was considered a matter of regret 
rather than resentment. In each case the levels of trust were strong enough to 
withstand the threat posed by the defection. Hearteningly, none of these 
incidents prompted a ‘dissolution’ of the partnership.
It is apparent from all four case studies that partnership has transformed the 
atmosphere, or spirit, of employment relations (except for SchoolWear, where it 
affirmed already very positive relations). The reflections gathered in the second 
round of interviews overwhelmingly (though not unanimously) point to 
transparently major shifts in the qualitative nature of trust-based relations. As the 
partnership became embedded, and demonstrated its value to the key players, so the 
trust strengthened. Where partnership was not so convincingly embedded -  within 
NorthWest NHS Trust -  the trust remained fickle, disparate and lacked cohesion 
among the participants.
These enhanced trust levels are however not a permanent state of affairs; the trust 
remains perennially prone to disruption and abuse (such as at WhiskyCo, NorthWest 
NHS Trust, and maybe, soon, at EngineParts?)
Between whom is the trust/ partnership forged?
A major finding is that this enhanced trust seems to be confined in the main to the 
senior key players in the management and trade unions/ workforce teams, and is not 
replicated to anything like the same extent in the relationship between the 
organisation and shopfloor/ ordinary employees in general. This was found to be the
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case not only in the three unionised enterprises (was it not ever thus?), but 
fascinatingly, also within the non-unionised firm, SchoolWear.
This surprising and universal finding reveals a detached ambivalence toward 
partnership among non-key players, even in long-standing arrangements (such as at 
EngineParts - hilariously so, in the case of one 50+ shopfloor worker who described 
his working life as “all right” during the tumultuous 1970s, and “all right” under 
partnership!) Partnership seems not to have shifted ‘rank-and-file* attitudes to any 
noteworthy degree; each of the GMB ballots at WhiskyCo saw the same percentage 
voting in favour and against the partnership, for example. For those on the 
shopfloor, partnership’s impact on their thinking, and indeed their view of the 
organisation, seems minimal.
For the key players, however, it is apparent that partnership plays a powerful role in 
their working lives, and establishes some very strong friendships, indeed (including 
identification-based trust).
So, the partnership is mainly conducted between the key players as individuals (as 
Salamon indicated: 1998). A ‘partnership elite* is created that jointly engages in a 
principled and positive process of joint problem solving, primarily between 
themselves, to manage the organisation’s employment relations issues more co­
operatively. This process designs and implements mutual gains policies and 
practices. A partnership agreement endows these individuals with the authority to 
seek commitment to change from their respective constituencies; employees, if they 
do not resist outright, can be expected to go along with the agreed change 
programme (though, as WhiskyCo compellingly illustrates, even this is not 
guaranteed).
This finding challenges the more extravagant claims for partnership as an 
organisation-wide cultural change programme as, surely, fanciful. Indeed, I would 
predict that even within these established and, I consider, impressive partnership
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companies, staff surveys would reveal low levels of awareness of, let alone
e g
enthusiasm for, partnership, and still less for the nuances of the debate.
This discrepancy in trust levels can be readily explained by the trust literature. 
Firstly, trust emerges from observable demonstrations of beneficial trustworthiness. 
The individuals most immediately involved in partnership engage with each other 
much more frequently, on commonly agreed agendas, seeking mutually beneficial 
outcomes, in often emotionally-charged meetings. The trust literature suggests that 
this process will, if conducted in a consistent manner, inevitably improve trust levels 
among these individuals. Those outside the process are unlikely to develop the same 
body of evidence, and are also unable to exert much influence on the process, and so 
-  as the trust literature would infer -  these employees are much more likely to feel 
vulnerable and uncertain, and are much less confident in bestowing trust. As the HR 
Director at WhiskyCo noted, most shopfloor employees do not see managers (or 
their union reps) on a regular basis in a variety of situations, and so it is difficult for 
such employees to build up a substantial body of evidence of consistent behaviours 
and intentions. They may not be party to the information explaining the decisions 
reached, stifling trust levels.
From this one can postulate that, where managers meet more frequently with the 
workforce, and/or devolve joint problem solving down to the lowest levels, and/or 
share information openly, trust levels among the ‘rank-and-file’/ non-key players 
might be expected to increase. (That said, they might receive the information, but 
still not believe it - a problem encountered at EngineParts. This lends credence to the 
‘partnership elite’ theory.) Managers and trade unions should certainly not neglect to 
communicate with, and involve the wider workforce. Efforts to instil trust within the 
workforce as a whole (as SchoolWear does, EngineParts aspires to, and NorthWest 
NHS Trust seems rather to neglect) are essential, lest the elite be seen as remote and 
self-serving.
Given that the trust seems predominantly confined to the key players it further 
follows that for the trust to endure and develop the key players need to have a
58 When I  put this observation to Ross Dunn o f  Blue Circle, he denied any o f  the case studies here ‘partnership ’ 
status i f  the lower graded employees did not share the principles and the same levels o f  trust... It is, then, a huge 
pity that I  was not able to conduct my research inside Blue Circle to test this finding there.
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sustained presence in the process. Where there is disruption to the personnel in the 
‘partnership elite’ trust suffers. (The negative consequences of this can be observed 
at NorthWest NHS Trust and at WhiskyCo; the positive benefits of consistent 
personnel can likewise be discerned at SchoolWear and at EngineParts, although at 
the latter this may come under review with the arrival of the new MD.) The 
partnership, and indeed any mutual trust emerging from it, remains dependent on the 
original signatories, or like-minded persons, representing the different constituencies 
staying the course. It also relies on the benign support from an organisation’s senior 
managers.
What is it about partnership that leads to increased levels of trust?
The need for consistency and integrity in behaviour is the central lesson of all of the 
case studies. Where consistency is applied and even enforced, partnership grows and 
matures (EngineParts, SchoolWear, and for the most part WhiskyCo). Where 
behaviour is inconsistent or contrary partnership has faltered (NorthWest NHS 
Trust, and on one issue, WhiskyCo).
Agreeing and enacting a clear and inviolable set of partnership principles was shown 
to underpin the design and implementation of partnership practices (at WhiskyCo, 
EngineParts and SchoolWear). Where commitment to the principles was rather less 
convincing, or susceptible to equivocation (at NorthWest NHS Trust) the practices 
were less widespread and less coherent, tensions and conflicts were more prevalent, 
progress less impressive, and the trust less developed.
The important point is that the key players have to believe in the other’s convictions; 
warm words endorsing the partnership principles are clearly not sufficient (witness 
the three failed initiatives at WhiskyCo). This belief needs evidence, and from 
several respondents’ careful suspended judgements, it is also apparent that trust is 
not naive, but is indeed an intelligent appraisal of this evidence.
As for the partnership practices, from the evidence gathered here, information 
sharing and evidence of genuine joint problem solving would appear to be the 
decisive elements in the partnership model. Greatly enhanced joint problem solving 
was demonstrated at SchoolWear, WhiskyCo and EngineParts; where joint problem
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solving was weighted heavily in management’s favour (at NorthWest NHS Trust) 
there was rather less progress toward partnership.
Of the other elements of the partnership model, the presence of an employment 
security policy was also highly prized and appears to have had a significant bearing 
on progress (at EngineParts, WhiskyCo and SchoolWear). But perhaps surprisingly, 
very few respondents cited provisions for sharing the success of the organisation 
(profit-sharing, share ownership) as especially influential.
From respondents’ accounts, however, it is apparent that engaging in partnership is 
not about the terms of the agreement, nor especially is it cast in the structures for 
managing the employment relationship (since each of the four case studies here have 
very different agreements and structures). While an agreement, or statement of 
intent, must be in place (and where it was not -  at EngineParts initially and at 
NorthWest NHS Trust - the progress stalled), and the structures and practices must 
be used effectively, the strength or otherwise of partnership lies in the attitudes and 
behaviours of the key players. NorthWest NHS Trust’s practices are potentially 
exemplary, but the requisite attitudes and behaviours have yet to emerge fully, while 
EngineParts’ practices are perhaps the least impressive on paper, but their key 
players demonstrate abundantly high trust levels.
Which features of partnership are cited as decisive influences on the development of 
enhanced trust? From respondents’ explanations, the following emerge as important:
■ Joint acknowledgement of common objectives, whether ‘imposed’ from 
without or identified from within, spur efforts to find common ground, and 
reduce sources of animosity and conflict
■ The increased frequency of interactions among the key players, across a 
range of workplace issues, reduces the potency of assumed antagonisms, and 
increases players’ estimation of the other’s trustworthiness
■ The increased dissemination of honest organisational information has a 
particularly marked influence on behaviours, since it demonstrates a 
willingness to trust, but also manoeveures parties’ strategic responses toward 
co-operation, and invites joint problem solving
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■ Securing tangible benefits from the joint problem solving approach, and 
demonstrations of mutual gain, reinforce the value of the partnership/ trust- 
building process, and the benefits to be accrued from reciprocity and 
continuing to be engaged in the process. They are most effective when 
delivered early
■ Provisions for employment security are viewed very positively, since it 
permits parties to feel confident about the future, and reduces the stifling 
doubt that one party -  particularly the trade union(s) -  may about to be 
duped.
■ Above all, however, it is consistency and integrity, and thus the predictability 
of benevolence, which marks successful partnerships.
Obviously, I would welcome researchers testing this theory and method in other 
partnership settings.59
Partnership and the demise of effective trade unions?
Many commentators are concerned about the long-term implications for trade unions 
should partnership fail: "The question is whether, in the course o f building a new 
type o f non-adversarial relationship with employers, unions will retain a sufficiently 
independent role” (IDS, 1998b: p2).
The first point to make is to reiterate that partnership should not be confined to 
union-management relations; the impressive findings from SchoolWear demonstrate 
its worth in non-unionised firms. Secondly, none of the union respondents from the 
three unionised organisations reported a decline in their influence, or in their 
membership levels. They argue that their influence has greatly increased as a result 
of working with, rather than resisting, the partnership. (Moreover, it is not the case 
that these are passive, moderate, right-wing trade unionists; most had been involved 
in -  and even led - industrial action in the past and were not afraid to be again.)
59 I  have been pleased to observe the essential points being confirmed in newspaper and conference accounts 
from  other organisations -  such as the stasis within a major high street retailer as its recognised union has 
witnessed the incidence o f  joint wins declining, to the extent that the union is reviewing involvement in the 
partnership; and at the major car manufacturer where a serious defection -  the surprise closure o f  a successful 
plant -  extinguished all trust, and unleashed serious reprisals against the company.
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Many ‘rank-and-file’ members did express scepticism and even some indignation 
for their representatives’ engagement with partnership, but one suspects that these 
criticisms are not much more than moans; certainly there has been no challenge 
whatsoever to unions’ involvement in partnership at any of the unionised sites. In 
short, from this evidence, partnership does not appear to have damaged union 
cohesiveness or effectiveness.
Partnership, trust and pluralism: Fox revisited.
Returning to Fox and his typologies for both frames of reference on the employment 
relationship, and management styles, I argued in chapter one that partnership ought 
to be viewed as a pluralist model for managing the employment relationship. The 
evidence from the case studies surely supports this judgement.
In each organisation ‘partnership’ has not eradicated the bases of conflicts of interest 
between the employer and the employed. Even in what seem highly co-operative 
workplaces enjoying high-trust relationships, antagonisms and conflict, and even 
orchestrated resistance, continue to happen. But, according to the testimonies 
gathered here, partnership has succeeded in managing the conflict more 
productively, for mutual benefit. Thus, unitarist perspectives have little to offer by 
way of explanation in these case studies.
Radicalist and Marxist interpretations, from the likes of Kelly (1996), Claydon 
(1998) and Whitston (2001), seek to condemn partnership as a duplicitous 
managerial programme in eliciting worker compliance during periods of difficult 
change. Their argument, that foolish unions are co-opted in order to nullify their 
members’ latent threat to managerial diktat, may be persuasive, but for it to pertain 
from the evidence here, each of the managers would have had to lie about their 
motives, not just to me in these interviews, but to their employees and union 
representatives, and to maintain a false commitment to joint problem solving over 
several years. As the HR Director at WhiskyCo said to me, sustaining that level of 
deceit is almost impossible. Additionally, radicalists would need to explain why the 
employees and their representatives are among the most vociferous defenders of 
partnership, the workforces in Engine Parts ad WhiskyCo endorsing continued
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partnership by a ratio of at least three to one each time. For these reasons I am not 
convinced by the ‘co-opted’ thesis.
The appeal of ‘trust’ as a lens through which to view partnership is that it can 
accommodate both a pluralist reading -  trust is the medium through which conflicts 
of interest can be managed -  and radicalism’s conviction in ongoing, dynamic 
animosities that, at different times, can be abated or stifled, but never eradicated.
What would appear to distinguish partnership from ‘old-style’ pluralism is that 
parties to modem partnerships -  as defined here -  seem not to rely on compliance 
with mles and procedures, as pluralists recommended in the past, but emphasise 
instead normative and even emotive constraints on each other’s behaviours and 
decisions. This would appear to be a new approach -  certainly in the organisations 
studied and seemingly, from my review in chapter four, in British industrial relations 
tradition. Pluralism has mutated to reflect the times.
For the unions (although, again, I reaffirm my argument that partnership is not a 
union-only model), it is illustrative that they have been careful, in their depictions of 
credible partnership, to shift their language accordingly. The top union leaders do 
not appeal too strongly for ‘old-style’ structures and processes and institutions when 
articulating partnership; instead, they have couched their models in vague, 
management-friendly attitudinal and behavioural terms: ‘building relationships’, 
‘seeking common solutions to common problems’, and of course, ‘developing trust’.
That said, a minimum framework of joint problem solving is needed to get the 
process started, and to differentiate partnership from paternalism. For the 
implications of this see my comments on the ‘prospects for partnership’ below.
Fox argued (1974a), persuasively, that the quality or otherwise of an organisation’s 
trust levels are ‘designed in’ or ‘out’ by management’s decisions on job design and 
employee involvement, while Thompson (1998) has noted that reward systems can 
have a powerful effect on intra-organisational trust levels. The degrees of trust 
presented here can augment and refine Fox’s management styles typology. 
Deterrence-based and calculus-based trust might be seen to reflect the suspicious,
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conflict-led, short-termist, fire-fighting ‘standard-modern’ approach. Pursuit of 
knowledge-based and/ or relational-based trust on the other hand bears similarity 
with ‘sophisticated-modern’ styles of management (cf. Purcell, 1983), recognising 
that conflicts can occur, and seeking to harmonise interests for organisational 
effectiveness and ‘industrial’ peace. Less convincingly, one might transpose the 
philosophy behind the ‘sophisticated-paternal’ style -  which denies the legitimacy of 
conflicts of interest, and obviates employees’ need for separate representation of 
their interests with a set of benefits -  onto identification-based trust.
The prospects for partnership in Britain.
What of the prospects of partnership, when comparable joint collaborative 
programmes have come and gone, and are not widely mourned?
My (admittedly truncated) analysis of the history of partnership-style initiatives in 
the UK in chapter four highlighted two main points. The first (borne out by the case 
studies here) is that the present programme relies much more than its antecedents on 
demonstrating consistent attitudes and behaviours, rather than fretting about and 
getting bogged down in quibbles about agendas, structures and due process. In the 
preceding programmes there had been scant attention paid to the attitudes and 
behaviours required; they were rather assumed to materialise automatically. This 
has, I suggest, been a mistake. The elegance of trust in particular is that it acts as 
judge and jury on any collaborative programme, and it seems that earlier 
programmes were found wanting in the development of this valued commodity. 
Partnership is the first programme to have been deliberately conceived with this 
central objective in mind.
The second point qualifies the first, however. It is a concern that the recommended 
attention to informal processes may mean that partnership is condemned to repeat 
Flanders’ and Donovan’s criticisms of earlier industrial relations systems. We have 
seen the upheaval and damage caused by abused trust.
This perhaps offers a strong argument for greater institutional support for 
partnership. Tax incentives for profit sharing or employee share ownership have 
been introduced, and are to be welcomed. But if, as suggested in these case studies,
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it is information sharing and joint problem solving that really improves trust, then 
the forthcoming EC directive on information and consultation needs to be given 
more support. (Employers’ bitter resistance may in part stem from a desire to retain 
their managerial prerogative, but from the analysis here, demonstrates starkly their 
lack of trust in their employees.) Additionally, legislation strengthening information 
sharing and consultative obligations in the event of mass redundancies, to at least 
jointly manage this defection, would also, in my view, be welcome.
There are, alas, conflicting signals in the institutional environment. Both the 
government and employers may endorse partnership, but seem content to rely upon 
managers’ voluntary and enlightened benevolence to instil it. This has not been our 
past experience. Meanwhile among the trade unions, although the TUC embraces 
partnership, the recent elections of hard Left candidates as General Secretary in 
UNISON, PCS, ASLEF and the RMT (with the GMB, Amicus and the T&G to 
come) suggest a much less enthusiastic mood abroad among union members...
Future research agendas: some suggestions.
More systematic data, collected through quantitative survey methods and analysed 
using statistical techniques, would have enhanced my confidence in these tentative 
findings. Future research might fruitfully examine the following areas.
On which elements of the partnership model are most significant in improving an 
organisation’s internal relations through trust, the case study evidence points to 
some being perceived as more helpful (greater information sharing, opportunities for 
joint problem solving, employment security), than others (notably, and curiously, 
reward schemes). Is this true? What can explain this? Does, perhaps, partnership 
have ‘hygiene’ elements that, while not directly influential on trust levels, need to be 
in place for ‘motivators’ (or, in this case, ‘trust-builders’) to work? Which policies 
fall into which category?
Relatedly, is it the case that organisations must subscribe to the principles, and be 
able to demonstrate conviction in these as articles of faith, as Guest and Peccei argue 
(1998; 2001)? Or is partnership sustained primarily through its set of practices? Or, 
are neither essential and the principles and practices are incidental to, simply,
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consistent benevolent behaviour on the part of management? Research tools 
isolating and testing for these variables would clarify some of the content of the 
learning points I suggest are most pertinent.
Quantitative, attitudinal data could also verify the impression formed from the four 
case studies that partnership creates an ‘elite’ of key players whose trust in the 
partnership process is not shared to the same degree of confidence by the ‘rank-and- 
file’. Comparing perceptions of intra-organisational trust levels between the ‘shop 
floor’ and the key players would be fascinating. If the ‘elite’ finding holds true, why 
might this be the case? Is the HR Director at WhiskyCo correct that the ‘shop floor’ 
are less trusting of managers because they do not witness the key players making 
trustworthy decisions, and so cannot gather credible evidence of trustworthiness? Or 
do workers, as Kelly and Kelly might hope, continue to harbour suspicious ‘them 
and us’ sentiments toward management that prevent deeper levels of trust from 
developing?
Relatedly, this research was conducted in recognisable ‘partnership’ organisations. 
Comparative research might investigate whether trust levels are qualitatively better 
in partnership organisations over similar non-partnership organisations (in which 
case partnership’s distinctive claim to improve trust levels might be challenged).
Each of the stages in Figure 4 (on page 79) offers a research agenda of its own. For 
example, what legitimates the ‘leap of faith’ into trust? What then sustains it? How 
do people cope with abuses of trust? (What reactions occur: angry recrimination, or 
indignant withdrawal from the relationship, or just weary cynicism?) Is there an 
optimal trust level?
To analyse trust more precisely, and to generate sophisticated and credible results, a 
more nuanced measure is required, based on the important differences among the 
degrees of trust outlined in chapter two. (I shall shortly begin working on such a 
measure at Erasmus University, Rotterdam.) Likert-scale items need to incorporate 
the different degrees of trust, to test for the strength of the belief. The sources of 
trust need also to be identified correctly: again, trust may stem from the partnership 
principles and practices, or from the testimonies gathered for these case studies, it
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would seem that the experience of consistently positive, or at least non-detrimental, 
behaviour might be critical. But an individual’s perception of another’s 
trustworthiness is influenced by several other factors, and these include:
■ One’s innate pre-disposition toward trust. Some people, such as the UNISON 
rep in NorthWest NHS concede that their ‘default position’ is to trust others, 
often in the face of contrary evidence; others, such as the union reps at 
WhiskyCo and Engine Parts, reported much more suspicious natures.)
■ One’s ‘ideological’ perspective on the employment relationship. Those who 
consider that management and workforce goals are either complementary, or 
can at least be aligned on a semi-permanent basis, may be more inclined to 
trust the motives of the other party; the more sceptical, or class-conscious, 
may be far more reticent.
■ One’s desire to ‘belong’, or ‘fit in’ versus one’s desire to remain 
independent. Some people may acquiesce more readily than others, to feel 
comfortable among in company, even with people whose agenda may 
conflict with theirs. Others may value their autonomous status more, and so 
withdraw from the vulnerability that trust implies.
A danger, however, is that one-off ‘snap-shots’ recording trust levels at a given time 
may only reflect events and impressions from the immediate past; shifts in degrees 
of trust would need to be tracked over time to avoid this distortion.
Finally, sector-level survey research among similar firms, differentiated only by the 
presence or otherwise of a genuine ‘partnership’ agreement, can begin to answer 
whether partnership, and/or trust, delivers improved organisational performance.
Final remarks: the value of trust.
The evidence gathered here demonstrates the essentially dynamic and ever- 
fluctuating nature of both partnership and of trust.
Tensions and conflicts, and ‘us and them’ attitudes, do prevail, even in well- 
established partnership organisations, and most intriguingly, even in non-unionised 
settings. As such these case studies should dissuade any commentator (sceptic and 
evangelist alike) from inferring that partnership constitutes an ideal-type, permanent
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resolution of the conflicts inherent in the “structured antagonism” of the 
employment relationship. Plainly, it is nothing of the sort, and nor should any 
serious commentator have imagined that it could ever have been.
Indeed, the value of examining partnership according to its central process, goal and 
outcome -  the development of mutual trust -  is, as I hope to have shown, that this 
provides an intellectually coherent, multi-faceted, flexible and precise prism through 
which to, firstly, research, then understand and even perhaps to predict what happens 
in a partnership.
Furthermore, trust’s dynamic essence, and the differing degrees of quality of trust, 
allow for the possibility of both weak and strong forms, positive and negative 
experiences, mutual success and unilateral betrayal. Trust is especially compelling 
because it is less than certainty, and so can entail considerable risk for participants. 
Trust is a commodity in perpetual flux; it needs to be constantly demonstrated and 
reinvigorated. And as it is deepened and strengthened, the terrible prospect of 
‘defection’ or betrayal both increases pressure on all parties to adhere to its 
strictures, while at the same time constrains otherwise fruitful options and 
opportunities. The fall-out from error or abuse is likely to be much worse than if one 
had not attempted to improve trust relations at all. However, the evidence here 
suggests that the gains to be had are considerable, and positive mutual trust was 
much preferred to adversarial conflict by all respondents.
There is then a fascinating, perhaps even fatal, paradox at the heart of partnership, 
and the nature of trust. Betrayal, and perhaps the destruction of either -  both rather 
fragile -  may unleash fresh aggression from the abused party who, having entered 
the relationship in good faith, will be expected to feel they have been duped. 
(Employees may become more militant; managers more belligerent and 
authoritarian.) As such, partnership has within it a potential boon for its Marxist 
critics. For if a hard-won ‘partnership’ does yield mutual trust, only for that trust to 
be undermined or destroyed, then one would expect the ensuing consciousness and 
anger to fuel antagonism toward the employer, and perhaps even renewed class­
conscious radicalism. For, after ‘partnership’ - as defined here - fails, what is left for 
managers, or trade unionists, to try?
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To conclude, with the distinctions of degrees of trust in mind it would seem prudent 
to recommend that advocates of partnership resist overly ambitious claims for what 
partnership can deliver. A modest, achievable and valuable outcome from 
partnership would be the establishment and sustainability of positive and efficient 
knowledge-based trust, and in more sophisticated and long-standing forms, 
relational-based trust.
A parting comment: ‘partnership’ perhaps suffers from the connotations that 
different constituencies associate with the word, and the concept. For the Left, it 
seems to infer “unions getting into bed with managers”, and a catastrophic 
compromise of integrity and power. For unitarist-minded managers the notion that 
there might be two (or more) distinct and potentially conflicting parties in the 
employment relationship is anathema to their optimistic exhortations for common 
goals and teamworking.
Perhaps then the principles and practices that constitute ‘partnership’ would be more 
widely adopted if they went under a more enticing, and less ideologically-loaded 
name... ‘High-trust management’ (HTM)?
Graham Dietz, February 19 2002; 
amended version completed, 26 July 2002.
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APPENDIX 1 -  KNOWN UK PARTNERSHIP ORGANISATIONS.
Private sector &  unionised
• Abbey Corrugated (non-unionised until 2001) • Hickson Fine Chemicals
•  Alstom Gas Turbines • HP Bulmers
• Anglian Water • ICI Quest International
•  AstraZeneca (Macclesfield site) • Iggesund Paperboard
• Baxi Partnership (was employee-owned, and • John Dewar & Sons
unionised) • John Heathcoat
• Birds’ Eye Walls (Humberside site) • Legal & General
• Blue Circle Cement • Lever Faberge
• BNFL (Springfields plant) • Leyland Trucks
• British Airways • Littlewoods
• British Gas Trading • Lloyds TSB
• Castle Cement • Midland Mainline
• Co-operative Bank • Northern Ireland Electricity
• Coca-Cola Schweppes (Wakefield plant) • Scottish Power (General Wholesale)
• ChiRex • Tesco
• Elementis Chromium • Thames Water
• Emhart Fastening Teknologies • Transco (Yorkshire operations)
• ‘EngineParts’ • UDV: United Distillers & Vintners
• ETOL • Unisys
• EWS: English Welsh & Scottish Railways • Vauxhall
• Fleet Support Services • Welsh Water
• GNER • ‘WhiskyCo’
Private sector &  non-unionised Public sector
• Appor (SME) • Birmingham Womens’ Hospital Trust
• Black & Decker • Defence and Aviation Repairs Agency
• Dutton Engineering (SME) • Ealing Hospital NHS Trust
• John Lewis Partnership (predominantly non- • Inland Revenue
unionised; employee-owned) ‘North West NHS Trust \
• Oldrid Group • Royal Shrewsbury Hospital NHS Trust
• Scott Bader Commonwealth (employee-owned) • South and East Belfast NHS Health and Social
•  ‘SchoolWear* (employee-owned SME) Services Trust
•  St Lukes’ Communications (employee-owned • Suffolk County Council
SME) • Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust
•  Trifast (not employee-owned)
• Zotefoams
There are many other organisations for whom partnership status has been claimed. I 
am aware o f  the following reported case studies, but I have not been able to verify 
whether the full complement o f  partnership practices is in operation. The entity 
claiming partnership status is provided in the square brackets:
3M [ACAS Wales], Anglia Rail [self], Anglian Water [self], AXA Insurance [TUC], 
BAe Systems (Filton) [TUC], Barclays Bank [self/ Unifi/ IRS], Barr & Stroud 
[T&GWU], Beneficial Bank [self/ IRS], Bristol City Council [TUC], British 
Bakeries [self/ TUC], Caradon [self/ IRS], Cellnet [IPA], CSC [self' MSF], Crown 
Prosecution Service [self], CSL [self/ ERS], Derbyshire Ambulance Service NHS 
Trust [self], DGAA Homelife [self/ IRS], Domnick Hunter [Knell/ DTI], East 
Midland Electricity [self/ IP A], Express Dairies [Humberside TEC], Gardner 
Merchant [self' GMB], GEHE UK [USDAW], Grattan Home Shopping [USDAW], 
Hays Montrose [GMB], H&R Johnson Tiles [self], Herga Electric [Knell/ DTI],
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Lancer Boss [self], Levi Strauss [GMB], LG Electronics [TUC; IDS], Litton 
Interconnection Products [Knell/ DTI], Michaelides & Bednash [Knell/ DTI], Miles’ 
[ACAS Wales], Monarch Aircraft Engineering [AEEU], NatWest [MSF], Nestle 
(York) [IPA], Nissan Yamoto Engineering [self/ IRS], North Yorkshire Ambulance 
Service NHS Trust [self/ IRS], Onyx [GMB], Peri-Dent [TUC], Playtex [TUC], 
Roadchef [GMB], Royal & Sun Alliance [self], Schlumberger Industries [self], 
Shelter [Knell/ DTI], Solaglas [GMB], Smithkline Beecham (Worthing site) [self/ 
IRS], Southampton Container Terminals [self/ ACAS], West Country Ambulance 
Service NHS Trust [self/ IRS] and Wm Morrisons Supermarkets [USDAW].
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APPENDIX 2 - U K  PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMMES (c. 1860 -  PRESENT).
KEY;
^  = indicates from  w here the main im petus fo r  the program m e came.
©  =  overall, o r  official, support.
©  =  genera l indifference, o r  a neutral stance.
©  =  overall, o r  official, hostility.
Where m ore than two fa c e s  appear, the unbracketed fa c e  indicates the predom in an t/ official view; the bracketed  fa c e  indicates a sign ifican t m inority, o r unofficial, view.
MAIN IMPETUS PARTNERSHIP
PROGRAMME
SUPPORT OPPOSITION/ INDIFFERENCE
STATE EMPLOYERS UNIONS EMPLOYEES STATE EMPLOYERS UNIONS STATE EMPLOYERS UNIONS
✓ Financial participation 
(1860-1914)
(©) © © ©
✓ Whitleyism
(1917-1919)
© (©) © ©
✓ M ond-Turner talks 
(1927-1929)
© ©/(©) © / ( © )
✓ ✓ ✓ Joint production committees 
(1940-1951)
(©) ( © ) © © ©
✓ Productivity bargaining 
(1960-1965)
(©) © / ( © ) © ©
✓ Donovan commission 
(1968)
© © ©
✓ Bullock committee 
(1977)
© © ©
✓ ✓ The ‘Social Contract’ 
(1975-1979)
© © © (©)
✓
(some TUs)
‘No-strike’ deals 
(1981-1988)
(©) © © ©
s/ ‘Partnership’
(1990-1997)
© © ©/(©) (©)
¥ ✓ ‘Partnership’
(1997-????)
© ( © ) © (©) © (©)
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APPENDIX 2 -  UK PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMMES (c. 1860 -  PRESENT).
PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME OUTCOME (cf. Ramsay, 1977)
Financial participation (1860-1914) Triviality: isolated and short-lived cases. No broad-based support: 
union hostility and employer indifference.
Whitleyism (1917-1919) Instability: broad-based support fo r  a brief period, but abandoned 
after employers ’pressure.
Mond-Turner talks (1927-1929) Triviality an isolated and short-lived initiative. Abandoned fo r  lack o f  
support from both unions and employers.
Joint production committees (1940-1951) Instability: broad-based support fo r  a briefperiod, but abandoned fo r  
lack o f  support from unions and employers.
Productivity bargaining (1960-1965) Triviality isolated and short-lived cases. No broad-based support: 
union hostility, employer enthusiasm waned after apparent failure o f  
schemes.
Donovan commission (1968) Triviality dismissed as impractical or unattractive by both unions and 
employers.
Bullock committee (1977) Triviality dismissed as impractical or unattractive by both unions and 
employers, and the State.
The ‘Social Contract’ (1975-1979) Instability: broad-based support fo r  a brief period, but collapsed in 
the face o f  resurgent union militancy.
‘No-strike’ deals (1981-1988) Triviality: isolated and short-lived cases. No broad-based support: 
considerable union hostility, employer indifference.
‘Partnership’ (1990-1997) Triviality: isolated and short-lived cases. No broad-based support: 
employer indifference, State hostility.
‘Partnership’ (1997-????) ? Broad-based support, especially among (most) unions and the State. 
Considerable employer wariness; also from  the State.
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